

JPRS-UPA-89-070
29 DECEMBER 1989



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-070

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29 December 1989

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CPSU Support of Federation, Objections to Confederation Detailed

90UN0437A Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 18,
Sep 89 pp 12-15

[Article by A. Kolesnikov: "Federation or Confederation: Historic Choice"]

[Text] In accordance with a decree of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the draft CPSU platform "The Party's Nationalities Policy Under Present-Day Conditions" will be discussed at the upcoming plenum. Consistently defending the Leninist principle of national self-determination, the CPSU sees its primary political task as providing, through a renewed federation, by giving it a real political and economic content, for the satisfaction of the diverse requirements of all Soviet nations, so that each of them may acquire broad possibilities for improving its economy and culture. Why do we prefer a federation to a confederation? The following article helps understand that.

The magazine ISKUSTVO KINO (No 6, 1989) published A. Kabakov's screenplay "Nevozvrashchenets" [The Man Who Did Not Return]. The author, as it seems to him, paints the picture of our possible not-so-distant future in bold colors: "The transistor radio squawked and wheezed: '...the capital of the Estonian republic. Hello, dear Russian friends! We are reporting the news. Yesterday there were disturbances in a camp for interned citizens of Russia. The federal police took action. In the Baltic Federation Parliament, the deputy from Koenigsberg, Mr. Chernov, made an inquiry....'"

We shall not try to guess whether things will turn out that way or not. But the fact that conjectures of that sort are arising is itself extremely alarming. So one feels like saying: "We've really sunk far!" In the joyous April of 1985, full of hopes for the success of restructuring, it is hardly likely that anyone could have predicted that one of the most acute problems of society's democratic development would become the question of the form of the USSR's national-state structure. Yet disputes over confederation and federation are becoming more and more bitter and are leading to an obvious polarization of opinions: Some people support the idea of a strong federation, while others propose confederal principles of structuring the USSR as a means of resolving the nationalities question.

It is not just in literature that distressing forecasts are being expressed. They have already penetrated a number of official documents of democratic movements. In their appeal to the First Congress of People's Deputies, the participants in a republic rally of working people that was held in Tallinn on 23 May 1989 warned that the idea of confederation contained a destructive charge and could lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fear for the integrity of the state was heard in the speeches of many deputies at the congress and in the session, and an "anticonfederal" position formed the basis of the platform presented by the United Council of Estonian SSR

Labor Collectives for the CPSU Central Committee's plenum on internationality relations.

It is noteworthy that the question of national-state structure intersects with the problem of internationality relations that has currently become so exacerbated, and that it is connected, in particular, with the resolution of the fate of national minorities in the union republics. There is another aspect of the problem, as well: the question of the observance of elementary human rights, regardless of a person's nationality, and of the legislative resolution of conflicts and contradictions between all-union laws and republic legislative acts.

The time has passed when social and political phenomena could be painted without qualification in a single color, freed of half-tones and shadows: such-and-such is "white," and such-and-such is "black." Political life is far more multicolored, and therefore it is impossible to say categorically that the "confederalists" are invariably "ill-intentioned" and that the "federalists" are "good," or vice-versa. The idea of republic cost-accounting, which seemed highly confederal, has been endorsed by the state's supreme legislative body for the simple reason that cost accounting is supposed to lead the country out of economic crisis. However, there remain political (the means of relations between the union and the republics) and legal questions.

The Baltic parliamentarians who signed the declaration by USSR people's deputies favoring radical restructuring that was distributed as an official document of the Congress are right in insisting that the original concept of the union absolutely must be restored. However, in this connection there is already a built-in contradiction in their position: the union in its original form was based on the principles of federation, not confederation. The USSR was based on the treaty on the unification into a single union state of the soviet socialist republics that adopted the decision to form the USSR in their official congresses. The declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the USSR that were ratified 30 December 1922 by the First USSR Congress of Soviets proved in a theoretical sense to be compromise constitutional acts of a sort. In them federation as the form of national-state structure that was fully optimal from a political and economic standpoint was opposed to the "centralist" position, which proposed the creation of an essentially unitary state, as well as to the position of the confederalists, which reduced to naught the principle of the unity of the republics making up the union. V.I. Lenin wrote: "We recognize ourselves as equals of the Ukrainian SSR etc. and, at the same time, enter on an equal basis with them into a new union, a new federation, the 'Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia'....It is important that we not provide fuel to the 'pro-independence' forces and not destroy the republics' independence, but create yet a new stage, a federation of equal republics (V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 45, pp 211-212). It is perfectly obvious that a confederation was regarded as a more archaic form of

national-state structure, a stage that historically and logically preceded that of federation.

Such an interpretation of the significance of a confederation for resolving the nationalities question was not the invention of Marxism. Russian bourgeois theorists of the state took an extremely wary attitude toward a confederal structure. In their extensive works, "Teoriya federalizma" [Theory of Federalism] and "Teoriya soyuznogo gosudarstva" [Theory of the Union State], which came out long before the revolution, the scholars Yashchenko and Zhilin viewed a confederation as an outmoded form of state structure.

The historical context in which the Soviet federation began its existence was in many respects similar to the present political situation. In particular, one reason for the creation of a federal state was the impossibility in those years of reviving the economy if the republics existed separately. History is repeating itself in different circumstances and at a higher level in the spiral of social development. This must immediately be qualified with the observation that it is precisely the concrete historical situation that dictates the course for resolving the question of a country's national-state structure. Here it is necessary to take fully into account, according to Lenin, which historical era a country is going through, and what the **concrete** features of the nationalities question and national movements of the **given** country are in a **given** era.

If we hypothesize that a confederation represents the path that is capable under the conditions of restructuring of leading to the flourishing of the union and of each of its hypothetical constituent subjects of confederation, we must first of all substantiate the advantages of this form over that of a federation. The first thing that comes to one's attention is the striking discrepancy between the economic potentials of, say, Estonia and Uzbekistan. For reasons of a political, national and even geographical nature, the inequality of those republics in the imagined confederal union would become even greater.

All steps taken along a constructive course, the course of restructuring, are aimed at activating the principles of the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR, principles which have become ossified through no fault of their own and which, in "working" condition, are capable of satisfying the needs of the most exacting "confederalist":

"—the Union is the voluntary association of equal peoples:

—each republic is guaranteed the right to freely secede from the union."

Genuinely **equal** peoples that have genuinely **voluntarily** united are capable of existing within the framework of a federal structure.

In the opinion of a number of people's deputies who support the idea of a confederation, relations among the union republics should be based on intergovernmental

treaties. However, in order to implement that idea it would be necessary, to all intents and purposes, to dismantle the entire building of the union and annul the 1922 treaty and the declaration on the Baltic republics' entry into the USSR.

A confederation in that form provides no guarantees whatsoever of the observance of the equality of nations and the preservation of equilibrium in rights between republics' indigenous populations and their so-called "migrants." A confederal structure presupposes the existence of a veto right on issues affecting the interests of a union republic. This establishes the priority of republic laws over all-union laws. The republics thereby shield themselves against any constructive oversight whatsoever over the state of legality in the broad sense of that word within their own territories. For example, the well-known Estonian SSR Law on Emigration, the fundamental provisions of which are at odds with the norms of international law, would remain effectively outside the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Oversight Committee. Not a single agency, whether it be a "general confederal" or republic agency, would be able to intervene and revoke the establishment of citizenship in a republic based on qualifications of language and residence, or the granting of enterprises the right to fire an employee for inadequate knowledge of the state language, that is, in connection with his lack of fitness for his job (!), or in connection with his inadequate qualification for the work performed (Explanations for the Establishment of Requirements for the Mastery of Language in Ministries, State Committees, etc. Approved by the Estonian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Central Council of Trade Unions, 31 May 1989, No 2/22).

Laws on republic citizenship and language, which seemingly regulate a fairly narrow area of societal relations and are important in a certain sense for the restoration of historic justice, violate fundamental human rights—the rights to work, housing, education, free movement and social security.

Theoreticians of the new structure of the union view Western models as possessing a kind of ideal nature, from which one must copy everything down to the smallest details, while also giving the picture a local coloring. Yet a look at that nature reveals a mass of specific features in the regulation of questions of national-state structure in the bourgeois democratic countries. First of all, even the subjects of federations there for the most part do not possess the sovereignty and status of states [gosudarstva]. There are no limitations on entry onto the territory of states [shtaty], lands, etc.—freedom of movement is guaranteed without any qualifications whatsoever. In West Germany federal law takes priority over the law of the lands (Art 31 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). Moreover, the norms of international law crown the legislative pyramid and have unconditional priority over official laws (Art 25); and in both the FRG (Articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution) and the United States (Section 10,

Article 1), dualistic federalism—the strict delimitation of spheres of jurisdiction of the federation (the union) and the subjects of the federation (the states and the lands)—is a fundamental constitutional principle. Centralistic tendencies remain under the protection of legal paragraphs and become a reality outside the boundaries of legal acts in practical politics. In accordance with the U.S. Constitution, the states, for example, may not enter into international alliances, conclude international treaties, or mint money. Our advocates of regional currency try not to notice that.

The facts indicate that the **"Baltic-style" confederal model has a strong admixture of nationalism and leaves nothing whatsoever remaining of the Leninist principle concerning the need to unconditionally prohibit any one nation's having privileges.** It is precisely nationalism that brings out separatist tendencies and the desire not only for such a form of confederation, but for separation from the union. No one intends to take away the right to freely secede from the USSR; however, nor has anyone granted the right to say that "on the original land of one nation there cannot be equality among all nations" (the newspaper VPERED [Forward], 28 February 1989). Inequality strips bare the significance of the very right to self-determination. It would be possible to speak seriously of a full-fledged confederation only when symmetry and equilibrium were preserved not only in inter-republic relations but in relations among nations within the republics. As we have shown above, so far there are virtually no legislative guarantees of the preservation of equality in the republics. For the normal existence of both a federation and a confederation under socialism, there must be equality among the subjects of those forms of national-state structure.

Both a republic monetary system and a republic army belong to the attributes of a confederation. If there are serious arguments along economic lines for establishing a republic currency, from the same standpoint it is hardly possible, taking into account the situation of the Baltic republics, or for that matter of any other republics, to justify the confederal principle for organizing the armed forces.

Let us note that in a legal sense a union of confederal states cannot be viewed as a unified state. A state-and-legal association of several sovereign countries represents a federation—a union state. A confederation, on the other hand, is a union of states that are not united "under the roof" of a single state. Weaker economic and political ties, relatively speaking, with the center and among the republics are also in keeping with the legal status of a confederation.

State formations, moreover, may also be of a mixed nature: both confederal and federal principles of national-state construction coexist with one another in one proportion or another. Under certain historical conditions, this mixture of attributes may play a positive role—a federation may remain full-fledged even when it is "diluted" with elements of confederation.

Contrary to the opinion that is being instilled in people's minds concerning the creative potential of a confederation, let us note that the very existence of a confederal mechanism now belongs to the history of state and law. The new model of a confederation appears practically in a vacuum. **According to strictly legal canons, at the present time there is not a single confederation in the world.** The classic model, Switzerland, which serves as a kind of beacon and inspirational example in more than the area of national-state structure, was a confederation only until 1848. The German Confederation existed 50 years, from 1815 until 1866. A confederation in America existed for 11 years, from 1776 until 1787.

In order to introduce an ultimately purely theoretical clarity, without judgments and authorial intrusions, into the question of the differences between a confederation and a federation, let us indicate at least eight attributes distinguishing these two forms. To do so, we shall partly sum up what has already been said.

1. A confederation is formed by the adoption of a treaty. A federation is formed by the same means, but its emergence, as a rule, is accompanied by the proclamation of a constitution.
2. A confederation is a union of independent states that do not form a new state. A federation is a union state.
3. Within the framework of a federation there exists a common territory that is created as the result of the unification of the sovereign states making it up. In a confederation there is no common territory. There is the divided sum of the individual territories of each state.
4. Union citizenship is characteristic of a federation; in confederations there is no single citizenship.
5. Under a federal structure there are a supreme body of state authority and a government. In confederations there also exists a kind of common state agency, which nonetheless is incomparable in its jurisdiction to a federal parliament or government.
6. General federal laws are binding throughout a state's entire territory. In confederations there exists a right of nullification, whereby the supreme state agency of a given subject of confederation may abrogate the decision of the common confederal body of authority.
7. A federation is characterized by a unified monetary and taxation system, which is not characteristic of a confederation.
8. Finally, a federation possesses unified armed forces. In a confederation, each subject has its own army, joined to the others by a common command.

The search for a way out of an impasse always leads to a rational compromise, a "golden mean," which is currently seen in the creation of a new type of national-state centralism.

The formula of the new thinking in nationalities policy—strong center- strong republics—contains two equal items, the transposition of which does not change the meaning of this political equation: strong republics-strong center. The path toward the practical embodiment of this formula lies in the rational expansion of the republics' rights on the constitutional level and the functioning of the federation on the basis of general consensus and consent on the fundamental aspects of interrepublic and internationality relations.

The strengthening of the republics' sovereignty and enhancement of the status of the autonomies and their real relative weight in state affairs should take place along the lines of a sharp change in the management of local affairs on the basis of the principles of citizens' self-government in the context of the utmost development of their initiative and the active participation in this process of public organizations and democratic movements. The law should keep pace with restructuring processes, which need legislative regulation and protection. Therefore, it is difficult to overestimate the role of all-union laws, in accordance with which the federal mechanism will operate. Among them one must include the law on the general principles of local self-government and the local economy, and the law codifying the restructuring of the management of the economy and the social sphere in the union republics, both of which laws are being drafted.

On the legislative level it is necessary to delimit the jurisdiction of the USSR and the union republics anew, for which the Supreme Soviet (with especially active participation by the Council of Nationalities) should work out the criteria for this delimitation, which guarantees the republics' sovereignty. This is the essence of the shift from bureaucratic centralism, which was justified by the need for centripetal, integration processes without actually taking the republics' specific national, ethnic, economic and geographical features into account, to democratic centralism.

In politics the positive action of the center will receive an equal response from the republics—that is when political co-operation is born. The more obvious the desire of the union to protect the republics' sovereignty within rational and unambiguously legally drawn limits becomes, the more confident the republics will feel within the framework of the federation, and the greater return there will be from the republics for the federation. That is what V.I. Lenin wrote about, having in mind the desire of peoples, including the Baltic peoples, for state unification with Soviet Russia (V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 25, pp 276-277, and Vol 40, p 44). But co-operation should be carried out in a situation of the sides' complete equality. For a "federation is a union of equals, a union requiring common consent" (V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 48, p 235).

In order to build a strong federation, it is by no means necessary to discover America in the almost literal

meaning of this phrase. There is no need to copy out the U.S. Constitution like students. It is much more useful to see that it was instituted for the formation "of a more perfect union," that is, the establishment of a federation in place of a weak confederation consisting of 13 states.

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Updated Flowchart of State Power

90UN0413A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 47, 25 Nov 89-1 Dec 89 p 8

[Reader's letter to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and response]

[Text] As an ordinary person, I would like to understand the structure of state power. Help me gain an understanding of this graphically

A. Isachenko, Novosibirsk.

The editorial staff receives very many letters like this one. Readers ask us to tell how the most important state bodies interact. Therefore, we decided to include a flowchart prepared on the basis of materials gathered by our correspondent A. Arkhipov. We hope that this will help our subscribers to gain an understanding of the "intricacies" of the mechanism of state power.

[See following page for above-mentioned chart]


Moscow Gorkom Official on Perestroika in Party

90UN0140A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Aleksey Bryachikhin by A. Kamenev: "Perestroika in the Party is Primarily an Issue of Power"]

[Text] One year from now, in October 1990, the 28th CPSU Congress will open. A debate is unfolding on what the party should be like, on problems of restructuring [perestroika] the forms and methods of party work. The 19th All-Union Party Conference directly raised the question that the party must give up functions which are not appropriate to it. A changeover has begun in the CPSU to political methods of leadership. But so far the process is slow. Why? This is the topic of today's "Political Dialogue" with Aleksey Mikhayevich Bryachikhin, first secretary of Moscow's Sevastopol Rayon CPSU Committee and member of the Moscow City Party Committee bureau.

[Kamenev] Aleksey Mikhayevich, let us begin by reiterating that the time of cozy, nonaccountable governance of party agencies has passed. Party committees seem to be at a loss what to do, how to work. And what do we mean by "political leadership"? And now the informals are getting more political and adding fat to the fire; demonstrations, rallies, strikes and fasting have become facts of life. However, you will probably agree that so far there have been no radical changes in party forms, methods and functions. So they really are at a loss?



[Bryachikhin] First, let us ask who the party apparat are: political functionaries or... clerks? What do they do? Are they agitators, propagandists and ideologists who take the party line to the masses or party hacks? What are their functions? And why are various complaints addressed to instructors rather than to members of elected party bodies, including when, for instance, we avoid political debate? On the one hand it is fair, on the other hand it is a displacement of functions. Hence the bewilderment.

Although this assessment might seem offensive—after all, we are supposed to be the “formals” while they are the “informals”—but it contains a deeper meaning and an element of subtlety on the part of those who invented the term.

It is not that we are working less, but our methods remain formal and boring. Today perestroika, glasnost and democratization have aroused people, who hold emotional rallies and engage in sharp, concerned debates. Most important, there is no formalism, because they are, after all, **not organized**. They are utterly frank. Unusual? So get used to it. Without this we will never have the feedback without which we have become so formalized, which we talk about so much but refuse to accept, although we understand that without it our entire

political system cannot function effectively and our economy will never get out of its crisis.

It is also obvious that our completely authoritarian and administrative management system is patently not progressive and therefore simply rejected by people. And the informals actively rebelling against its remaining, but still strong, positions are one of the tangible results of the politicalization of society and the processes which are pursued more actively in the political system than in the economic system or the party itself.

[Kamenev] There are also quite a few communists among the informals. It's no secret that thanks to their activity at rallies and in the press many of them won seats in the spring elections of people's deputies. This gives rise to a serious question: a communist in an informal, public movement. Some would even have them punished. Here is a document I have read: “To consider association with organizations opposing the party and aimed at subverting the unity of society as being incompatible with membership of the CPSU...”

[Bryachikhin] The legitimacy of the quoted document is doubtful, if only because even the current CPSU Rules allow communists to uphold their viewpoints right up to the Central Committee level. No, I can't agree with such a measure. Let us consider why would a communist feel compelled to join an informal association? Are there

adequate conditions for expressing one's opinion in the primary party organization, at the rayon or city level, in fact in the party as a whole? Well, if we shun them, if we try to intimidate them, nothing useful will be gained: We will lose feedback, we will lose touch of people.

Look what's happening: Communists have joined and head many informal movements. Whom do people listen to at rallies? To communists! Are they speaking against the party? No, they are against the administrative, apparat system of management. Yes, the people have woken up; that is a real step in the democratization of our life, it is a healthy movement within our society, and we must view it objectively and reasonably, not brush it off or apply labels, but listen attentively to the processes taking place and find ways of cooperation, not confrontation. There is nothing to be afraid of, though that is the case in some party committees. Indeed, they are not very comfortable customers, but the present time isn't very comfortable either.

In our rayon there is a "Democratic Perestroyka" club, there are "Communists for Perestroyka," there is an interclub party group for which, incidentally, the raykom caught it hard. I frequently attend their meetings and hear their arguments and discussions about, say, the party's role in society, about its prestige. I see nothing unacceptable if our interclub party group draws up an alternative draft platform for our party organization to present at the elections to local soviets. And let "Democratic Perestroyka" do some work. Jointly we can work out the best from several variants.

[Kamenev] The time for rallies is already passing, it's time to act.

[Bryachikhin] Indeed, the time has come to deal with specific issues, including that of power. If the CPSU is really a vanguard party, a leader party, it, or more precisely, all of us communists, must prove our right to that role. And if we are not truly leaders in the fullest sense of the word and don't strive for effective results, if we don't head the popular movement in perestroyka, we will have no authority. Because authority, the right to a vanguard role, is not a constitutional guarantee, like, say, the right to education or work. A statement in the constitution is but an act of formalization, a declaration; the vanguard role is an actual state of affairs.

Since we are speaking here of the problem of the party, of democratization and intraparty perestroyka I will say frankly—in fact, you know it yourself—that so far we are obviously lagging behind. How do I explain this? There is only one explanation: the party is too omnivorous. Specifically, having proclaimed perestroyka, the party has failed to conceptualize it for itself. The issue of "the party versus society" still remains open.

[Kamenev] You say that the party launched perestroyka. But the party consists of individuals. And perestroyka, I am convinced, was initiated by its best forces. And it is individuals, not the party as a whole, who are to blame for the fact that perestroyka is advancing with such

difficulty. It has now become habitual to praise the party in general while criticizing individuals.

[Bryachikhin] There is no contradiction here. There is, if you wish, a kind of apparatus game: point a finger at a specific communist while taking refuge behind the party. I feel that complaints to the party can only be addressed in one way, as regards specific issues in its rules, program or platform. When people criticize the party I think they have in mind not its political organization, but the party apparat, which has over many years rather successfully identified itself both with the party committee and the party as a whole. The only complaint that can be addressed to the party is its program: does it satisfy communists or not? The organization formulates its program and proposes something, but it's communists who implement it. Thus, a very fine program can be poorly implemented. So who is to blame, the party or the individual communists who failed to implement that program?

[Kamenev] But when we say that the party accepts responsibility for the situation in the country, in the economy, in the reform of the political system, don't we mean the correspondence of its program and platform to the aspirations of the people?

[Bryachikhin] Absolutely. But there is one aspect here: Since it is the ruling party it must, and I stress must, answer to the entire people. Because today, too, party decisions affect vital issues not only and not so much within the party itself as in the country as a whole. That is the main consideration. The issue has become especially acute today. I think that, wielding the levers of power, the party dealt with all and everything, without ever turning towards itself, becoming a rather conservative force. But then, could it have been otherwise?

I once counted: at the rayon level the leadership has to deal with 60 areas of work and sectors. Can you imagine? Construction, transportation, housing, bread, tree planting, vegetables for the winter, health care, law and order, culture... And so far the party committee is responsible for all this, whether at the rayon, city or Central Committee level... As long as I can remember myself I have been hearing talk that the party is minding the business of others, that it is necessary to separate functions, so to say leave unto Caesar what is Caesar's... But all this is at the discourse level. The reason, I am convinced, is the absence of a scientifically justified concept of political work and party leadership.

Look at what has happened and is happening. Economists have joined in working out a concept of economic reform. Incidentally, many have done this before: they formulated, proposed, wrote, often fought tooth and nail. But have any philosophers, political scientists or party theoreticians every tried to develop a concept of the party at the present stage? Our political scientists were busy not with formulating but with explaining various measures undertaken by the supreme party leadership. They made no predictions, no forecasts; all they

did was to juggle events to fit a general concept of socialism, changing it beyond recognition.

[Kamenev] But party agencies, including in your Sevastopol Raykom in Moscow, have carried out reorganization and established, let us call them, problem-analytical, conceptual structures...

[Bryachikhin] ...whose functions, alas, have remained the same, whatever the raykom departments may be called. So raykom and gorkom secretaries continue to oversee production sectors and public spheres. Yes those are functions of yesterday. But what are today's? Formulation of political programs and platforms? But power still hasn't been transferred to the soviets. Who will repair roofs? You understand, of course, that any country has to be governed.

There are three levers of power: personnel—who appoints and who dismisses; economic—supervising the economy through your own personnel and formulating economic (strategic and tactical) programs, also through your own personnel; the third lever is ideology, which reaches to the masses through the mass media. Whoever has them all in his hands has the power: shapes public consciousness, sets guidelines, places personnel as needed for the work in hand or his own interests. Today it's already obvious that the party is losing the personnel lever: even in party committees the party apparat is no longer always the sole decision-maker, and economic appointments are no longer always made by the party, or more precisely, the party committee, or even more precisely, the party apparat. It is my view that the party should not deal with specific economic matters either. Its business is to define the strategic line; then the government or economic agencies set up by the Supreme Soviet or local soviets should deal with questions of tactics. What is left is ideology—that is a purely party matter. But ideology in its true sense, not only, and not so much, as specific oversight of virtually all mass media outlets.

We must deal with party matters, which in pure form require daily and hourly attention. Questions of party purity, of getting rid of deadweight, recruiting fighter propagandists, raising commissars and leaders, and first and foremost, formulation of political programs and platforms, backing them up ideologically, improving the management of purely party matters—those are now the main tasks.

[Kamenev] True enough, the question of transferring power to the soviets is still only a proclaimed objective. It was raised rather timidly at the first Congress of Peoples Deputies, as well as at the second Supreme Soviet session, with nothing so far being said about the transfer mechanism.

[Bryachikhin] There have already been plenty of assessments of the congress and the session—contradictory and forthright, objective and subjective. It seems to me that our young parliament still can't get rid of a rally type mentality, depressingly few deputies reason and speak in a statesmanly way. Many continue to come to the

rostrum with their regional or professional problems. True, these are growing pains, a breaking out of old mental stereotypes and the very concepts of power. It is, of course, a pity that time is being wasted, but it will pass and the deputies will learn to single out priority problems on a national scale. People still have an urge to speak out, the country, society, and the party have accumulated too many painful and immediate issues. People were silent for too long. They preferred not to speak of internal party problems, or of problems of power, or of how the party was coping with its legalized vanguard role, and what it represented as a guiding force. Now, when preparations for the 28th Party Congress are beginning, when new party documents are being worked out, it is just the time to speak of all this. Incidentally, did you note the congress agenda proposed by the September Central Committee plenum?

[Kamenev] Of course. "On Perestroika and the Tasks of the Party. Report of the CPSU Central Committee." There hasn't been an agenda like it since, I think, the 22nd Congress. Usually there was only one question put up for discussion—if we can call it that—guidelines for the upcoming 5-year plan. It was to accommodate the 5-year plan periods that the regularity of congresses was changed from four to five years. You will agree that this did not contribute to the search for serious issues to be considered by congresses. They all traditionally dealt with economic problems, political issues were never raised, and there were, of course, no discussions of extraordinary turns in party affairs.

[Bryachikhin] Precisely. The entire party work was geared to that, to the idea that the economy was primary. Naturally, the party cannot abandon guidance of the economy. But how? So far I see no serious turns. I think we have now gone to another extreme: trying to emulate everything in the West, including political structures. But there the economy functions according to an evolved system and structure. Relations are different there, and the citizenry are different. We still have to raise a Citizen of the country. You know the cost of the huge losses caused by the strikes in the Kuzbas and Donbas: almost three billion rubles. That means that every one of us, infants included, were denied 10 rubles, which were given to them. Is that civic behavior, is that a solution to the question? I will tell you more: given the existing system of management with literally crazy centralism, strikes may simply become useful to local party and government agencies, helping them to resolve their local problems at the expense of the country, at the expense of you and me. But when a region goes over to cost accounting [khozraschet], when it will no longer be able to come begging to the government—which hasn't got anything as it is—will they strike then? I doubt it.

[Kamenev] You seem to be straying from my question about the party congress.

[Bryachikhin] On the contrary, I'm just getting to it. Well, the volume and level of discussion of internal party political problems at the forthcoming party congress will

depend, I am convinced, on what happens at the current and next year's sessions of the Supreme Soviet and the forthcoming 2nd Congress of People's Deputies; on how soon and how specifically the economy will start functioning, on how the question of power is resolved, in short, on how the roles are distributed. I, for one, consider that a great misunderstanding of the present moment is the absence of any clearcut policy and position, of a clearcut structure for running the country. The Supreme Soviet, government, party Central Committee, AUCCTU: what can and should they do in governing the country? How do these structures interrelate? The effectiveness of the party forum will depend on answers to these questions. We can adopt party rules, make significant changes in the program, or work out a new one directly connected with improving party work and its tasks, but in any case it will be seen through the prism of power: if the party does not have power in the present-day—I stress this—sense, if it remains as a political structure, it will base itself and its documents on this premise. If it wants to improve its power, it will organize its work and formulate its basic documents accordingly. And the debate at the congress will follow the appropriate channel...

[Kamenev] ...and the corp of delegates will form, or more precisely, be elected at the congress accordingly?

[Bryachikhin] Exactly. We must decide the functions for which we will be electing delegates.

[Kamenev] Incidentally, how are they to be elected?

[Bryachikhin] I don't know, though I think of it constantly. We will be offered a certain number of delegate seats...

[Kamenev] ...based on the number of seats in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses?

[Bryachikhin] Most likely. Should candidates be proposed by the raykom buro? But then it would be said that the apparat is nominating its own people. Should nominations be made in primary organizations? But what about small ones? And how should they be elected? By direct vote in precincts set up, say, by party raykoms? One thing is clear: the old multitiered system in which primary organizations nominated delegates to the rayon conference, who nominated on to city and oblast conferences, was the very same sieve that had aroused so many objections during the elections of people's deputies, when district meetings played the role of our conferences. Other flaws may be repeated. Once again the chances are that the winners could simply be the more vocal critics who advocate, say, a multiparty or factional system, and so on. But now many people understand the historic import of the moment sincerely, in a party and civic spirit? And how does one find them? I still maintain that delegates to the congress must be elected solely on the basis of functions assumed by the party. But the elections must be—and I will insist on this—on an alternative basis.

[Kamenev] But it is no secret that quite a few party functionaries have no wish to change the current functions of the party or the party apparat. I'm afraid that in some places the preparations for the local soviets elections and, later, for electing delegates to the party congress, will, instead of formulating and defending a rayon or city party organization's platform, be reduced to a hunt for protective barriers to block the informals, people who think differently, and to upholding the notorious principle of "one mandate - one candidate."

[Bryachikhin] Many generations of party functionaries have been reared on party functions that have evolved over 70 years. It is hardly surprising that quite a few view their activity only in that context. That is why at the September CC Plenum M.S. Gorbachev stressed the need to name and authorize people capable of advancing the cause of perestroika and unequivocally expressed the view that the preparations for the congress and the report- and-election campaign that precedes them would make it possible to substantially renovate the party leadership at all levels. Recall the April CC Plenum: there was a virtual onslaught from the right! Or take the statements made by some party leaders at the Congress of People's Deputies. Incidentally, at our latest plenum of the Moscow city party committee I also heard several statements with which I cannot agree: they seem totally out of touch with the present, they are out of the past. I fully agree that there are quite a few people among the leadership of party organizations of every level and rank who have essentially failed to keep up with the realities of present-day life and yearn for the old, wholly administrative system of management. They don't understand what is happening, that times have changed. So they often use the lofty rostrums not to discuss urgent problems, but to call for preserving the power they are losing. That is why they criticize the press. And their attitude towards the informals is unambiguous: scum, they say, and that's it. But the majority are different, the majority of the party are people who sincerely advocate perestroika and spare no effort for it.

[Kamenev] The majority is all very well, but there is also a minority of people in the party who are at least equally concerned with perestroika—not those whom you spoke of but active, we could call them radically minded communists. How can their rights be protected?

[Bryachikhin] Formally no one has ever denied the minority their rights. Yes, on the one hand there are the party rules, there is the program, and if a decision has been passed, then, dear comrades, let us implement it. But, on the other hand, the minority should not be hounded for having opinions of their own and for speaking out. The minority must have an unequivocal guarantee in the rules permitting them to defend their opinions. And if the rules and program are at variance with the processes taking place in the party and in society, if that is why the party has fallen back somewhat in its development, they must be changed, and we now say this openly. Today it is normal to hold differing views within the party and certainly not an indication of

factionalism. But here is what I think, moreover quite unequivocally. As of today we still haven't even fully utilized the party, our one-party system. Because if the party cannot, by itself, ensure its internal self-development and self-preservation it can neither develop nor exist. One of the laws of dialectics is the negation of negation, the struggle of opposites. We have suffered enough from the mindless show of unanimity. Different points of view manifest themselves in attitudes towards tactical issues and also, I would say, working elements. Juxtaposition of those different points of view, alternative programs and ways and means of resolving problems will only help in the search for optimal variants.

[Kamenev] I can't agree with you that the party is unable to ensure internal self-preservation. Look back at the twenty-year stagnation period: wasn't it a way of ensuring self-preservation, which led to self-destruction? But really, if there were differing views and groups in the party...

[Bryachikhin] But they always existed. Whether openly or not, but they were there! Khrushchev, after all, was overthrown by an opposition. Not because they disagreed with his tactical methods of reform. They were against the strategic reforms themselves, which were aimed at breaking down the administrative-command system. Brezhnev had no apparent opposition in the administrative-command elite, because they were quite satisfied with the system created under him: from its placidity, shadow economy and pervasive pilfering to expectations of the next medal due to be awarded for an upcoming jubilee, and the almost total indifference, which was hailed as patriotic unanimity. I read, I think in one of your materials, that the main privilege which the adherents of the apparat system refuse to give up today is that of irresponsibility, the privilege of decision-making with no responsibility for the results thereof. The establishment of such an artificial—or more precisely, artful—system was really some accomplishment! It doesn't make sense: there is the party and its Rules, which state that every communist can voice and uphold his point of view right up to the CC, but more often than not no one wants this! Why? On the one hand there is the rigidity of the rules, the requirement of unconditional support of all decisions adopted by the majority. Habitual administrative-command rigidity taught people not to display their emotions, forcing them to withdraw into themselves with the feeling that no one needs my opinion, all I can do in this system is follow orders. On the other hand people, rank-and-file—and not so-rank-and-file—communists began simply to be afraid. Over many years they have been taught to beware of labels and active opposition. So it is hardly surprising that communists did not seek to so to say officially voice their views.

[Kamenev] Actually, the need to launch a creative debate in the party doesn't have to be argued: it is already occurring. This summer a plenum of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom originated a debate in the Moscow party organization. What did it yield for you and your raykom?

[Bryachikhin] To tell the truth, so far not much. When we were debating the issue at the Moscow Gorkom buro and the plenum we had hoped for considerable involvement and significant proposals. After all, the questions were of perfecting party work. I can't speak for the city, the results so far haven't been summed up, but at our level we found that communists are simply not ready for such a debate. What should the debate be about? Functions? Power? But dependence is still strong: "We weren't told, the CC didn't suggest..." So go out and suggest something on your own! Discuss rights and duties. The debate was constantly sidetracked to economic rails and managerial problems. Party problems have been left on the back burner, they are rarely discussed, because it would mean discussing yourself, what kind of communist you are. It's a pity, of course, and I would prefer to be wrong, but so far our discussion has yielded nothing new in the creative aspect.

[Kamenev] Perhaps it was necessary to suggest not just a general outline of issues but, say, a draft of amendments to the Rules and Program.

[Bryachikhin] But who will prepare them? The same old apparat, which we so readily criticize today? The discussion would then be not about the proposals but about the fact that the apparat has again failed to do this or that, or done it badly. To begin with, we need proposals. That is what we asked for: Let's sum up and then discuss in detail, but alas... So I am so far not satisfied with the course of the debate. Of course, we could have counted on useful help from scholars. After all, our rayon houses the cream of the humanities institutes and almost the entire range of the Academy of Sciences' economic institutes. They comprise 19 authoritative research centers—the nation's brain trust—with almost 50 full and corresponding members of the Academy, almost 500 doctors and 4,000 candidates of science: a huge force. It would seem that they could easily suggest variants of a new system for managing societal development, which would also include thoughts on the development of party activity. But people still keep saying that it's all not right. So what is right? The fifth year is coming to an end, but there is still no answer.

All right. You also remember that until quite recently all many of them did was to wait for someone somewhere to say something so that they could immediately start looking for an allegedly scientific definition of what was said, write "scholarly" papers for which they could receive titles, awards and, of course, salaries. April 1985, it would seem, put an end to that: enough engaging in falsification. But today it is still not out of the ordinary to get paid for one thing and then go out and preach something entirely different in an informal movement. Where are the scientists dealing with the political aspects of perestroika, moreover in such a way as to embody them in their own scientific programs, and in what strategic direction? Where is the ideological support of what is happening? Those institutes could suggest how the country and the party should develop: this way in the economic sphere, here is a political program, here is an

ideological platform. Then the communists could discuss them, clarify, adopt. So far there are no such programs, while time is passing.

So here is what makes me wonder. How come that scholars voice bold thoughts and ideas at rallies and in the press, while their institutes, laboratories or sections keep working on very conventional issues? How do they manifest themselves and their civic stand at their place of work? It doesn't take that much. All one has to do is work honestly and seriously on one's job.

You may think I'm conservative, but I will tell you unequivocally: no elective body has worked, can or ever will work without an apparatus. There has occurred a shift in emphasis: since an elective body does not, in the final analysis, function on a permanent basis and merely gives advice and makes decisions, the work has to be done by a salaried apparatus, which little by little takes over all the power. With time this substitution evolved into management by the apparatus. Yesterday it was, and today it is, the party apparatus; tomorrow power will be transferred to the soviets, and it will be managed by the apparatus of the soviets. That is quite normal. And a time will come when the informal movements and organizations grow stronger, and they, too, will start setting up their apparatuses to, at the very least, manage their organizations, and I don't preclude that they will also start striving for power: don't think that socialism completely precludes this. The important thing is to distinguish between the apparatus as an administrative body and as the individuals working within it.

[Kamenev] Here I am, listening to you and wondering whether not only the communists of Sevastopol Rayon, but all its inhabitants as well know their party leader?

[Bryachikhin] I may sound overly self-confident, but I think they do. Not everyone, but many. Why? Because I attend various gatherings, I take part in debates and rallies, appear in the press and don't avoid televised meetings. I am not afraid of doing this: I have my stand, I voice it openly and am not afraid of expressing and defending it. You will agree that it is much harder for me as a party functionary than for, say, a writer, actor or economist, to gain political prestige, because they don't have to answer for failures in one sphere or another, they don't have to offer a positive, constructive program. All they have to do to gain instant popularity is raise some controversial issue. But a party functionary can't do that, he has no right. He must be answerable, make decisions, not just suggestions, which is why he is always under fire. Decisions are made not by those who criticize everyone and everything but by other people. And those other people must do the job. You must once again agree that people have been gaining popularity mostly for criticizing, not for being constructive. But it is necessary to go through this unstable period of growth, through the current stage of democratization.

The next "popularity test" will be the elections to the local soviets and later to the party congress. Last spring

I lost the election to academician Oleg Timofeyevich Bogomolov in, I am convinced, a normal electoral confrontation, though there were all kinds of things. This is real life and the current lessons of the struggle for power. All too frequently, instead of discussing the nomination of candidates for deputy, delegate or minister we start settling accounts, without thinking of issues or consequences. There are problems. But after all, we are setting up an entirely new system. Incidentally it is interesting to note the haste with which we criticize everything without really trying it out. So there were some flaws in the elections. But they were actually the very first in all the years of soviet government, so now we see what has to be corrected.

[Kamenev] The topic we initially defined is indeed boundless: the party has accumulated too many problems not only throughout the years of its existence, but in the last three or four years since the 27th CPSU Congress, which have to be discussed and settled during both the preparations for the 28th Congress and its deliberations. I would like to ask you a question which is sure to arise during this period. The question is: Nowadays, turning in one's party card is no longer so uncommon...

[Bryachikhin] You mean, are people resigning from the party? Yes, they are. For a variety of reasons. Moscow once campaigned to have a million communists in the ranks of the city party organization. There is no need to recount how that campaign was conducted. Anyone who overfulfilled his planned quota was accepted. True, intellectuals were sifted out so as not to exceed the notorious percentage rate. The consequences of that sifting are there. I know the latest figure for the city: 250 candidate members never became full members. Some were not recommended, others refused to join. In the Sevastopol Raykom 96 people dropped out. I see no tragedy in this. Some resign because they have lost faith—that happens, too. Pensioners resign: they have been deprived of their past and they don't understand today's movement. Workers resign. I think that in many ways this can be traced to the way they were admitted. But we must also recognize that quite a lot of deadweight has accumulated. After all, there were those who joined to enhance their careers or positions, but nowadays a party card is no guarantee of this. I regard the fact that over the entire postwar period the Moscow party organization, far from increasing, has been shrinking as indicative of the commencement of a process self-purging, a reassessment of values. But there is another thing, for which I have so far found no explanation: quite a few young researchers have been joining the party. That means there will be people on whom we can rely.

[Kamenev] But our's is a proletarian party.

[Bryachikhin] I would not like to set workers against intellectuals. At the Congress of People's Deputies someone declared that a professor would not speak out for worker interests. A professor will uphold national and popular interests, and are they any different from those of a working man? I repeat: A worker or peasant

should not be pushed forward merely because he is an honest, conscientious, hard-working person. A communist is, after all, a political fighter. It doesn't matter whether you are a worker or a scientist. Because of natural, and often manmade, difficulties, because of the actual and mythical decline in the party's prestige, it must restructure and regroup as a political organization which needs a new type of communist.

[Kamenev] I think that this issue will also be raised at the party forum, because it is not secondary. Let us hope that the congress will concentrate on examining, analyzing, forecasting internal party affairs, on which all government matters in large measure depend, and that all questions will be resolved. Including, and primarily, the question of power. We have had an interesting discussion. Thank you for it.

Armenian Official Details Progress in Handling Refugee Crisis

90US0180A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian 11 Oct 89 p 2

[Speech by Deputy V.M. Movsisyan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers, chairman of the Republic State Committee for the Agroindustrial Complex, on Fulfilling the Decrees of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Armenian Council of Ministers on Settling Refugees and on Additional Measures to Improve This Work, at the Extraordinary Session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Respected Comrade Deputies!

At the previous session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, the republic government reported briefly on the work being done with Armenian refugees who had left their permanent place of residence.

Allow me to report more thoroughly on the measures which have been taken over the past period by the party soviet and economic bodies, by the social and other organizations and by the entire republic population.

The events in the region and primarily the Sumgait crimes became the cause of mass flight and migration for the Armenian population.

At present, according to the data of the executive committees of the rayon and urban soviets, the total number of Armenian refugees which have arrived in the republic is over 213,000 persons, or about 56,000 families while the number of Azerbaijani who have left Armenia has reached 153,000.

The new wave of Armenian refugees arose on 17 August of the current year, when the Azerbaijan party press published a provocative, irresponsible and politically harmful appeal of the Baku intelligentsia to the people and this further exacerbated the interethnic relations and made a voluntary return impossible.

It is irritating that this "war cry" up to now has not been given a principled political assessment both in Azerbaijan and in the center. Just in the last month, over 17,000 refugees arrived in Armenia and from their evidence a policy of persecuting the Armenians continues in Baku, Kirovabad and other places.

The Buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in being deeply concerned with the fate of our compatriots recently appealed to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, insisting on the adoption of immediate and decisive measures to ensure the safety of the Armenians living in Azerbaijan.

It must be pointed out that from the very first days the refugees in Armenia were surrounded with the particular concern of our people. The Armenian people, regardless of their already difficult situation, have been ready to

extend a helping hand to our brothers. Although the catastrophic earthquake caused enormous harm and bled the republic white, further exacerbating the already acute problems of housing, food, the employment of the population and the social sphere, the party and soviet bodies and all the workers of the republic found it possible to welcome and provide for all the refugees arriving in the motherland. They were provided with all of the necessary financial, material and other aid, and opportunities were created for the school children and students to continue their studies. They have already been provided with aid totaling 41 million rubles.

The Armenian CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the republic government are continuing to do everything to normalize the situation in the region and to settle the questions of housing and the social problems of the refugees.

For this purpose from the representatives of the republic party, the soviet, law enforcement and economic bodies as well as the public organizations republic and inter-republic commissions have been organized on refugee questions and an administration under the Council of Ministers has been established. The implementing of this work on the spot has been assigned to the executive committees of the urban and rayon soviets.

In accord with the decree adopted in 1989 of the USSR Council of Ministers, we have taken measures to assist the voluntary return of citizens to their permanent residence and ensure their safety.

Proceeding from the fact that an absolute majority of the refugees categorically refused to return to their former residences, in justifying this by the fact that their security was not guaranteed, work has been done to solve the questions of their permanent residence, job placement and sociodomic problems.

Due to the measures taken, some 108,000 persons, or 27,000 families, have already exchanged or have acquired houses and apartments and 38,000 persons have found jobs. The question of pension support has been settled for 21,500 refugees.

The remaining refugees have been placed temporarily in hotels, boarding houses, vacations homes and dormitories in various cities and rayons of the republic and have found shelter with their relatives and acquaintances. Actually, as of now not a single refugee has been left without shelter.

However, it would be naive to assume that this exceptionally complicated problem is close to being solved. Actually, only the first steps have been taken. Suffice it to point out that as of now the questions of providing housing for 105,000 persons, jobs for more than 50,000 able-bodied citizens and many other vital problems have not been solved.

There are rather major difficulties particularly in settling the housing problem of the refugees. You are aware that

the housing problem in the republic is already extremely difficult. Actually, 514,000 persons in the disaster zone were left without shelter while 345,000 citizens for long years have been waiting their turn for apartments. Naturally, at present, the question of providing apartments for refugees from the state housing supplies is an unsolvable problem. It must be said that a majority of refugees has shown proper understanding of this problem. Everyone must consider this difficult reality. Consequently, under such conditions the republic government is seeking out realistic approaches to carry out this complex task.

In considering that the most obvious and realistic way out is in an exchange of apartments and houses, any sort of exchange in housing has been permitted even the exchanging of private houses for state apartments.

In the city of Yerevan the refugees have been permitted to purchase private homes as well as cooperative apartments regardless of the presence and form of a residence permit. In exchanging an apartment in Yerevan, the standard of housing area per refugee family member has been set at at least 5 m² instead of the current 9 m².

It must be pointed out that the question of exchanging housing due to the fault of a number of the local bodies in the neighboring republic has gone on slowly and artificial obstacles and farfetched restrictions have been encountered.

This work is also impeded by the circumstance that a majority of the urban population which has moved into the republic does not wish to live in a rural locality. In Vardenisskiy, Amasiyskiy, Kafanskiy, Gorisskiy, Kalininskiy, Yekhegnadzorskiy and other rayons, the number of vacant homes exceeds 7,000. The arguments of the urban refugees are quite understandable, particularly the former residents of Baku, when they refuse to live permanently in these homes. However, before creating the appropriate opportunities for them in more convenient places, the refusal to live temporarily in these houses and the proposing of categorical demands are scarcely sound and reasonable.

For this reason, the executive committees of the rayon soviets must within the shortest time put the vacant houses in order and prepare them for occupancy. The republic government has instructed the Gosplan, the Gossnab [State Supply Committee] and the Gosagroprom [State Committee for the Agroindustrial Complex] to make available the appropriate funds and materials for carrying out this work.

Another realistic way to solve the housing problem of the refugees is to have them build individual housing.

The Commission for Refugee Affairs which was set up at the previous session of the republic Supreme Soviet on 15 August 1989 adopted a decision that the refugees who are registered and have residence permits in all the republic rayons and who voice a desire to build individual houses are to be given the appropriate plots of

land and long-term low-interest loans have been made available. Over the past short period, for this purpose, already over 300 hectares have been provided, including in the rayons of the Ararat Valley. Long-term credits totaling 5 million rubles have already been made available for the building of individual houses by the refugees in Bagramyanskiy and Razdanskiy Rayons. This work is continuing.

However, a number of executive committees of the urban and rayon soviets has shown an irresponsible attitude toward the question of providing land, they create red tape and allow a bureaucratic approach. As of now, Araratskiy, Artashatskiy, Echmiadzinskiy, Kalininskiy, Sevanskiy and other rayons have not submitted the documents on the confiscating of land.

The Commission of the Council of Ministers on these questions, the Administration for Refugee Affairs and the corresponding service of the Gosagroprom have not shown proper exactingness on this important matter.

It is essential that the executive committees of the rayon and urban soviets and the Gosagroprom prior to 1 October complete the work of allocating land for building individual housing and organize concrete help to the refugees in providing plans, credits and building materials.

The republic government has instructed the Armenian Ministry of Finances, the savings bank, the Gosplan, the Gosagroprom, Aykoop [Armenian Cooperative Movement] and the Ministry of Trade to fully satisfy the need for loans and building materials.

The state of supplying building materials causes serious concern. The Armstroyaterial [Armenian Building Material] Production Association (L. Makaryan) has not imposed proper order in increasing building materials production, let alone in their sales. There have been numerous instances of speculating in building materials, major violations of funding discipline and other abuses. All of this has occurred with the connivance of the executive committees of the rayon soviets, the people's control bodies and the law enforcement bodies.

The republic government considers one other area for resolving the housing problem for refugees to be the organizing of housing construction cooperatives for 30,000 families in the towns of Abovyan, Razdan, Charentsavan, the rayon center of Bagramyanskiy Rayon as well as in Ashtarakskiy, Araratskiy and Abovyan Rayons. The government has approved a temporary regulation on organizing such cooperatives and has instructed the executive committees of the corresponding urban and rayon soviets to immediately set to this work.

Even now, some 4,517 families have stated their desire to become shareholders in cooperative apartments. This work is continuing. But here there has also been irresponsibility and an indifferent attitude. The executive committees of the Araratskiy, Ashtarakskiy Rayon

Soviets, the Charentsavan and Razdan Urban Soviets have done virtually nothing in this regard. The republic Gosstroy (deputy chairman, A. Aleksanyan) and its corresponding design institutes have still not completed the work on selecting the sites for cooperative construction in the designated towns and rayons, drawing up general layouts and plans and working out the design and estimate specifications. The Republic Gosplan (A. Terlsrayelyan) has still not carried out the assignment of including the volume of cooperative construction in the 1990 State Plan or assigning the contracting organizations. Delay in this matter is impossible and the republic Gosplan, Gosstroy and Gosagroprom in a short period of time should provide a final resolution to these questions. The executive committees of the rayon and urban soviets and the administration for refugee affairs under the Council of Ministers should put an end to the slowness and red tape in organizing the cooperatives, impose proper order as well as intensify and supervise this work.

Finally, in the aim of providing the refugees with housing, the republic government in its decree of 17 July of the current year has instructed the executive committees of the Leninakan, Kirovakan, Spitak and Stepanavan Urban Soviets, the organization leaders responsible for construction and reconstruction in the disaster zone to hire refugees, to settle the question of their permanent residence permit and conclude a contract with them for providing housing. A good deal in this area has been done by the executive committees of the Spitak and Stepanavan Town Soviets as well as the Gugarkskiy, Kalininskiy and other rayon soviets. Some 2,500 refugees have already been hired for reconstruction work and have a contract to receive apartments. Regardless of all of this, there are significant difficulties in the area of residence permits and job placement for the refugees. Over 50,000 able-bodied refugees are not involved in socially useful labor and over 46,000 people have no permits at all.

After reviewing this question at the previous session of the republic Supreme Soviet, the Armenian CP Central Committee and the government revised the decree of the Armenian Council of Ministers of 10 February of the current year in the aim of eliminating the restrictions on the questions of job placement and residence permits.

In amending the designated decree, it was decided along with the remaining republic rayons to grant residence permits to refugees in Abovianskiy, Araratskiy, Artashatskiy, Ashtarakskiy, Masisskiy, Nairiyskiy, Oktembrianskiy and Echmiadzinskiy Rayons as well as in the towns of Abovyan, Ararat, Artashat, Ashtarak, Oktembryan, Razdan, Charentsavan and Echmiadzin for housing area of apartment renters and homeowners with their agreement. At the same time, it was decided that all republic enterprises and institutions would be allowed to hire refugees regardless of the presence of a residence permit and its form, with the exception of the city of Yerevan, where they can be hired with a permanent or temporary permit in the suburban zone.

However, a number of executive committees of the rayon and urban soviets, their internal affairs departments and the executive committees of the settlement and rural soviets without any grounds have delayed in drawing up the files for residence permits issued to refugees, justifying this by the illegality of one or another document or peace of information, forgetting that the refugees are already the consequence of committed cruel illegal actions.

The republic Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] (I. Semenov) and the executive committees of the rayon and urban soviets are not showing involved concern on the question of rapid job placement for the refugees. We can no longer tolerate such an attitude and the republic government will give a principled assessment of the conduct by such leaders.

The republic government has instructed the executive committees of the urban and rayon soviets, the Armenian Gosplan, the Gosagroprom, the Ministries of Local and Light Industries as well as other republic departments to draw up proposals to establish affiliates of enterprises or cooperatives in the villages inhabited by refugees so that these be in operation beginning in the second half of 1990. For these purposes they will use both prefabricated modules as well as vacated production buildings and ca

The republic government has issued a special assignment to the Ministry of Health to organize outpatient services for all refugees, to immediately reestablish the medical stations and services in areas where concentrated numbers of them live as well as open up similar stations in the boarding houses, dormitories and other areas of mass residence of the refugees. This work is being carried out but slowly. The Armenian Ministry of Health (A. Aznauryan) should intensify this work so that no person remain without complete medical aid.

Serious tasks also confront the Republic Ministry of Public Education. The ministry, the executive committees of the rayon and urban soviets and the republic Gosplan have been ordered to enroll all the refugee children in the educational process. The executive committees of the rayon soviets and the labor collectives should supply the children with a free school uniform, textbooks and writing supplies, and in population points where there are no schools the children are to be bused to school and back on specially assigned buses.

Definite work has been done to settle the questions of keeping the uninterrupted period of employment for the pension support of refugees, for providing them with one-shot aid and granting assistance under state social security and other social security questions even up to allowing the Ministry of Social Security even in the absence of the necessary documents to provide the refugees with a minimum pension at their actual residence. The Ministry of Social Security (N. Balayan) should carry out the specific work for obtaining the refugee pension records from Azerbaijan and accelerate

the drawing up of the files which are in the works so that all the pension-age refugees within a few days are able to obtain both their ordinary and benefit pension.

Together with the republic Veterans' Council, it is essential to pay exceptional attention to resolving the socioeconomic questions for the disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War and the disabled workers in immediately submitting to the Armenian Council of Ministers proposals on questions requiring a government action.

The republic Council of Ministers has instructed the Gosplan (S. Nazinyan) and the Gosagroprom (R. Chiftalyan) in the villages inhabited by refugees to give priority to resolving the question of central gas supply, water supply and telephone as well as organizing trade facilities and utility-domestic services.

The Aykoop (M. Muradyan), the Ministry of Trade (R. Sukhudyan) and the executive committees of the urban soviets must thoroughly revise the situation in trade services for the refugees and fundamentally improve their supply with industrial goods and foodstuffs. The Gosplan (M. Mkrtchyan) should immediately allocate additional resources for these purposes.

The work of the interrepublic commission showed that in the range of socioeconomic questions of the refugees there are many problems a solution to which will require the intervention of the USSR government. It is a question of providing compensation for the value of the individual and state housing and apartments as well as the damage caused to personal property, the providing of one-shot aid and preferential pensions, the organized transporting of household goods and property as well as other unsolved questions.

These problems were thoroughly described at a joint session of the bureau members of the Central Committees of the communist parties of the two republics at the CPSU Central Committee. The CPSU Central Committee ordered the USSR government to quickly review and resolve the listed problems.

The republic government has drawn up specific proposals to solve these problems and these have been submitted to the Union government.

In considering that our republic has basically received citizens living in state apartments, we have proposed that the refugees receive compensation for their value in cash in accord with the estimated value of the apartments. The value of the unsold or unexchanged private homes, including self-standing structures, garden huts and other structures should be repaid fully by state insurance with the agreement of the homeowners.

It has also been proposed that at the demand of the shareholder in a construction cooperative, the share which he has paid should be returned in full. For compensating for damage to personal property, a proposal was made to pay out to individual citizens 2,000

rubles, 3,000 rubles to families of two persons and 500 rubles for each following family member.

The amount of the one-shot aid has been proposed as the total earnings over 3 months figuring up to 200 rubles for each month. We have also agreed to pay out to the refugees amounts of one-shot aid and other types of monetary compensation in Armenia at the place of their permanent or temporary residence. A number of questions was also raised in the social sphere. Here the republic government has insisted that the proposed benefits and conditions be extended equally to the Armenian refugees who have moved out of Azerbaijan to other regions of the nation.

The Union government has instructed the USSR Ministry of Finances, the Goskomtrud and the Ministry of Justice to quickly review the questions raised by the republic government and submit proposals. The republic government has discussed these questions with the designated ministries and has reached certain agreement on their positive settlement. Undoubtedly, the resolving of these problems will significantly ease the concern of the refugees and will contribute to a normalizing of the situation in the region.

The shortcomings and oversights pointed out in the report and the unsolved problems urgently demand that the republic government and its permanent commission as well as the local soviet bodies further intensify and concretize work with the refugees and more efficiently solve the arising problems.

The Armenian Interrepublic Commission and the Commission of the Armenian Supreme Soviet on Refugee Affairs, proceeding from the arising difficult situation, in the shortest period of time are working out additional measures to raise the responsibility of the economic leaders and the local soviets in this matter, for differentiating work with each refugee family and accelerating the solution to the problems concerning them.

In the aim of involving the financial and material-technical opportunities of the labor collectives in solving the refugee sociodomestic questions, the republic government intends in the next few days to assign ministries, departments, enterprises and institutions to specific organizations and rayons.

Inordinately great is the burden which rests on the shoulders of our people, however we are drawing together and uniting, and stone by stone we will rebuild our homeland, we will welcome and place our brothers.

At present, more than at any other time, we must show unity and a maximum straining of all intellectual and spiritual forces in order to emerge from the crisis. Any attempts to destabilize the situation in essence are immoral and run contrary to the interests of our people.

ArSSR: Refugee Resettlement Figures Detailed*90US0180B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 11 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by S. Arutyunyan, KOMMUNIST special correspondent: "Refugees"]

[Text] Refugees in peacetime. Their shame is great. For many it seems that no one cares about them. And certainly they escaped here in the hope that they would not be abandoned in their misfortune....

A Special Rayon

It was a rayon like any other rayon. There are many like this in Armenia. But recently, and more precisely from the beginning of the tragic year of 1988, it, it can be said, has been on a special status. For Masisskiy Rayon has become one of the epicenters of work with refugees with the Azerbaijanis hurriedly departing and their place being taken by Armenian refugees.

Information from the Masisskiy Rayispolkom. From 1 January 1988 until the present, 3,491 Azerbaijani families have left the rayon with a total of 17,137 persons. Of this number, 3,265 families numbering 16,167 persons exchanged their own homes for state-owned ones, basically in the cities of Azerbaijan, where an Armenian population lived and 208 houses have been sold by Azerbaijanis. Another 10 families are waiting for an exchange.

During the same period, 5,440 Armenian families with a total number of 27,000 persons have arrived from Azerbaijan in Masisskiy Rayon. Over this time, 643 families (4,694 persons) have gone back from the rayon or have moved to other regions of the republic. At present, living in the rayon are 4,797 families (22,306 persons) including 3,460 families (13,824 persons) who have permanent residence permits there.

Temporarily registered are 296 families (1,214 persons), and 95 families (475 persons) have also received permission for residence but the exchange with Baku has been delayed for various reasons.

This is the statistical picture. It is not difficult to understand why precisely Masis was chosen by a majority of the refugees for a place of residence and not, for instance, Vardenis, although as many Azerbaijanis have left there and the population density per square kilometer is just 20 persons while in Masis it is 430. Yerevan is nearby, right at hand, just 30 minutes travel by bus. If one also considers that a majority of the new arrivals are urban residents who lived in Baku, Kirovabad, Mingechaur and Sumgait, then one can understand their desire to be closer to the Armenian capital where it is possible to find work in one's specialty. And many have not concealed their hope that in time, when things settle down and become easier, it will be possible to move to the capital.

In Masis from the very first days they worked hard on the refugee problems. It must be honestly admitted that the party and soviet bodies and the community of the rayon voluntarily assumed this difficult burden, without waiting for orders from above, as was the case in other places, and worked hard on the problem of providing housing for the refugees. The people endeavored to help in every way possible.

"Under the Rayispolkom, from the very first days, a volunteer commission was established consisting of 30 persons," related the Rayispolkom Chairman, G. Gevorkyan. "They were chiefly concerned with the questions of the exchange as well as placing the refugees in the rayon center and villages. The new arrivals were primarily given material aid as many had left hurriedly, abandoning everything (their home and property). The 124 families from Sumgait who arrived the 1st were given aid of 200 rubles each. Disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War, upon a decision of the republic Council of Ministers, were given 1,000 rubles each. The remaining new arrivals received 100 rubles per family. All in all, the material aid was around 2 million rubles. Students of the primary grades were given a free school uniform and so forth."

It was very important that the people feel and support and confidence that they would not be abandoned in their misfortune. But the burden of hardships and unresolved problems grew with each passing day. And the people were constantly asking:

How Shall We Live? Where Shall We Work?

The questions, of course, were not idle ones. While a rural resident is always happy to move into the city, it is very, very complicated for an urban resident to adapt to the countryside. The problem was that rural inhabitants left Armenia while arriving in their place were engineers, technicians and white collar personnel from the Azerbaijan cities and they had never held a hoe in their lives. But if only this were the problem, things could have been worked out. The people who were accustomed to a city way of life with its domestic and utility conveniences in the new place encountered amazing disorder. The decrepit, primitive houses of the Azerbaijanis, a majority of which were more like huts had no gas, water or sewage. The refugees had to move into precisely such houses in the village of Nizami, Sayat-Nova, Sarvanlar, Demurchi, Zangilar, Zakhmet and others. Many of them were unable to adapt to such a life and left. The local authorities first of all set to work solving social problems. Involved in this question were the republic organizations which are the sponsors of the rayon as well as the design institutes and construction organizations.

"First of all, they tackled the sorest point of water supply," said G. Gevorkyan, continuing the story. "Certainly eight villages did not have drinking water and used an artesian well. Over the year, water was brought to the houses of the inhabitants of Sayat-Nova, Nizami and

Demurchi. Before the year's end, a water line will be built in the remaining villages."

With the aid of the Dairy Production Association where the Kalinino Sovkhoz is considered a subsidiary farm, the village has rapidly repaired the school, the nursery and the bathhouse. With the forces of the construction organizations of Glavarmvodstroy [Main Armenian Water Construction] the Leninskiy Rayon of Yerevan, the State Committee for the Main Gas Administration, the Erebuni Production Association and the Yerevan Railroad Division repairs and public amenities are being carried out in the villages. By the start of the academic year, 10 schools had undergone a major overhaul. It was difficult to organize the educational process. The arriving children had studied in Russian and in Masis you could count the number on the fingers of your hand. For the students of grades 6-10, they opened Russian schools and there were no problems with teachers as there were a sufficient number in the refugees. Armenian schools were organized for the students of grades 1-4.

Of course, much was done. But this was only the first step. There are many immediate concerns still ahead. A final solution to the social problems is the main concern. It is essential to quickly provide public amenities for the streets, the roads, and provide houses with water and gas and develop the other utility conveniences. The rayon budget is not so rich and it is incapable of doing the impossible. The republic Gosplan must consider these problems and incorporate them in the economic and social development plans of Masisskiy Rayon for the following year.

And in the meantime, the life of the refugees goes on. The people must be satisfied with what exists. Whatever the case, you must go on living. I visited several villages and spoke with refugee families.

Mikhail Martirosyan: I arrived with my family at relative in Masis in December of last year. They advised I buy a home in Nizami. I found a job as a firefighter in the rayon center although I myself am a construction worker by profession. My wife works at the souvenir factory. My children are senior graders and go to school in the neighboring village of Sayat-Nova as there is no Russian school in our own, only the primary grades. The house has no utilities. We carry water from a well. We want to build a new home because we have essentially purchased a hut, but, as they say, there are no building materials.

Boris Grigoryan: I was able to make an exchange in the village of Sayat-Nova. The house was more or less normal. But there were no conveniences. I found a job at the freight yard of Masis as a mechanic and my wife has gone to work in the fields. We would like to start building but we have the same problems.

For these families, we can consider, everything has gone well. Others have done as they could. But many are still without shelter. Some 820 families (4,335 persons) are staying in Masisskiy Rayon with relatives. Some 34

families (1,442 persons) live in the facilities of enterprises and organizations which are not adapted for housing, while 76 families (144 persons) live in dormitories.

While housing is more or less eased (there is a roof over your head and for the meanwhile you can live), it is much more difficult in finding employment for the refugees.

Information from the Rayispolkom. Some 10,111 persons are fit to work among those arriving and at the given moment 6,195 persons are employed in Yerevan, Masis and in agricultural production. But 4,000 persons are still without employment including 370 with a higher education.

In the village of Sarvanlar, former Baku residents are now working on a livestock farm. Their higher education is no longer (or for now) of use. But they have proven to be efficient milkmaids. In any event, they mastered the new profession for themselves rather quickly and already on the farm the milk yields in comparison with last year have markedly increased from 1,456 kg to 1,621 kg over the 6 months.

And crop raising has also risen to a level which previously the inhabitants of Sarvanlar could not imagine. The increased production of vegetable crops has risen from 130 tons to 305.

All the same, the engineers, musicians and physicians did not go willingly to the fields and farms. The lack of facilities and the despair of finding employment in one's specialty and much else contributed to the abandoning of Masisskiy Rayon by hundreds of families. They also are leaving other rayons where there are even more problems than in Masis and the problems are being tackled even worse. Many have left for the Northern Caucasus and to other regions of the nation and some have even gone back to the cities of the neighboring republic which are engulfed in the flames of strikes and meetings, where they live in fear and terror without knowing what tomorrow will bring them.

On the Benefit of Charity

A good deal has been said about the benefit of charity. This is one of the most popular subjects presently. One can scarcely find a person who does not support the numerous appeals for attention to those who have suffered a disaster. Just remember the black month of December 1988. The tragedy of our small country became a tragedy of the entire world. You could not find a single person who in one way or another did not share the pain of loss with us. And now the bridge of charity erected into Armenia as before is still in operation and each day we learn about some act of charity. For instance, the Italians have built a residential compound for the people of Spitak, the English, Yugoslavs and very recently the Norwegians presented the people living in the earthquake zone with new facilities such as hospitals and homes. Scores of thousands of construction workers

from all ends of the nation are rebuilding the destroyed towns and villages. That is, we see charity not in words but in deed.

The terrible tragedy which fell on our shoulders has concealed the problem of refugees from Azerbaijan. But it has been 18 months since their resettlement and we are still deciding what must be done to provide them with concrete aid. We are drawing up certain action programs, we are establishing commissions and we are voting at meetings and assemblies on the benefit of charity but we are unable to let the people breathe easily and feel at home and not at some temporary place. I have spoken with many refugees in Masisskiy Rayon. And this is what they say: With our own forces we could have built housing or repaired the homes into which we have moved. Just give us a bank loan and building materials. The Rayispolkom has the following information: 740 families have submitted requests to obtain loans to build individual housing. The total demand for loans in the rayon is 8 million rubles. Over the 18 months, it would have been possible to move mountains. Certainly, the foreigners in our zone are able to build entire micro-towns in just a few months.

Over this period, the refugees have succeeded in "wresting away" just 1 million rubles from our financial workers. The savings bank does not grant loans for repairs as the law does not permit this, only for capital construction but there also are no building materials. In our area shortages are everywhere and everything has been funded or limits have been set.

Couldn't one cough up something for a noble cause? Possibly there was not enough money and building materials just for the refugees? Well take a look and you can see at what a pace they are putting up cooperatives and other income-earning facilities. Last year, several-score million rubles were provided just for loans to cooperative members. And building materials for them are no problem at all. Even the scarce and funded can be found.

Or take a drive to old Nork, Kilikiya, or Nor Aresh and you will see how the fat cats buy up the good houses of the emigres, tear them down and erect on their site mansions and medieval castles which we, simple mortals, could scarcely even see in the films. And how many cranes, bulldozers and other domestic and foreign equipment are operating there, trucks and dump trucks rhythmically deliver building materials, and whatever you might fancy they can provide. Only just make sure you can pay. Brick, rough or dressed stone—what house do you want built? And build at least three stories. And dachas?

Hence, there is everything necessary but only for one category of persons and for the other everything is stuck in funds and limits. Actually, it is caused by our indifference distorted by selfish calculations and giving rise to desperation.

At the previous extraordinary session of the republic Supreme Soviet they again spoke about refugee problems with great concern. They mentioned specific rayons, departments, ministries as well as all sorts of organizations and people who had not shown proper concern for the refugees and again they said: "inform," "instruct," and "consider"....

Again the promises and assurances. Has not the time come to move specifically from empty words to concrete actions?

Georgian Council of Ministers Addresses Energy Shortage

90US0225A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Nov 89 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "In the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers: On Shifting Days Off in the Republic from Saturdays and Sundays to Wednesdays and Thursdays and Measures Related to This"]

[Text] Based on the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution dated October 3, 1989, "On Urgent Measures to Ensure Uninterrupted Functioning of Rail Transport and Vital Industries" and for the purpose of ensuring uninterrupted functioning of the economy of the republic in winter months, the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers resolved:

Between November 15, 1989, and March 31, 1990, to shift days off in the republic from Saturdays and Sundays to Wednesdays and Thursdays.

Georgian SSR ministries and agencies and union-level enterprises based on the territory of the republic were instructed, on the personal responsibility of their managers, to ensure that their subordinate enterprises, organizations and agencies be shifted to the new work and leisure schedule and to carry out preparatory and explanatory work at labor collectives, developing and carrying out appropriate measures on a timely basis for the purpose of avoiding disruptions in the normal and rhythmic functioning of the economy during the transition period, various difficulties and interruptions.

The Ministries of Housing and Communal Services and of Consumer Services for Georgian SSR population, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Retail Trade, the Tsekavshiri Board, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health Care, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Culture, the Georgian SSR State Committee on Culture and Sports, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Communications, the Georgian SSR branch of the USSR Savings Bank, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and all agencies and organizations of the consumer services industry must establish work schedules ensuring that uninterrupted services be provided to the population during the transition to the new work week.

Enterprises, organizations and entities of the service industry with days off falling on Sundays and Mondays will have Thursdays and Fridays off, while those who used to rest on Mondays, will rest on Fridays.

The Georgian SSR Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways was asked to ensure a smooth transition for its workers and employees to the new work schedule.

The Councils of Ministers of the Abkhazskaya ASSR and the Adzharskaya ASSR and the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies of the Yugo-Osetinskaya AO, cities and rayons of the republic were ordered to implement all the necessary measures to ensure an organized transition to the new work schedule for economic entities in their districts and their coordinated functioning.

The Georgian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio and the republic's press must carry out broad discussions on the need for the new work schedule and measures related to it.

A GRUZINFORM correspondent asked Otar Kvilitay, first deputy chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, to comment on this resolution.

"It was our poverty that prompted this decision," he said. "The upcoming cold winter and acute shortages of electricity in our republic and all over Trans-Caucasus are posing an extremely difficult challenge to provide power and fuel to all industries and social sectors. The causes of this critical situation—I do not hesitate to call it that—are well-known. It is the stoppage at the nuclear power plant in Armenia and the unreliability of the GRES in Azerbaijan, the two republics with whom we are in a joint power grid. In all likelihood, the new, ninth portion of the Tbilisi GRES will not be completed by the end of the year. Even if it is, its top utilization rate will not initially exceed 40 percent, which will not, of course, provide a quick resolution to the problem.

"All this, plus continued disruptions in rail transport, delays and failure to deliver fuel, have forced us to conclude an intergovernment agreement at the level of chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to temporarily shift workweeks. For instance our weekends are switched from Saturdays and Sundays to Wednesdays and Thursdays, and in Armenia and Azerbaijan they are moved to different days. A schedule of even capacity utilization for the power systems in all three republics is thus established.

"Let me repeat that it was a forced measure. If we did not agree to it, we in Georgia would have to shut down large energy-intensive enterprises, such as the Zeftafon ferrous alloy plant and the Rustava "Azot" industrial complex. Still, we may have to reduce somewhat the work schedules at some of them. If worse comes to worst, we could fall back on the so-called "fan" schedule, whereby power will be shifted from east to west according to a strict timetable. We are also considering such options as reducing power exports to Turkey and even reducing

television broadcasts and curtailing electric public transport in cities, such as metro, trolleys and trams. All will depend on the help the republic gets from union entities, and on how much power the Russian Federation can give us, in particular Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays. Unfortunately, we can not expect too much, since our northern neighbors have their own grave problems related to the coming winter. The situation in our republic is equally bad as far as the supply of natural gas, diesel, gasoline and other fuel is concerned.

"In short, we are faced with a serious challenge. These conditions, of course, call for care when using power, gas and fuel. All ministries and agencies, enterprises and residents of the republic must accept responsibility for saving energy and use fuel and power resources rationally. Each kilowatt of power, each cubic meter of gas and each liter of gasoline must be accounted for. We must hold exhibitions and contests in energy saving. Only a high level of consciousness among the people and a high level of organization will help the republic ensure stable functioning of the economy and help provide heat and power to consumers during the coming winter months."

Alternative Forms for South Ossetian AO Party Structure Proposed

90US0249A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
7 Nov 89 p 6

[Article by G. Dzhanayev, candidate of economic sciences: "The Roots of Bureaucracy"]

[Text] Most inhabitants of South Ossetia, probably, have run up against situations in which the decision concerning some trivial matter involved big problems. Failing to get satisfaction locally, people are forced to turn to oblast and even republic organs on practically every question. Even there, frequently, no immediate decision can be made, because, for example, the matter was not examined locally, or was examined improperly, and will have to be reviewed. Moreover, it is frequently impossible to get by without a decision by the local authorities, because they really do exist, and their decision, opinion, or verdict is needed, and so on.

People are aware that this situation derives to a large extent from the overabundance of administrators and administrative organs. For this reason, they perceive practically every apparatus official as a bureaucrat, and they call the oblast's system of administration a bureaucratic one. And by and large, unfortunately, the people are actually right. Bureaucracy has put down deep roots in the autonomous oblast, fed by the defects of the system and the structures of administration and the overabundance thereof, on the one hand, and by the informal ties that affect the entire administration system, on the other.

In order that the fight against bureaucracy not flounder about, what is needed is an in-depth analysis of the

system of administration in the autonomous oblast, which includes party, state, economic, and cooperative administrative apparatuses.

What is the specific point here? That the administrative system ought to be consonant with the object [obyekt] of administration. In terms of that consonancy, how do things stand in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, and what does it represent as an object of administration?

South Ossetia comprises 3900 square kilometers, 98,000 population, 49,000 persons employed in the national economy, 30 industrial enterprises, 37 kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and industrial and agricultural output totaling 100 million and 25 million rubles, respectively, per year. Would it be necessary to create an oblast administrative link over such an object of administration if there were no South Ossetian autonomous entity? No, it would not be necessary, and this is confirmed by the whole system of administration in our country. As an object of administration, consequently, South Ossetia, and other such small autonomous formations, are unique entities. That's one aspect.

On the other hand, the administrative system in the autonomous oblast is structured on the traditional basis, by analogy with other oblasts. And it is this which constitutes the root cause of existing shortcomings.

The organization of the system of administration on the traditional basis in the South Ossetian AO has brought it about that the proportion of the administrative apparatus in the total number of those employed in the national economy of the oblast stands at 4 percent, versus an average all-union figure of 2 percent and an average republic figure of 3 percent. Measures being taken now to reduce the administrative apparatus and merge several of its horizontal links, far from resulting in a situation in which the proportion of the administrative apparatus in the oblast is on the same level as the average all-union and average republic figures (because at these levels plans call for a more substantial reduction in administrative links), will not even accomplish the main task, namely making it consonant with the object of administration.

This can be accomplished only by creating administrative structures in all organs of administration which radically differ from their counterparts in other oblasts.

Consider the oblast party organization, for example. Since we have an administrative unit—the autonomous oblast—there is also a party obkom [oblast committee]. And based on administrative divisions, there is one gorkom [city party committee] and four raykoms [rayon party committees].

But what about the object of administration? We cited the statistical indicators for the oblast as a whole above, but in terms of the oblast party organization they look like this: There are 9100 communists and 380 primary party organizations. Yet we know of quite a few gorkoms

and raykoms which are made up of several hundred primary party organizations and more than 10,000 or 20,000 communists. Let us refer to the article "Against Bureaucratism," which appeared in PRAVDA on 5 April of last year, and which cited a similar example in the case of Mytishchinskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast, with its almost one half million population. In addition to the city of Mytishchi, where the raykom is located, there are two other cities in the rayon having a population of 80,000, yet they have neither gorkoms nor raykoms. Yet in Tskhinvali, with a population of 40,000, there is a gorkom—even though there is an obkom right alongside it with a substantial apparatus.

Clearly, it is not objectively necessary to have six party committees (an obkom, a gorkom, and four raykoms) for 9000 communists and less than 100,000 population and a small economic potential. They have been created exclusively on the basis of the administrative division of the oblast. Other structures of administration are similarly constituted. This results in the fact that the oblast's administrative apparatus is unusually inflated, inert, and bureaucratic. The upper-level oblast links of administration inevitably take over the powers of the intermediate links (city and rayon) in making decisions regarding the primary links (labor collectives, primary organizations), in view of the relatively small size of the object of administration, and, conversely, they place responsibility on them for decisions they themselves did not make. This engenders apathy, lack of initiative, and inertia in the city and rayon links, the habit of waiting for directions from above on any matter. Overall, moreover, the administrative apparatus is ineffective.

Nevertheless, there are some rationally organized administrative systems in the oblast. Consider, for example, the military commissariats. Rayon commissariats have been created in Dzhava, Znauri, Leningori, and the city of Tskhinvali, while Tskhinvalskiy Rayon is directly administered by the oblast commissariat. Why couldn't this kind of structure be set up in regard to the procuracy, the courts, the militia, the party and Komsomol organs, and so on? The object of administration makes this entirely feasible.

The overabundance of administrative organs also results in a situation which probably has no analogies anywhere else in terms of the numbers of various forums per capita in South Ossetia, such as buros, ispolkoms [executive committees], plenums, sessions, aktivs, assemblies, conferences, and so on. This is so obvious that it does not even require any special analysis.

The foregoing makes it possible to conclude that it is essential to restructure the vertical administrative components in the autonomous oblast. All of them should be structured with a strictly individual approach, without automatically duplicating the existing structures of administration in other oblasts. In this way, the contradiction that was noted above will be resolved. The form

(the existing system of administration) is brought more closely into line with the content of the object of administration.

In addition, it can also accomplish a number of other vital tasks: It will reduce the number of decision-making centers, which in itself is a positive factor—that is, it will result in less bureaucratism. It will enhance the role of the ispolkoms as the main organs of authority within a given territory; it will so to speak effect a direct “rapprochement” between oblast organs and the masses, the labor collectives, whereas at present they are sometimes artificially detached from them, by reference to their intermediate links. And, most important, it will eliminate an entire stratum of informal ties within the administrative apparatus. To the uninitiated this may not seem very important, so let us take a more detailed look at this situation.

In any administrative apparatus, so-called informal ties develop in addition to formal vertical ties of supervision and subordination, ties based on acquaintanceship, friendship, nationality [zemlyachestvo], kinship, and so on. The larger the administrative apparatus and the greater the number of organs within it, the more intensive the informal ties will be and the greater their influence on the decision-making process. It is in these informal ties that we must seek the roots—so incomprehensible sometimes to the broad masses—of cadre transfers, protectionism, settling of scores, and so on. It is probably impossible, of course, to do away entirely with the influence of informal ties, but when they become dominant it can result in a drastic decline in the effectiveness of the work of the administrative apparatus and a loss of authority among the masses.

But now let the readers (meaning readers in South Ossetia) themselves decide whether everything that has been discussed here really has a place in our reality, and whether all of this reflects on the authority of certain officials. I think there are many people who could cite specific examples of the manifestation of the unsavory role of informal ties in the apparatus. Examples like that were cited at recent rallies in Tskhinvali and the latest meeting of the oblast aktiv.

There may be those who see fit to try to treat this article as being practically directed against the autonomy of South Ossetia. But this is absolutely untrue. The implementation of these proposed measures would objectively facilitate the further development of autonomy, whereas so far our bureaucracy is expanding and strengthening its positions, and this cannot help being an object of concern to every inhabitant of the oblast. I say every inhabitant, because the Ossetian worker, the Georgian worker, or the worker of any other nationality all suffer uniformly from bureaucratism. It is not reciprocal explanations regarding relations among representatives of the various nationalities that will help improve matters—it is their joint effort against the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats.

Tajik CP Central Committee Appeal to Republic Voters

90US0243A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 4 Nov 89 pp 1, 3

["Appeal of the Tajik CP Central Committee to the Voters of the Republic"]

[Text] Comrades! On the threshold of the election of local Soviets and People's Deputies of the Tajik SSR, the Tajik CP Central Committee considers it necessary to express its position on questions which are of concern to each of us. We speak primarily of the paths and prospects for further development of those processes which perestroyka has set in motion in the republic.

Perestroyka was designed for the sake of the people, in order that the working people might feel that they are the true and responsible masters in the socialist state. It was namely of such a principled party policy that Lenin was speaking when he asserted: "Socialism is the lively creativity of the masses."

Today one cannot but notice the reassuring changes taking place in the life of every one of us. The years which have passed since April 1985 have clearly revealed the enormous responsibility which the CPSU has assumed, the hopes it has raised, and the kind of popular forces it has set in motion.

The economic mechanism spawned by the administrative-command system is living out its span. Working collectives are receiving ever greater rights to independence. Alternative candidates for election of administrators of enterprises, organizations and institutions have already become routine. There are already positive results from introducing cost-accounting and leasing relationships. Appropriations for socio-cultural needs have been increased in the republic during the present five-year plan. Fields under cotton cultivation have been reduced in favor of increasing production of food crops.

And we ourselves have changed. There is greater openness, and the zone of immunity to criticism is becoming smaller and smaller. We have learned more of the truth about ourselves and about our past, and we can speak of our misfortunes without fear.

We were participants in open democratic elections for USSR People's Deputies. For the first time in the history of our republic, all the people's candidates went through a sharply competitive struggle: both repeat elections and run-offs were held.

Naturally, for the time being, there are more unresolved problems than victories achieved on the path of perestroyka. But after all, these problems have been piling up for many decades, and it would be naive to think that they could all be solved in a flash. It is clear that it will require many years to solve many of them. The workers of the republic are impatient with the shortcomings brought about by elementary inefficiency and lack of concern for their daily needs. They speak openly of this

at their meetings, and write to the newspapers; and the administrators who have not yet abandoned the command-bureaucratic methods of leadership are subjected to sharp criticism.

These questions have in essence become the chief topic of party meetings and plenums and party committees. Today republic party organizations are taking special pains to seek solutions to the burning topics of the day. In spite of the difficulties, and at times even painful disruptions of certain processes of renovation, the majority of the republic's population supports the restructuring begun by the party.

The Tajik CP Central Committee believes that the growth of civic activeness, open and sharp criticism of shortcomings, and a sincere quest for ways to overcome them have become indispensable parts of perestroyka itself. Republic party committees will continue to strive for proper analysis of the state of affairs in all sectors, to meet life head-on and not hide from it, and not flee from difficulties and critical situations.

We all wish to quickly see and experience for ourselves the results of perestroyka. Man, as is well-known, cannot live all the time in an atmosphere of negative emotions, which are intensified by the shortages of goods, housing, social justice and culture, to include the political. And whereas glasnost is entering our lives more and more, there is still a lot of hard work to do in order to liquidate the other deficiencies.

Republic party organizations are especially concerned about the situation of providing housing to the workers. Many thousands of families do not have housing; even more are living in temporary dwellings or drafty khibitkas [nomad tents], and require improved living conditions.

The Tajik CP Central Committee and the republic government are taking measures to significantly strengthen the base of the building and building materials industries in the near future, and on this basis increase the volume of housing construction. In 1989 new capacities of 150,000 square meters of housing per year were put into operation at the Dushanbe Housing Construction Combine, which will make it possible to nearly double the introduction of housing; linoleum, which had previously not been manufactured in the republic, will reach 3 million square meters per year; plaster, will be increased by 102,000 tons per year; and we are ready to introduce production of bricks, slate, keramzit [lightweight concrete aggregate], paints, and dressed paneling. On the whole, this year 86 million rubles worth of new capacities will be introduced in the building and building materials industries.

The means and manpower of working collectives are being enlisted for housing construction. For example, the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Kumsangirskiy Rayon has decided on a housing program, and plans to build 170 houses per year until 1995, by its own efforts. And it is coping with the task. Construction cooperatives in the

city of Dushanbe have actively become involved in realizing the Housing-93 Program.

Along with the expansion of state construction, erection of individual houses has become widespread. Whereas for the 10-year period from 1975 to 1985, 196 hectares of land area, or 2,450 plots, were allocated for private subsidiary farms and construction of housing in the republic—for the three years and nine months of the current five-year-plan, 5,800 hectares, or 72,000 plots of land have been allocated, including more than 2,200 hectares during the first nine months of this year. About 10,000 individual houses have already been built. Individual house builders have been granted 28 million rubles in bank loans.

The Tajik CP Central Committee and the republic government are taking all necessary measures to ensure that the republic's Housing-93 Program, which was approved by the 11th Central Committee Plenum, is completed on time and in full volume.

We know that there is an acute shortage of school-houses and kindergartens, especially in the rural area where a large number of schools are still in adapted quarters, which puts its mark on the process of educating and training the upcoming generation. Nor is the material base of many VUZ's and secondary specialized academic institutions in the best of condition.

Health care is also in a state of neglect. There are not enough medical institutions in the cities, and especially not in the villages. In the republic there are numerous hospitals which do not have electricity or running water; and they are situated in drafty buildings with unsanitary conditions.

For a long time assets for developing public education and health care had been allocated in an extremely unsatisfactory manner, nor did the administrators of enterprises and organizations rush aid to them.

The first steps have been taken in this matter and the economic administrators' stereotypes are being smashed. A large number of buildings, which were vacated as a result of reductions in the administrative apparatus of party, Soviet and state organs have been transferred to health-care and public education institutions.

Upon initiative of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the republic government, the question has been decided on transfer of the 14-story building of the Tadzhik-kolkhozproekt Institute, which is under construction, to the republic diagnostic center. Fifteen million rubles will be expended for building and furnishing it. The center is to go into operation in 1990. Every day up to 1,000 people are to be served in it, which will permit freeing up thousands of places each year in hospitals which are not being used for healing, but for examining patients. During the years of the current five-year plan, almost twice as much capital investment has been made for

developing health-care facilities and for public education, than during the preceding five-year plan.

The Tajik CP Central Committee, through the communists elected to the Soviets of People's Deputies, shall strive to achieve priority allocation and assimilation of assets for the development of health care, public education and other social needs.

As we see, one problem stems from another; in aggregate, they complicate the situation of the populace. In the republic there are families in which the average per-capita income is lower than the minimum required to sustain life; there is neither enough food, nor consumer goods.

In this situation it is very important to strengthen the prestige of every party organization and every Soviet of People's Deputies with deeds, to strive for results every day, every week, every month—if only small results, but real ones, and to keep moving ahead. There are quite a few reserves that, if put into operation, would permit noticeably reducing the shortages right away, and putting things into order in trade, in hospitals and polyclinics, and on the streets in our everyday life.

The republic party organization will pursue the firm line it has taken for restoring the health of socio-economic life in Tajikistan; it will follow a course of social reorientation of the national economy, for changes in the investment structure in favor of the consumer sector, and for raising the standard of living of the republic's workers.

The high birthrate and the consequent swift increase in population, and a shortage of land in aggregate with other problems has placed the republic in great difficulty. At present Tajikistan possesses 0.11 hectares of arable land per capita. And this area "per capita" is inexorably shrinking, which is fraught with an increase in various kinds of negative phenomena, and demands the adoption of urgent, concrete, practical measures.

The Tajik CP Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers have drawn up and are implementing a program for boosting the economy and restoring its financial health, and are at the same time seeking the solution of problems associated with the demographic situation.

By means of the measures taken in the current five-year plan, an additional 97,000 workplaces have been created. In the 13th Five-Year Plan it will be easier to increase the construction of new production for manufacturing consumer goods, shops and branches for assembly and manufacture of machinery, equipment, instruments and other products.

It is planned to put up to 100,000 hectares of land into gardens and vineyards before the year 2000, and to establish 100 new sovkhoses in the foothill zone. In sum these measures will guarantee the creation of about 130,000 workplaces. During the years 1988-1989,

16,000 hectares of land were already put under cultivation and 19 sovkhoses were established.

A considerable number of families which had previously settled in the valley will be granted the opportunity to return to the kishlaks that were abandoned, and restore them to life. In the near future, 22 mountain settlements in Perkharskiy, Moskovskiy and other rayons of the republic will achieve rebirth.

The republic party organization, in resolving the problem of full employment for the able-bodied populace, will strive for optimal distribution of the productive forces, for accelerated construction of shops and branch enterprises in the rural areas, and for the development of traditional native industries.

Providing the population of the republic with foodstuffs, manufactured goods and paid services are subjects of special attention.

Major leased collectives have acquitted themselves well in Leninabad and Khatlonskoy [sic] Oblasts; as well as the agrofirms and agrokombinats that have built their relationships on the basis of cooperation and leasing.

The Tajik CP Central Committee considers the basic directions of its work in the agrarian sector: changing the economic relationships in the rural area by means of steadfastly switching kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other enterprises in the agro-industrial complex to principles of self-management and self-financing; developing those forms of socialist relations which most fully provide a harmonious combination of the interests of the citizens, working collectives and society, such as leasing and cooperation; and reducing to economically and scientifically justified volumes the production of raw cotton, and increasing at its expense the volume of vegetables, potatoes, melons and fodder crops.

An unfavorable ecological situation has come to pass in the republic. For a long time the problems of protecting the environment and rational use of natural resources were considered of secondary importance, assets for construction of environmental-protection projects were allocated on the "left-overs" principle, and even these were not fully assimilated.

Recently a number of measures were adopted to restore the health of the environment. The use of toxic chemicals has been forbidden in agricultural production; construction of a battery plant in the city of Kulyab has been halted, shops for producing ammonia at the Bakhshskiy nitrogen-mineral fertilizer plant were closed, as was production of chloromethane at the Tadzhikkhimprom production association.

Communists elected to the new Soviets will speak out decisively for wise use of the republic's natural resources, and to promote the improvement of the ecological situation.

The cooperative movement has become quite widespread in the republic. Today, 2,286 cooperatives are in

operation; during this year alone they produced goods and provided services to the public in the amount of 186 million rubles. Unfortunately, some of them merely reprocess materials, and even resell at unacceptably high prices products manufactured by the state; and are more and more becoming another source of social tensions.

The republic party organization finds this phenomenon unacceptable and will support only those cooperatives which add to the goods, help repair equipment, houses, and apartments—that is, those which make the people's work easier and create conveniences for them. Every assistance will be given to cooperatives which sell their products and render services at prices within the bounds of state prices.

Naturally, the course toward improving things demands combining efforts and means, and enormous tensions. This requires a normal, peaceful social situation, conducive to creative labor and the direct socio-economic improvement of the republic. On the whole such conditions are being established.

Of course it is naive to assume that this course is being maintained everywhere, by everyone without exception. Progress is fraught with a multitude of conflicts, the struggle of the old and the new. You see, leading positions in various sectors are still occupied by people who only give lip service to the revolutionary transformations, who are in fact hindering them. They will not permit the initiatives swelling up from below—from the collectives, from talented specialists, from ordinary workers—to develop. After all, bureaucratic methods are more convenient: with their help one can remain in one's post, surround oneself with relatives and bootlickers, and at times one can rob the state with impunity.

In connection with improving the administrative structure, in 1988 the staffs of republic organs were reduced by almost 50 percent, and by 30 percent in the oblasts. However, in other administrative areas the numbers remain unchanged, and here and there—especially at enterprises—they have even increased.

The Communists who will be elected to the new Soviets will wage a decisive struggle with this phenomenon. The Tajik CP Central Committee considers it its duty to provide every assistance to putting into effect the Law on the Socialist Enterprise, to support the movement from below of those who take a specific role in perestroika.

At the very same time one cannot avoid mentioning the fact that in recent times people have appeared who, taking advantage of difficulties and negative incidents, have decided to enrich themselves on this political capital, representing themselves as fighters for justice; whereas, they have nothing to offer except groundless criticism. Others want to see only "their very own" people in power, at any level, not taking into consideration the fact that today, when the fate of the people depends on their leaders, the principal criteria can and

must be only competence and the ability to properly organize the people's work, and not relatives or relations of nationality.

Such trends, if they are allowed to develop even further, will have a fatal influence on public opinion and on the people's mood, and that means on the development of the economy, culture, and improving the people's standard of living—which, as is well-known lags behind the other union republics.

Also grounds for concern is the fact that many party and soviet organizations, and working collectives, have not yet realized the extent of the danger of the highly significant negative tendencies in inter-ethnic relations. Meanwhile it is precisely the party committees and the communists who must be the first to react to such manifestations—especially to attempts to destabilize the situation on this basis, as happened in Isfarinskiy, Kolkhozabadskiy, Ganchinskiy and a number of other rayons, where disputes over use of water and land were used by extremist elements in an attempt to exacerbate inter-ethnic relations.

The Tajik CP Central Committee considers harmonization of inter-ethnic relations to be one of the most important goals of the nationalities policy. No matter how complex inter-ethnic problems are—optimal solutions to them are possible. Toward these ends the republic party committees will consolidate the positive forces and all the people living in our republic.

The fate of our progress depends upon responsibility and on strengthening in every way the state of organization and discipline in production and in administration. Under conditions of democratization, certain people believe that this truth is already obsolete. But no matter how many administrators are transferred, or how much capital investments are increased will provide the required results, if we do not change our attitude toward work, and if we do not become the real masters at our own workplaces. We must remember that at all times and among all nations, nothing has ever been respected as much as honest labor and great skill.

The turning point in the history of the Soviet people confirms with new force the role of the CPSU as vanguard in all the transformations taking place in society, in spite of the sharp discussion going on around it.

We must proceed from the fact that, first of all, the party itself has consciously subjected itself to the fire of criticism, for the purpose of purging itself from everything that undermines its authority and hinders it from operating more effectively; and secondly, that the party consists of people who, although they are called the same—communists—are in fact altogether different.

Life testifies to the fact that not everyone who possesses a party card strives to put his shoulder to the wheel and help resolve the urgent problems. Therefore, the process of purging its ranks is gaining strength in the party. New members are being selected with greater care. For it is

namely the people—the workers, the farm laborers, and the progressive intelligentsia; everyone who has tied his fate with that of the party and honestly and conscientiously serves its great cause; and they are in the majority—who are the great potential of the CPSU, its honor and its glory.

It is necessary to distinguish between criticism of individual party members who are remiss, and abuse of the entire party—which is advantageous to those who would like to create an atmosphere of chaos and anarchy.

Yes, complex and multi-faceted processes are taking place in the party. The new is clashing with the old, the conservatives with the progressives. All of this indisputably hinders movement and slows down the current of the processes of perestroika.

The party exists for the people and serves the people; in all its activities it is guided by Marxist-Leninist teachings; and it was, is and shall be the party of revolutionary action. It is namely the party that bears responsibility for the fate of socialism, for the fate of our multi-national Motherland. Nor shall the Communist Party of Tajikistan, as a constituent part of the CPSU, abandon that path.

Today an especially crucial question is that of the relationships between the party and the Soviets. It is no secret to anyone that in operating in the new way, we are learning as we go, and we are taking only the first steps on the way to transferring power to the Soviets. And although quite a number of resolutions have been adopted, and many words spoken on the fact that there must be no substitute for the Soviets, substitution is not a rarity even today. For that there are objective and subjective reasons. On the one hand, the Soviets are for a variety of reasons not prepared to completely assume power; and on the other, many party committees are unwilling to part with the functions uncharacteristic of them.

One cannot but speak of the fact that the slogan proclaimed by the party, "All Power to the Soviets," is interpreted by some as a policy of removing its political influence, and placing its leading role in society in doubt. But under such a policy, no positive results nor progress can be achieved in the country. It is very important that both the republic party organization and the Soviets strengthen their authority with concrete deeds.

What kind of corps of deputies there will be in the localities, who will bear great responsibility for the future of perestroika, depends upon the active and energetic participation of every citizen of the republic in preparing for the forthcoming elections.

I would like to call upon the electors to be more exacting in evaluating and comparing the pre-election programs of candidates for deputy. Practical experience from last Spring's election campaign has shown that the programs of certain candidates contained open speculation on the difficulties at hand; empty, but effectively delivered

promises; and reliance on negation of all that is positive, all that has been undertaken in the republic on the initiative of the party organization. No doubt everyone is tired of that. But it is not excluded, that there may be programs of this kind in the forthcoming campaign.

What is the basis for one's confidence in a candidate? Probably above all, how well he has already acquitted himself in the years of perestroika. After all, everyone was given a chance to do so. And one who has not merely paid lip-service, but has in fact accepted and supports perestroika, has probably already revealed himself in the last four-plus years.

Obviously the voters owe a vote of confidence to those who in their past actions, deeds and concrete results have proven that their words are not at odds with their deeds.

The party organizations shall nominate and support just such candidates. Those elected to the organs of power must be the best representatives of our society, who are indeed capable of implementing the people's will. The people do not believe in words, but in deeds.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan appeals to Communists and Komsomol members; to non-party members; to workers and kolkhoz members; to the intelligentsia and the student body; and to everyone to whom the honor and glory of the republic is dear: to become thoroughly conscious of and aware of their responsibility for the future of Soviet Tajikistan; to display great political maturity and civic consciousness; to create a favorable social atmosphere, and to support with persistent labor the programmed goals of the party for the economic and social renovation of the country.

Uzbekistan Creates Disaster, Rescue Emergency Response Body

90US0253A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Nov 89 p4

[Report by T.Golubkina and Ye.Yefimov, UzTAG correspondents: "The Flag of Hope Will Fly"]

[Text] Two hundred brave and strong men stand ready to help in emergency at any time and in any corner of Uzbekistan.

They will answer calls from fraternal republics and other countries.

This refers to the new entity, the Republic Multipurpose Rapid Response Center (RMTsBR). The service is still at its initial stages, but the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers has already signed the order establishing it.

Chernobyl, the Armenian earthquake and the rail disaster in Bashkiria. Glasnost told us the truth about the scale and the causes of these disasters. How many other tragedies, both natural and man-made, born of incompetence and carelessness, happened in silence in the past: in a happy state there is no room for disasters. And without disasters, who needs rescue services?

But earthquakes, explosions and floods still happened, and every time those who rushed to the rescue showed courage and capacity for self-sacrifice. The accidents also showed how short we were on organization and ability to coordinate actions by various services, reach the site of accident quickly and with necessary equipment and immediately begin rescue work under extreme conditions.

It was glasnost that revealed this problem, too. This is why we rightly list the need for new rescue services among challenges posed by perestroika.

It is a sign of times that an official with the rank of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers was chosen to direct the national safety system. Similar state services are being set up all over the country. In emergency situations, all necessary resources will be transferred under their command. This includes rescue work professionals.

Yes, professionals. We say, for instance, that the soldier's profession is to defend the motherland. An extremely high level of professionalism is also needed to parry blows of nature and disasters. Our people have plenty of pluck and are ready to sacrifice themselves, but often lack skills.

This is why the first all-purpose rescue center, an agency equipped to deal with any emergency, is being set up in Uzbekistan. The all-purpose quality is achieved by coordinating efforts of many agencies, public organizations and volunteer societies.

Any agency could have started this undertaking, but this time it was the Republic State Committee for Sports. Someone had to do it. The Republic Civil Defense Center and the central committee of the Uzbek Red Crescent Society answered the call promptly. Sixteen additional ministries, enterprises, research institutes and public organizations expressed desire to take part in this noble project.

The sports committee will initially sponsor the RMTsBR. This is not because the committee is its founder. Based on the traditions and experience of alpinists, rock climbers and representatives of other sports which require courage, decisiveness and mutual assistance, we can say that the center is ready for action. They will be joined by groups specializing in fire, radiation, chemical and bacteriological emergency services.

In the future, the center will become independent and will be incorporated in the UzSSR state prompt response system.

What will the center be like? In its core will be the basic rescue team comprised of 16 people able to take command of a detachment, provide instruction to volunteer helpers, drive a vehicle on mountain roads, establish radio contact and even send a trained dog on a trail. This includes the command group comprised of five people who will both

take care of the RMTsBR day-to-day business and coordinate activities of various divisions. In case of need, these commanders could themselves assist victims of emergencies.

Who will direct the center? The director and two deputies will be chosen in a competitive election. Worthy candidates have already come forward.

Members of volunteer rescue teams will also be chosen carefully. Preliminary lists have already been put together. They include mainly athletes, mountain climbers and avalanche rescue specialists, all experienced, high-ranking instructors. They will be given a contract which includes a training course at professional rescue schools, such as the one in Tashkent. Study trips abroad are also planned.

Following a strict test, they will be awarded a special badge. Wearing this badge is not only a mark of honor but a sign of responsibility, since those who show it can demand assistance from everyone.

The capabilities of the rescue team and the range of its activities can be gauged by its equipment. It includes various motor vehicles, tow trucks, utility vehicles, bulldozers, tractors, trailers, small power generators, portable transmitters, explosives, welding equipment, inflatable craft, radiation and chemical protection equipment, avalanche sondage equipment, mountain climbing and diving gear and trench picks.

The center's supplies also include everything necessary to give help to victims: surgical equipment, tents, a field kitchen and a supply of medicines and food. The center even has 500 bags which could be filled with sand to close a break in a dam.

Rescue workers will learn what they need in each specific case from information bulletins and weather reports provided by the Seismology Institute of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the Central Asian Regional Scientific Research Institute of Hydrometeorology and the Civil Defense Headquarters. After they receive the alarm signal and information where to gather, the team will depart for the site where their assistance is required.

Another one of RMTsBR functions is to train professionals for agency rescue services. This is a step in self-financing activity, which apparently is possible in this area as well. Initially, the center will be supported by state funds, of course, but later it will pay as much of its expenses as possible with revenues from its professional rescue school, safety training, commercial mountain climbing services and special equipment manufacturing. There is great demand for such equipment and it is no coincidence that the center already has its private trade mark.

They are already looking for a spot at Sergeli for the center's headquarters. Branches of the emergency service will also be established in oblasts.

Starting January 1, 1990, the RMTsBR will be in business. How many strong, brave and ready for action people, ones who will help others in emergency, will it have by then?

The blue flag with the emblem of the rescue service will be the symbol of hope.

Moscow Deputies Meet Constituents

18120019 Moscow *MOSCOW NEWS in English* No 46, 19-26 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by D.O.: "Muscovites Meet Their Deputies"]

[Text] On November 3 the USSR people's deputies Yuriy Afanasyev, Boris Yeltsin, Viktor Palma and

Gavriil Popov met with Moscow's intelligentsia at the Film-Makers' Club. As members of the inter-regional group, the deputies reported on their activities and commented on the performance of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Answering numerous questions, the four deputies stoutly denied the recent allegations about the inter-regional group aiming to seize power and establish a dictatorship, and calling for terror and sabotage to that end. Such fabrications, the deputies said, are being spread by those who fear true democratization of our society and the transition to people's power. It is no accident that such rumours are being whipped up as elections to local Soviet approach.

Journal Commentary on Nationalities Program

90UN0264A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 20, Oct 89 (signed to press 10 Nov 89) pp 3-7

[Unsigned article: "The Party's Nationalities Platform—A Program of Consolidation and Actions"]

[Text] The September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum has special significance in the life of the country, and the party. It will undoubtedly be given its place among the definitive events. The Plenum was an important milestone on the way to realization of the policy of perestroika and putting this political course into practice. Resolutions were worked out and adopted which take into consideration the situation which has evolved in the country, and define the top-priority directions in the work of the communists at today's crucial stage of perestroika.

The Plenum resolved to advance the date for holding the next party congress, the 28th, to October 1990. It is now the duty of every communist and every party organization, in the course of the current preparations for the congress, to combine their active and creative work and to consolidate the efforts of the people in fulfilling the essential tasks of perestroika; to assert through practical deeds the right of the party to the vanguard role in society; and to take maximum advantage of everything in order that a turn for the better takes place in all spheres—social, national, cultural—in the life of the Soviet people.

One of the key directions of all this work is the CPSU Platform on "The Nationalities Policy of the Party in Contemporary Conditions," which was approved by the Plenum.

The current state of interethnic relations in our country has made it necessary to develop a comprehensive program of actions which would become the basis for a fundamental renewal of the nationalities policy and the renovation of the federation in the interests of all the Soviet peoples. And the CPSU has provided such a program, once again convincingly and vividly displaying its leading role in society.

The CPSU platform is the result of analysis and comparison of the opinions of party committees, Soviet organs and scientific institutions; of the broad public, various social movements and scholars; of press materials and new ideas raised at the Congress of People's Deputies; and of workers' letters to the CPSU Central Committee. The platform also takes domestic and world experience into consideration. It was examined in draft and discussed by the people, and has received their active support. And only then was it submitted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The party's program of actions for resolving the problems in its nationalities policy absorbs everything that has been created over the decades by the peoples of the USSR on the path to socialist transformations. But this

innovative program, built on Leninist principles and the current party strategy on the nationalities question, reflects the actual realities and needs of today, which dominate the trends in world social development. The program defines the party's nationalities policy as a most important, integral part of the overall conception of perestroika. Therein lies its scientific basis and its vitality.

Party committees, party organizations, communists, and everyone to whom the cause of perestroika is dear, must firmly grasp and assimilate the permanent significance of the document adopted by the September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Such is the role of the program attributed to it by the party in the cause of perestroika—bearing in mind that in such a multinational state as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics perestroika cannot succeed without the renovation of inter-ethnic relations. The unifying and consolidating role of the party platform must be understood by and become a part of the consciousness of every Soviet citizen.

This means persistent and purposeful organizational, political and ideological work, in which it is important to effectively utilize accumulated practical experience, proven and effective forms and methods of establishing direct contact with the people—be they conversations in a production section or meetings with citizens at home; speeches at a party committee; or dialog at a village meeting. The important thing is that these must be direct, open, and interested dialogs with the people, aimed at achieving mutual understanding and unity of efforts. Such work with the people must not be oriented toward upon the audience in general, but toward a person's heart and soul, his individuality.

It is necessary to talk about these things because, in the organizational, political and ideological activity of certain party committees and party organizations, one can still find sluggishness and inertia, a preference for slogans and formalism, and an aversion to associate directly with working collectives, with the populace of a housing subdivision, or with an individual. The letters to the editor cited below clearly demonstrate the results of such positions.

"Unfortunately," writes K. Sidorin of Lvov, "the initiative is quite often seized by those who wish to take advantage of perestroika for their own ambitious ends or those driven by nationalistic hysteria. Local activists of such a persuasion are actively supported by emissaries from the Baltic, Azerbaijan, Georgia or Armenia. And then the blue-and-yellow banner is already raised, and the 'Rukh' trident shaken. And one can hear very clearly among them the voices of those who, citing historical examples, strive to justify and even make heroes out of nationalists who had collaborated with the Fascists, whose bestiality thousands and thousands of families cannot to this day recall without quaking. In such 'discussions' we must rely on the working collectives, where people of various nationalities work shoulder to

shoulder, where internationalism is not just a word but life itself, and where the memory of our brotherhood, which helped us triumph in severe misfortunes and trials, is not so short."

This idea is expressed in numerous letters from the magazine's readers. Here is the memory which Vyacheslav Valerianovich Smirnov of Maykop preserves in his heart. In a large letter in which he speaks about the affairs and problems of his collective, he recalls the war years. "I am proud," writes V. Smirnov, "that I, a Russian and a son of the lands of Kerch, received my first lessons in internationalism from commissar-bolsheviks M. Zeynalov, an Azerbaijani; A. Akbidzhanyan, an Armenian; and I. Kukin, a Russian... It was my politruk Kurban Kafarov who called all of us, Russians, Azerbaijanians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Georgians and Belorussians—flowers from the same garden." And the author of the letter concludes: "Then, you see, they were skillful at conducting individual work!"

The CPSU Platform, "The Party's Nationalities Policy in Contemporary Conditions," is for just such heart-to-heart individual work, because it is close to the common people, for whom friendship, brotherhood and internationalism is life itself. It knocks the ground out from under those, who for their unseemly and quite often illegal purposes, dwell on the difficulties and try to mislead the people, promoting chauvinistic attitudes, the display of nationalistic egoism and intolerance, and clashes among representatives of different nations. Of course, the CPSU Platform does not go down well with them. They are frightened by the realization of its power to consolidate the working collectives and every Soviet citizen. They understand that the strength of perestroika and the source of its success lies in such a realization.

This is why the political work of the party committees, party organizations and communists is so important, as they work with the people regarding the party platform on nationalities questions in an atmosphere of broad glasnost, frankness, openness and dialog. And on the accumulation of practical matters.

And they already exist in every republic and oblast. Take one of the most acute problems—the problem of the development of national culture and language, especially for non-indigenous nationalities. There is experience in solving it in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belorussia and Uzbekistan; in Tataria and the Komi ASSR; and in other regions of the country. In Bashkiriya, the opening of schools and classes for studying the Chuvash, Mary and Udmurt languages was hampered by the shortage of teacher cadres and textbooks. Their neighbors came to their assistance: the pedagogical institutes of the Chuvash, Udmurt and Mary ASSR are sending their graduates to Bashkiriya; and the publishing houses of the cities of Cheboksary, Izhevsk and Yoshkar-Ola are sending textbooks and methodological aids. In turn, Bashkiriya is helping organize Bashkir schools in Orenburg, Kuybyshev, Chelyabinsk and other oblasts.

The Chuvash Oblast party committee, for example, has established a commission for developing inter-ethnic relations and for strengthening the international education of the workers, combining in them the best creative forces of the republic, including the intelligentsia. Their practical program of actions and concrete work have removed many areas of conflict: meetings are unnecessary, since they have been afforded the opportunity to direct their energies, initiative and desire to serve the people toward the embodiment of practical matters.

Many small Northern peoples dwell on the enormous territory of the Yakut ASSR. Oblast and rayon party committees themselves have taken the initiative for the purposeful organization and implementation of a program for training national technical cadres, establishing mass information media in the languages of the small nations, and propagating their culture, traditions and customs.

The okrug committee of the Evenkiyskiy Autonomous Okrug has accomplished a great deal of work on organizing the instruction of the Even language in elementary schools. Scholars specializing on the North and volunteer teachers have developed a complete course of the Even literary language, a set of textbooks for first through eighth grades, and an elective course of study of terminology of the branches of the traditional northern economy, for older students with a professional bent. This experience is being studied by teachers of the Even language in Buryan ASSR, Khabarovsk Kray, Chita and Irkutsk Oblasts, and all the rayons of the Evenkiyskiy AO. Here is what can be done if initiative is not confined to speeches, but is actually put into practice. And one could cite such examples from all ends of our country.

Yes, a great many obstacles have piled up in inter-ethnic relations. But they will remain obstacles as long as people merely hold meetings on the streets, and not clear them out. "It is necessary to work," answered, V. Astafyev, a writer whom the people love and respect, who has been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, when a television correspondent asked him, "What is not the most important thing?" "Words won't help matters, and you see it's easy to tear down what has been created," says Ye. Parubok, team leader on a mechanized sugar beet cultivation team at the Kolkhoz imeni Suvorov in the Ukrainian SSR. "It is necessary to work. To work and to create material values": these are the words of A. Myasnikov, an excavating machine operator from Irkutsk Oblast. Both the writer, and the farmer and the worker are firmly convinced of one thing: in order for perestroika to complete its noble tasks, what is needed is honest and responsible labor for the common goals.

Achieving them depends largely on harmonizing inter-ethnic relations. The party platform stresses that the task consists of eliminating injustice and pouring new energy into the economic, political and spiritual life of every nation in our country, and opening the way to free national development—while preserving all that is of value from the past. And at the same time it depends

upon increasing and multiplying the international unity of the socialist society, and placing the multinational Soviet state on a firm foundation.

Dishonest and provocative methods are characteristic of those who aspire to stirring up national enmity; these methods consist of nullifying, hushing up or putting down the achievements in the nationalities question made during the years of Soviet rule, while making every effort to over-emphasize the distortions that occurred. In their organizational and political work, party committees and party organizations can rely today on clear-cut, objective and correct analysis of the heritage which we have received. The CPSU Central Committee Platform points out the distortions which began soon after the death of Lenin, which had a pernicious effect on inter-ethnic relations, and affect them to this day. The administrative-command system gave birth to not only negative political and economic consequences, but also ecological, demographic, linguistic, educational and cultural problems. The limitations on the jurisdiction of the Union and the republics fixed in the 1924 Constitution were eroded, and republic sovereignty became largely a formality. Mass repressions and resettlement of entire nations were major causes of the aggravation of the nationalities problem. The party speaks of all of this in its platform, directly and openly.

But during that very same time, across the vast spaces of the former Russian empire—where, especially in the national regions, there was in fact no industrial production, many nations were at the feudal and even the patriarchal-clan stage of social development, where social inequality exacerbated national oppression—industrialization and socialistic restructuring of the villages were carried out; the former backwardness of the outlying regions was eliminated; and the level of economic development and material possessions of the nations was equalized. Fundamental changes took place in the spiritual life of the nations: a working class was raised in the republics, as well as a scientific-technical and artistic intelligentsia. All this was the result of the actions of the Soviet people under the leadership of the party, the result of the efforts of the soviet republics, united on the basis of a federation. Writer B. Oleynik put it well at the Plenum: "We must protect what we received on such a hard journey... For if we do not respect ourselves, then who will?"

Those who are prepared to break up the state system which has taken shape in our country, to transform the federation into a confederation, or take up the redrawing of our borders, cannot cancel out the achievements of the Soviet Federation. But they would like to undermine the foundation of our Union, our historical interrelations, and our unity. The party committees, party organizations, communists and the ideological aktiv must explain to the people what lies behind the speeches of certain proponents of national exclusiveness who heap abuse upon other nations—accusing some of oppressive actions, or loftily proclaiming that others are lagging behind in "development," and not having grown to the

proper "level." The directions of the nationalities policy are different; they are close to every nation and every person in a Soviet country; and they meet their civic and national interests and feelings. Today the party, through this policy, emphasizes:

- perfection of the Soviet federation, filling it with genuine political and economic content;
- expanding the rights and opportunities of all kinds of national autonomy;
- ensuring equal rights to every nation and satisfying the specific interests of every nationality;
- creating conditions for the free development of national languages and culture;
- strengthening the guarantees which preclude encroachments on the rights of citizens based on their national origin;
- renewing all ideological-political, scientific-research and educational work in the sphere of national relations; and,
- affirming, in inter-ethnic relations, mutual respect for historical traditions and specific national character, and consideration for the economic and spiritual interests of each nation.

All these directions of the CPSU's nationalities policy consider the realities of contemporary inter-ethnic relations in the USSR.

Today the entire course of development of the nation lead to the conclusion: not rejection of the Soviet federation, but its radical transformation—that is the path which will permit it to restructure and make it robust. The principal idea which lies at the basis of the Soviet federation, as the CPSU platform states, is expressed in the universally recognized formula: Without a strong Union there can be no strong republics; without strong republics there can be no strong Union.

The guarantee of stability of our federation, the CPSU Central Committee platform stresses, is the completely voluntary nature of the unity of the Soviet republics in a single unified state, in which every republic retains its independence, and has the right to take part in the adoption of common decisions. The CPSU consistently defends the Leninist principle of national self-determination in its true sense, which must be supported by the appropriate legal guarantees.

Representatives of certain fronts, groups, and certain "protectors of rights" are consciously, for the purposes of justifying their own nationalistic or chauvinistic pretensions, are trying to pervert the values of the Soviet federations, and Lenin's principle of self-determination.

The CPSU Central Committee platform on the nationalities policy clearly defines the jurisdiction and mutual responsibilities of the Union and the republics; and

Soviet citizenship, which does not allow privileges for some and encroachments on other Soviet citizens for reasons of nationality, religion, language or length of residence in an area. And it resolves other questions associated with carrying out the basic tasks of the country's foreign policy, ensuring national security, and the peaceful labor of the Soviet nations, along with the status and activity of social organizations.

A subject of especially acute discussion today is the economic content of self-determination and sovereignty in contemporary conditions. This is explained by the fact that solution of the entire complex of urgent problems in inter-ethnic ties depends largely on solving the problems of economic-management relationships. It was stressed at the Plenum that as a result of many years of development of the economy of the USSR on a planned basis, a high degree of integration has been achieved, and an integrated national-economic complex has evolved. And it must not be pulled apart, into national segments. Every such attempt would deal unjustified and unpredictable harm not only to the Union, but also to every republic. The CPSU platform provides prospects for further development and enrichment of economic relationships in the USSR, stressing that in contemporary conditions the economic content of self-determination and sovereignty finds its expression in the transition of the republics to cost-accounting and self-financing.

Another question of great political significance raised in the party platform is the restoration in full amount of the legal rights and interests of the nations which dwell in autonomous republics, oblasts and okrugs. Measures have been defined which permit realization of their national needs and solution of accumulated problems. The platform transfers the question of nationalities policy to the arena of implementing concrete, practical matters. And it is very important that the positive experience which the party committees and party organizations have accumulated, modest though it may be, becomes a good foundation for this.

Letters from readers continue to arrive at the editorial department, expressing total, enthusiastic approval of the CPSU platform on the nationalities question. And it is characteristic that the authors strive to emphasize that we should single out that which does not divide, but rather unites the nations of our country, and enriches their historic ties, which are vital to this day.

Here is one of them. Writing to us from the city of Guryev is K. Satkayev, a Kazakh by nationality: "I am glad, as many of my relatives and friends are glad that at last they have remembered that enormous republic in the Soviet nation, the Russian Federation; and I am happy for its nations, and above all for the Russian nation. We, as Kazakhs have age-old ties with the Russians. Thus, it has turned out that the Russian people have always taken most things upon their own shoulders—both misfortune and bitterness, rather than pass them on to their friends. And it is painful for me to hear that some people are trying very hard to slander and humiliate them. I am

bitter, and ashamed for such people. Of course, they do not express the feelings of their nations. After all, no nation would permit it self to slander another, because it knows that it would lose face, and the respect of its neighbors. But you see, certain people are capable of that. And I would like to say to the Russians, and to all the nations of the RSFSR: Do not take such slander to heart. It does not befit purity and kindness. And it was proper to affirm the Russian language as the nationwide language, for it is indeed nationwide; the history of our great state has made it such."

Letters to the editor, heartfelt and sincere, affirm that the platform of the nationalities policy of the CPSU has been dictated by life itself and reflects the aspirations of the nations of our country; and that the Soviet people associate its implementation primarily with the party. They can clearly see that only the party is capable of regenerating Leninist principles of nationality policy. In its nationalities platform it has presented a new aspect of our Soviet federation, which harmoniously combines the interests of national sovereignty and development with the common interests of the union of nations of our country.

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Armenian Deputies Describe Supreme Soviet NKAO Debates

90US0185A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
10 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with Lyudmila Arutyunyan and Genrikh Igityan, Armenian deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, by *KOMMUNIST* special correspondent V. Sarkisyan: "Parliamentary Clashes"]

[Text] The second week of work of the second session of the country's Supreme Soviet has been completed. Each day of parliamentary debate adds, as it were, a definite underline to the decisions concerning the vitally important questions for the country and for society. The heated passions, the stormy process of debates: the parliament of the country, as it should be, has become the "epicenter" for taking decisions on which the fate of each and every one of us hangs.

In the last year and a half we have tied many hopes to each official visit to the capital by a delegation of deputies from Armenia. And each time it seemed to us that at last the truth would win out and historical justice be restored.

...It was 3:00 in the morning when I managed to get to the Hotel Moskva—the headquarters of the people's deputies of the country. The heated debates of one of the most difficult days for our deputies were already over. N. Muradyan, first secretary of Spitakskiy Raykom, was not asleep. He greeted me and asked me loads of questions, although, it seemed to me, I was supposed to be the one asking questions. They followed, but later. But for now,

he put his papers into meticulous order, and prepared for the next day's work. Such is the life of a deputy.

When this material reaches our readers, they will already be familiar with the decree passed on Tuesday, 3 October. We will attempt, in conversations with participants in these sharp debates, to recreate the clashes which occurred out of sight of the camera.

[Arutyunyan] I think that it would be interesting for readers of the newspaper to get to know the logic of the process of the parliamentary debates of the last two days. When it became clear, in the week of 2 October, that the blockade problem kept on needing to be discussed, a very interesting thing was done (but this is one of the peculiarities of a parliamentary struggle): two more draft laws were introduced for examination. Ones about strikes and extraordinary measures.

A sort of triad resulted. We are talking about the blockade, others about strikes, and in addition, at the same time, yet another draft law, concerning labor conflicts, is being advanced. It appeared quite natural, the clash of progressive circles who have no wish to encroach on the democratic gains of the working people. After all, until quite recently, strikes were forbidden. On the other hand, the Armenian people, who are themselves voting for progressive changes, were the first to raise the banner of perestroika. But lifting the blockade was tied up in the closest possible way with the demands to forbid strikes. An additional task faced us: to express our precise attitude toward the rest of the draft laws. We resolved this conflict as follows.

On Monday there was a stirring speech by G.M. Voskanyan, which characterized the blockade as an immoral act and demanded a political assessment of it. The heat of emotion that day reached such a point that it seemed that an appropriate decision would be taken. But it was suggested that it was necessary to think everything through thoroughly one more time over the night. Although, in my view, the deputies were prepared to take the decision that same evening. Over the night, as everyone knows, not a single railcar went into the republic. Thus, we came to the next bout of debates with a consciousness that the limit of the time allotted to us was running out.

But at the morning session as well, people preferred to remain silent about the blockade. We had to get the floor in order finally to begin discussing the problem which was worrying us. I saw our basic task as explaining to the deputies the fact that a blockade and a strike are two independent things. Talking about the blockade without having resolved the demarcation of these questions was the equivalent of trying to resolve a very complex problem without calling things by their proper names. So I began with this. I spoke further about the fact that a strike is a democratic means of protecting the rights of the working people, while the blockade is a weapon from the arsenal of cave-dwellers' methods of stifling human rights. I managed to focus the deputies' attention on the

existing situation in Armenia and noted that the parliament was discussing these contradictory concepts in just one context.

The second topic of the speech touched on the draft decree concerning extraordinary measures, a decree which spoke, in accordance with "our" usual traditions, about the "adoption of necessary measures prior to 9 October." I focused the deputies' attention on the necessity for the Supreme Soviet to respond precisely to this question: Can it take effective measures to remove the blockade? In the case of a negative, the only thing left for the population of Armenia, having studied the experience of the Leningrad blockade, is to survive this experience as well. After all, the NKAO has been surviving this blockade for a year and a half already. No matter how difficult it has been, nevertheless I ended my speech on an optimistic note, expressing the hope that the supreme authorities of the country would demand justice from the instigators, organizers, executors, and advocates of this immoral act.

The deputies began to pay particular attention. The deputy from Azerbaijan who spoke acknowledged to a significant degree that it is not a matter of strikes but of people's actions designed to resolve the NKAO problem. At this point the remaining deputies demanded a solution to the problem from the presidium. I think that it was very timely that Sergey Aleksandrovich Ambartsumyan ascended the speakers' stand. He demanded a political evaluation of the blockade, and condemnation of it, as well as creating a mechanism for removing it, resolving the problems, compensating for the damages, and punishing the guilty parties. At this, Deputy Anar, now speaking unequivocally, announced that the main point was a desperate people who did not know any other way of struggling. And this would continue, said the deputy from Azerbaijan, until such time as the territorial pretensions on the part of Armenia were renounced.

Approaching the end of the daytime session, the debates showed that the decree would not be passed in this form. It was necessary to put it into order, for it was a conglomeration of two decisions: concerning the blockade, and concerning extraordinary measures. It was a difficult task to combine them in one document. A commission was put together, under the leadership of N.I. Ryzhkov.

On our side the following people participated in the work: G. Voskanyan, S. Ambartsumyan, myself, and Z. Balayan as a representative of the NKAO. Each word of this document was born during the course of two hours of laborious proceedings, arguments, and debates.

The suggestion to get rid of the blockade for the preparations for winter—passed. The blockade was condemned, although without using this word. Probably due to the fact that people did not wish to acknowledge the existence of this ugly fact in our country. It was cast in a different formulation, the time period was removed and

"if necessary" was inserted, and the Council of Ministers was given the appropriate powers.

We returned to the hall. N.I. Ryzhkov read the text of the draft decree. The deputies began to discuss it, and then G. Igityan asked his question [... he himself will tell about this below—V.S.]. A.Kh. Vezirov took advantage of this question and made a fairly verbose speech. Each speech must be examined in the context of the concrete situation. In this sense, we were lucky that Z. Balayan was prepared to speak after him.

I would like to turn the readers' attention to the concluding speeches by M.I. Ryzhkov and M.S. Gorbachev. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers said that the NKAO problem must be resolved, and must be resolved in a political fashion, for the country must be administered by political measures, not by bayonets. Mikhail Sergeyevich said that the NKAO problem had existed since long ago, that only during the war years had it not been raised, and that historically this question had not been resolved in the best fashion. The problem must be resolved, he said, for the measures passed earlier did not remove it from the agenda. At the same time he emphasized that there would be no redrawing of borders.

In essence, the discussion of the blockade problem was completed, and a start was made on another, the most painful and urgent problem—the NKAO. In this plane, I would evaluate the recent days of parliamentary debates as productive. Because they served to establish our body of deputies. Establish in the sense that we worked harmoniously, coordinating our efforts.

[Igityan] I would like to begin with the fact that our delegation has worked and is continuing to work very intensively. Each of us is trying to contribute his bit to the common cause on the strength of his capacities and capabilities. And a concrete task has been set before us in these days—deblockading Armenia and the NKAO.

I spoke of the fact that if a political assessment of Sumgait had been provided in time, there would not have been any Fergana or Kokand. I am convinced that if the blockade had been condemned in time, there would not have been any danger that this anti-human form would develop like this. I went out onto the speakers' stand in order to "repent" in the name of my people. You see, it turns out that we ourselves caused Sumgait, the blockade, and are preventing the reconstruction of our cities and villages in the disaster zone. The deputies got the point, and later reacted with indignation to attempts by deputies from Azerbaijan to present us in just this light.

The progressive portion of the deputies very much feared an escalation of the situation. It seemed to them that Armenia was calling for a militarization of the country. A retort by Andrey Sakharov, I think, dispelled these opinions. He said: If a fire has broken out in an apartment, it is only necessary to extinguish the place which is on fire, it is not necessary to flood the entire apartment with water.

On Tuesday, after we had familiarized ourselves with the draft decree, I asked a very simple question of N.I. Ryzhkov and A.Kh. Vezirov. The leader of the Azerbaijan Communist Party demonstrated a significant degree of powerlessness: "You think that Vezirov does not want to let the trains in." Later he had much to say about the refugees. Then there followed what I consider a brilliant speech by Zoriy Valayan.

These speeches attest to the growing maturity of the body of deputies. All right, we are still learning. This too should be welcomed.

As a result, the document with which readers have now had the chance to become familiar was adopted. Of course, this document is incomplete. In this instance we are maximalists and would like to achieve greater things. After all, it discussed the railroad, but not highways. The word "blockade" was omitted.

But the concrete task remained: to bend every effort to break the blockade, and it must be admitted that every word of this decree was literally extorted.

NKAO People's Deputy Balayan Refutes Vezirov Supsov Statements

*90US0185B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
10 Oct 89 p 2*

[Interview with Zoriy Gaykovich Balayan, NKAO people's deputy: "And a Siege Too"]

[Text] Sharp debates at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet challenged the blockade of Armenia and the Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on the part of Azerbaijan. With great interest the session listened to the speeches by deputies Sergey Ambartsumyan, Zoriy Balayan, Lyudmila Arutyunyan, Genrikh Igityan, and especially Grant Voskanyan. By decision of the session, not one of the speeches of the deputies of both republics was shown on television.

We understand our countrymen, when under the conditions of the cruel and cynical blockade they pin their hopes on Moscow, on the Kremlin, where the work of the session is going on, and in response get either no information or, what is even more painful, disinformation.

Taking this circumstance into account, our correspondent turned to Zoriy Balayan, people's deputy from the NKAO, with a request to comment on the debates about the blockade at the Supreme Soviet session.

Agreeing to answer the newspaper's questions, Z. Balayan emphasized that the entire text of his interview repeated word for word the text of his speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

[KOMMUNIST] Zoriy Gaykovich, in his speech, Deputy A. Vezirov, like the other deputies from Azerbaijan, painted in dramatic terms the situation of the Azerbaijani refugees and did not say a single word about the fate of the Armenians who were forcibly expelled

from Baku and the regions of historic Armenia which were incorporated into Azerbaijan by Stalin.

Nor did he say anything about the blockade of Karabakh, although debates at the session raged around just this problem.

[Balayan] I think that parliamentary order was violated during the course of debates. At the very beginning we agreed, or rather, we were asked, not to raise the Karabakh question or the national question in general. For it would be heard separately, but for now we must pass the draft law about the blockade, we agreed to conclude the day specifically with the idea that we would hold debates about the draft proposed by Comrade Ryzhkov. But the speech by Deputy Vezirov forced us to say several words at this point by way of reply.

In all of the speeches by Azerbaijani deputies, without exception, much was said about the refugees of Azerbaijan nationality who had left their homes and left Armenia. Figures were cited. But we wanted precise information about the refugees to be heard, once and for all. And we appealed to Georgiy Tarazevich, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission for Nationality Policies and Interethnic Relations, asking him to provide precise information—how many Armenians had left the Azerbaijan SSR and how many Azerbaijanis had left Armenia? How many rubles' compensation had been paid to Azerbaijanis and how many had been paid to Armenians? Anticipating what Comrade Tarazevich would have to say, I must report that Armenians have not been paid a single kopeck, while the Azerbaijanis have been paid 70 million rubles by Armenia. As for the figures characterizing the migration, here I must say that half of the 150,000 Azerbaijanis who moved out of the Armenian SSR are people who were living in the disaster zone. They moved after the earthquake.

According to data which were reported to the country by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov at one time, following 7 December 1988 approximately 700,000 individuals were left homeless in Armenia. To this figure were added the approximately 300,000 Armenians who left the Azerbaijan SSR. A total of 207,000 Armenians who were born and lived in Baku have today been practically all deported from their city. We can count up all of them here. Some 50,000 Armenians have moved out of Kirovabad, and 70,000 from Khanlarskiy, Dashkesanskiy, and Shamkhorskiy rayons.

According to census data, as of 15 January 1979, 475,000 Armenians were residing in the Azerbaijan SSR. Today there are practically no Armenians: 150,000 in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), 22,000 in Shaumyanskiy Rayon, which borders the autonomous oblast to the north, and five Armenian population points in the so-called Khanlarskiy or Getashenskiy subrayon. Thus, a total of only 180,000 Armenians have remained in the Azerbaijan SSR. All the rest have been deported.

In the village of Chardakhlu, which Deputy Igityan mentioned at the session, and which has given the country two marshals, three Heroes of the Soviet Union, and hundreds of front-line soldiers, today not one single Armenian remains. Not one person. And suddenly, for the umpteenth time, on the high tribune they are talking about refugees who have left Armenia, about the fact that Azerbaijanis have no place to settle, about the fact that Azerbaijan is not made out of rubber. All right, let us resort to the figures again.

According to our figures, for every Azerbaijani who has left Armenia, there are two beds in the Azerbaijan SSR today. Two formerly Armenian beds. Moreover, it should be recalled that there is a decision of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers concerning the placement of the refugees in specific administrative regions. Of course, this list does not include—nor could it include—the Armenian autonomous oblast Artsakh. But the Azerbaijanis, along with the Meskhetian Turks, are for some reason being placed right in the NKAO.

Deputy Vezirov said at the session that 10,000 Azerbaijanis had moved out of the NKAO. Not a single Azerbaijani has moved out of the NKAO. In Shusha, Malibeylu, Khodzhallu, and Kesalare today there are refugees of Azerbaijan nationality who have moved out of the Armenian SSR. And this provocation act has been practically legitimized. At a recent session of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet it was suggested that all of the Azerbaijanis migrating into the republic be placed nowhere else but in Karabakh, in connection with the fact that, you see, this place has the climatic conditions which are suitable for them in all parameters.

One last thing. A decision was taken to establish in the Azerbaijan SSR a State Committee for Resettlers' [pere-selentsy] Affairs. In the situation which has developed, and under current conditions, I consider this decision provocation. Is it really not clear why this is being done? In the Armenian SSR today there are approximately 1 million people without homes—I think that these facts should be confirmed by comrades Ryzhkov and Voronin. But we have no State Committee for Refugees' Affairs. I repeat, isn't it obvious, really, that Azerbaijan is doing this not by any means out of concern for the fate of the resettlers, but only in order to place them in Karabakh? Armenia is not made out of rubber either, it is stony, its territory—29,000 square kilometers—is three times smaller than Azerbaijan's.

[KOMMUNIST] You participated in the work on the draft decree concerning extraordinary measures in transport. How come it didn't single out the question of the blockade of Armenia and the NKAO?

[Balayan] We devoted a great deal of time to working on the draft. We devoted it to the blockade. In the draft it says that if necessary, and it became necessary long ago, the powers and means not only of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs but also the USSR Ministry of Defense should immediately be brought into action in order to

remove the blockade and assure security in transportation. The things needed to sustain life, particularly in railroad transport, are the essence of strategic concepts.

In this connection I would like to say one more thing. Today we are permitting a great mistake, when we talk only about the two-month blockade of Armenia. In doing so, we are for some reason forgetting that the national-state enclave of the NKAO has been under the blockade for a year and a half now. The only "road of life" which connects Karabakh with the outside world has been blocked off. This is the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert Road. The USSR CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers decree of 24 March 1988 makes special mention of this road. The decree, which is signed by comrades Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, directs that this road be immediately built and restored. There is even a figure cited here—75 kilometers. Although we all know full well that this road is about 105 kilometers in length. But we also understand that this figure is not cited in the document by accident. Taking into account that this is the only road, for all its twists and turns, it was decided to straighten it, correct it, go through passes, cut through hills, and make tunnels. And all of this in order to reduce the road's hairpin turns, in order to obtain a reliable transport connection.

I don't know whether the leadership of Azerbaijan answers to the USSR CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers about the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of party-government decisions. But I know one thing for sure: the decree about constructing this road has been completely ignored. As of today not a single meter of this road has been restored or constructed. Not only that, half of it has been put out of commission. And Karabakh, as an administrative enclave, is not only under a blockade, but even under siege. And suddenly we are not taking any sort of decision with regard to the blockade and siege of Nagorny Karabakh. I asked Comrade Ryzhkov, working in his office on the staff of the blockade commission, to add, here, where it talks about railroad transport, a comma, or the conjunction "and [i]," and then the phrase "automotive transport," having in mind the specific circumstances of Artsakh. This was not done, although at my urgent request they did remove, in one place in the text, the word "railroad," leaving only "transport," which also implies automotive, river, maritime, and air transport. I believe that the blockade and siege of Karabakh must be immediately removed.

Political Goals of New Armenian Workers Association Outlined

90US0179A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
12 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by V. Tsvetkova: "OSTKA: The Will of the Labor Collectives"]

[Text] "Over many years, the administrative-command system of government has led the country to a serious crisis in the economy, the social sphere, and foreign

relations, and to a catastrophic situation in the environment. The delay in solving the problems of reuniting the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast with Soviet Armenia, the numerous refugees from Azerbaijan, the catastrophic earthquake, the blockade—have deepened the general crisis in Armenia even more. The situation that has been created can be corrected only by reorganizing the republic's system of government on the bases of people's rule and through uniting the nation's forces." These are lines from the Declaration that was adopted at the Founding Congress of the Soviets of Labor Collectives of Armenia, which took place a few days ago.

In order to strengthen Armenia's political and economic might, which is based on the principles of self-administration and republic economic accounting, it is necessary to unite the creative forces of all of the labor collectives, the role of which lately has grown perceptibly in public life. At the Congress of Labor Collectives, a new organization was created—the Association of Soviets of Labor Collectives of Armenia (OSTKA), which, as the program points out, will coordinate those efforts of the Armenian workers which are directed toward the economic flowering of the republic and the entire Armenian people, and toward the development of self-administration, based on strengthening the rights of labor collectives that have to do with the means of production and active participation in the process of broadening the people's sovereignty.

The Association of Soviets of Labor Collectives, established by the Congress, has refused a centralized administration, and has chosen a coordinating council, which will not issue commands, but will develop recommendations for the Soviets of Labor Collectives locally, and will coordinate their activities. OSTKA will operate through its press organs and an information center, which also will carry the necessary information to the Soviets of Labor Collectives. Working committees have been created, as well: on assisting people's deputies, on the introduction and development of methods of self-administration at enterprises, on the preparation and implementation of legislative initiatives, and on perfecting the republic's economic model. A working group (Artsakh), which was created separately, will deal directly with assisting in the establishment of closer economic ties between the enterprises and labor collectives of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia; there is also a group with the conditional title "Disaster Zone."

At the Congress, a large amount of attention was devoted to the question of creating a republic market on the basis of direct contractual ties, which will make it possible, first of all, to predict the stable development of various enterprises and of the republic's economy as a whole; and second, to decrease the economic loss caused by the blockade from Azerbaijan.

OSTKA's program is also varied in the area of the development of production relations and legal questions. Mostly, it is concerned with working out a law on the legal protection of enterprises, on the social safeguarding

of workers, on creating the conditions for a shift from the administrative-command principle to the contractual-legal principle of relations between enterprises and administrative organs.

An anxious call issued from the Congress' podium to aid in improving the ecological state of the republic. It is no secret that the pollution of the environment and the harmful release into the atmosphere of wastes from industrial enterprises, resulting from the utilization of obsolete technology in production, are leading to the mass poisoning of people, causing various diseases and the birth of sick children, and are doing irrevocable damage to the environment.

Many important problems were raised at the Founding Congress of the Soviets of Labor Collectives. Armenia's technical intelligentsia has announced its goal of assisting in the socio-economic development of its native region, in transforming Armenia into a politically and economically strong republic. **During the intermission, we interviewed members of the initiative group and the Congress' participants.**

[Levon Kazaryan, instructor at the Yerevan Institute of Economics] In our time, labor collectives are acquiring a real strength; people listen to their opinions. The economy and man are interdependent. No matter how good a law is, if it is not understood by the collective, or not adopted by it—it does nothing. In our memory, more than a few declarations and decisions that have hardly been born, have died. For this reason, the "approbation" of economic drafts must be conducted right in the labor collectives—after all, it is they who will bring these drafts to life. It is exactly the labor collective soviet at each enterprise that is the basic unit of self-administration, and uniting them in OSTKA creates a powerful mechanism for the republic's self-administration.

[Robert Akopyan, head of the department of integration at Sevan, the Yerevan Mathematical Machines Scientific Research Institute MPO experimental factory] The essence of the OSTKA program is to attain an independent economy, to create a domestic market in the republic, saturated with goods, especially consumer goods. We will attract experienced lawyers, economists, sociologists, and ecologists to work in OSTKA, who will give any collective the necessary consultation needed to improve the health of its financial and economic operation. OSTKA will coordinate the work of enterprises, and will them in introducing ecologically clean, progressive technologies.

[Simon Shakhazizyan, scientific associate at the Yerevan Institute of Physics] The nation, half of which is located outside of the country, and more than one third—in diaspora in the Soviet Union, has only one opportunity to retain its statehood, to develop and strengthen it—this is to become a self-administrating nation, to have a dynamic and continually developing national program that is in keeping with the times and the political situation. Every Armenian must be taught from the

cradle in the spirit of national state thinking, and not to allow the divergance of personal and national interests.

The interaction of the Association of Soviets of Labor Collectives with other public organizations that express the interests of various social groups and of the people as a whole, aids in correctly formulating the tasks to which the united forces of the labor collectives should be directed. For example, the Union of Scientists that has been created in Armenia places before itself the task of studying the state of the science sphere in the republic, and of working out prospective directions for scientific and public development. The task of OSTKA is to blow life into these beginnings, and to realize the existing programs.

Armenian Workers Group Issues Appeal On NKAO Issue

90US0179B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
15 Oct 89 pp 1-2

["Appeal of the Association of Soviets of Labor Collectives of Armenian to the Country's Soviets of Labor Collectives at Enterprises and Organizations"]

[Text] Respected comrades!

Extraordinary circumstances have forced us to appeal to you. The blockade of the Armenian SSR has been going on for more than two months; the blockade of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] that is being conducted by the Azerbaijan SSR has gone on for over a year and a half. Armenia and the NKAO are almost isolated from the country. Food and fuel are not arriving, there are not enough construction materials, the greater portion of the transportation vehicles are standing still, many enterprises are stopped, and the harvest is not being freighted out. Already, damage in the billions of rubles has been done to the economy of the entire country. The blockade has had an especially serious effect on restoration work in the zone of the catastrophic earthquake. Construction workers who have come from all parts of the country and from abroad to give us brotherly aid are forced to sit idle. Hundreds of thousands of people remain without shelter on the threshold of a harsh mountain winter.

Think, comrades, about this word: blockade. Remember...

How, in a union government, did these kinds of actions, made by one republic against another, become possible? How can a republic blockade an autonomous oblast? In accordance with the norms of international law, a blockade is tantamount to aggression. Why, then, does the leadership of the country not fulfill its constitutional obligations to defend one of the peoples that is a part of the Soviet federation? Because it cannot, or because it does not wish to? Or does the dummy "People's Front of Azerbaijan" give orders outside the borders of its own republic, as well?

In our labor collectives, among the people, we are deeply disenchanted by the results of the past CPSU Central Committee Plenum and by the progress of the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Under the pretext of searching for the "reasons for the blockade," attempts are being made to smudge the positions of the two sides and to give them equal status. There is open chicanery, the facts are being ignored, and there is an unwillingness to call things by their real names. The political problem is reduced to its purely economic aspects, and unbiased delays and postponements are being allowed. The half-baked decisions that are made in the general pot do not give clear guarantees. And all this is occurring on the background of the indifference of the majority of the participants.

It is time, finally, to understand that if the blockade is given no political assessment, if it is not judged as an illegal and anti-human act, if the initiators, organizers, and executors are not exposed and brought to criminal account, if compensation for the damages done is not demanded, then extremely serious consequences could follow for the whole country. Political shortsightedness and immorality do not pass by without leaving a trace. Indulgence towards the organizers of the genocide at Sumgait leads to the atrocities in Fergana, while the lies about the events at the Zvartnots airport are followed by the punitive action taken in Tbilisi. The boomerangs are returning...

Special mention should be made of the role of the central mass media. The fact that the majority of Soviet people have no idea of the actual events "in Nagorno-Karabakh and environs" saddens us, but it does not surprise us. After all, the truth is stubbornly concealed, the facts are ignored or distorted. A taboo has been placed even on information about discussion of these questions in the Supreme Soviet. The journalists and officials who appear on the pages of the majority of publications and who broadcast from the screens frequently hold an openly one-sided, inflammatory position. There are many examples of this. Just lately, there has been a noticeable attempt to portray the issue as an inter-ethnic squabble, the barbaric enmity of two half-wild peoples, led by "the opponents of restructuring" and "nationalists." All of this is accompanied by Pharisaical exhortations, appeals to reason, and calls for reconciliation and compromise.

But under what conditions is this "compromise" possible? They announce to us: "Give up Karabakh—and we will take down the blockade." Consequently, the economic blockade is a means of forceful pressure, the current argument put forth with the goal of not permitting a fair resolution for the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

What is the essence of this problem? If we shuck off the wordy husk from it about "redrawing the borders, territorial claims," and so on, the main issue remains—the question of realizing or violating the nations' right to self-determination. We will not plunge into historical

excursions; we will only note that it was exactly here, in the monasteries of ancient Artsakh, where the creator of the Armenian written language, Mesrop Mashtots, opened his first schools back in the fifth century. In 1921, with the participation and under the direct pressure of Stalin, the Caucasian Bureau of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] adopted the decision that Nagorno-Karabakh, the population of which was 95 percent Armenian, be transferred to Azerbaijan. From that time, the policy of national oppression has not ceased, nor has the national liberation movement ceased. Yes, there really is national oppression and a national liberation movement in the "brotherly family of peoples." We must resign ourselves to the idea that the most "frightening" words from our "foreign" lexicon turn out to be applicable to events occurring here, at home. For decades, the policy of the leadership of Azerbaijan has been aimed at assimilating or expelling Armenians; discrimination has taken over practically all aspects of life—the socio-economic sphere, the law, health care, education, language, culture, historical legacy, ties with Armenia. And throughout this entire period, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been putting forth the demand that they be reunited with the Armenian SSR.

The course set for restructuring, the hopes for democratization, for building a lawful government, have stirred people up. In the course of 1987, at almost all of the enterprises and collective and state farms of the NKAO, meetings of workers' collectives were held that adopted decrees on the necessity of reuniting the area with Armenia. The very same decrees were adopted at the beginning of the 1988 session of the regional Soviets of People's Deputies.

On February 20, 1988 the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, expressing the will of the overwhelming majority of the oblast's population, 80 percent of which is Armenian, adopted a decision to appeal to the USSR, Azerbaijan SSR, and Armenian SSR Supreme Soviets with the request to transfer the NKAO from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. An analogous decision was adopted by the plenum of the oblast party committee. The hasty reaction from the center was simply negative; everything was explained as usual by the intrigues of "extremists," and the verse about "korruptivnyye elements" was put into circulation.

From the very first days, the workers of Armenia, at their gatherings, conferences, demonstrations, and meetings, unanimously supported the oblast Soviet deputies' just demand, which called for a solution to the problem in the spirit of Leninist national policy, in the spirit of the new thinking declared by restructuring. (It is interesting that one of the slogans read "The Nagorno-Karabakh problem is a test of restructuring".) For the sake of fairness it should be noted that at the beginning the Azerbaijani population, both in the oblast itself and outside of its borders, in the majority reacted fairly

calmly towards the events that were taking place. At the first meetings in Stepanakert, Armenians and Azerbaijanis stood together.

However, certain circles that were not invested in the country's democratic development used the situation to make the two nations clash, presenting the affair as a "fight over land." The ideas of an "encroachment upon one's native land," of "insidious neighbors," of "a national insult," etc. were dictated to the Azerbaijan people. And then came the thunderclap of Sumgait. For three days in a row, twenty minutes out of Baku, people were beaten, robbed, raped, and murdered, solely because they were Armenians. International law specifies such crimes as genocide; Soviet lawyers called it hooliganism. Thus, the Soviet people did not learn the truth; the real culprits went unpunished. No political assessment was given, not a word of judgement or condolence was pronounced. It is superfluous to say that this policy is amoral; we will say only that it is shortsighted. After all, it was made clear to everyone that here even this is possible, it goes unpunished.

The Armenian people's deep sorrow and rightful anger have not clouded their judgement. No reciprocal violence has followed. Sumgait, which was supposed to frighten Armenians, contributed to an even greater consolidation of the nation, which went about achieving the fulfillment of its just demands through peaceful, constitutional methods. However, escalation of the violence continued. Mass poisoning in the city of Masis, traps set in the village of Khodzhalu, provocative hysteria around Topkhana, the mass beating of Armenians in Kirovobad, and persecution in Baku. It is terribly bitter to admit it, but in November, outbreaks of violence had already taken on a mutual character. Waves of refugees stretched from both sides. The game being played at one goal and the policy of half-measures only deepened the gulf between the two nations.

Now the NKAO is on the brink of a most serious catastrophe. Besides the external blockade, an "internal" blockade is being conducted, as well—between separate populated points in the oblast. Famine is imminent, infectious diseases are spreading, armed clashes are occurring.

In violation of the USSR Constitution, Soviet authority has been eliminated in the oblast—the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has been dissolved. In violation of the CPSU Charter, the oblast has been deprived of party leadership—the oblast party committee has been abolished. The Special Administration Committee that was created in January, but which has not, however, been endowed with real authority, is conducting a two-faced policy that causes dissatisfaction on both sides. The recently formed National Soviet has taken upon itself the task of stabilizing the situation before the restoration of the oblast Soviet. The postponement of a political solution is aggravating the oblast's economic situation, supercharging the moral-psychological atmosphere, and

is making an explosive situation more acute, pushing both nations onto the road that leads to direct warfare.

The unceasing blockade of the NKAO leaves no illusions about the intentions of the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR, which is skillfully directing the actions of the "patriotic" intelligentsia and the "informals", who have just appeared. The basic goal is to complete the Azerbaijanization of the oblast, to force the Armenians to leave their historic motherland, using the experience already gained by the Nakhichevan ASSR, from whence the Armenians, who at one time constituted the majority, have in the years of Soviet power been expelled completely. Let each of you imagine that a portion of your own nation has been forcibly uprooted and made subject to humiliation, and let each person answer himself, can the Artsakhites give up their righteous battle, and do the Armenian people have the right to be indifferent to the fate of their brothers.

A few days ago the press hastened to gladden readers with the news that "the trains have started up," that the mythical "transportation strike" is over. This is another lie. The blockade of the Armenian SSR and the NKAO continues. The highways are blockaded; the few trains that have been let through have brought only metal for road-building and sand, rotting produce, broken and ransacked shelters and equipment, cement flooded with water, and empty fuel tanks. And at the same time, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is adopting a law "On Sovereignty," with the goal of perpetuating the annexation, and depriving the autonomous oblast of any sovereignty whatsoever. The republic reserves the exclusive right to annul the autonomous oblast, or even to pull it out, along with itself, of the USSR, without considering the opinion of the oblast's population. These openly provocative statements were used for the purpose of blackmailing not only the Armenians, but the center, as well. One gets the impression that the authors of the policy "divide and rule," having let the genie out of the bottle, have lost control of the situation.

It is bitter to write about all of this. It is probably bitter to read it, too... We call upon you, comrades, to realize the full seriousness of the situation, to cast off your neutrality, behind which indifference often hides. Demand complete and objective information, and draw your own conclusions about the state of affairs only on that basis.

We call upon you to demand an immediate political solution to the problem of the NKAO, based on the right to self-determination. Under the present circumstances, we believe it is necessary to withdraw the oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR as soon as possible, to restore the oblast organs of authority and their direct subordination to union organs, and to conduct a referendum among the entire population of the NKAO on its future status.

In the name of the labor collectives of Armenia, we call upon you to judge decisively the blockade of the Armenian SSR and the NKAO that is being conducted by

Azerbaijan; we call upon you to demand a political assessment of it, to demand punishment for the guilty and compensation for damages. And mainly—to demand full and unconditional removal of the blockade on all of the roads leading to the Armenian SSR and the NKAO.

Understand that this catastrophe knocks not only on our door!

Respected comrades, we appeal to you in the hope of breaking through the informational blockade, to bring the true state of affairs to the attention of the Soviet people.

We ask that you acquaint the members of your labor collectives with the contents of our Appeal.

Adopted at an expanded meeting of the coordinating council of OSTKA, 6 October 1989, Yerevan.

Interregional Deputies Group Members Discuss NKAO

*90US0199A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
15 Oct 89 p 2*

[Report by KOMMUNIST special correspondent V. Sarkisyan, Moscow, 9 Oct: "Interregional Group Holds Session"]

[Text] Moscow, 9 October—Everything which was discussed that evening at the meeting of the coordinating council of the Interregional Deputies Group (IDG) has aroused enormous interest. These fireworks of ideas are impressive. And many things were discussed. In Moscow a new political club of voters, attached to the House of Cinema, has appeared. The IDG ascribes serious significance to this form of people's political activity (I think that this experience should be taken up in our republic as well). An association of young leaders of industrial enterprises has been created. A publication in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA criticizing Yu. Afanasyev was regarded with alarm (earlier this lot fell to two other co-chairmen: Yeltsin and Sakharov). Deputies investigated the principal suggestions for developing economic reform and the cooperative movement. They criticized the practice of trips abroad by parliamentary groups without the appropriate discussion by the Supreme Soviet.

But readers, unquestionably, will be more interested in the discussion which touches directly on our region. Before commenting on this far from unanimous exchange of opinions, I will present a brief transcript of it. I think such a form of presenting the material is justified in this case, for each one of us has the right to draw his own conclusions.... [G. Starovoytova] Yesterday a deputy of the Bundestag came to me. He was coordinating the construction of a hospital in Spitak. He was well informed about what is going on in the Transcaucasus. They believe that Armenia is just as much in

need of assistance as after the earthquake. It was suggested to organize an air bridge from the FRG to Yerevan to supply fuel until the blockade is lifted. In response, the country's Council of Ministers regards this action as humane. It was also said, however, that such a step might provoke an ambivalent reaction in the region, and for this reason they refused to implement this project.

...Now as regards the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet session. I think that sovereignty is a noble cause. But the decision was taken that the republic itself would determine the administrative-territorial structure—that is, Azerbaijan reserves the right to break up the NKAO. Other resolutions of the session also raise doubts. Let us see how the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium reacts, because there are clear violations of the union Constitution in these resolutions. In their turn the almost analogous resolutions of the Estonians brought a reaction from the Center which was immediate and unequivocal.

...The fact that we have not passed a resolution condemning the blockade, I consider to be a mistake. Yes, there was an attempt to carry out negotiations between the informals of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The blockade is one thing, and negotiations are another. It must be said that certain circles in Armenia are displeased with our silence.

[A. Sakharov] Someone here participated in these negotiations. Where is he?

[A. Yablokov] Chelyshev came, but he got sick and went to Zaporozhye. If you like, I can tell you about it.

[Yu. Afanasyev] Yesterday I got a call from the Azerbaijan People's Front with a request to step up the IDG's participation in normalizing the situation. That is, there is a clear striving of this sort on the Azerbaijan side.

[G. Igityan] The Azerbaijanis have just one goal: to force the Armenians to give up their support of Karabakh.

[A. Sakharov] In that case they must be told that only ending the blockade can be the basis for any sort of negotiations.

[Yu. Afanasyev] Galina Vasilyevna says that we have made a mistake, and we must make things clear here. If we have made a mistake, then we can correct it. During those days the situation was complex. V. Palm led the negotiations, and he came with the report that an agreement was within reach, but it was broken off by the Armenian side. Then he said that evidently he had not understood everything and gave up on negotiations. The situation was equivocal. Palm announced that he rejected any sort of mediation, because it would not be well founded. The time was late, and a resolution condemning the blockade would have been passed too hastily. So I proposed meeting on the following day and working out a decision. This is a principled claim. It must be explained.

[G. Igityan] In any case, the blockade is an immoral action. And it must be condemned. You know full well the ultimatum of that side regarding this. How could we agree to that?

[Yu. Afanasyev] We must work out a position for the coordinating council, and then for the general assembly of the IDG, but unilaterally condemning the blockade is impossible.

[G. Igityan] It is impossible to condemn the blockade?...

[S. Stankevich] The newspapers write that Nakhichevan ASSR is also blockaded. If we condemn anything, it should be all forms of force.

[Igityan, Starovoytova] That's not true!

[A. Obolenskiy] Where are you getting that information from? Judging by geography, freight can come into Nakhichevan only through Armenia. That part is true. As for the other thing—who has blocked off the railroad: Armenians or Azerbaijanis?

[Voice] What are you talking about? Just you take a better look at the map!

[G. Popov] This will never work. If they want to use force and twist our arm, they're not going to get anywhere. We must act with maximum caution. I am willing to condemn the blockade. But I must have exhaustive information about the two blockades. Incidentally, I receive letters and telegrams from Russians who are living in Azerbaijan. They condemn the Karabakh movement.

[Voice] We know how those letters are cooked up!

[A. Yablokov] Chelyshev is the only one of us who has met with both the People's Front and the Karabakh Committee. It's a shame that he isn't here.

[A. Sakharov] For as long as the blockade goes on, it is necessary to break off any attempts at negotiations. On what grounds could they be conducted?

[S. Stankevich] Then there will not be any negotiations at all.

[A. Sakharov] But on what sort of grounds could the negotiations be conducted?

[S. Stankevich] Well, yes, but in that case it will be necessary to send troops in and—who knows what will start?... Is this what you are proposing?

[A. Sakharov] No one has to propose that. For as long as the blockade continues we must break off any attempts at negotiations.

[S. Stankevich] Fine. We won't conduct any negotiations, and the blockade will continue. Armenia is dying from hunger. What are we supposed to do?

[A. Sakharov] The government is taking on the responsibility of ending the blockade, and will use force if necessary.

[A. Yablokov] We must get the government to break the blockade using aviation.

[Voice] And who is flying at all these days?

[A. Yablokov] Judging by Chelyshev's report, only Armenian pilots are flying out of Baku.

[G. Popov] And so we are adopting a declaration condemning blockades as a pressure method, as an unacceptable form of force, without naming either the one or the other republic.

[V. Tikhonov] We should add that only the removal of the blockade will serve as the condition for holding negotiations. I would suggest yet a third point—appeal to the government with the demand that they take immediate measures to supply the people of Armenia. In addition to this, we must appeal to the parliaments of the world and clearly declare that the blockade is a form of genocide against a people who have suffered from a monstrous earthquake, and work out measures to provide the Armenian people with everything they need.

[Voice] We are holding out....

[G. Popov] These points are absolutely unambiguous. I can vote for mediation, for cooperation in negotiations. This I can do.

[S. Stankevich] We must move in the direction of the proposals on which we have the maximum agreement. Everyone is agreed to condemn the blockade. In any case it is essential to provide Armenia with all necessary things. We must demand this from the government. We must not permit mass hunger which would force enterprises to shut down. But even this will not remove the urgency, unless we eliminate the first cause. We need an interethnic reconciliation, the formula of which can be worked out by the two conflicting sides. And a third party which will facilitate resolution of the conflict. We need to create a trilateral commission for interethnic reconciliation and include on it both representatives of the Supreme Soviets of both republics, and social organizations, and also four individuals from the NKAO—two Armenians and two Azerbaijanis. And give them two weeks to work out a formula. Otherwise we will be drawn into endless blockades, deblockades, and waves of violence which will have to be suppressed by counterforce.

[G. Popov] The Supreme Soviets of both republics have turned out to be ineffective. The real powers are the People's Fronts. What can there be to discuss, when the population of Azerbaijan expresses a complete lack of confidence in the republic's Supreme Soviet and the deputies. Even those who are in Moscow.

[Yu. Afanasyev] I am in favor of condemning the blockade and giving assistance to Armenia. It can be limited to this.

[G. Popov] To sum up. The first thing is to condemn the blockade. The second thing is to take measures to provide Armenia with all that is necessary.

[V. Tikhonov] We must not confine ourselves to this. We must make constructive proposals. Winter is approaching. Construction in the disaster zone has been suspended. Hundreds of thousands of people have been left homeless. Therefore, the second point must say something about resuming the construction and providing Armenia with construction materials.

[S. Stankevich] "All that is necessary" implies construction materials too....

I must note that the process of discussing the problem made a contradictory impression on me. Let us begin, if you will, with the fact that several members of the IDG are very afraid of a "military precedent." But democracy must also be defended. For some reason we do not become indignant when, during the American air controllers' strike, extraordinary measures are taken, and the government uses military specialists in these positions. The government of any civilized country in Europe is not slow to take the harshest measures when necessary. So, why be afraid of a precedent here, where the union government is simply obliged to take the sternest measures in order to remove this monstrous blockade?

I got the impression that several members of the IDG had taken up the notorious "policy of parity." Turn your attention to the fact that the interregional group condemned **not a specific blockade**, but rather that **type of coercion in general**. But this is as clear as broad daylight. Let's suppose that in a year this situation is repeated in another region of the country. What will the reaction of the IDG be? Will the interregional group refer back to the resolution adopted last Friday, or will there be a new reaction to the specific event in a specific region?

Actions of Armenian Deputies Group in Supsov Blockade Debate Explored

90US0199B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
21 Oct 89 p 4

[Report by *KOMMUNIST* special correspondent V. Sarkisyan, Moscow-Yerevan: "Polemical Notes. The Corps of Deputies"]

[Text] Moscow-Yerevan—Various different things are being said in Yerevan about our republic's corps of deputies. Some consider it weak, others criticize their elected representatives for inertia. Until recently, the absence of reliable information, and the meager television reporting doled out in the late hours of the evening, made it impossible to form a sufficiently objective opinion about this. This article was put together based on the opinions

and doubts of the USSR people's deputies themselves, personal observations during the course of one week, and scarcely the most dramatic week, in the life of our delegation. The week ended, as everyone knows, when the deputies from the Armenian SSR were forced to leave the session hall, as a sign of protest....

It seemed important to begin this talk with a skeptical formulation of the question about the "weak corps." Objectively, and even in practical terms, our delegation is not inferior in ability to its "opponents" in any parameter at all. It is usual to make judgments based on the results of labor. You will agree that not a single deputation celebrated a "victory." Such are not only impossible but also not allowable in the country's parliament. For here we are called upon to work out all-union legislative acts, and settle questions of domestic and foreign policy aimed at the triumph of truth. And this truth is the same for everyone. Alas, in this conglomerate of nationalities, each one, in the grip of severe problems, is still trying "to pull the holey blanket over to its side." The holes aren't getting smaller. But sometimes such practices lead to frank misunderstanding of neighbors' particular problems. Just recall the ambivalent reaction evoked among some of the deputies by the discussion of the question of extraordinary measures on the railroad. It seemed to many, in particular to representatives of the Baltic republics, that it could quite possibly lead to a further escalation of tensions.

Far from the heated debates and unseen parliamentary struggle, sometimes things seem to us to be much simpler than they really are. In a recent interview on Armenian television, Zoriy Balayan confessed that our delegation is to some extent in a blockade there as well. Rather bluntly stated, of course, but for many these words were a revelation. Every hour, day, and night during the period of sessions is a parliamentary struggle. So no other words would be suitable. Let me cite just one typical case.

An all-union minister returned from an inspection tour. He was going to make a statement which would largely facilitate the shaping of a complete impression about events on the railroad. In the lobby he made no secret of his position, based on the notorious parity. Within 10 minutes of parliamentary recess, Goar Yenokyan not only succeeded in convincing the minister of the erroneousness of his approach but also in compelling him to draw the appropriate conclusions. In short, he spoke without a "prepared" text. He had to possess abundant factological material and courage in order to achieve the seemingly impossible in... 10 minutes.

Probably the hardest task is to get the audience in the mood, to draw everyone's attention and gain not only mutual understanding but sympathy. Yes, it is necessary to take risks, sometimes outside the bounds of the permissible. From the statement of Lyudmilla Arutyunyan at the day session of 3 October: "Our people know that the Supreme Soviet is naive, but not so naive as to

count a blockade a strike." In several different paragraphs, that sentence would later wind up on the pages of PRAVDA. Here is one comment: "In this way, off the cuff, in an attempt to strike a blow against the 'adversary,' an untactful 'assessment' is made against the whole parliament." These lines need no further commentary. PRAVDA's well known conservatism seems to demonstrate that there are those who would wish to introduce the practice of pungency "in small doses" in parliament as well. What is needed in such cases is considerable strength of will and conviction of the rightness of one's position in order to, in addition, defend oneself against being pounced upon from the right and the left.

Parliamentary debates require special mastery of the art of improvisation. They require the gift of a grand master who can calculate several moves in advance; otherwise, a seemingly apt phrase may be cleverly turned against you. Genrikh Igityan asked a very simple question (our newspaper recounted this episode). In response, the leader of our neighboring republic held the floor for 20 whole minutes. Sentiments in the hall were changing. But his speech was brilliantly answered by Zoriy Balayan. It's all in the homework, as chess players say. On that day (the blockade situation was being discussed) everything went off like clockwork, in one breath. Our corps has never experienced such coordination of words and actions.

Every word, phrase, or retort uttered in this hall needs to be weighed very carefully. It is very strange when a speech by an Armenian deputy is interrupted by a remark... from "our own" bench. Even if true, the parliamentary struggle cannot stand differences of opinion in our own camp.

The character of any corps is determined by its leaders. They are distinguished from the others by their uncompromising and principled stand, by their ability to convey their thoughts succinctly and convincingly in Russian. No sociological surveys have been taken yet, but according to the deputies themselves the audience has to a certain extent "got tired" of people who keep repeating themselves. What is needed is new faces, for anything new brings in fresh thinking, a different view of things. So far, however, many of our deputies prefer to keep silent. Despite my attempts during my brief and heavily scheduled trip, unfortunately, I was not able to meet with everyone and talk about this subject.

Deputies from other regions of the country have stated that the members of our delegation show interest only during discussions of interethnic problems and prefer to keep silent during debates on other matters. Why? Practically all our deputies have acknowledged that any departure from the "main" theme of concern to the people leads to a backlash. There is an increase in the number of telephone calls, letters, and telegrams with this very unequivocal content: "What did we send you to Moscow for?" We will return to this subject later, but at this point let us say that this oversimplified, primitive approach to the work of the deputies hampers their activities.

We met with Elmir Arutyunyan and Armen Kirakosyan on the day of the glorious celebration of the Soviet Constitution.

"My time has not yet come," said E. Arutyunyan. "When discussion turns to the main question, I will 'make use of' my silence. They will have to give me the floor."

Apparently, this notion appealed to A. Kirovakan, the deputy from the Komsomol, because he nodded his head in agreement. I don't know whether many of our other deputies of the silent camp share what Arutyunyan said, but you have to agree that this rather curious policy can, on some particular day, lead to unforeseen differences of opinion.

Every deputy has the right to his own opinion, of course, and his own statement. I had the chance to look over some prepared texts. Let me say honestly that they are all right for rallies in Yerevan but are unsuitable for parliamentary struggle. In particular because they do not fit within a general system leading to concrete results. It is essential to point all speeches, regardless of the time allotted to them, toward achieving one specific goal. Although we have acknowledged that the character of the corps is determined by its leaders, we must also bear in mind another truth: **the work of our delegation is not the labor of particular individuals.** How to achieve, how to increase the efficiency of each particular member is the question of questions.

Everyone admits that we are learning. This is absolutely true. G. Igityan is right: a man who was not born a Van Gogh is never going to become one. All we can do is count on the diligence of our elected representatives and demand that they grow. We cannot compare such an experienced political figure as Sergey Aleksandrovich Ambartsumyan with a lathe operator who is just taking his first steps in the political arena. But the present session has clearly revealed who's who. For this reason, **it is the prime duty of voters to demand that deputies show definite growth in political knowledge.**

I dropped in on Bavakan Mnatsakanyan at work. She was studying materials and making notes. What she said seemed important.

"I have never spared myself in efforts for the common cause. I do my best, but it's hard. I don't know Russian well enough. I'm studying, making up for lost time. When they wanted to elect me to the country's Supreme Soviet, I appealed to many and attempted to dissuade them. I would be more useful in my home village, rayon, republic. Here in Moscow, I find it hard. I can only speak from a prepared text. Believe me, I sincerely envy my friends Lyudmila and Goar. They are tougher than some men. I am greatly hampered by the language barrier. If they can find someone who is better able to cope with a deputy's duties, I am ready to give up my credentials."

We said goodbye to one another. Bavakan sat down at her desk. You don't very often get that kind of frankness

and courage. I was surprised when I heard almost the same words from Lyudmila Arutyunyan.

"I'm ready to give up my credentials at any time. Let some more professional deputy take my place."

It may be that these words were not spoken at the best moments of Lyudmila Akopovna's parliamentary life. For she has also stated different words: "A nation's sacred right to self-determination is higher than the ambitions of reactionaries of any stripe. It is with this understanding that I fulfill my duty as deputy." These words might be endorsed by all the members of our delegation. But every one of them carries out this mission on the strength of his own abilities and potential.

We now realize that the deployment of forces in our corps was not entirely correct tactically from the professional standpoint. We are sorely in need of jurists and economists. Of course the pre-election campaign took place at a time that was very difficult for the people, and perhaps for this reason, because of a number of factors, we forgot about an outstanding economist and a no less talented political scientist who are living in Moscow, and many others who are residents of Yerevan, who are professionally trained for the difficult parliamentary struggle. I do not intend to force the idea on anyone, in particular because we are all learning to be good voters and to elect the best deputies. The period since 26 March has shown that there are deputies who are dealing with the issues in a serious and professional manner, while others are just sitting it out in the Supreme Soviet.

At any rate, our deputies need help, appropriate consultation. How well is this being done? In the capital city I happened to meet with a group of qualified specialists who are providing the necessary help. It turned out that organizational problems related to the group have not been resolved, and some of them were getting ready to return to Yerevan. And that's what happened. Simple laxity and dilettantism took their toll in these matters. Having realized the necessity of providing assistance to the corps, we cannot conduct the effort on an amateur basis.

Consider the question of aides. This conversation took place with E. Arutyunyan.

"You don't need an aide?"

"No. What kind of deputy am I if I can't draft a letter or the text of a speech on my own? Unless I'm mistaken, the pay for an aide is set at 300 rubles. And how much do we deputies get? Over 2000. Yet we talk about the shortage of money for social needs. Quite a reserve!"

An interesting thought! Meanwhile, deputies from other regions have found energetic young people who are jurists, and they are taking care of a big part of the work front. It is not a question of giving a young person a job—it's a matter of enhancing the effectiveness of the people's elected representative himself. An American congressman or British member of parliament has a

whole staff of aides. And no one thinks that this money is being wasted or ought to be channeled somewhere else. I had the chance to meet G. Yenokyan's aide, Feliks Tokhyan, a professional jurist and candidate of science. He provides invaluable help to the delegation, advising everyone who needs it.

We need "spichraytery"—people who know how to write speeches. We can't get along without them. I don't want to repeat myself, but the texts of our deputies' speeches make a deplorable impression. It will be very difficult for them to hold the audience's attention.

The corps needs all kinds of assistance and support. No one should be surprised by this: such is the parliamentary practice of all the civilized countries. It is also very important always to have parliamentary correspondents from our republic on hand, correspondents who will efficiently report on the work of our delegation. There is much that remains offscreen, leading to the spread of rumors and false stories.

Strange as it seems, in Yerevan the barb of criticism is directed against those who are making the most effort and being most energetic in Moscow. It seems that those who have chosen a policy of silence are tactically in a better position than those who are bending every effort in the parliamentary struggle. Everybody looking on from the sidelines fancies himself a strategist. It reminds you of a game without rules....

I have often noticed how nervous deputies are when they go to the telephone. The situation in the republic is such, alas, that nobody expects good news. You must agree, however, that it is not a very pleasant scene when someone calls and dumps unjustified complaints on deputies. Their desks are literally piled high with wrathful telegrams containing ultimatums. It is wrong to keep our elected representatives under constant pressure. We cannot demand that the deputies do what they are not free to do. Politics is, after all, the art of the possible. And while demanding that the deputies grow, finally, we must not forget that this process ought to be reciprocal.

A final point. It is essential to deliver fresh mail to the corps on a regular basis. From 25 September through 5 October there was not a single republic newspaper in the kiosk of the Moskva Hotel. It was painful to watch representatives of other republics carrying away two or three of "their" publications while ours could only sigh—no newspapers today either. Even now, newspapers are still not coming in regularly. Although it is gratifying to note that our newspaper's "Chronicle of the Blockade" has caught the interest of deputies from many other regions. I might not even have written about this, but the other day I was in contact with our deputies, and it seems the newspapers, again, are not being delivered....

Months and years of the parliamentary struggle lie ahead. Despite certain difficulties, our corps of deputies is united and ready for the struggle. Every one of them is unsparing of his energy and knowledge in order that the

Truth shall triumph. But they cannot get along without our sensitivity, patience, and support. Let us not forget that our deputies face extraordinarily difficult tasks and are working under conditions that are close to the extreme. By improving the corps's ability to work we will gain strong and firm positions in the Center. Let us build further relations between the voters and the people's deputies of the USSR with a realization of these factors.

Uniformed, Civilian Officials Discuss Armenian SSR Military, Related Issues

90US0224A Yerevan KOMSOMOLES in Russian
31 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by M. Diloyan: "We and the Army: Experience of Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] The processes taking place in our society, whether we like it or not, are largely forcing us to look anew at phenomena and things that seemed familiar to everyone. They are giving rise to new attitudes and creating a new reality. The numerous rallies, the sit-down demonstrations, and the strikes are already becoming commonplace. Armored personnel carriers and lines of armed soldiers no longer surprise them. They no longer gather in small circles to look over a poster pinned to the fence of the Central Committee "Not One Soldier to the Army of Occupation" and the group of young conscripts under it. No longer... But then there have been quite a few changes, and no one is surprised that today a general and a conscript can sit at the same table and carry on a dialogue as equals.

This dialogue is necessary today; it must not stop until as long as there are disturbing issues.

The other day at the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee, a "round table" meeting was held between representatives of the Army and the republic military commissariat, Komsomol organizations of the city, the Armenian Nationwide Movement, and the mass media.

Before turning to the essence of the conversation that took place, I would like to introduce some of its participants, but not with the customary phrase "Present at the meeting were..." because the word "present" does not fit well with the serious and intense exchange of opinions on the most acute and painful problems. So, the following participated in the round table: Maj Gen Mikhail Surkov, USSR people's deputy, military council member, and chief of the political department of a troop formation; Gurgen Akopyan, secretary of the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee; Col Eduard Gevorgyan, chief of the political department of the Republic Military Commissariat; Capt Yuri Budarin, assistant chief of a political body for Komsomol work; Samson Kazaryan, member of an initiative committee of the Armenian Nationwide Movement (AOD); and Suren Sirunyan, member of an initiative group for protection of the rights of conscripts; and others.

Answering the first question of representatives of the mass media about what the military thinks about creating a national army, national units or formations, Maj Gen Surkov and Col Gevorgyan tried to outline their points of view on this question thoroughly and in detail. But before touching upon the problems of national formations, USSR People's Deputy M. Surkov stated:

"I am often asked about my attitude toward Armenia, toward the Armenian people. I have on more than one occasion already expressed my opinion that I respect the people, feel pain and anxiety over their troubles, and understand the plans and hopes of the Armenian people. As a deputy from Armenia, and moreover from the disaster area, I believe that I am doing everything within my power to assist my electorate, not only as the people's chosen one but also as a Communist and a general.

"It seems to me that we are gathered together today to conduct a frank, honest dialogue; therefore, it is natural that we may turn out to have different points of view, a different approach and understanding of certain problems. I would not want the differences in views to turn into conflicts. We came here with the hope that this step would serve the main cause—mutual prestige and friendship between the army and the people.

"Taking advantage of the fact that representatives of the mass media are present, I would like to appeal to everyone again—let us meet more often. Our doors, the doors of any military unit are open for any person. We have proposed through the newspapers to set up open house days, we are willing to talk. We have had many mistakes and many, many shortcomings, but I know there is also something positive that we can share.

"Now, my opinion on national formations. The idea of national formations exists today not only in Armenia. This question has been raised in the Baltic region, in Moldavia, and in other regions. I think that before we turn to solving this matter, we must consider from the state point of view whether or not the republic is ready today to solve three basic problems: What will be the basic doctrine of these national formations that are being proposed to create here? The second question: What kind of economic support will there be for this national formation? And finally: How will the cadre and technical question be resolved? I know well and am convinced that it is impossible today to create national formations on the scale of our state. Economically, not a single republic is ready to arm such a formation. We must also think about whether the republic will be able to support it in terms of military-technical and cadre training. Yes, Armenia can be proud of its Heroes of the Soviet Union, its generals, and officers who covered themselves with undying glory during various periods of Soviet history, and we have officers of the Armenian nationality serving well today, too. But, certainly, that is not enough for today.

"In addition, what about the troops providing security for the union? I have in mind the Border Troops, the

Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, the Air Force? Who will support them? This idea can be developed further, too. One can ask: Who will supply service members to the Railroad Troops?

"I am of this opinion: There can be and should be subunits created based on nationality. They should be made up of people who through their labor in production and in agriculture have earned the right to serve at home, on the territory of Armenia in this case, in such small national subunits as a platoon or company bearing the name of some national hero or Hero of the Soviet Union. But the rest, I think, is unrealistic today. It is especially unrealistic because national relations have worsened and continue to worsen; you see, national formations may be used, unfortunately, for other than intended purposes. This in general terms is my point of view toward creating national formations."

Eduard Semenovitch Gevorkyan, chief of the political department of the republic military commissariat, also expressed his point of view on national military formations.

"Those who closely follow the events in our republic know that the proposals to create a national army were heard for the first time and outlined on 4 August of this year at a rally dedicated to creating a national army. I met with comrades calling themselves members of an initiative group for creating a national army. I have already expressed my position on the issue on the pages of KOMSOMOLETS. There was another article in KOMSOMOLETS in which a worker from the Astro Plant disagreed with my arguments.

"When I met with representatives of the initiative group, I asked what they meant by the word combination 'national army.' They explained to me that a national army is an independent army that is subordinate to the parliament of the republic and carries out the will and laws of the Armenian parliament. I have a question in return: What, today there is already an independent Armenia, we have resolved all the issues, Karabakh has been annexed, the blockade has been lifted, and now we have to deal with issues of a national army? I want to ask one more question: Do you know how many armed forces Turkey has? You see, an army is created to protect against an external enemy. Altogether different issues are being raised now, in essence, about a national guard, self-defense forces. So, how many troops does Turkey have? If I am not mistaken, about 560,000. (Here Maj Gen Surkov made a correction—700,000 soldiers and officers and 24 NATO missile bases.) You would have to have a minimum of 500,000 soldiers to oppose Turkey. You have to have the appropriate training centers to train specialists for the armed forces. Even if the republic is able to create four training centers for training tank crewmen, artillerymen, communications personnel, and so forth, these training basis and areas would occupy roughly 50-60 percent of the territory of Armenia. Tell me, is this realistic in existing conditions? Even 10 republic budgets cannot cover this.

"More than 100 training units and schools scattered throughout the Soviet Union train specialists for units stationed in Armenia. I would like you to ponder these figures: We annually receive orders for almost all schools of the Soviet Union for approximately 2,000 people. We fill 50 percent of the orders (approximately 1000-1100 people), and 35 percent of this number enroll each year. Mainly, our Armenian youth enroll in motor vehicle, rear services, finance, and political schools. You will not create a national army with such a composition of specialists.

"Opponents object, saying that if there is actually not enough money, the plants will help, the factories will help, and so forth. Comrades, you will not create an army at such a level and with such amateurish arguments. And another thing: There are comrades sitting here with whom I have met (meaning members of initiative groups). None of them, other than general speeches at rallies, has presented any kind of platform, any kind of program, any arguments. Thus, at the rally on 4 August, they said the following, literally: 'People, congratulations on creating a national army!' The question of a national army, if it comes up, is not resolved at the level of the military commissariat or the political department of the formation of troops stationed here. All these questions require serious study—above all, the economic and financial questions."

"One more thing," M. Surkov added. "Despite the unilateral reduction in armed forces on the part of the USSR, NATO has not reduced its contingent in Turkey by a single soldier or by a single rifle."

The question of creating a national army, especially in light of recent events, cannot help but excite and interest the public of the republic. It was not by chance that the question was asked first, and it is understandable that even a detailed analysis of the position on this problem left room for more questions. The question that was asked by the representative of the information center of the Armenian Nationwide Movement, I am confident, was on other people's minds, too. Being a part of the Soviet state, Armenia, like the rest of the republics, has been making corresponding deductions to the country's budget, a certain part of which has been going to military needs. Logic says that some specific portion of the armaments of the defense industry and so forth have been paid for by our republic, and it has a right to this portion. The remarks by the military persistently contain the thought that we must start everything from nothing.

Unfortunately, none of the people present, apparently, had the necessary economic calculations for a precise answer to this question. Nevertheless, in responding to the question, the military council member made the assumption that despite the relatively high profitability of the republic (Armenia contributes about 1 percent to the country's state budget), it is not likely that the amount remaining after mutual recalculations would be enough to create a national army.

The "round table" discussion lasted about 4 hours, so there was no opportunity to address in detail all the problems broached. A large part of the questions concerned how many Armenian soldiers are serving on the territory of the republic, by what principles the military commissariat is guided by in selecting the contingent to serve in the republic in certain branches of troops, what percentage of Armenian youth are sent to serve in construction units, and so forth. Col Gevorkyan and Maj Gen Surkov gave explanations concerning this. It must be taken into account that the figures vary each year. Thus, this year they have dropped by 2,000-3,000 for known reasons (the earthquake and so forth). Up to the present, 0.5-0.7 percent were left to serve in the Border Troops on the territory of Armenia.

The Border Troops select draftees for themselves; during the draft they meet with the lads, consider their "vocational suitability," and so forth. The rest, approximately 80 percent, are drivers. Although, the total number of Armenian soldiers in units of the republic is greater, since the figures are cited only for the republic's military commissariat. Armenian soldiers are also drafted from other regions of the country and are transferred to Armenia from training units and centers for duty. Today the question of leaving up to 20-30 percent of all draftees to serve in the republic is being resolved once and for all. These questions have been carefully studied by a commission of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and re-examined, and at present there is an agreement that up to 2,000 will be left to serve on the territory of Armenia.

"Several times at the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the republic," said E. Gevorkyan, "Deputy Khachik Stamboltzian has cited figures on how many Armenians are serving in the Construction Troops. One time he cited 100 percent and another time 40 percent of all draftees. I say that these figures do not correspond to reality. We have analyzed all data from 1985, and the largest figure was 30 percent; it dropped as low as 29 and 26 percent. Now the order has been cut in half—and we negotiated to have all of them serve in Armenia, in the disaster area. There is an agreement to increase the orders for draftees to the training center in Tbilisi; there the Armenian draftees will receive a military specialty, and all 100 percent will return to serve at home."

Lately rumors have been spreading in the republic that many Armenian youths are dying as a result of clashes with Azerbaijanis due to nationality. How true are these rumors? How should we regard the official versions of the death of soldiers? What are the true statistics of the tragic incidents? There exist official and unofficial lists in which the causes of the tragic incidents are interpreted differently...

Quite naturally, the question has come up about what is being done to make sure that Armenians do not end up in units in which Azerbaijanis are also serving, since clashes due to nationality are possible. We cannot help

but be concerned about this problem today, especially in light of the events taking place and the new escalation of tension.

"Of course," Maj Gen Surkov noted, "we are not able to restaff the entire Soviet Army today. This is impossible and unrealistic. I want to state with all seriousness that, according to data I have available, during all of 1989 two people were killed due to nationality clashes. I want to note that these figures are just for the Soviet Army and military construction detachments of the Ministry of Defense. This does not include the Border Troops and construction workers who are not subordinate to the minister of defense. The total number who have died is much larger, of course. Today people in the army are being killed, and we cannot escape that. Unfortunately, this is the bitter truth, just as it is the truth that people are being killed outside the army. Informal groups, representatives of the public, and Afghan veterans have asked me why Armenian soldiers are being killed. When I was in Moscow at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I looked into this question. We did an analysis of all nationalities of the union republics. I am not authorized to cite the total figures, but I will say that in percentage that Armenians are somewhere in the middle of the list for the number killed. There are no more or no less Armenians being killed than other nationalities. The analysis showed that the main reason is violation of safety procedures and traffic rules.

"We did not observe any trends of an increase in the number killed associated with the inter-ethnic relations and the events of the last 2 years. The overall increase in the number of tragic incidents in the army is related primarily to a series of aviation accidents, the loss of submarines, and the train explosion in the Urals, in which many service members also were killed.

"As regards the death of our young men this year, we tried to investigate thoroughly what took place. Unfortunately, there are still cases in which a unit in which a tragic incident occurred sends a noncommittal answer to the military commissariat and the parents, which naturally gives rise to suspicions and rumors. We have sent inquiries to all units and all procuracies in order to find out what happened in each specific case."

At recent assemblies, the republic military commissariat has raised the question before the General Staff about not having Azerbaijanis and Armenians serve together, even if on the scale of small military subunits. It was promised that very close attention would be given to this beginning with the present fall call-up.

All participants in the "round table" agreed that it is necessary to set up public commissions which would be made up of specialists and representatives of the military commissariat, the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee, and the mass media, and that they visit units and clear up all the questions once and for all. They also agreed that such questions need glasnost and that it is necessary to inform the public of the republic in a timely

manner. It was proposed to publish lists for the last several years, with appropriate comments and indicating the causes of death. It must be noted that representatives of the AOD expressed apprehensions that the military does not want to make public certain facts and will hinder the work of the commissions. Mikhail Semenovich Surkov assured them that he is willing to help as much as he can in creating the optimum conditions for the commissions' work.

Much was also said about the problem of soldiers who have gone absent without leave and come home. Col Gevorkyan turned to the representatives of the mass media and members of the initiative group for protecting the rights of draftees with a request to inform soldiers who had left their units without permission, their parents, and loved ones that if such a thing has happened, they must consult the military commissariats. Otherwise, criminal proceedings will be brought against them, regardless of the reasons why they deserted their units. All claims will be examined thoroughly, and if the facts are confirmed, all measures will be taken by the appropriate services, up to and including transferring them to different units for them to continue serving.

Eduard Sarkisovich confirmed that indeed there are cases in which soldiers are physically and morally assaulted and that there have been cases of relations at variance with regulations, as the army calls them.

"The garrison procuracy, headed by Col Justice Sevyan, investigates these cases, sends the people that have been mistreated to the hospital, and sends the case to the prosecutor of the garrison where this took place. But there are also those who, as they say, simply take advantage of the moment, and there are those who themselves have committed a crime, but here they pass themselves off as the victim. Now the decision has been made that those who turn to the military commandant's office will be formed into a separate unit. They will serve here until all the circumstances have been clarified."

To confirm what was said, Col Gevorkyan and other officers taking part in the "round table" cited several incidents that have taken place.

The secretary of the Yerevan Komsomol Gorkom, O. Tsaturyan, asked a questions which, judging by the lively debates, interested many: How was the figure of 20 percent determined for those draftees who will remain to serve in Armenia and in the disaster area? Is it possible—and the Yerevan Komsomol Gorkom adopted a decision at its plenum to make a request of the USSR minister of defense in this regard, considering the consequences of the tragic earthquake and the situation in the republic—to leave the entire call-up for this year in Armenia?

The following was said in this regard: The requirement of units stationed on the territory of the republic is 5-8 times less than the number being drafted in Armenia. There are now 10 construction detachments working in the disaster area, manned with people and outfitted with equipment, having their own personnel, and so forth.

The strength of each detachment is not over 500 men, and there are no "vacancies" in them. So, the realistic figure for those who will remain to serve in Armenia is not likely to exceed 20-23 percent. Primarily, these will be young men from the disaster area, those who lost relatives and loved ones, those left without a roof over their head, and also those from other areas of the republic who have a difficult family situation, have no parents, or have large families, but by law cannot be exempt from the draft. The military commissariats are willing to publish lists of those who will remain to serve in Armenia.

Now there are sit-down demonstrations taking place in many areas of Armenia, including in Yerevan. I was proposed to send their participants to work in the earthquake area as an experiment. However, we do not have any information that the experiment has begun, unfortunately.

In our view, the participants in the "round table" did not come to a common opinion on a number of question, in particular, on why it is not possible to add some portion to the 20 percent being left to serve in the republic (and this decision was made with respect to all union republics), considering that Armenia is in a special situation today as a result of the tragedy, and also on the fact that if it is not profitable to create national units, how profitable is it to draft young people from every corner of the country to serve in Armenia.

The conversation also turned to participation of the republic's Komsomol in military-patriotic work being conducted in units located on the territory of the republic, how Armenian soldiers are serving, and assistance from the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee to Komsomol organizations of military subunits. The secretary of the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee, G. Akopyan, responded to a number of questions from officers who are secretaries of Komsomol organizations of military subunits.

However, there remained a whole layer of questions that seemed to hang in the air. These concerned Sumgait, "Zvartnots," the arrest of members of the "Karabakh" and "Krun" committees, the recent events of 10 October in Stepanakert, and so forth. They concerned the confidence of the people, youth, and draftees in the army, and what has brought about the reluctance to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army and the strikes by draftees during the last two call-ups. Maj Gen Surkov emphasized that, in his opinion, many do not wish to separate the Soviet Army from the Internal Troops.

"The fact of the matter is," he said, "that the Soviet Army is called upon to protect the borders of our homeland against an external enemy. The Internal Troops have totally different tasks. I say with all seriousness," he said, "that there was not a single soldier of the Soviet Army on Oktemberyan Prospekt or at 'Zvartnots'. So the term 'the military', by which they combine us all into one whole, is advantageous only for those who do

not want to understand the essence of what is taking place. Yes, we were charged with the responsibility of implementing a curfew in Armenia, but during this period not a single Armenian died at the hand of a soldier of the Soviet Army. At the First Congress of People's Deputies, they condemned this practice of using soldiers of the Soviet Army to carry out internal tasks. And I share and support this opinion fully."

One can understand the position of the chief of the political department of the formation of troops, but this does not reduce the number of questions. All the participants in the conversation that took place agreed that it cannot be considered finished. Besides a continuing dialogue with representatives of the Soviet Army, we would also like to hear the opinions and position of the representatives of the Internal Troops. Indeed, quite a few questions have accumulated for them. We would hope that they will respond to the proposal to hold such a meeting.

Azerbaijani Regions Bordering Armenia Losing Faith in Law

18310405A

[Editorial Report] Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri on 20 October 1989 carries on pages 1 and 2 a 2,500 word report by Kamila Ne'mat and Atababa Hajybabayev on a factfinding tour through Lachyn and Kalbajar rayons, which border Armenia. They point out that buses traveling the roads are frequently boarded by members of the Azerbaijan People's Front who inform the driver and passengers of dangers on the road ahead. "In Lachyn the sound of gunfire is constantly bringing the unarmed population to its feet. One question is on everyone's mind: why is it that the Armenians have weapons and Soviet organs and soldiers see these weapons but do nothing about it?" The reporters add: "All this is happening under one flag and one law. Thus, we are losing faith in these laws."

Belorussian SSR Supsov Official on Impending Language Law

90UN0438A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with Nil Semenovich Gilevich, deputy of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, first secretary of the board of the Writers' Union of the republic, and deputy chairman of the Commission on the Preparation of Proposals on Legislation to Regulate the Status of the Belorussian and Russian, and Other Languages Used by the Population in the Belorussian SSR, by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA correspondent S. Pyatkovskiy: "The Law Concerning Language Is a Law Concerning Culture"]

[Text] "Language" is one of the synonyms of the word "nation." Have we forgotten this?

This question is quite proper, at least in Belorussia. In July, as many of our readers remind us, a Commission on the Preparation of Proposals on Legislation to Regulate the Status of the Belorussian and Russian Languages, and also Other Languages was established by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR. At the present time, the commission is completing work on the draft Law on Languages.

Our correspondent met with Nil Semenovich Gilevich, deputy chairman of the commission, a deputy to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, and first secretary of the board of the Writers' Union of the republic. It was assumed that the interview with him would be devoted specifically to questions associated with the preparation of the draft law. However, responding to the questions that were posed, N.S. Gilevich touched on many other subjects. And this is natural, because language is not only linguistics and philology. It is also culture, the self-knowledge of the people, its spirituality, and its past and future.

After reading the record of this interview, you yourselves can take part in it, if you wish. Moreover, this is very desirable: In a short time, the Law on Languages in the Belorussian SSR will be published, and we will all be invited to discuss it. The editorial staff awaits your letters. And so...

[Correspondent] Nil Semenovich, why exactly now? Not a year earlier, and not a year later?

[Gilevich] The answer here is simple. A general process is going on in the country of returning to that which was lost once upon a time. Moreover, in some republics the question of the legal regulation of the status of the national language was brought up earlier than here. We are following a track that takes experience into account and, as I hope, we are trying not to repeat mistakes. We together, are arriving jointly (perhaps slower than we would want it) at an understanding of the very need for a rebirth of national culture and, consequently, also the need for a national language as its first element.

[Correspondent] One would like to believe that this is the case. However, not very long ago, even within the memory of the present generation of youth, optimistic statements were heard everywhere about "a genuine flourishing of national cultures," and about their broad mutual enrichment, bringing together, and mutual influence.

[Gilevich] True. But in my opinion, this "bringing together" very frequently covered something else—a "blending." But these are difference concepts, and we must learn how to distinguish... For example, bringing cultures together and their mutual influence, I will even say their spiritual integration—all of this was always useful in the history of mankind. Every person with common sense will understand that to borrow the best, and to take from others all that is healthy and interesting, and thanks to this, to learn to understand the personality of a neighbor and a friend, and even oneself, is a vitally

necessary matter. But in our country, because of the work of powerful political levers over the course of many years, a very simplified understanding of national cultural processes was affirmed everywhere. The kind of an approach and the kind of an understanding that prevailed were at one time very clearly expressed by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, while standing at the entrance to the Belorussian State University: "The sooner we bring all cultures and languages together, the sooner will we come to communism." And so, we have come... Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was not the first to conduct such a policy. And not the last. It is natural that, gradually and with the passage of time—and we are talking here about decades—the situation got more and more complicated. I would even say that the crisis came to a head in the objective reality of national cultures. The question is now a very specific one: either—or. Either the nations that are a part of the USSR save themselves, preserving their culture and language, or they will really leave the historical arena. History knows any number of examples like this: The disappearance of nations began with the assimilation of language and the dissolution of culture. You look, and there is already no one "to become mutually enriched with."

[Correspondent] But nations, certainly, also have an inherent sense of self-preservation.

[Gilevich] You know, there is this Lithuanian film "No One Wanted to Die." The processes associated with the national question are now defined in our country, it seems to me, precisely by this phrase. The question here is also about large nations, including the Russian nation, and about small nations. All want to preserve themselves, their personality, and their soul. It was painful, and it broke through... And, of course, these processes are predetermined in many ways, we will tell it the way it is, by perestroika. True, if it did not exist, even then, it seems to me, crisis problems would break through to the surface. But in that event, we would run into them, I am confident, in even more painful, perhaps in even more abnormal manifestations. Perestroika has created conditions for the resolution of a problem, which we are discussing with you, precisely by political means that are carefully weighed and reasoned. Although it cannot be resolved easily even now. It is even very hard. But, I repeat, it could have been worse.

[Correspondent] Belorussia, as it is now accepted to think, is a fortunate republic in many ways.

[Gilevich] Well, as regards the depersonalization of culture and a narrowing of the sphere of employment of a national language, then, here, pardon me, we are really going "in advance of progress."

[Correspondent] Laws have already been adopted in many republics of the USSR that preserve the national language. Judging by the debate in the press, which is rather prolonged, the Belorussian public moved step by step toward the realization of the need for legislative regulation of the status of the Belorussian language.

Opinions have been expressed more and more frequently about giving it the rights of a state language, with retention of the status of an international language of intercourse for the Russian language...

[Gilevich] That is so. It can be said about this in this respect that a rather weighty public opinion has developed which cannot be ignored. Although, if one is to speak honestly, a lot of people hold to their former positions. Of course, I would like to believe that all of us in Belorussia—Belorussians, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, and Tatars—all of us have already come to an understanding that the time has come to be concerned about the language of the nation, and to give a new push to the development of its national culture. However, there are still very many people who are complacent or who simply do not understand the essence of the problem.

[Correspondent] It is proposed now that it, this problem, be regulated legislatively.

[Gilevich] Credit should be given here to the Supreme Soviet of the republic and to the central committee of the KPB [Belorussian Communist Party], which has sanctioned work in this direction.

[Correspondent] I would like to get an explanation of the informational procedure: How did the work go on the draft law? And what is written in its main provisions?

[Gilevich] About 50 persons were on the special commission that was organized by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. This includes linguists, lawyers, cultural figures, and people of various specialties. The commission formed a working group on the preparation of the draft law. I was entrusted to lead the group. We worked with enthusiasm and with a keen interest. The document we prepared has already been discussed by the commission, and additional work has been done on it, taking into account the commission's comments and refinements.

[Correspondent] I was able to attend a meeting which was conducted by the chairman of the commission, N.N. Mazay, who is a deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. The meeting did not avoid arguments—heated arguments!

[Gilevich] This should have been expected. But I am personally pleased that an absolute majority of the participants in the discussion approved the prepared document. In principle, its main task is rather natural and noble—the regulation of social relationships in the area of the development and use of the Belorussian, Russian, and other languages used by the population of the republic, the protection of the constitutional rights of the citizens in this sphere, the inculcation of respectful attitudes toward the national dignity of a person and his culture and language, and the further strengthening of friendship between Soviet peoples.

Note that, along with the provision on the state status of the Belorussian language, there is also a provision in the draft law that the republic guarantees the right of free use of the Russian language—the language of international relations, and also that the Belorussian SSR shows state concern about the free development and use of all national languages that the population of the republic uses.

I consider these provisions the most important—they predetermine everything else.

The law will create the prerequisites for the restoration of the practical need of the Belorussian language—in the spheres of culture, science, way of life, educational institutions, office work, and so forth... And the authors of the draft law, in my opinion, tried to show the maximum consideration, in Belorussian—"abachlivastsi," in order not to place anyone in a difficult position.

[Correspondent] Can you give an example?

[Gilevich] Well, at least lines from the clause on the language of office work: "The Belorussian language is the language of office work and documentation in enterprises (including that which is of union subordination), and, when necessary, the Russian language."

While working on the draft law, we proceeded from the fact that all privileges and restrictions on personal rights are impermissible. The transition to Belorussian will not be implemented immediately after the publication of the law, by means of an immediate attack. We determined that the introduction of one or another article of the law in force will occur in periods of from 1 to 10 years. The approach here, in my opinion, is quite realistic. But, in fact, you will not come to school today and declare: "Children, starting tomorrow..." And orders will not help in such spheres as transport, medicine, and trade. In general, time will be needed...

I am afraid of omitting a very important idea in this conversation. It is necessary to do it so that the entire process of "returning" the Belorussian language is done painlessly and in natural forms. And, you know, the best thing will be, at least in the first stage, not to pay attention to who is speaking what language here. You will agree that today we frequently see: It is enough for someone just to start talking in Belorussian in a bus, a trolley bus, or a store, when then and there everyone looks at him as at a stranger. This is an absolutely abnormal situation.

[Correspondent] When will the law be published?

[Gilevich] Our commission recommended that it be as early as November. I ask all of those who read the draft not to hurry to jump to conclusions. Let us say that something in one of the clauses is disturbing... Do not get angry, read on, and read through the entire draft law, look carefully into its essence, and, it is possible that your doubts will be dispelled. With the adoption of the

law, nobody, of course, will force workers at a machine, for example, to switch to Belorussian.

[Correspondent] However, there is a category of workers for whom, as far as I know, specific periods for mastering the language are envisaged...

[Gilevich] Yes, this category includes managerial workers of the party, state organs, public organizations, establishments, and enterprises. It is they who are called on to put the law into practice, right? Three years... We assume that this period will be enough for the comrade executives to learn the language. More than enough. When the need arises, we even learn the English language in 3 months...

[Correspondent] At times I also hear judgments like this: All of the discussions today about language and about national feelings divide us and, so to say, drive a wedge between us...

[Gilevich] I do not agree. If the great Belorussian nation of 10 million people, which, I believe, has not completely exhausted its own potential capabilities, takes a step forward in development, then this is only good. It is good for the people themselves, for the country, and for humanity. Can you really pose the question for a genuinely cultured person this way: this language or that. No. The question for him can only be put this way: this and this. And also desirable is a third language, and a fourth...

[Correspondent] At the same time, many of us who live in Belorussia clearly do not know either Belorussian or Russian.

[Gilevich] So, I also think, therefore, that the Law on Languages is first and foremost a law on culture. In raising the language culture (and it certainly is at the basis of everything), we also raise the general culture. You remarked how few people there are among us who are able to freely and fully develop and explain their thoughts? Very often people argue and formulate their opinion according to the most primitive scheme: "yes," or "no." I am confident that this is tied, among other things, to our overall language inadequacy. For science proved a long time ago: Thinking and language are inseparable one from the other. That is, if we raise the problem of language, we thereby also affect a huge stratum of problems of the spiritual development of society and the development of personality. It is necessary that people remember basic spiritual values and take to folklore and national history, and associate themselves with the moral principles of their ancestors.

[Correspondent] One of the popular points of view encountered in letters that come to the newspaper's editorial office goes like this: Do not worry about that, comrades: All of these intelligent discussions about language, culture, and history will not result here in more products, machines, and apartments...

[Gilevich] Then it is too bad that such a viewpoint is really very popular. But, forgive me, can we talk seriously about lifting up the economy and resolving social and ecological problems, if all of this work will be done by people with empty hearts and low culture?

[Correspondent] There are many facts that say that we are poor not because we are poor, but it is because we are uncultured...

[Gilevich] That is absolutely correct. We simply cannot become rich today. We cannot, because this requires that we master new technology and modern technological processes, learn to take care of nature, build our living quarters beautifully, and arrange our everyday living. Can all of this be done at the former level of culture? I am confident that it cannot. Recently I read this sad statistic: According to level of computerization and the employment of electronics, we are behind many of those countries whom we are helping economically, because they are apparently poorly developed.

I sometimes hear attacks on speeches in defense of language, culture, and spirituality—attacks, so to say, from civic and patriotic positions. They say that there are some kind of intrigues here, some kind of nationalism, and some kind of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet tendency. I do not understand such statements. Can a genuine citizen and patriot really allow himself henceforth to manage his own land as he does now, leaving a real wasteland as a legacy to children and grandchildren. A wasteland not only in a physical sense (how many rivers, lakes, and forests we have ruined, and how many minerals we have thrown to the winds), but a wasteland in a spiritual sense as well? We are forgetting our history, our songs, our customs, and popular wisdom which over the centuries have put a stamp on language. We are departing from that natural popular code of ethics which did not permit one to work poorly, did not permit not taking care of the earth benefactress, and did not permit not being concerned about family (and specifically to respect and honor the older generation and to love and bring up children well). There they are—the real misfortunes of our culture.

[Correspondent] In general, you are talking about obvious matters.

[Gilevich] But I ask that you take note of how frequently people do not want to talk about these obvious matters! And this is despite the fact that there are educated people everywhere. There are dozens of higher educational institutions in the republic. It is very likely that we omitted something very important in the education of a person. Perhaps, a main link. We had big ideas about some space achievements, but we forgot about and are trampling on that which is on earth itself and which hangs onto earth by its roots. It seems that now everyone has looked around and has begun to ponder...

[Correspondent] The Law on Languages in the Belorussian SSR, in whose development you took part, it must

be supposed, will force all of us not only to look around and to ponder, but will also nudge us into practical activity...

[Gilevich] There is no law yet. But its draft will be published soon, and then we, respected fellow-countrymen, will have to state our positions on it somehow. It will be very sad if people perceive the draft as some kind of a professorial or literary invention. I am convinced that this document is dictated by life, and that it is good for progress, for our children, and for all of us.

It is unlikely that people can be found today who will say: Let the Belorussian nation leave the historical arena. You will not find them. They will all say: Let it prosper and flourish! But, dear comrades, in order that the people—specifically the people and not simply the population—prosper and flourish, something real has to be done. The Law on Languages in the Belorussian SSR will be a real and weighty matter. This is my point of view. I hope that everyone who shares it will support me.

Belorussian Draft Law on Languages Nears Completion

90UN0457A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 28 Nov 89 p 3

[BELTA report by A. Mikhalechuk: "In the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions: Draft Law on Languages Discussed"]

[Text] The draft Law on Languages in the Belorussian SSR was examined at a joint session of the Commission for Legislative Proposals, the Commission on Ethnic Issues and Interethnic Relations, and the Commission on Public Education and Culture.

The draft was introduced by N.N. Mazay, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Commission for Drawing Up Proposals on Legislative Regulation of the Status of the Belorussian, Russian, and Other Languages Spoken by the Population of Belorussia, a commission established at the 11th session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The chairman noted that work on the draft was difficult and prolonged. Over the course of 3 months, an action committee met in session many times before deciding to present the collective effort for discussion. The draft is based on the Leninist concept of the functioning of languages in a multi-national state and the party platform on ethnic policy adopted by the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Also taken into account were the practical effects of legal resolution of the language problem in our republic during the initial years following its entry into the USSR, as well as legislation currently in effect.

Participants in drawing up the draft—including USSR people's deputies and people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, scholars and employees of

party and soviet organs, teachers, legal experts, and representatives of social organizations—also gave comprehensive consideration to drafts and adopted laws on languages in other union republics, and examined the record of foreign countries in this regard. And, of course, they listened most attentively to the judgment expressed by citizens of the republic in the press, in letters, and at meetings.

"Working on this draft," N.N. Mazay stressed, "we realized that we live in a multi-national country and multi-national republic, that representatives of all nationalities have the same right to free development of their native language as do Belorussians. In determining the status of state language for Belorussian, we therefore stipulated that we must facilitate development of the languages of all ethnic groups represented in the Belorussian SSR without exception on that same state level. And our unremitting concern is for a thorough knowledge of Russian as the language of interethnic contact."

Thus, the problems which have accumulated over decades and begun to threaten the very existence of the Belorussian language are beginning to be presented for legal solution. I will treat only certain provisions of the document.

The law proposes to regulate the use of language in state, socio-economic, and cultural life, but of course does not control the language of communication among people in their private lives or the language in which they deal with state and social organizations, with institutions. Privileges or restrictions of rights of any kind with respect to language are not to be tolerated. The necessity to show respect to the Belorussian language, like any language, is reflected in the article which provides for holding individuals responsible for public abuse or propagation of hostility on the basis of language.

The article of the draft concerning obligations of directors and other employees of state institutions, party and social organs, and enterprises rings of the spirit of the legal standards of multi-ethnic states. No such employee can occupy his position without an adequate knowledge of Belorussian and Russian. True, we do not yet know who will be "taking examinations" and in what manner, but this determination is probably not the business of the law. Acts of the highest organs of state power and republic government must be taken up in Belorussian, but be printed also in Russian. This also pertains to acts of ministries and departments, and local organs of authority, with the one difference that, when necessary, these are published in Belorussian and the language of the majority of the population in a given locality.

The language of industry, of mutual relations between various organizations, institutions, and enterprises—is Belorussian. Russian is used when necessary, probably for enterprises of USSR subordination. The working language at congresses, conferences, plenums, sessions, and meetings, etc., in the republic is Belorussian. Another language may be chosen by the participants

themselves at inter-republic, all-union, or international forums. But the term "working language" does not mean that each delegate at a rayon party conference, let us say, absolutely must speak Belorussian—he retains the right of choice, but presentations are translated into the working language of the conference.

Similarly, the draft law examines the conduct of legal proceedings, notarial and arbitration matters, public procuracy and legal assistance matters. All matters are conducted in the Belorussian language, but if an involved party does not know Belorussian or if the organization is located outside the republic, or other similar conditions apply, Russian or some other language acceptable to the parties is used.

The authors of the draft law have devoted a special section to treating everything regarding the language of education, science, and culture. Without getting into the details, I will say that the basic approach comprises a guarantee of the right of every inhabitant of the republic to receive an education in his native language. Here we have in mind not just Belorussian and Russian. The state is creating the conditions for implementation of this right for citizens of other ethnic groups in locales where they live in high density—building nurseries and kindergartens, classrooms and schools.

The language of the majority of official mass media instruments is Belorussian, but it can be Russian or languages of other ethnic groups. Announcements, posters, and placards appear in Belorussian; a translation in another language may be placed alongside. Goods are marked in Belorussian, but those which are directed outside the republic are marked in Russian or the language of the customer.

I repeat that I have not set for myself the task of restating the draft law. But I believe the reader will agree, and from these comments it is evident, that we are dealing with a document of fundamental importance. And in this regard, the commission headed by N.N. Mazay has presented, along with the draft law, a draft procedure for implementing the Law on Languages in the Belorussian SSR. Just as the Belorussification program of the 1920's was intended for a somewhat lengthy period of time, it is proposed that the articles of this law be introduced not all at once, but gradually, over a 10-year period.

Clearly, all inhabitants of the republic will not tomorrow begin speaking like radio announcers (all the more so since radio announcers sometimes make mistakes). And therefore with regard to the system of education, where appropriate cadre training is required as well as the development of training and teaching-methods literature, in legal proceedings and the rendering of notarial and judicial assistance, the period of transition to Belorussian is envisaged as maximal. Directors of official institutions are allocated just 3 years for this.

Deputies, members of commissions who discussed the draft law were unanimous in their opinion that its authors had used deep and all-encompassing insight in

drawing up a founding document for legal regulation of the use of languages of diverse ethnic groups. Corrections introduced did not change the document, but simply clarified it. The deputies proposed reconsideration of the time periods for implementing certain articles of the law, paid special attention to its application with respect to military servicemen, and were interested in whether computations had been made regarding financial and material expenditures associated with implementation of the law. It was noted that, in all likelihood, the possibility of creating groups in which training would be conducted in the ethnic language—similar to the schools—would have to be stipulated for professional technical institutions and secondary specialized training institutes. The question also arose as to the wording of "Predominant Use of Belorussian Language in All Spheres of Culture" [rendered in Belorussian]. The authors' motives are understandable—language is the basis of ethnic culture. All the same, the deputies questioned whether the advantages of Belorussian over other languages should be stressed.

Also discussed at a joint session of the commissions was the State Program of Development of Belorussian and Other Ethnic Languages in the Belorussian SSR, for the period up to the year 2000.

Again noting the fruitful effort of the Commission for Drawing Up Proposals on the Legislative Regulation of the Status of the Belorussian, Russian, and Other Languages Spoken by the Population of the Belorussian SSR, session participants decided unanimously to approve the draft law, directing the commission to finalize it taking the comments expressed into account, and present it to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic; and following examination by this body—to present the draft for general discussion among the people. Thus, the draft law will probably be published in mid-December.

Participating in the work of the commission were Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet V.A. Mikulich, and Secretary of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet L.N. Syroyegina.

Georgian Strike Committee Demands Role in Naming New Transport Minister

90US0229A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
4 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by A.Yeremyan: "A Strike?"]

[Text] Last Wednesday morning, a young man came to the editorial office of our newspaper and introduced himself: "My name is Taniel Kapanadze. I am the chairman of the strike committee of Tbilisi transport workers." Frankly, we knew nothing about that strike committee. Taniel took out several typewritten pages held together by a paper clip and gave them to me. It turned out to be a letter to the Georgia CP Central Committee. We are reprinting it in this article.

Since we are not indifferent to the issue who will become the minister of highways and motor transportation, we want to make our demands known.

Unfortunately, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Highways and Motor Transportation has no minister now.

The death of Aleksandr Glurdzhidze engendered two sentiments in us. The first one was profound grief, and the other one was concern. Yes, concern over who will replace him in that position. We no longer want to be mere spectators. We want to take a direct part in seeing that a trusted person assumes this office.

During our meeting we unanimously proposed Badri Shalvovich Dardzhaniya, director general of the Tbilisi Auto Transport Complex, whom we know well professionally and have tested on numerous occasions and in different situations. It may seem ridiculous, but few of the so-called specialists would pass our test. This is why we demand that Badri Shalvovich Dardzhaniya be appointed minister of highways and motor transportation.

If our demand is not met, we reserve the right to resort to extreme measures. This will be reflected in work stoppages on all means of transportation in Tbilisi. The action will continue until our demand is met.

Please take into account the fact that Badri Shalvovich Dardzhaniya is a man whom we would follow into the fire or water without batting an eye.

Also, please take into consideration that the person who submits this demand, the driver of the Tbilisi taxi garage No 5 Taniel Giviyeich Kapanadze, the head of the primary organization of the Georgia People's Front in the motor transport network, has our complete trust. Please consider his opinion that of the entire collective of Georgia transport workers, which is several thousands workers strong.

We confirm everything stated above with our signatures and believe that our government will live up to expectations and will support us.

*With great respect,
Georgian motor transport workers.*

That was the letter. Drivers are proposing their candidate for minister. Five years ago no one would have taken this demand seriously. But times change. From central newspapers we constantly learn about alternative candidates in elections of managers of various ranks. Tbilisi motor transport workers now propose something similar. What compelled Tbilisi drivers, and in particular Taniel Kapanadze, the head of the strike committee, to do so? Let him say it in his own words.

"In the past several decades, our system has fallen apart completely. The situation began to improve when A.Glurdzhidze was appointed minister of highways and motor transport. He began to make first steps toward taking the system out of its difficult situation. An honest man, he advocated radical changes in the ministry itself

and in its subordinate organizations. Unfortunately, he was in office only a little over six months. Now, we were all suddenly scared that everything would return to the old ways.

"The man we propose for the position of minister can carry on the work to improve the entire motor transport system. People trust him. I take full responsibility for this statement on behalf of the entire collective which is several thousands drivers strong. He is a man who seeks new solutions and takes business personally. I myself have spoken to him often; sometimes our opinions differ and we argue. But one thing I am certain about: he never avoids a dialogue.

"Let me cite one example. During events in Abkhazia, our guys worked on their buses in cities of the autonomous republic, since local transport workers were on strike. Badri Dardzhaniya was the one who initiated this. He simply said: 'I am going. Who will follow me?' There were plenty of volunteers. But it entailed a definite danger and we had to work under the guard of soldiers armed with assault rifles. I do not know whether the guys would have gone to Abkhazia in their buses if someone else had proposed it.

"Or another example. The management office headed by Badri Dardzhaniya once had 500 employees. Now it has only 80. He cut the rest. But this is not the limit: he wants to slash management staff to 30 employees. You may ask me why. To reduce the number of parasites who feed off the drivers. All their lives the drivers feed their superiors. This should be brought to an end.

"Our superior organizations were very much surprised when they learned about our proposal. They said: 'Who are you? Why do you dare to raise your voices? Why do you meddle in matters that are not your affair?' And whose affair is it? We are the ones who do the work. We simply see no other candidate for this office. People say that a director of an auto transport complex cannot be put into the ministerial chair. But what use is there to speak of the career ladder? The system has to be revived. Our main goal is to improve the service to the public. We demand an answer to our request, a positive or a negative one. In either case, we want the decision to be a well-founded one.

"Our opinion has never been taken into account and our representatives have always been turned back on one excuse or another. One of them is as follows: 'Do not disturb us while we are working. We are deciding matters of state importance.' But what about our concern? Is it not a matter of state importance? Do not avoid a dialogue with the people. This is why we have set up a strike committee. It consists of 38 active members, representing various motor transport enterprises of the city. We do not want to see matters deteriorate to the point where we will have to strike. But if our opinion is disregarded, as it happened many times before, if it is ignored, we will have to call a strike.

"I want to say one more thing. All our projects wither on the vine. In our taxi garage, we once had an idea: we asked for a small space and a long-term loan. We wanted to use the money to buy cars at the plant, bring them to Tbilisi and start working. The republic would earn a net profit. We would fire all bosses and thus save on wages. Gasoline, spare parts and service would be paid by us. We would also pay repairs from our profits. We would work two shifts, also at night, on call. But the idea was killed. And yet, this way of organizing drivers' work would have improved the quality of service.

"We could talk endlessly about problems, but it would not turn things around. So I repeat that we will continue to fight for our demands to the end."

When he writes an article, the reporter always expresses his position and opinion on what he writes about; he analyzes it and draws conclusions. But let us not do so now. Let us only state the facts. They are as follows: a strike committee of motor transport workers of the city of Tbilisi has been formed. Their goal is to promote their candidate for the position of minister of highways and motor transport, a man whom drivers themselves know well and trust, and who is, according to references, a competent specialist.

We wanted to know what superior organizations thought of all this, since in one way or another they are involved in everything Taniel spoke about. Unfortunately, we were unable to get a reasonable or exhaustive response. Maybe this was the reason Taniel had come to our newspaper in the first place, to draw the attention of the republic's public to this painful issue.

This seems to be all. It is impossible to predict the course of events in the future. And yet, one would think that it is necessary to find the most optimal and correct solution in the existing situation. One alternative is to hold competitive elections for the position of minister. But one thing is clear: in this process, the opinion of the people, and drivers in particular, should not be ignored. Today, the people are no longer silent. This is the sign of the times, perestroika times.

'Appeals' Reflect Two Sides of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict

18130021 Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO in Georgian No 42, 20 Oct 89 p 6

[Ossetian workers' and Adamon Nikhas "Appeal" with editorial and other commentary]

[Text] Ossetian Workers' Appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, the CPSU Central Committee

On 15 August 1989 the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers passed a decree on the State Georgian Language Program.

We welcome the Georgian people's endeavors to implement the comprehensive development of their national culture, traditions, and language, and we consider it the inalienable right of any people and nation.

In terms of its content, the aforementioned decree of the Georgian government is anti-democratic and discriminatory against the republic's non-Georgian population, in particular the people of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The State Georgian Language Program says nothing about the status of the language of interethnic communication or the language of small nations.

The history of the North Ossetian ASSR and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast is such that for us the language of business and interethnic communication, along with Ossetian, is Russian. The Georgian government's new decree has set in motion the artificial assimilation of Ossetians living in the southern part of the oblast by the Georgians, because it is impermissible to carry out different language policies in North and South Ossetia.

We deem it politically and economically absurd, within the framework of a democratic state, for the small nation of Ossetia to be divided into two administrative units, and we request that the question of the union of North and South Ossetia be discussed at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum devoted to nationality questions. We hope that every Ossetian's age-old dream of unification will finally be realized.

Meanwhile, the discriminatory and anti-democratic character of the decree that has been passed is kindling the fierce indignation of Ossetia's non-Georgian population. A number of warning strikes [zabastovki] and rallies have been held. The general consensus is that it constitutes one more link in the chain of humiliations and insults to the non-Georgian population of the republic and South Ossetia, a chain which pours forth unbroken from Georgian television, radio, and the press.

In consideration of the principles of Leninist nationality policy, the provisions of the CPSU's platform on nationality questions, and the social-political situation of the Ossetian workers in the Georgian SSR,

We Demand:

1. That the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Nationality Questions discuss and resolve the problem of the unification of South and North Ossetia, thus realizing every Ossetian's age-old dream. We consider that unification of the two parts will afford a way out of the historically, politically, and economically absurd situation in which one nation having a common territory is divided into two administrative units within a democratic state and finds itself within different state entities. In consideration of the country's political situation today, we presume that the first stage in the unification of North and South Ossetia should be the granting of autonomous republic status to South Ossetia (Oblast).

2. That every autonomous formation's right to guide its own destiny be stipulated constitutionally (the right of free secession from a union republic).

3. That the question of every type of autonomous formation's subordination to the joint, common federative center be decided....

4. That every law, decree, decision, or amendment to the constitutions of the USSR and the union republic which bear upon the interests of the autonomous formations of the USSR or the union republic be submitted to the autonomous formation's people for general, public discussion.

5. That the law on language include the following point: "Ossetian shall be declared the state language in all party, soviet, administrative, scientific and educational, and economic institutions, enterprises, and social organizations. The conduct of business as well as instruction in all types of educational and scientific institutions of South Ossetia shall be in Ossetian and Russian, in compliance with the principle of national-Russian bilingualism [dvuyazychiye]. In areas of compact settlement of persons of the Georgian nationality, the Georgian language shall function on an equal footing with Ossetian and Russian."

Ossetian Workers and Adamon Nikhas. 1989.

From the editors:

This is not a case where comment is superfluous, but we will make no comment here. Why? First of all, because we anticipate your opinion, dear readers. We want our community's attitude toward this Appeal of the "Ossetian Workers and Adamon Nikhas" to the highest authorities to be made clear and manifest. We do have this question: perhaps it can be determined once and for all who is meant by these "Ossetian workers" (we already have a rather clear idea of "Adamon Nikhas," but our sense of fairness still prompts us not to bring on another tragedy by calling this self-styled "People's Assembly," which has gone on the offensive against the Georgian people, by its right name); perhaps our fellow Ossetian writers, figures of Ossetian culture, can help us in this.

What we can say with certainty is this: What the "Ossetian Workers and Adamon Nikhas" are demanding is not what the **Ossetian people** are demanding; we do not place an equals sign between the Ossetian people and the "Ossetian Workers." But let us not deceive ourselves: a portion of the Ossetian people, confused and led astray, egged on and manipulated by so-called leaders [lidery] who do not reflect the interests and aspirations of the whole Ossetian people but are in the grip of insidious intentions, is actually imbued with an anti-Georgian spirit. And it cares nothing for historical, legal, or moral considerations.

(We are publishing the "Ossetian Workers' and Adamon Nikhas Appeal" because we have had bitter experience.

What brought the tragedy in Abkhazia upon us, probably, was the fact that we failed to bring the despicable "Lykhny Appeal" to the attention of the public at large on time, we failed to assess the "Lykhnyans'" absurd, irresponsible, slanderous claims in a properly political manner.)

And so, we turn the floor over to our public.

Meanwhile, we present to you the following "Appeal to the Georgian People!" in response to the above Ossetian Workers' and Adamon Nikhas Appeal; this item appeared in the Main Committee for National Salvation's monthly periodical KARTVLIS DEDA No 5 (the periodical has been coming out since May 1989). (We will comment that some parts of this Appeal lack moderation, but when someone kicks you and slaps you in the face—someone who used to share your joys and sorrows in times gone by—how can you defend yourself in moderation?)

Appeal to the Georgian People

Lately there has been an increase in anti-Georgian attacks in Inner Kartlia—historical Samachablo, which was proclaimed to be "South Ossetia" by the invading bolsheviks after the sovietization of Georgia; these attacks are being planned and carried out by "Adamon Nikhas," the so-called Ossetian People's Front. This ancient Georgian land, where all the cultural and historical monuments and all the placenames are Georgian, where the Soviet Encyclopedia itself states that the Ossetians began to settle in the 13th century (although that applies more to the highlands than the Tskhinvali District, where the Ossetians began to settle in the 20th century) is being declared "the ancient land of the Alans." They are distributing fantastic maps, published in Moscow, showing that the whole left bank of the Kura belongs to the Alans; they are posting slogans in Tskhinvali that read "Georgians, leave Ossetian soil"; they are disseminating proclamations and appeals demanding that the forthcoming CPSU Plenum unite so-called South Ossetia with North Ossetia, create a new Ossetian Republic, and separate it from Georgia. They are also demanding that Ossetian be made the official state language, that Georgian be rejected, and that Ossetia be Russified. Adamon Nikhas is already collecting funds and weapons for a future massacre of the Georgians.

It is plain as day that all of this is the latest provocation from the Kremlin, whose goal is a new bloodletting and the genocide of the Georgians. In consideration of all this, the Main Committee for Georgian National Salvation calls upon the Georgian nation:

1. To hold mass rallies, demonstrations, and warning strikes [zabastovki] all over Georgia demanding the abolition of the illegally created so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.

2. That the Georgian authorities take immediate steps to restrain the provocateurs in order that events similar to the tragedy in Sukhumi may not be repeated in Tskhinvali.

3. That a mass rally of many thousands of Georgians be held in Tskhinvali to put forth the above demands and put a stop to violations of Georgians' rights and discrimination against the Georgian language on this ancient Georgian soil.

Let the interlopers leave this land if they no longer wish to live in peace with us. Samachablo is Georgia!

Our struggle is just!

God is with us!

Long live independent Georgia!

Platform of Georgian Opposition Group Outlined

18130022 Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO in Georgian No 42, 20 Oct 89 p 7

[Statement by Irakli Shengelaia: "Our Road Leads to Freedom"]

[Text] "The Road to Salvation...."

Herewith, IRAKLI SHENGELAIA's answers to our correspondent's questions:

1. Would you please briefly state your organization's platform.
2. In your opinion, at what stage is the Georgian national-liberation movement today? How correct or justified is the position it occupies at present?
3. What measures would you undertake to settle ethnic conflicts in Georgia?
4. How do you account for the West's cautious, variegated attitude toward the situation in the Baltic republics? What conclusions can opposition national forces draw from this?
5. In general, how do you envision the social-economic prospects of a sovereign Georgian republic?

1. The platform of the Uniate Association of the Georgian Legal-Radical Party and the Georgian National Justice Union can be formulated briefly as follows:

a) All the critical problems facing Georgia and the Georgian nation today can be solved only when Georgia regains the status of full statehood and becomes an independent, democratic, free republic.

b) The Georgian republic's democratic nature should be defined by its internal political structure, social infrastructure, and complete freedom of the individual. We envision Georgia as a country of provincial federalism

[samkhareo pederalizmi] divided into the 24 historical provinces [mkhare] within today's territories. In our opinion, the republic ought to be governed by a two-chamber, multi-party national Duma [satatbiro]. The upper chamber—the constituent assembly—should be elected by the principle of majority rule, with two deputies from each province. The lower chamber—the assembly of representatives—should be elected on the principle of proportionality. In the supreme legislative organ—the national Duma—the Georgian nation and the peoples who live in the republic will be represented by 150 to 160 deputies. The head of state should be a president elected in universal, direct elections, with a ministerial cabinet formed by parliamentary majority.

c) Georgia is a country of traditional Orthodox Christianity. It should remain so, with full freedom of conscience for persons of other faiths and ethnic groups. The principle of state noninterference in the Church's internal affairs must be maintained.

d) The social-economic infrastructure should be based on free economic relations. Both forms of property ownership, private and state, must be established in the republic. In our opinion, the republic's economy should be based on private property. The present wretched state of Georgia's economy can be salvaged only by promoting private ownership. The means of production should be turned over to private individuals, groups of persons, cooperative associations, stock companies, and labor collectives through purchase for private ownership.

2. The Georgian national movement today has an alternative: to make the fight for independence a political one, or to continue the old, tried-and-true path. The Georgian national movement to restore independent statehood incorporates two aspects (or, at any rate, in my opinion it ought to)—the political and the economic. Both are aspects of a single whole; I cannot imagine how we would attain economic independence without becoming politically independent. In the same way, how are we to become politically independent if we don't fight for economic independence?!

What does political struggle entail? The achievement of a multi-party system! Without that, it is impossible to imagine Georgian independence. Realization of the principle of nations' self-determination is inconceivable unless the subject-object relation is resolved. Without getting bogged down in historical examples, the problem of today's decolonization is being resolved the same way. Accordingly, there must be a democratic mechanism whose activation will bring us freedom. One of the most essential attributes of democracy is a multi-party system. Let no one think, however, that a multi-party system is a panacea and that as soon as it is allowed everything will resolve itself. The fact is that we already seem to have a certain amount of pluralism, except that it is merely a pluralism of opinions rather than political pluralism! Hence, pluralism of action is not allowed. It is impossible to establish democracy that way. The establishment of a multi-party system will guarantee us that total

de-ideologization of the state will take place. A free individual cannot be politicized; he must have true freedom of choice. In a one-party state, everyone is politicized—both those who favor and those who oppose the state—and there is no place for freedom. Hence, a soviet on whatever level of the mono-party structure, regardless of internal pluralism of opinions, cannot convey democracy. Perhaps others will find this assertion unacceptable, but for us it constitutes a basic principle. By reference to it I will answer two questions at once: First, why we aren't taking part in elections; second, by our principle we categorically reject the notion that the national movement must not be made a political movement. There are those who go even further and attempt to argue (?) that the political movement hinders the national. A political movement (for example, the bolshevik and, at the initial stage, the social-democratic) may hinder the progress of a national movement (and in fact did), but if the nation's movement toward freedom incorporates political struggle, its road cannot be unacceptable to the nation. In my opinion, what is unacceptable is the reformist road that does not lead us to the restoration of an independent state but rather toward implementation of the principle of federalism on the basis of a new treaty, again within the Union.

3. The origin of ethnic conflicts in Georgia, which by now have become critical, came about for two reasons: First, the demographic imbalance in favor of foreign tribes [inoplemenniki], caused by economic or, if you will, political deformation. Second, setting against one another peoples who have lived in Georgia historically, an example of the imperial *divide et impera* policy. Let us not quibble over who has lived among us and for how long; their residence in Georgia today is a reality, and it behooves us to find a way out of this difficult situation.

In the realm of discussion, I envision the resolution of these conflicts this way: If provincial federalism is realized, the Georgian provinces will be given economic and cultural self-government, the non-Georgian provinces will get cultural and national self-government, and Abkhazia, in addition to the other two, will be given political self-government. One aspect that needs to be taken account of: There is the principle of nations' (nationalities', peoples', ethnoses') self-determination, but there is also the principle of state wholeness [tselnost]. Georgia today, far from expanding onto the land of others, has actually lost a substantial portion of its historical territories. Of the 91,110 square kilometers of Georgian territory recognized *de jure* by the League of Nations we now only have 69,700 square kilometers. A total of 21,410 square kilometers were openly annexed. Accordingly, as a non-sovereign state fighting to regain the sovereignty it lost in February 1921, Georgia at least has the complete right to form itself within the borders it finds itself in today. And the realization of all three forms of self-government will fully guarantee the non-Georgians, under international legal norms, the right to live on Georgian soil. Any attempt against this will be

considered an encroachment upon Georgia's territorial integrity and hence, separatism.

By what means can we resolve nationality relations today? Without even thinking one can say that it won't be the route proposed by the "CPSU Platform on the Nationality Question." The so-called "horizontal structure" will destroy Georgia. To be sure, it was stated at the last plenum that the borders are not to be revised, but will the authors of the "Platform" kindly explain how they envision keeping Abkhazia, the former Samachablo [South Ossetia], and Adzharia within Georgia by expanding their rights?! Wouldn't the implementation of this notion relegate Georgia to the role of passive observer of "expanded" relations between the Center and "autonomous entities with expanded rights"?!?

It is my firm belief that the way out is as follows:

a) First of all, dialogue. However hard it seems to us, dialogue must be started. Nothing is accomplished without trying, as the saying goes. Without dialogue, the following picture unfolds: There is a triangle, with three angles, three vertexes, and two sides, the third side being broken. A Georgian stands in one corner, his rival (no one yet knows why) in the other, and at the top is the Center. The third side, which connects the Georgian nation with its rival, is broken. Relations between them are conducted via the top angle—the Center. But the ray refracted through the Third Power's prism brings darkness rather than light. The remedy is to restore the broken side. The fight for freedom is impossible without this.

b) There may be those who find it curious, but the multi-party mechanism represents the sole means of resolving interethnic relations. Every party in Georgia must serve its interests. By legal norms, it is impermissible for the party of one state to exist in another state. Georgia, moreover, is the Georgian nation's homeland. But, as in the case of the Georgian nation, other peoples also have particular strata and circles. Their interests, I repeat, deriving from Georgia's interests, impinge on one another to a certain extent. Consequently, a non-Georgian living in the republic relates to Georgia via the party which defends his social interests. The guarantee of individual freedom is provided by multi-party democracy, and freedom can resolve any tense relations.

4. Prior to the publication of the CPSU Central Committee's Appeal to the Baltic nations, I and members of our party as well as representatives of Georgia's other national-political associations, had the opportunity to see, during a direct meeting, that the West has a cautious attitude not only toward the affairs of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, but in general toward all nations. You will recall that on 21-23 August of this year there was an international conference in Riga on the problem of "Nations' Self-Determination and Equality." Conference participants from the Western countries—senators, deputies, and political scientists from the United States, West Germany, Poland, and Great Britain—stated

unanimously: "International law knows no other mechanism by which a small nation can be given the opportunity to attain full independence on the strength of self-determination save by implementing it in the subject-object relation." In terms of statehood, the international legal subject [subyekt] must recognize the sovereignty of the object [obyekt] (the non-sovereign state as exemplified by us and the Baltic countries) and thereby grant it international legal-subjecthood in terms of statehood. There will always be moral-ethical support from the Western countries, but in terms of real politics it is very difficult to implement, in the next two or three years at any rate. So far the West finds today's status quo acceptable. It wants a stable world and does not want to disrupt the balance that it has achieved or is trying to achieve. In terms of legal norms, Lithuania's, Latvia's and Estonia's position is better than ours, not to mention the other republics and nations. The West does not recognize the annexation of the Baltic countries. In addition, they link that annexation to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the start of World War Two, Hitler's Germany, and Stalin's Soviet Empire. The annexation of the Georgian Democratic Republic (both overt and covert) casts doubt on the legitimacy of the creation of the Soviet state. The West did not recognize the annexation of Georgia. This is indicated by the fact that the independent Georgian government existed in exile until 1933. Legally our position is much less clear: France recognized the Soviet Union in 1924, but with the following wording: "on territory where Soviet rule was established with the consent of the local population." That means that Soviet rule was established in Georgia following the occupation/invasion. This is also attested by a bill passed in the United States Senate in 1929. All of this, however, is mere preamble. The point is that freedom must be implemented, independence must be instituted in real life. To do so will require the following:

a) Restoration of the Georgian question to legal status. In this context, vital importance attaches to the United States Senate's recent resolution concerning the annexation of Georgia.

b) A major point: Historical injustice is one matter; whether we want independence today, however, is another. What is crucial, then, is the present—whether the Georgian nation aspires to the restoration of statehood. Hence, I believe it is unacceptable to conclude a new all-union treaty (for which they are so assiduously preparing us) within the framework of federalism or even confederalism.

5. Social-economic development is impossible on the basis of the plan they are submitting to us for discussion and "approval." Until the Georgian nation has the right to allocate its own national income, there can be no question of comprehensive development. The recently concocted "theoretical" foundation for consolidating the unity/wholeness of the all-union economy is nothing but modified colonialism. The proportion of all-union and union-republic property ownership in Georgia stands at 89 percent. In this respect I don't think the Georgian

nation is in any better shape than the Namibian people. Enterprises located on Georgian territory ought to belong to our own economic complex. We must retain our national income in our own house. By what route? Perhaps by activating the strike [zabastovka] mechanism, for example. We ought to manage our economy ourselves. The only thing that can help our agriculture is to abolish the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and restore farms to community and household ownership. Moreover, private ownership of the means of production must be permitted. But might not such reforms portend a rejection of the gains of socialism?! Excuse me but, which socialism? The socialism that has ruined agriculture, destroyed industry, ravaged the environment, perverted the individual, and physically destroyed millions of people?! These are gains we ought to discard, and the sooner the better.

Let me emphasize, finally, that economic independence does not mean isolation. Civilized countries cannot live isolated from one another. The integrative processes taking place in today's world (economic ones at least) are the result of freedom. The Georgian nation also wants freedom in order that it may join this process as an equal member.

Our road leads to freedom.

Ethnic, Economic Implications of Tajik Language Law

90US0217A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 1 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with M.Sh. Shukurov, scientist-philologist and academician of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, by TadzhiKTA correspondent Vladimir Fomin: "Toward the Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum: The Magic of One's Native Language"]

[Text] As we have already reported, the constituent congress of the Tajik Language Fund was held in Dushanbe in October. One of the main speakers at the congress was scientist-philologist and academician of the Tajik SSR Academy of Science M.Sh. Shukurov. Tajik TA correspondent Vladimir Fomin met with the scientist and asked him to tell about the processes which are taking place in the republic.

[Shukurov] The congress ratified the charter of the Society of Friends of the Tajik Language which has been created in the republic, and elected its chairman—the well-known poet and publicist, editor-in-chief of the journal SADOI SHARK, Loik Sherali.

The society will promote the publication of books in the Tajik language and the development of a new instructional program for secondary schools, since the one currently in effect was created before the war and is extremely outdated.

I cannot help but comment on the school program. Our Tajik language lessons are perhaps the weakest of all.

The emphasis is placed primarily on mere rote memorization of rules. From the first through the eighth grades it is grammar, which awaits the school graduate again at the institute. However, as yet we have no creative assimilation of the language. We must radically change both the content of the program and the methodology of instruction.

[Correspondent] What scientific institutions serve as the basis for the development of the new methodologies?

[Shukurov] Today there are practically no such organizations, with the exception of the Scientific-Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, which is called upon to engage in the compilation of programs, textbooks, scientific and methodological study aids. Its scientific staffing, however, is very weak. To a certain degree this is a consequence also of the paltry wages. The Institute often cannot afford to hire good specialists. There are even some people here who cannot get a job anywhere else.

Yet we are faced with a large sphere of activity. Today a new conception of secondary education has been published in the newspapers and presented for public judgment. It suffers from a series of shortcomings. It is no accident, therefore, that the conception of the national secondary school is being created parallel to this. A serious methodological base is needed here.

[Correspondent] Have specific proposals for the creation of such a methodological base been presented at the congress?

[Shukurov] Unfortunately, this question was practically not touched upon. As strange as it may seem, another painful question was the primary center of attention—the question of Bukhara and Samarkand. The day before, a meeting at the "Spartak" [spartacus] stadium was devoted to this question. And almost the entire congress, in which the representatives of these cities participated, was devoted to it alone.

[Correspondent] What do you think should be in first place: The development of language in the republic or the question of Bukhara and Samarkand?

[Shukurov] In my opinion, they are closely tied in a cultural plane, but these are individual questions which have equal significance for the Tajik people. At the current stage they are equally important.

[Correspondent] Since they are "equally important", then if the discussion at the congress centered primarily around linguistic and other cultural problems of Tajiks living in Bukhara and Samarkand, the discussion of these cities is more important if we discuss it, so to speak, "arithmetically"?

[Shukurov] In fact it has turned out that way. Yet from my standpoint, we should first of all have discussed the association charter. However, this question was somehow pushed off into the background.

As for Bukhara and Samarkand, in the plane of language it is very important. For example, the Tajik literary language was formulated in the 9th century in Bukhara. At the same time, the classical Persian-Tajik literature was formulated there. For 1,000 years the dialects of these cities were one of the primary sources of development of literary Farsi-Tajik. In our time, when the process of democratization of the Tajik literary language has begun, it has again been based on the dialects of Bukhara and Samarkand. It is necessary that these cities continue to take an active part in the development of Tajik language and culture.

[Correspondent] And how does the republic's intelligentsia view the fact that sometimes, succumbing to sentiments and talk, and often the most absurd rumors, good specialists in the national economy who are not native residents, not fluent in Tajik, leave the republic?

[Shukurov] This question is being very actively discussed. For example, in September IZVESTIYA published the notes of the newspaper's own correspondent in Dushanbe, A. Karpov, in which he wrote that there are emerging tendencies for Russian-speaking specialists to leave the republic. Moreover, the author of the article associated this with the heated discussions which preceded the adoption of the Law on Language in the Tajik SSR. But when they started to check the statistical data, it turned out that there was nothing of the sort! Possibly some, very few, did leave. However, the problem is much more complex. After all, Tajiks are leaving too. The roots of the problem stem from the difficult socio-economic position of the republic.

[Correspondent] That is, you believe that there is a normal migration process occurring as compared with previous years?

[Shukurov] You know, a normal one. I have focused on the first results of the population census. It follows from them that up until about 1979 the migration was from the RSFSR in the direction of the other republics. Later, however, the process seemed to reverse itself. There is even the following peculiarity: [this migration is taking place] not to the central rayons of Russia, but to rayons which are remote from the center. That is, on the whole a new process and new phenomena are becoming apparent. What does this mean? It means that the living conditions have changed there. Land is being given, as well as the opportunity to move there. Let us say, to the deserted villages, in order to resurrect them. All this is being financed. This is a normal process.

[Correspondent] And yet, what do you think, is the work of the writing intelligentsia enough in exposing, for example, the economic loss which the departure of specialists inflicts on the republic?

[Shukurov] For the time being, of course, it is not enough. In my opinion, we must do everything possible so that, for example, the Russian-speaking population is able to remain here, so that the Law on Language does not have a negative effect on the economic life of the

republic. That is, we must do everything to see that people know the language, and that everyone who wants to can study it.

Today we are still far from the realization of this. There are few textbooks, instructors, and special courses. Moreover, now there are new methods of accelerated language instruction.

For us, specialists are the most serious problem. And if we view it in the national plane, then today we have extremely few specialists of Tajik nationality. How many years have we built the Nurekskiy GES [hydroelectric station], and now the Rogunskiy? If we ask, for example, where are those specialists today who built the Nurekskiy GES? What are they doing? Construction is in full swing, but we, as before, are forced to rely on available specialists. Even today, a specialist leaves if he is offered more money and better housing conditions somewhere else. Yet what will happen tomorrow, when the republic changes over to cost accounting? They might again promise him more money somewhere else, and he will leave the republic. That way we will be left without any specialists at all.

How many places, for example, are allocated in the Moscow VUZes for the republic, and without competition? The republic itself decides whom to send. Yet here is what is interesting. Not only does the quality of the educational training of the young people being sent leave something to be desired, but we cannot even get enough of them. For example, after the first year of study, many students, poorly prepared for study in Russian, return to the republic, frightened by the difficulties.

[Correspondent] And here is a question which relates to journalists: If you had to write an article on the economic loss inflicted upon the republic by the departure of specialists, would it be easy to obtain such data?

[Shukurov] I believe it would be very difficult. For example, when we worked on the commission for developing the Law on Language, in order to see the full picture we had to know the percentage ratio of the national groups of Dushanbe. Moreover, not just how many Tajiks, Uzbeks, Russians, etc. there were, but also, for example, how many Russian speakers. After all, even a Tajik may not know the Tajik language. We needed data to rely on. We turned to the republic's Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics] and received a rejection. So, in this respect we acted blindly to some degree. This was quite annoying for us.

[Correspondent] Let us return to purely linguistic questions. Do you, an academician, have scientific opponents, people who differ from you on the question of the direction of language development?

[Shukurov] Today some very interesting processes are taking place in the language. They evoke great arguments and I, of course, am included in these discussions. I see that there are opponents. As yet they have not spoken out openly. For example, they did not speak out at the

congress of the lovers of Tajik literature. Yet during the recess between meetings there were arguments. It is true, for now they are not being conducted from the podium. However, this means that soon such arguments will begin also in the pages of the press. In fact, I am now preparing a polemical article for a popular journal on questions of the current status of the Tajik literary language. Why in a popular journal? Why, because the article has not only scientific, but also practical importance.

For example, many Tajiks have been to Iran and Afghanistan in recent years. There they heard a language which was less polluted than that which we have here. They come to Dushanbe and are delighted by that language, but unfortunately they forget that all this is nevertheless another, separate branch of the Farsi language. After all, Farsi, which is the source for Tajik, has three styles. And the fact that one of these three styles is better retained somewhere else still does not mean that we must rest on the more preserved style. We must retain the uniqueness of Tajik Farsi, which for centuries has served as the example for the others.

Today here in Central Asia, and not only in Central Asia, such a time has come when the problems of language in the republics are taking on particular importance. Even the personal relations of people are sometimes associated with their attitude toward language. The magic of the native language is capable of helping to deeper understand each other, and at the same time to repel. For example, the better a Tajik knows his native language, the more he will feel himself a Tajik on one hand, and the more he will understand and respect the language of another people—on the other.

I will also stress that the time has come to adopt an all-union law which would define the status of national languages, including Russian. After all, the discussion about this has been going on for a long time. At the same time, the discussion about granting Russian the status of an all-state language, in my opinion, will negate the laws on languages adopted in the national republics. Will this not lead once again to the degradation of national languages, and specifically of Tajik? That is what I am afraid of.

Moscow KGB Chief Interview on Glasnost, KGB
90UN0137A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 10 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Maj Gen V.M. Prilukov, chief of the USSR KGB Administration for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, by correspondent T. Gladkov: "Reported for Duty"]

[Text] A new chief of the USSR KGB Administration for Moscow and the Moscow Oblast, Maj Gen V.M. Prilukov, recently reported for duty. Our correspondent met Vitaliy Mikhaylovich.

[Correspondent] First question is traditional. Tell us in greater detail about yourself.

[Prilukov] I was born in 1939 in a family of physicians in Perm. There I finished the aviation technical school and then the Polytechnical Institute. I was elected to the Komsomol organs, and was an obkom secretary. Then I returned to industry. Worked as chief of an assembly shop at an instrument-making plant. I was elected secretary of the Sverdlovsk CPSU Raykom. The party obkom then recommended me for preparatory courses for the management staff of the USSR KGB, after which I began service in subsections of the USSR KGB central apparatus.

[Correspondent] You have a large family?

[Prilukov] The usual. My wife's occupation is financial worker, now housewife. My son is in the military, bachelor, so far. My daughter is a nurse, married, has a son, our grandson.

[Correspondent] Thank you. Now to the substance of our meeting. Tell me what it is today, before the passage of the law about the USSR KGB, that falls under the competence of the organs of state security?

[Prilukov] Strictly speaking, the area of competence of the organs of government security is determined by the decree ratified by the Council of Ministers back in 1959, and remains unchanged. What has changed, as you know, naturally enough, are the conditions in the country and our society. It is true that the organs of government security must carry out their tasks differently than before. Perestroyka here is moving quite actively, but today we must have a new document setting out the foundations, on which we must guide ourselves in our activity for the good of the government, society, and each individual citizen. Furthermore, this must not be an administrative or even governmental act, but a law, openly discussed, and accepted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. A draft of such a law is already in existence. Highly qualified jurists, responsible workers in many of our services, the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR Procuracy, the Supreme Court, scientific-investigative institutes, have taken part in its preparation. In its full complexity the draft was subjected to various additions, changes, rethinking, both deep and substantive, more than 10 times. We would like

very much for it to go into effect as soon as possible. And that is understandable: we are all striving for the creation of a socialist government of laws.

[Correspondent] What are the tasks of KGB organs today, now?

[Prilukov] The most important of them is the assurance of governmental security of the country. This duty is imposed on the KGB, as on other governmental organs, by the USSR constitution. Others can be divided roughly as follows: Intelligence, specifically the uncovering of plots and plans of foreign governments which threaten the interests of USSR and countries of the socialist world. Then counterintelligence, that is warning, uncovering, and suppression of the activities of special services, foreign, political and other centers, working against the USSR. Included in this are, unfortunately, the unceasing cases of state treason, spying, terrorist acts, subversive activity, smuggling, dangerous manifestations of organized crime.

[Correspondent] Could you cite such examples?

[Prilukov] Certainly. On 1 May of this year, an unknown person, using a special incendiary device, set fire to the building of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, which is on 25th October Street near the Red Square. In view of the dangerous nature of the act, done during a holiday demonstration, the USSR KGB administration for Moscow and the Moscow Oblast immediately opened a criminal case of indicated diversion. Already on 5 May Moscow security personnel identified the criminal—Kastornyy, student at the University of Rostov, living at Rostov na Donu. Kastornyy admitted his guilt in committing deliberate arson and gave detailed evidence about the circumstances of preparation and commission of the diversion.

The Moscow security men suppressed the spying of one Ivanovskiy, who caused significant economic losses to our country. Over several years Ivanovskiy got from his foreign employers close to 170,000 rubles.

In a deployment area of a troop unit of air defense forces our colleagues have found a most complicated device for listening to telephone conversations, working in an automated environment and transmitting the collected information to American satellites. The device was camouflaged under a pine stump. Another device was intended for listening to telephone conversations between defense establishments. It was installed by foreign intelligence people directly on the communications cable underground.

Among the tasks of the organs of the USSR KGB are the conduct of investigations, guarding state borders of the USSR, assuring the safety of large public-political actions, protection of governmental communications and administrative activity.

[Correspondent] I would suggest that our readers would be primarily interested in the work of KGB investigators.

[Prilukov] I must note first that our colleagues conduct investigations under strict supervision by the Moscow or oblast procuracy in cases primarily in areas of competence of state security organs. Aside from that, cases are investigated on direct assignment from the procuracy, for instance property crimes of exceptional size. Usually in such cases we work closely with the procuracy and organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Correspondent] I know that a series of notorious criminal cases were uncovered by colleagues of your administration. Unfortunately, the press coverage of the participation of security people was skimpy.

[Prilukov] Indeed, Moscow security men investigated large, million ruble embezzlements in the "Okean" trading company in the main administration of trading of the Mosgorispolkom ('Tregubov Affair' and others). They also stood at the source of exposure in the so-called cotton affair and many others. Thanks to their efforts many criminals were given well-earned punishments. But something else is far more important: pus-pockets of corruption were opened, light was shed on ways and mechanisms of criminal machinations, and rather significant sums were returned to the government in rubles, hard currencies and valuables. Only in the last year our investigators looked through 150 materials connected with smuggling. As a result over 2 million rubles were returned to the treasury.

[Correspondent] It turns out that security men partly supply government budget expenditures for their maintenance?

[Prilukov] Indeed it does. But the matter is not limited to returning stolen goods to their lawful owner. We see one of our tasks being to cooperate in a variety of ways in development of economic, scientific-technical and defense potential of the country. State security organs are in a position to do it partly because among our colleagues are numerous highly qualified specialists in practically any field of science, technology, industry, etc. They are in a position to help many industrial enterprises, scientific research institutions, governmental organizations of various levels.

Thus in the last 2 years over 40 extraordinary misfortunes at industrial enterprises and scientific institutions at the city and oblast were prevented. These happenings, had they occurred, could have caused loss of life and serious material losses. For instance, at Vnukovo airport it was discovered that an engine with a totally used-up operating life was installed on an Il-86 airplane instead of a new one. It is easy to imagine what could have happened. Together with the procuracy we have established direct evidence of gross negligence of persons responsible for this work. The guilty parties were brought before the court. This event, unfortunately, is not unique. In the last 3 years at the Vnukovo, Domodedovo

and Bykovo airports we were instrumental in removing from service 12 airplanes with serious defects.

Security people of the administration prevented a large loss, calculated in tens of millions of foreign currency rubles, which our country might have had to suffer as a result of incompetence of workers in certain ministries in buying various equipment at foreign firms.

[Correspondent] Indeed, the facts are amazing. It is a pity that the general public is badly informed about them. Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, what changes in structure or functions of the organs of state security, in your opinion, would most visibly express their perestroyka?

[Prilukov] It is known that in the criminal codes of RSFSR and other Soviet republics articles were changed which used to punish rather severely anti-Soviet propaganda and deliberate slander about Soviet governmental and public structures. Now we have moved from the concept of struggle with ideological diversions to the concept of an immeasurably higher order: protection, using internal security methods, of the Soviet constitutional order. In other words, we will persecute not criticism addressed at Soviet rule, but only direct calls for violent subversion of our governmental and public-political structure, and concrete actions aimed that way. In this way the area of competence of organs of state security has simultaneously become narrower and has risen to a principally new level. Such is the dialectic of life itself.

[Correspondent] How was this manifested in an organizational manner?

[Prilukov] We used to have services and subdivisions, which, by decision of directive organs, occupied themselves with the struggle against the so-called ideological diversions, as we understood them in those years. Now these structures have been abolished. Within the structure of the USSR KGB, an administration (correspondingly departments in the territorial organs) for the defense of the Soviet constitutional structure has been established. They are charged with organization and activation of counterintelligence work on defense of the constitutional foundations of the Soviet state, fencing-off of Soviet society from disruptive activities of the special services of imperialist powers, anti-Soviet organizations abroad, and from actions of antisocialist elements inside the country. It is really too early to discuss the actual work of the internal security men that have come to this new-born administration, but in a few months we could return particularly to this subject.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Vitaliy Mikhaylovich. Now a question, which recently is often heard. How do you understand or interpret the principle of glasnost in relation to your work?

[Prilukov] I should note that perestroyka and, first of all, the confirmation of the principle of glasnost, in the work of state security organs are extremely complicated matters, not permitting any undue haste. It is known that the

first principle of medicine since ancient times is the hippocratic "do no harm." Therefore we are trying to, exactly and prudently, correlate glasnost with true secrecy. To speak frankly, we, as an area of government, are truly interested in a broad interpretation of our work, while observing certain common sense limits. The Soviet people must know with confidence what the organs of state security are doing and trust and support them. After all, we chekists are part of our own people, work in the interests of society, inside society and together with society.

[Correspondent] What is being done about it, concretely?

[Prilukov] Recently many of our colleagues held dozens of meetings at Moscow enterprises, in scientific-research and other institutions, told the workers of their own work, answered a wide variety of questions. Recently we had a management meeting of secretaries of party committees and chairmen of the councils of labor collectives of major enterprises and associations. In the foyer there was an exhibit of photographs confiscated from internal security people taken by our operators.

Such meetings on our "territory" and directly in labor collectives of Moscow and the oblast we will continue regularly into the future. We have formed a press group composed generally of young colleagues with a taste not only for operational work but also for journalism. In a short time with their help articles were prepared about the work of security men in the capital, which appeared in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and other papers. Organized transmissions on Moscow radio and television. Good relations were established with the "Moskovskiy Rabochiy" publishing house so one can await the appearance of books on our subject. We are thinking of making movies, at first documentaries. We would like to attract to this work Moscow writers, journalists, cinematographers and dramatists.

[Correspondent] And will you open the archives to them?

[Prilukov] And we will open the archives...To be understood, not in the sense that we will move our archival treasures to a public room. We cannot, we simply do not have the right to open up our methods, the specifics of internal security work. That would be handing it to our opponents on a platter. But all materials of importance to historians, writers, journalists will be offered. In fact, this is already being done. The press has published much new material, it is only that readers do not always know that the authors had the opportunity of acquaintance with primary sources.

On that subject, the opening of documentation depends not on our wishes or non-wishes. Individual initiative here is impermissible. The first requirement is for a strict legal basis, which will appear upon the passage of the

USSR law on the KGB, the press, and on glasnost. Finally, on the archival fund, which, incidentally, is also being worked on now.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, the question about archives has a direct relationship to another, which greatly excites the entire Soviet society, including Muscovites. I have in mind the rehabilitation of our fellow Soviet citizens, who perished in the years of lawless repressions.

[Prilukov] Our colleagues work on it, and I must say, very intensely. To be brief, I shall mention only two figures: over 9 months 12,000 cases of the period were examined, and accordingly 15,000 persons were rehabilitated.

[Correspondent] Who are these people?

[Prilukov] On the whole, not only prominent party members, government workers, military, notable writers scientists and artists, which is sometimes the impression. For instance, a large group of Moscow horse-cab drivers was rehabilitated. They had been repressed in the 30's as "concealed kulaks." Here the only thing that corresponds to the truth is that these were peasants who moved to the city after the sweeping so-called "liquidation of kulaks as a class

[Correspondent] Are there searches for buried victims of repression?

[Prilukov] Yes. That is not nearly as simple as could appear at first sight. In the personal files of the victims there are only data on the carrying out of the sentence or death while under confinement. In the documents which we have burial places are not indicated. So far we have not found them in archives either. In those years such data were considered top secret, instructions were given orally, it appears.

We are now trying to establish burial places through stories of the few eye-witnesses, but one must not forget how many years have passed since those times. Sometimes we find them accidentally, for instance when working or digging the soil. From the words of long-time residents, one can judge that such burials were at the cemetery of Kalitnikovo, in the rayon of the former village of Strogino, where they buried detainees building the Moskva-Volga canal, on the land of the old Moscow crematorium, in the so-called burial of unclaimed remains. Searches are continuing, and we will inform Muscovites about their results.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, our editors, as well as those of, apparently, many newspapers frequently receive citizens' complaints about extremes pertaining to so-called enterprises involving special security for prohibiting private and tourist trips abroad for secrecy reasons. They are of the opinion that these secrecy reasons have become a brake on the establishment of scientific contacts with foreign colleagues for the exchange of information vital to us and the like. There

are cases where workers are removed from duties upon departure of relatives for permanent residence abroad. In such cases persons in charge point to instructions supposedly from the KGB or the government.

[Prilukov] I must clarify immediately: in the vast majority of cases we are in no way connected with this type of activity. We in fact assure the security of a number of enterprises and institutions, let's say, those involved with defense. But the decision of what is secret and what is not, determination of the periods of secrecy of scientific and technical work and corresponding rules rest upon the institution itself. The travel of their workers abroad depends on them, too. Incidentally, not long ago legislation was issued greatly simplifying the regulation of such trips. Now many questions are solved independently by local governmental units, departments, and even separate enterprises and their public organizations.

We get involved in these matters very rarely, only in cases where we take care of very serious considerations of a governmental nature. And the final decision is not made by us, but by higher decision-making echelons. I consider all references to the "secret involvement of the KGB" in such situations to be invented and totally unfounded. I can announce that a law on the protection of secret information is now being worked on which will put everything in its place in this truly important matter.

[Correspondent] Several words on another very troublesome theme—about the fight against organized crime.

[Prilukov] Based on the well known decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Moscow, like in other cities, a temporary committee for combating crime has been founded, headed by the chairman of the Moscow soviet, Comrade Saikin. I am also a member of this committee. Would like to note that the creation of this committee does not at all mean, as is occasionally mentioned in the press, a replacement of long-term, thoroughgoing work with yet another power campaign. Not at all. Roots of common criminality go deep into our economic and social troubles. Only their liquidation with the combined efforts of society, the entire people, might bring us to the uprooting of crime or at least its radical reduction.

The task of the temporary committee is to bring a decisive break-through in the struggle with the very dangerous organized crime in the capital in a short time. It is not a secret that criminal elements are more and more integrated with corrupted government workers, employees of the Soviets and in a number of cases, of law-enforcing agencies. We already see the politization and internationalization of such criminality, which threatens our constitutional order. Work will be carried on in close contact with internal affairs organs, procuracy and other institutions. [Correspondent] Where is the task of internal security people in particular in this struggle?

[Prilukov] With common efforts we must destroy the system of corruption, clarify and destroy mechanisms of

inspiration of negative processes in society by ringleaders of organized crime. Persecute attempts of enemy special services to penetrate activities of organized crime, and with its help carry out secret operations, inflame social tensions and mass disorders. We will uncover illegal structures of antisocialist formations inside the country. Ringleaders of organized crime—and that Soviet people must know—think today not only of wealth and la dolce vita, they are encroaching on the system of our governmental apparatus. In other words, they aim for power.

In the staff of our Moscow administration a mobile subunit was formed, specifically to fight organized crime. It was formed exclusively of volunteers, correspondingly trained, and, simply speaking, the best colleagues.

[Correspondent] Any results attained yet?

[Prilukov] I will not give a complete answer yet. I would propose we could also return to this theme.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, would the presence of a journalist, at, say, the carrying out of some kind of operation by this sub-unit be possible?

[Prilukov] Definitely. I can reserve a place in the system for correspondents of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

[Correspondent] Thank you, I shall hold you to your word.


And the last question today. How do the internal security people of Moscow live, what, for instance, are their privileges, how are their families provided for?

[Prilukov] We have no special privileges. Our basic cadres are officers, they get all rights and are subject to all obligations of military personnel of the Armed Forces. Their pay corresponds exactly to their rank and duties. For results achieved, a colleague can be further stimulated with a financial award or valuable gift. Our officers do not have the right to work on the side in cooperatives or by performing individual work. Employed workers are members of the labor union which defends their interests. We have a USSR KGB general polyclinic and hospital. Unfortunately, we do not have our own kindergarten. Our veterans-pensioners, the majority of whom participated in World War II, frequently use our seaside rest home. Our colleagues get apartments in the same order as officers of the Armed Forces. As of today, unfortunately, there is a substantial waiting list.

Like workers in other Moscow institutions, our colleagues, both officers and employees, have the right to make food purchases of the greatest-need commonest products. When it comes to crabs, caviar, and the like, we have the same image of them as all Muscovites.

[Correspondent] What kind of working hours do internal security people observe?

Crime Dynamics In the First Half of 1989



[Prilukov] They are not regulated. Everyone works as much as his business requires.

[Correspondent] Do you have any personal outside interests?

[Prilukov] I like my work very much and do not require a respite. Talking of rest, I like to dig the soil, but I do not have a dacha, either government-furnished or private. Unfortunately, I have time to read only newspapers and the most interesting magazines, and that, of course is not all.

When it comes to sport, I very much like to swim. But now I cannot even dream of it, even though the administration has a swimming pool, again because of lack of time. But I do fitness exercises and pour cold water on myself daily. As far as I know all responsible colleagues of the administration maintain a similar pattern of activity.

[Correspondent] I thank you, Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, for the talk, could my editors count on such meetings in the future?

[Prilukov] Indeed.

First Half 1989 Crime Dynamics

90UN0412A Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 21,
Nov 89 p 34


[Diagrams comparing crime dynamics and structure of crime in first half of 1988 and first half of 1989]

[Text]

[See graphics at top of this page and on the following page for the above-mentioned diagrams]

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Structure of Crime (in percent)



Rising Georgian Crime Rate Blamed on Public Apathy

18130020 Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian
20 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Soso Toidze: "Three Shots... Three Crimes"]

[Text] Georgian SSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Roman Gventsadze told us that the day-to-day situation in the republic has deteriorated lately. Crimes have risen, especially such serious crimes as murder, attempted murder, deliberate bodily injury, and so on.

Yes, various kinds of crimes have proliferated; this is a fact that is proclaimed by statistics, but one always wants to go beyond dry facts and statistics, to look farther and seek their root causes. Haven't we often asked, on hearing of some horrifying event, Why? What happened? What led up to it?

"Apathy," said Roman Gventsadze. "People have grown apathetic and hard-hearted; they don't bat an eye on seeing a man killed. And society's callousness also has an influence on wrongdoers."

And now, in confirmation of this statement, one more shocking event:

At 9:20 on 18 October, some as yet unidentified person shot and killed Gldani Rayon People's Judge Iuri Shalvayevich Alania. And consider this fact: the murder was not committed stealthily or in secret; it happened in the morning, in front of everyone, in the courtyard of the Gldani Rayon People's Court building.

At approximately 10:15, the same weapon was used to murder Davit Vladimirovich Matkava, an attorney in

Lenin Rayon's legal advice office. Here again, the murderer acted in public, without concealment, and committed his bloody deed in the Legal Advice Office building.

Forty-five minutes later, another shot rang out in the gorispolkom's Tbilisnabsbyt building (Kalinin Rayon). Someone gravely wounded administration chief Murman Platonovich Nikolaishvili in his own office.

Three crimes.... Three very serious crimes, all three on the same day, all bearing the same stamp (according to preliminary investigative findings, by comparing cartridges taken from the scene, all these crimes had to be committed by one and the same person!) in sight of the public.... So far, the murderer has not been identified.

"It's because society has turned the whole job of solving crimes over to the administrative organs while itself standing aside, avoiding involvement, turning a blind eye. In a number of foreign countries, on the other hand, the people account for most of the crimes that are solved; when a crime is committed, people go to the nearest telephone and call the police. Here, however.... Yet just one telephone call could decide everything, spare us more crimes and thwart evil.

"Today, moreover, when every Georgian, every citizen represents a burning candle and the nation's wealth, it is difficult to imagine such callousness and lack of compassion. And apathetic eyewitnesses are as guilty as the murderer for this state of affairs."

...The crime that was committed on 18 October is being investigated, a special investigative task force has been

created and is taking the appropriate steps to solve the crime and apprehend the criminal.

Rising Crime Rates, Police Budget in Uzbekistan Noted

90US0193A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 27 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Sergey Svetlov: "Six Minutes at Risk: A Cry from the Soul"]

[Text] On 7 March of this year, at the very moment when we in the editorial offices were congratulating our charming female colleagues on the occasion of International Women's Day, a burglary was taking place in my apartment. THEY smashed the locks, ransacked all the cupboards, chests, and boxes, and then left, having taken EVERYTHING. Without any particular risk (the apartment building is a new one, nobody knows anybody, the locks and doors are the type that seem to say "Hello, thieves!") they took everything of MINE, everything earned by my back-breaking toil.

My mournful feeling of utter defenselessness, just as at the moment of an earthquake, did not disappear even after a visit by the criminal-investigation team, despite the fact that these sturdy lads in their civvies conscientiously took our (?) fingerprints and confidently assured us of the following: "We're familiar with this 'style,' and we'll nab those birds within a day or two." Then the ROVD [Rayon Division of Internal Affairs] investigator took a look at our regular series entitled "The Bondmaids of Izaura," and when saying goodbye, told us the following: "If something comes up, give us a call."

Nothing did "come up," but during the initial period I used to call regularly. "Nothing so far, unfortunately" was the invariable response.

Eight months elapsed, but nothing transpired about the burglary except debts.

On the other hand, our editorial offices recently received a report from this republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs containing a complete account of the distribution of crimes committed during the first nine months of the current. The list aroused our curiosity, and we studied it analytically, calculator at hand. And here are some of the results that we came up with.

During the period from January through September of 1989 some 59,270 crimes were registered in this republic for all branches of the service. A simple arithmetic calculation showed the following: in Uzbekistan a crime is committed every 6 minutes, 10 seconds. This is 18.1 percent higher than it was last year. In other words, whereas a year ago we had to be afraid for something over seven minutes, nowadays anyone of us can become a victim every six minutes.

Matters are indeed bad if you consider that the number of murders or attempted murders rose by 41 percent as

compared to last year: in 1988 there were 531 such cases, whereas this year there have been 749. That is a rate of two murders a day!

Four hundred and twenty-one girls were rape victims. Last year 336 rapes and attempted rapes were committed. This shows an increase of 25.3 percent.

Robberies have increased substantially, by almost 70 percent (!). During the nine-month period involved here there were 1,929 such cases.

However, the "chief 'provider'" in the growth of crime remains robbery of personal property; public property is of much less interest to thieves. This year 16,360 thefts were committed (including the one which occurred on 7 March in my apartment!); this is slightly above 5,000 more than last year. What does this tell us? In the first place, the criminal senses that he can operate with impunity; he functions brazenly. Why so? Obviously because the police lack sufficient forces and funds to combat the burgeoning army of pickpockets and burglars. There are immeasurably more criminals because the rising generation, naturally, is not ready for life under the conditions of a total deficit and a chronic lack of money. One more thing should be added to this—a deficit of morality. The lack of a good upbringing, the straying from Biblical precepts, superimposed on each other, have increased the criminal element.

However, this is a topic for a separate discussion. Let's return to the strict figures of statistics.

The corrective-labor institutions, the so-called "colonies," have ceased to correct; they remain merely labor institutions. There has been an increase by more than 20 percent in the number of crimes committed by previously convicted persons—there have been 4,141 such crimes during the current year. Forced, practically unpaid labor is incapable of making a citizen out of a criminal. Alas, more and more often a thief comes out from behind the barbed wire still a thief, but a more refined one; a murderer—still a murderer, but more careful.

Also noteworthy is the increase of crime among minors. During the first nine months of last year teenagers committed 2,403 crimes, whereas this year the figure is 2,808. The increase amounts to 16.8 percent.

Nor has the anti-alcohol campaign provided any particular results. Otherwise, how are we to explain the fact that this year crimes committed while in a state of inebriation are up by more than a third over last year? There have been 4,628 "drunken" murders, thefts, robberies, and rapes.... Was this what we expected from raising the prices "at the request of the working people" on alcoholic beverages and placing restrictions on their production? The formula is a simple one: when you have been standing for a long time in a seemingly endless line, it makes more sense to buy three "mumbles" [i.e., bottles], rather than one. But far from everyone is given the patience to stretch three bottles out over a period of

three days. It is clear that, after three bottles, it is easier for the hand to reach for a knife; the brakes have failed....

The list of crimes "for all branches of the service" is a long one. Let me report only the following: when comparing the statistics for the present year with those of last year, we find only increases rather than decreases. In other words, it would be incorrect to console ourselves by saying that one type of crime might be increasing, but another is decreasing. That is simply not true. Crime is "advancing" along the entire front, and so far there is no force capable of repulsing this "attack."

You see, on one occasion I visited the office of the investigator (the same one who had a look at "The Bondmaid of Izaura"), and I became convinced that the case of the burglary which occurred at my place would never be solved! A little room whose ceiling and walls had seen neither a painter nor a plasterer, a broken lock on the door, papers, a file-folder containing cases, statements, the minutes of interrogations, papers, a safe bursting with papers.... Their equipment is a battered typewriter without a "hard sign" or the letter "kh".... Can such work be loved? Can it be effective? What is the motivation for an investigator who is on a fixed salary?

Ah, what can be said? Computers, dictaphones, video cameras, a car, a pistol with a number of cartridges that not need be accounted for—all this is in another world, in books and films about decadent imperialism. How can you solve 59,270 crimes with an typewriter that hardly works? No way.

...At the recent plenum of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium the decree entitled "On Measures To Stabilize the Sociopolitical Situation in the Republic" was adopted. It stated the following: "The republic's Council of Ministers shall examine within a month's time the problems of improving the material and technical support of the internal-affairs organs of the city of Tashkent, as well as improving the working and everyday-life conditions of their staff members. Allocation of motor-vehicle transport shall be provided for these organs from commercial stocks. In order to provide encouragement...for the staff members of this republic's internal-affairs organs...it shall be deemed necessary to allocate 500,000 rubles from the republic- and oblast-level budgets...."

Will this help? It ought to help. We shall see. And until it does help, we shall have to sigh with the sense of doom felt by a victim. Any of us could become such a victim every six minutes....

Armenian Internal Affairs Minister on Republic Crime Rates

90US0193B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
18 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Maj Gen U.S. Arutyunyan, Armenian SSR minister of internal affairs, by S. Garibyan, Armenpress correspondent: "Universal Crime Increase"]

[Text] The Armenpress correspondent requested U.S. Arutyunyan, Armenian SSR minister of internal affairs and major general, to answer a number of questions.

[Correspondent] At the beginning of this year a precipitous upward leap in crime was observed. How would you characterize the operative situation in this republic based on the results of the past nine months?

[U.S. Arutyunyan] The situation has changed somewhat now. We've managed to beat down the upsurge of crime, and there is a distinctly marked tendency toward reduction of the growth rate. Thus, whereas in January this figure amounted to 190.2 percent, in May it was 101.5 percent, and in September it was already down to 19.0 percent. However, the operative situation here remains tense and is a cause for serious concern. It is basically characterized by the complexity of the sociopolitical situation and by an increase in the number of crimes under the jurisdiction of our service's criminal-investigation branch. The growth of crime relating to this branch, as compared to the analogous period of last year, amounted to 56.8 percent. Just as before, the statistics regarding encroachments on state and personal property appear particularly unfavorable. Thus, the number of thefts of state property increased by a factor of more than 1.5, burglary of personal property—by 79 cases, and street robbery of personal property—by 51 cases.

In speaking about apartment burglaries, I'd like to draw citizens' attention to the necessity of taking precautionary measures. As practical experience has shown, an alarm system is an effective means for making your personal property safe. Where such systems are in operation, burglaries have hardly occurred at all in recent times. They were averted by the intervention of the police force.

There have been more serious crimes, auto thefts, and crimes committed by minors.

Complex problems have arisen with regard to ensuring the safety of road traffic. Despite the tightening up of monitoring controls by the GAI [State Motor-Vehicle Inspectorate], the number of road-transport accidents rose by 60.2 percent, 502 persons died in auto accidents, and 1,359 persons received injuries in varying degrees of severity. No small "contribution" to these mournful statistics were made by drivers operating their motor vehicles while in an inebriated condition. They were to blame for almost 50 deaths. For the republic as a whole, 6,748 drunk drivers were subjected to administrative penalties of fines.

It is obviously high time that we worked out a nationwide program for ensuring road traffic safety, a program which would involve the ministries and departments concerned. Because, after all, it's dreadful to think that during peacetime utterly innocent people, including children, are perishing on our roads.

In connection with this, we have made our own proposals to this republic's Council of Ministers. These

proposals include recommendations for improving the road network, technical services for the motor pool, etc.

[Correspondent] As was pointed out at a briefing held in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at the beginning of this past summer, there has been a noticeable increase throughout the country in the number of unsolved crimes under the jurisdiction of the criminal-investigation branch. How do matters stand now with regard to this in our republic?

[U.S. Arutyunyan] Let me say straight out that this is an unsatisfactory situation. The number of unsolved criminal cases has increased by a factor of 1.5. Virtually every other case involving theft of state property remains unsolved, along with more than half of the cases involving theft of personal property, and more than one-third of those involving the robbery of personal property. Such a situation is to be explained, in the first place, by the low level of preventive measures taken with regard to violations of the law, as well as by the substantial costs involved in operative work. Furthermore, the police personnel since February 1988 have been working, as you know, under the extreme conditions connected with the complication of inter-ethnic attitudes and the devastating earthquake which hit Armenia. The increase in the crime statistics is also to be explained by the rigorous tightening of departmental monitoring controls on the timeliness of accounting for and registering statements and reports about crimes, by the heightened demands placed on supervisors and other staff members in the municipal and rayon-level internal-affairs divisions to observe legality in this matter. We are now holding strictly responsible those persons who attempt to conceal even one violation of the law, regardless of its seriousness or social danger.

[Correspondent] What are the crime statistics in the zone affected by the natural disaster? After all, it is a known fact that a tight knot of problems evolved here.

[U.S. Arutyunyan] It is undoubtedly true that the overall unsettled, disorderly state of everyday life for the local inhabitants and the tens of thousands of construction personnel who came there from the most diverse regions of the country, as well as the motley contingent of construction detachments could not help but have an effect on the criminogenic situation in that region. As a result, the earthquake zone registered more than one-fourth of all the crimes under the jurisdiction of the criminal-investigation branch for the republic as a whole. This includes one-fourth of the murders, approximately 38 percent of the serious bodily injuries, almost one-third of the thefts of state and personal property, as well as apartment burglaries. This zone also accounts for 37.7 percent of auto accidents resulting in fatalities. Especially alarming is the fact that, of the 319 crimes committed in this republic while the persons charged were in an inebriated condition, 137, or 42.9 percent were registered in the zone where the natural disaster had occurred. With the help of police staff members who came to our republic together with the construction

detachments, we have changed the operative situation in this zone somewhat during the last two months. We hope to institute the necessary order here and achieve a decisive turning point in the struggle against negative phenomena.

[Correspondent] The public is expressing a justifiable dissatisfaction with the growth of profiteering, bribery, and mercenary crimes which have hit our society. What kind of a struggle is being waged against this?

[U.S. Arutyunyan] This year the activity of the BKhSS [Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Profiteering] in the fight against the abuse of official positions and economic crimes has been stepped up somewhat. There has been an increase in the number of cases of embezzlement and misappropriations solved, including by 21.6 percent of major and especially large proportions, profiteering by 12.8 percent, and cheating or defrauding customers by 22 percent. Thus, the head of one fuel-and-lubricating materials warehouse within the Armenian SSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial] system, the head of a garage, and the bookkeeper, who were all together in a criminal conspiracy, from July 1988 through March of the present year, by means of juggling the books and falsifying the records concerning the issuance of fuel, plundered more than 124 tons of petroleum products worth a total amount of 38,000 rubles.

A group of persons who, through staff members of the Armyuvelirtorg Office of the republic's Ministry of Trade, about up about 5.5 kg of gold items for the purpose of reselling them, were exposed and charged with profiteering on a large and a particularly large scale.

And now about some instances of bribery. The head of a warehouse within the system of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, who was also the chairman of a housing-construction cooperative in the city of Yerevan, in exchange for issuing certificates and amortizing loans, extorted a bribe amounting to 5,000 rubles from a former shareholder of the cooperative.

A woman issuing documents from a ZhEK [housing operation office] in the city of Kirovakan received 2700 rubles in bribes from five citizens of that city for placing them on a list of persons to be reimbursed for damage to their personal property inflicted by the earthquake.

This list of cases involving negative phenomena could be continued. But this is not an end in itself. The main thing is to close off the channels of embezzlement and misappropriation, to struggle more decisively against profiteering, cheating customers, concealing goods in short supply, and other violations of the law which directly affect the people's interests.

[Correspondent] Quite a bit of light has recently been shed on the problems connected with the blockade of this republic, and particular attention has been paid to the situation on the railroad. Against this background the problem of ensuring the safety of movement along the

highways has been forced, so to speak, to take a back seat. But, of course, those highways running through the territory of the neighboring republic have been substantially blocked. What can you tell us about this matter?

[U.S. Arutyunyan] Yes, it's true that there is virtually no assurance of normal traffic for automotive freight or passenger transport running through the Kazakhskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan. During the last three months numerous instances have been registered with regard to attacks on motor vehicles and passengers en route to Armenia. Let me cite a very recent example. On 12 October the Idzhevskiy ROVD [Rayon Division of Internal Affairs] received an appeal from one Lazarescu, the senior man in charge of a truck column from Romania, which was traveling with a load of freight to Armenia. He reported that in the rayon of the city of Geokchay, in the Azerbaijan SSR, on 11 October at approximately 2000 hours four trucks carrying little houses for Stepanavan were stopped by the motor-vehicle service crew of a GAI along with a group of citizens numbering about 500. These persons, after forcing the drivers to get out of their cabs, checked their documents, and, upon finding out that the freight was destined for Armenia, carried out an illegal search. After this they began to smash the little houses and throw stones at the trucks, as a result of which three of the Romanian drivers received bodily harm, while one driver—Isteli Aleksandru Vasile—was beaten up by the mob, and two wristwatches were stolen from him.

On 12 October a driver from the SM Plant in Zaporozhye Oblast filed a statement to the effect that on the previous day on the territory of the Kazakhskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan SSR, some unknown persons of Azerbaijani nationality stopped the KamAZ 6872 ZPP truck which had been assigned to him, forced him to get out, and, after taking his money, eyeglasses, passport, and clothing, let him go.

Since the beginning of this year the Goris-Stepanakert Road has been completely blocked. This year, accompanied by military patrols, slightly more than 100 trucks have managed to get through to Stepanakert; most of them arrived at their destination in a battered condition.

Such a state of affairs cannot be deemed normal. After all, a blockade of roads seriously violates economic ties. Roads and highways, like the railroads, belong to the state and must function normally.

[Correspondent] What kinds of measures is the Ministry taking to increase the effectiveness of the fight against crime and to eliminate shortcomings in personnel staff work?

[U.S. Arutyunyan] Let me speak first about personnel. We are finishing up the certification of our staff personnel. This process has already helped a great deal in determining the moral, businesslike, and personal qualities of our fellow staff members. For negative factors 274 employees were fired this year. During the time elapsed so far 22 violations of legality in our operations

have been discovered, and the guilty parties have been punished in accordance with the disciplinary procedure.

We have developed and implemented programs for intensifying the struggle against violations of the law by minors, apartment burglaries, drug addiction, etc. We are carrying out measures to strengthen the ties between the police and the population, as well as with the labor collectives.

A special division for combatting organized crime has been formed within the structure of our ministry. We have also established a Preventive Service Administration; it is called upon to reveal in a timely manner and eliminate the causes and conditions which facilitate the committing of crimes.

In order to successfully fulfill the requirements of the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet entitled "On Decisively Intensifying the Fight Against Crime," we have presented to this republic's provisional committee the appropriate proposals. Their implementation would facilitate the normalization of the situation and raise the level of law-enforcement activity.

Militia Colonel on Crime in Cooperative Sector, Trade

90UN0475A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 23 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with A. Filatov by correspondent A. Baranovskiy: "The Cooperative System, Speculation, and the Racket"]

[Text] Wherever you look nowadays, there is a reduction in forces. But the USSR MVD is becoming enlarged. Newer and newer departments and administrations are appearing in the ministry: the preventive service, the fight against organized crime, and the legal support of the activities of the internal-affairs agencies. Recently, under the main administration of BKhSS [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] a new department was created: the Department for Organizing the Fight Against Crime in the Cooperative Sector of the Economy and in the Sphere of Foreign-Economic Activity. Our correspondent met with its chief, Militia Colonel A. Filatov.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Georgiyevich, I am probably correct in stating that for a long time we have not had such heated discussions as those that deal with the cooperative system. People are arguing about it everywhere—on the streets, in the Supreme Soviet, on the pages of newspapers and magazines. The opinions differ: from triumphant "in favor of" to categorical "against." What is your personal attitude toward this movement?

[A. Filatov] I feel two ways about it. On the one hand, I realize that this is a necessary thing that has to be done. On the other... I cannot reconcile myself with the fact that certain cooperative members are shamelessly swindling the nation. The cost of their commodities and

services can simply blow your mind! And those stupendous earnings! I am convinced that, in exchange for identical labor results—and I am speaking specifically of the results, rather than monkey's work—there should be identical payment in the cooperative system and in the state sector. But today a miner or a steel worker receive much less than any shashlik vendor. Are we really supposed to consider that to be just? Of course, people can object to what I am saying by claiming that there are objective reasons for all of this. I agree. It is for that reason that, in our work, we are not guided by emotions: however high the prices are, whatever terms are proposed when concluding deals, if there is nothing criminal in the actions taken by the cooperative members, that is no concern of ours.

[Correspondent] I would like to believe that objectivity. But many people are getting the impression that there has been a deliberate wish to discredit the cooperative system as a movement.

[A. Filatov] Recently we were asked that question by People's Deputy Academician Tikhonov. We carried out a comparative analysis—we computed how many thefts there are per 10,000 persons working in trade and in the cooperative sector. It turns out that the amount stolen from state granaries is actually three times greater—12 instances as compared with 4. But as soon as it came around to thefts in especially large amounts, the cooperative members immediately dashed ahead—with regard to this indicator, they have surpassed their competitors by almost four times. There is another statistic that is interesting: the total amount of losses per million rubles of proceeds in the cooperative system constituted 450 rubles, and in state trade 62. And one last thing—the number of bribes. The number of bribes per 100,000 cooperative members is 3.9, but 2.1 for the same number of shop workers. And this is so when the number of persons employed in state trade is almost twice as large.

Once again: during the entire past year, in the cooperative sphere, 1500 crimes were committed, but during only the first nine months of the current year, there have already been 5700.

[Correspondent] You mentioned bribes. But the cooperative members are simply forced to offer them. People demand money of them for everything—for registration, for accommodations, for being supplied with materials and products. In an open letter to OGONEK, A. Fedorov, chairman of the board of the Moscow Union of Cooperatives, made no attempt to conceal the amount of money that had been used to bribe state and nonstate individuals—31 million rubles.

[A. Filatov] We had a meeting with him. We told him: if you have specific facts, please cite them. But we did not get any reply. It is a strange picture that develops: the cooperative members complain about excessive fees, but they themselves remain silent about instances of extortion. How, then, are we supposed to fight bribery?

And where did that 31 million rubles come from? I think that this is how they got that figure. They computed the income and expenditure, and they couldn't make both ends meet. Where had that money gone? Obviously, it is had be used to pay bribes. But those millions also include money that was appropriated by the dishonest cooperative members themselves. For Moscow alone, during the first nine months of this year, thefts with a total amount of 1.8 million rubles were discovered.

[Correspondent] A bribe is offered on a one-to-one basis, and it is difficult to discover such a bribe. But certainly one can also understand the cooperative members who are in no hurry to give depositions against the extortioners. The authorities are far away, but those on whom your fate depends are right here, next to you.

[A. Filatov] We are ready to examine any statement. And, irrespective of the position that the bribe-taker occupies, steps will be taken. Obviously, it does no good to take to the militia rayon station a complaint about the chairman of the rayon ispolkom. But a person could go to the oblast level. In addition, giving oneself up completely frees the statement maker of any criminal responsibility.

But there are also other reasons why the cooperative members are in no hurry to come to us. In exchange for the bribes, they receive output that they subsequently resell at a stupendous markup. For example, the deputy chairman of the Tikhvin City Ispolkom was arrested recently. In exchange for a goodly recompense, he had supplied the cooperative members with sugar. In Tula Oblast, the deputy general director of one of the production associations was caught red-handed—he had been supplying detergents to cooperative members. They, in turn, had been repackaging it and selling it at increased prices.

In general, I must say that bribes have begun reaching tremendous size. They are already computed in the hundreds of thousands of rubles.

[Correspondent] Am I correct in thinking that the people who are causing you a lot of trouble are the "nonstate" extortioners—the racketeers?

[A. Filatov] For some reason, many people think that they are the ones who are basically feeding like parasites on the cooperative system. But here is a statistic. During the first six months of this year, 2427 instances of extortion were recorded. Among those who were victims of extortion, cooperatives constitute only 11 percent; and individuals, 5 percent. Incidentally, I have to dispel yet another myth—the laundering of money in the cooperative system. In all this time I have never encountered any instances of this.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Georgiyevich, with the appearance of the cooperative sector in the economy, hasn't there also been some kind of change in the nature of the crimes committed? Because, no matter what you

say, our people are ingenious. Every now and then you hear about schemes that Ostap Bender could be envious of.

[A. Filatov] In principle there is nothing new—everything is as old as the world. But there is something else that is surprising—the scope with which the swindlers act. In our department we have even created a data bank about the largest and most typical crimes. We input into it all the information that comes in from the outlying areas. For example, we recently received a report from Tula, and then from Kalinin, that cooperative members were buying up in banks the certificates and bonds for the 1982 3-percent state-loan lottery. Why? We began investigating. It turned out they were transferring large sums by non-cash transactions to savings banks, using that money to purchase securities, and then, in any other cash office, selling them and getting “live” money in their hands! That is, they had bypassed the RSFSR Council of Ministers decree that prohibits the issuance of cash to cooperative members other than for wages or the purchase of agricultural output. In Tula alone they intended to purchase bonds with a total value of almost 10 million rubles. But the total value sold in the city was 2 million a year. Obviously, we reported these operations to Gosbank, and they were discontinued.

[Correspondent] Wouldn't it have been easier to authorize the free use of the funds that were being held in the cooperative members' accounts?

[A. Filatov] Everything is not that simple. As of 1 April 1989 the cooperative members had been issued 3 billion rubles in cash. Only 400 million rubles were returned to the cash offices of savings banks. For example, in RSFSR the cooperative members returned to the banks one-tenth of the money that had been taken from there, and in Lithuania, one twenty-first. Approximately 29 million rubles of a loan for banks were lost irretrievably. There are also objective reasons here—the earthquakes in Armenia and Tajikistan. But increasingly frequently we encounter instances of deliberate fraudulent bankruptcy. For example, people have come together, registered a cooperative, received a loan, and contrived to transfer it to cash, and then split up. All of it disappears! No one gets anything. And there is just one answer: “The cooperative took it. Why am I supposed to take it on the chin?” But we are talking about millions of rubles. We propose introducing responsibility for fraudulent bankruptcy. At one time there used to be a debtor's prison. So it is necessary to take steps immediately, or things will reach the point of absurdity. Here is an example. An enterprising wheeler and dealer, who had previously been sentenced for swindling, while serving out his so-called sentence in a special komendatura in Arkhangelsk Oblast, organized the fictitious Byt [Personal Services] Cooperative. One of the local residents was registered as its chairman. They bought up agricultural produce with a total value of 280,000 rubles, sold it, and then declared that they were both bankrupt. After, of course, appropriating all the proceeds.

[Correspondent] I cannot get rid of the thought that the state itself encourages the cooperative members to take the criminal path. Temptations and seductions are all around—all you have to do is reach out your hand, and you've got money in your pocket. If, from the very beginning, all the questions about the cooperative system had been thought out properly, there probably would not have been any need for your department, and the Supreme Soviet could have devoted more time to other matters...

[A. Filatov] Please excuse the comparison, but an efficient manager first makes a corral, and then releases the sheep into it. But we have done it just the opposite way. And so now we have begun building chaotic fences, as though trying to prevent the wheelers and dealers from getting around the law. But they keep on finding holes in the fences.

Definitely, before giving the “green light” to the cooperative system, we should have studied the foreign experience properly, should have created a powerful monitoring mechanism, and reinforced the tax service.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, concerning the financial auditing system. About two years ago I attempted to find out from its representatives how they were building their relationships with the cooperative members. Other than learning that they accept the income declarations on faith, I did not succeed in learning anything. Whatever question I asked, the financial auditors dumped everything on you, on the BKhSS.

[A. Filatov] The situation is changing. Recently we received, for refinement purposes, the USSR Law Governing the Single Tax Service. The tens of thousands of persons engaging in this work will receive high salaries. In any case they will receive not 120-130 rubles each, as they do today, but a minimum of 300-400 each. In my opinion, this service should possess the rights of inquest agencies—that is, they should be able to carry out investigations, and to transfer materials to the law-enforcement agencies. For example, in all the civilized countries, the tax police has been given operational-investigative functions. Why, then, shouldn't we follow the foreign experience? This service also will engage in the collection and the verification of the income declarations.

[Correspondent] But what is your attitude toward the thesis that it is shameful to count the money in someone else's pocket?

[A. Filatov] It is one thing if an outsider is counting that money, but another thing if the state is counting it. Moreover, it is not the money that the state should count, but the income. Nevertheless the chief proceeds paid into the treasury come from taxes levied on citizens, enterprises, and cooperatives. So, things should not be allowed to move along under their own steam. The tax policy itself must be flexible, with a system of benefits. For example, if you manufacture wheelchairs, or if you produce materials that are scarce, you get a rebate. But if

you engage in some middleman actively that probably also cannot be banned, don't complain about an increased tax.

[Correspondent] But today trading and purchasing activity has been banned. And if the cooperative members engage in it again tomorrow, what sanctions will be applied to them?

[A. Filatov] I recommend viewing this as speculation and holding them criminally responsible. But the people in Ministry of Justice object. They say that it is necessary to close the cooperative. But those cooperatives have been closed, the wheelers and dealers have split up, but, once again, a single deal could bring millions to them. So, what have we done—punished them or encouraged them? It is necessary to observe the law precisely without any shilly-shallying. So it turns out that the chairman of the Yabloko [Apple] Cooperative in Moscow has purchased in the stores 3 tons of sausage. Then he has sold it at twice the price at railroad stations in the capital. But so far no suit has been lodged against him. Instead, they are arguing as to whether or not this is speculation.

As you can see, we have more than enough awkward resolutions, difficulties, and instances of obscurity in our work—our heads are spinning. And newer and newer worries are being dumped on us. For example, gambling business.

[Correspondent] I didn't mishear you, did I?

[A. Filatov] No. And we are talking not about underground roulette-game organizers or shell-game operators, or about card sharks, but about big-time official business which, in all probability, our department will have to monitor. The first casino has been already been opened in Moscow—in the Savoy Hotel. True, it is only for foreigners. It is also planned to make wide use of gambling slot machines, which we used to call "one-armed bandits." If they are installed in an area measuring 30 square meters, in the course of a year it is possible to get an income of \$60,000-80,000. By way of an experiment, in 1988 Goskominturist [State Committee for Foreign Tourism] installed 226 such slot machines in ten hotels. And this is the result—as of today, approximately 3 million rubles of profit has been received. Once again, foreign firms have shown an interest in this—they propose installing and servicing the slot machines free of charge. Obviously, for a share of the proceeds. According to estimates given by the Goskominturist chairman, this can provide the treasury with 4 to 5 million rubles worth of foreign currency and 5 to 6 billion of our own.

Whichever side you look at this from, it is a profitable enterprise. But a large number of questions arise: how does one tax the income from gambling business? Won't organized crime get entangled in that business? I think that in any case this situation should be monopolized by the state.

So we have a lot of things ahead of us—we will barely have time enough to turn around.

But there is something that I would particularly like to emphasize. We are not against the cooperative system, or joint enterprises. The people who have gone into them are, for the most part, honest and energetic people, but, unfortunately, there are also enough "bad apples" that are discrediting the new movement. Getting rid of them, I think, would be in our common interests.

Procuracy Official on Economic Crimes

90UN0342A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with V.A. Andreyev, USSR deputy procurator general, by Yu. Dmitriyev: "Code Name 'Protection'"]

[Text] [Andreyev] Procuracy inspections show that economic crimes are very common in this country and occur in practically every sector of the economy. Particularly alarming is the rise of unearned income, speculation, theft, numerous violations in cooperative activities, illegal activity in foreign commerce and growth of the shadow economy.

[Dmitriyev] Could you cite some examples?

[Andreyev] Of course. In the past 18 months, law enforcement agencies have uncovered over 136,000 cases of larceny in office, including 13,000 cases involving very large and large sums. Criminal charges involving theft, office and economic crimes have been brought against 136,500 people. Losses amounted to R400 million. Stable and organized groups of thieves and bribe takers have been found in the Ukraine, the Uzbek SSR, the Kazakh SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Turkmen SSR and Moscow. Yet, economic losses due to crime continue to mount. Every year, the state loses over R4 billion due to concealed revenues, theft and damage to material property.

[Dmitriyev] Could you identify the most troubled sectors?

[Andreyev] The most difficult situation is in the agricultural industry complex, retail trade, transportation and cooperatives. Currently, more than a third of agricultural output never reaches the consumer. Damage from livestock loss totals R2 billion. Due to mismanagement or theft in agriculture-related industries and transportation, some 2.4 million tons of meat and meat products, 20 million tons of corn, 4 million tons of vegetables and melons and 8.1 million tons of potatoes are wasted.

Entities in the Glavmosplodooveshchprom system alone failed to account for R3.6 million worth of fruit and vegetables while losses due to quality deterioration and spoilage amounted to R45 million. A similar situation exists this year as well.

In the course of the 18 months, over 2 million cases of theft, cheating and improper use of funds have been

uncovered in state and cooperative trade. Speculation, cheating, violations of price regulations, sale of goods in short supply from warehouses and storage facilities have become habitual occurrences. According to USSR State Committee for Statistics, speculator profits from resale of manufactured goods amount to over R1 billion. Retail trade management often merely give the appearance of combatting these abuses.

Cases have been uncovered whereby retail enterprises become completely subservient to criminals. For instance, one Mamedov, who officially did not work anywhere, effectively ran store No 24 of the Kirovskiy Rayon mixed trade association in Baku for several years. Nominal store directors Rustanov, Khadirov and Kuliyeve carried out all orders of the boss and, together with him, stole over R200,000.

[Dmitriyev] Much is being said and written now about negative aspects of our cooperative movement. What can you say about it?

[Andreyev] Unfortunately, activities of many cooperatives have been infected with greed-related abuses, with cases of theft, bribery and misuse of credit being found there. One out of every three thefts occurring in cooperatives involves large or very large sums. State resources are being siphoned off into cooperatives. The practice of purchasing shipments of food and manufactured goods at state stores and reselling them at higher prices has become very common. According to bank figures, in 1988 cooperatives siphoned off from the retail trade network some R3 billion worth of goods in this manner.

Under the new forms of economic management, group selfishness at the expense of national and state interests is often seen. Many enterprises abuse the rights and opportunities they have been given under economic accountability and systematically violate established price-setting principles, raising prices artificially. As a result, goods production is growing much faster in ruble terms than in volume, exacerbating shortages and creating conditions for speculation and other abuses. Using figures for a large group of light industry enterprises we have inspected, almost half of production growth, or 47.2 percent, came from price hikes.

The analysis of procuracy control sources, law-enforcement practice and data supplied by inspection entities suggests the following conclusion: the existing situation is largely the result of imperfections of the economic system and serious miscalculations in using economic methods to combat crime and exercise accounting controls.

This year, one out of four enterprises did not meet their contractual obligations for industrial output and goods. Consumers did not receive R8.6 billion worth of goods. Many problems in the task of intensifying the struggle against defected goods have not been solved.

The importation of poor quality manufactured goods, meat and meat products, canned foods, fruit and vegetables continues. Experts from the USSR Chamber of Commerce found 1.5 million pairs of imported shoes and some 1.6 million ready-to-wear and knitwear garments unacceptable. According to the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the backlog of unwanted and old goods grows by R40 million every year due to unneeded imports and amounts to almost R1 billion.

Ministries, enterprises and cooperatives which have been given the right to engage in foreign commerce independently tolerate serious violations of the law and a narrow departmental approach. They sell off irreplaceable natural and strategic resources in exchange for consumer goods. Goods in extremely short supply are also exported. For instance, the USSR Ministry of Fisheries fell short by 700,000 tons of fish products in its planned sales to the retail trade network in the first nine months of the year. At the same time, licenses to sell over 430,000 tons of fish products abroad were given with its blessing to various entities, including ones with no connection to fishing or fish processing. The procurator has issued orders to look into these allegations and to act on them accordingly.

The backlog of uninstalled equipment at enterprises and construction sites continues to grow. There is now R15 billion worth of such equipment, of which R5.4 billion is imported. The situation with uninstalled equipment is especially severe at enterprises of the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Industries and the Ministry of Petroleum and Gas Industries.

[Dmitriyev] If this is true, what have inspection agencies been doing?

[Andreyev] Existing control and inspection services are impotent. I do not think we have an adequate system of financial and tax controls. On the excuse of introducing economic accountability and economic management methods, the inspection complex and legal entities are either scaled down or liquidated. Material sanctions are used very infrequently by inspection organs. Enormous losses from spoilage and nonproduction expenditures are written off as production costs. Last year alone, R1.5 billion was written off.

Enterprise managers seek various ways to cover their losses at the expense of those who use their products and the state. In a majority of cases, labor collectives are edged out of the process of writing off assets and do not control their use. Many cases of abuse involving major losses occur because some managers, including local and inspection authorities, become involved in the shadow economy. This is why they have a financial stake in preserving the lack of accountability and chaos.

[Dmitriyev] Do procuracy control entities charged with the task of upholding economic laws always put an end to activities which violate the socialist law?

[Andreyev] Unfortunately no. In the past 18 months, procurators have sent 64,300 reports to representatives of ministries, state committees, enterprises and organizations, issued warnings and ordered to end abuses to 86,600 managers and subjected 225,100 officials and materially responsible individuals to disciplinary, administrative and material sanctions.

However, the effectiveness of these measures by procuracy entities remains low due to organizational mistakes. Lack of consistency, passivity and unprincipled conduct are also in evidence.

The practice of applying criminal sanctions for economic crimes has changed significantly in recent years. Unfortunately, refusals to open criminal cases for trial by the public are on the rise. Prosecution and procuracy control entities were not ready to work in the more complex conditions of the changing economic situation. Courts return cases for additional investigations, often too hastily. Out of the 242 cases in the above-mentioned category, one third were sent for additional investigation without proper justification.

In short, we need very effective and energetic measures.

MVD Investigation School Instructors Characterized

90UN0463A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[Report by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent V. Cherkasov: "Maigrets from Volgograd: Who is to Teach at the USSR MVD Higher Investigation School, Which is Training Investigation Professionals"]

[Text] Volgograd—Platoon commander Major Ivan Lisimenko is standing near an aircraft at the Stepanakert airport. To the right and left is a sparse chain of the fighting men in his subdivision at the USSR MVD Higher Investigation School. Each one is completely equipped: weapon, bulletproof vest, combat helmet, canteen—everything that the soldier is supposed to wear under combat conditions or, as they are now called, emergency conditions.

On the other side of the airfield, pushing against the weak gate columns, a crowd with a thousand heads, a crowd that has lost all reason, is rushing back and forth. Finally, the pitiful obstruction comes crashing down and the people rush onto the flying field, where the next scheduled aircraft to Yerevan has been prepared. Lisimenko sees his fighting men turn pale. There are only eight of them, and the uncontrollable flood of humanity will sweep them away in a second. Sergeant Aleksandr Galkov has already been shoved out of the admission corridor and people are attempting to snatch his submachine gun from his hands. Rushing to aid his comrade, the major shouts, "Take action!", well aware that Galkov does not hear him at all. Dozens of throats are shouting above his head, but the sergeant himself has

made the only correct decision: raising his submachine gun, he fires two shots in the air.

We shall let the psychologists explain how one fear can conquer another. The crowd has stopped. The people have realized that it was saved by these two people here—the sergeant and the major. A passenger aircraft was landing on the runway to which the crowd had been rushing in its frenzy. Nearby were two "choppers" with their blades turning. It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened if the soldiers had lost their self-control.

Reinforcements arrived. The fighting men began talking to the people. And the people who had just been a blind, howling mass turned once again into ordinary departing passengers and their escorts.

During the events that are sad for all of us, that are occurring in NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], at various times nine battalions that were formed from students at the Volgograd Higher Investigation School have been maintaining order there together with special troops. But is it intelligent for the future high-grade professional investigators, of whom there is such a great shortage in the law-enforcement agencies, to be assigned to what are essentially detachments to block the retreat of friendly forces?

"Too many 'hot points' appeared in the interethnic relations," Colonel V. Dorokhov says. "But the country's special troops have only a few tens of thousands of people. Can they guarantee order when 200,000-300,000 people gather in the squares? Should their number be increased?... Quite recently, certain orators protested against the very existence of these troops. Currently, when blood has been spilled in many places, these same people have been louder than all the others in crying for the reverse situation. Because the training of the special troops also requires attention and funds..."

"But the practice that the students are getting here is irreplaceable," Major Lisimenko says, entering the conversation. "I can give lectures for years to my students, and they can answer perfectly to the examination slips, and receive the top grades, but when these students come up against stern reality they will resemble blind kittens."

Actually, the helplessness of a rather large segment of the militia workers is alarming. Many of them take a casual attitude toward physical training and shoot poorly. Frequently one hears the investigators saying, "What does this have to do with me? After all, we are office workers." Could this be the reason why, in our UVD [administrations of internal forces], we have so many colonels with too much weight, so few strong and adroit lads, and no one to catch the hooligans and bandits?

Therefore the high exactingness toward the training of cadres in our country's only Higher Investigation Militia School is a command of the times. And the first demand is on the instructors. Exactly who are they?

Here is an episode taken from Major I. Lisimenko's practice. Once, in Murom, where he was working at that time, there was an urgent response to an emergency situation: a murder! As they rode into the city, they met the person who was being sought. It was known that in his Zhiguli he had a sawed-off ten-cartridge shotgun with a large reserve of shells, and also a trench knife. He had committed his vicious deed publicly and boldly. At this moment a subbotnik [voluntary work project] was under way in the streets, a large number of people were removing the snow, but he was driving his car back and forth at a furious speed.

The only thing visible through the back window of the car being pursued was the murderer's head. The situation was resolved in seconds. The shot, it turned out later, was the only correct decision. The bullet had hit the criminal in the neck. The car swerved to the right and hit the curb.

But it had not been possible to bypass the questions from the procurator, the judge, the lawyer, and the relatives of the deceased: "Did you identify yourself as a militia worker? Did you show him your identify card? Did you warn him that you would use karate against him or you would shoot?"

"Borderline" situations like this always put the militia man on guard. Knowing how to get out of them fairly effectively while observing legality is the primary task of the operational agent. You realize that in such situations you have only seconds to make up your mind.

"Often, unfortunately, it is an 'either-or' situation," I. Lisimenko says. "Either you get a posthumous award, or they say, 'It would have been good if he had stayed in the agencies...'"

At such time the militia turns out to be guilty in any case: either when it interfered, or when it did not interfere. It is a profession that is no easy one, and, we may as well admit, one that is still thankless. Still, people keep coming to the Higher School. The competition is two persons per place.

"And this is in a situation when the secondary school graduates are picked out at the oblast UVD," school chief V. Dorokhov says. "If the admissions were made on the scale of the entire system of higher educational institutions, the number of persons desiring to come to us would be immeasurably greater. Young people continue to be attracted by the romanticism of danger and the passion for solving detective-story puzzles. We alone have several dozen 'Afghans.'"

The French author Georges Simenon created the remarkably attractive image of police inspector Maigret. Humanitarianism and the highest professionalism characterize this ideal detective. How do we get our Soviet Maigrets to be closer to him? In order to cope with a criminal situation, our Soviet Maigret must have not only special training, but also profound, fundamental

knowledge, he must be an intellectual, he must have erudition and, if you like, the skills of an orator.

Unfortunately, certain present-day investigators demonstrate a lack of psychological training, a low professional level, numerous instances of violations of socialist legality, an accusatory slant in their investigation, the replacement of state interests by their personal ones... This "set" of transgressions continues to operate in some places in a manner that is detrimental to the militia's authority.

But the graduates will have to perform a lot of unpleasant work—work that is tedious and remote from the romanticism of the investigation. It is no easy matter to train them for this kind of work. It is here that the instructors' experience is so important.

"You wouldn't believe how many cubic meters of gravel I had to measure, to examine and make expert evaluations for thousands of crews to install railroad cross-ties," Ivan Grigoryevich Lisimenko says. "I could work as a superintendent at a railroad construction site."

One repair crew was called the "wolf pack" on the Volga-Don sector of the Volga Railroad. True, they were called that cautiously. Because it was headed by the sector managers themselves. Instead of the ordinary skills, they had to have a different type of art—the art of figure-padding. More than 20,000 rubles that had been stolen from the state was returned by Ivan Grigoryevich Lisimenko to the state treasury thanks to his "nit-picking" search.

Whereas the French Maigret conducts an investigation while puffing away on a pipe, his Volgograd counterpart worries about problems. There are many such problems in training high-grade detectives. For example, the students engage in practical work at the ROVD [rayon internal-affairs department] under the leadership of special agents who are not known to anyone. Why, for example, shouldn't a group of the most talented students be given the responsibility of doing work independently?

So gradually the experienced teachers leave and it is not always possible to find suitable replacements for them. A specialist might feel very awkward when addressing an audience, although he has had very rich practical experience behind him.

What, then, is the way out?

"I think that it would not be a bad idea, on the basis of the USSR MVD Academy, to create something like the initial training of newly appointed instructors. The selection of candidates should be made jointly with the leadership of MVD and UVD for work as an instructor, and they should be put into the reserve," Colonel Dorokhov says.

The restructuring of the system of training cadres for the internal-affairs agencies should proceed simultaneously with the renewal of the instructor cadres themselves. Speaking figuratively, it is necessary to teach the teachers.

First Deputy Chairman on Role, Function of USSR Journalists Union

90US0246A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 9, Sep 89 pp 10-12

[Interview with Ivan Alekseyevich Zubkov, first deputy chairman of the board, USSR Journalists' Union: "A Union is the Sum of its Initiatives"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] Ivan Alekseyevich! In recent times we've had to hear certain opinions that our Union has been hardly touched by perestroika. How do you feel about this?

[Zubkov] It's true, such opinions are heard. True, it's not always clear what is meant by the word "Union": whether it refers to the entire organization and its component parts, or to its board, or to the central apparat.

According to the Regulations, the USSR Journalists' Union unites the journalists' unions of the union and autonomous republics, and the kray and oblast journalist organizations. And the result of the actions of the Union is the sum of the initiatives and the results of their effectiveness. In other words, the more actively and fruitfully the primary "cells" operate, the city, oblast and kray organizations and the republic unions, the more powerful is our common Union.

Negative opinions, of course, are not formed in a vacuum, but they are to a significant degree based on elementary ignorance of journalists on the deeds of their organization and the Union as a whole. In order to fill this gap, the board has established a newspaper, ZHURNALISTSKIE NOVOSTI [Journalist News], which has already gained popularity. And nevertheless I must admit, that if we would devote more attention to continually being informed about the situation in the localities, the impression would not be created that the Union is "just sitting there."

Indisputably, it should be giving more concrete support to creative growth, to increasing the skills of the journalists, and to struggle more energetically to create the best conditions for their work and leisure time, for their medical treatment and pensions, and should be concerned for the social security of its members. But one cannot solve everything. And there are reasons for this, both objective and subjective.

It's no secret, that the creative potential of our Union was for a long time held back by lack of initiative and independence of the organizations. And they, in turn, were fettered by unjustified centralism, all sorts of instructions and statutes, and by bureaucratism and formalism. Even membership cards for new members were obtained only in Moscow; estimates of income and expenditures were maintained and approved only at the center, and it was impossible to manage one's own assets; and so on.

All that is in the past. After the 6th Congress, decentralization took place with respect to the "highers" and the "lowers." All the normative statutes which limited independence were abolished. Fundamental creative and financial-management activities were moved to the sphere of the republic unions, and to the kray and oblast organizations. Accountability was reduced, and membership cards are now signed and handed out in the localities. Now the organizations themselves, without approval and permission of the USSR Board of Journalists, determine the annual estimate of their income and expenses and the amounts of expenditures for creative and organizational activities and social needs; they establish the official wages of staff employees within the limits of the wage fund; they determine the costs for carrying out photography and other work; and they carry out the acquisition and transfer of valuable material goods and fixed capital.

The board of the USSR Journalists' Union has abolished deductions from organizational assets for a centralized fund for developing its material base. Now the entire amount of the entrance fee and membership dues, and everything that the organizations earn, remain entirely at their disposal. Moreover, the board, at the expense of its own resources, finances organizations operating at a loss; it allocates funds for rendering material assistance, credits for construction, and repair and equipping Journalists' Homes, boarding houses and vacation spots; for building housing on shares, and for other needs. A portion of the monetary assets may remain in the primary organizations for the needs of the members of the Union. Any initiative by an organization which helps strengthen its material-financial base is encouraged. When necessary, the board renders assistance through funds and quotas, and allocates staff personnel and the temporary staff fund.

Unfortunately, certain republic and oblast organizations are not taking into consideration the changes which have occurred, and are not making good use of their capabilities. Is it not disappointing that this year 18 organizations still cannot get along without subsidies... As a result, opinions are formed that the board is not sufficiently concerned for the social needs of the journalists. These complaints should be addressed to the organizations themselves. No one is hindering their initiative to work and to persistently try to resolve their imminent problems; all the rights have been granted—they must act! And there are, incidentally, sufficient examples of such actions. For example, the secretariat of the board of the Journalists' Union of the Ukraine has adopted a resolution to introduce a supplementary pension payment to members of the Union who are veterans of the press, such that they would receive no less than 110 rubles per month. It was also decided to pay for 50 percent of the cost of trips allotted for relaxation.

[Correspondent] In other words, one can already speak of positive achievements in the socio-domestic sphere?

[Zubkov] Indisputably. In this a CPSU Central Committee resolution on measures for strengthening the material-technical base of the Journalists' Union, adopted on suggestion of the board, played the chief role. As a result, the amounts deducted for the USSR Journalists' fund increased. Also contributing to them are the receipts from our publication, the weekly newspaper ZA RUBEZHOM [Abroad]. The board has doubled the printing of tickets for the International Lottery for Journalist Solidarity, and income from exhibition activities has become larger as well.

All of this has permitted establishing journalist funds [zhurfond] for the Moscow city organization, and the Journalists' Unions of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Moldavia, and certain oblast journalist organizations. The number of organizations in arrears has declined, and subsidies to them have been reduced from 240,000 to 87,000 rubles per year. At the same time, subsidies for material assistance and for paid travel to sanatoria has been increased to 100 percent, and for vacation trips abroad to 50 percent of their cost. For a long time there were not enough trips for rest and recuperation. At the present time the problem has become much less acute: we not only possess considerable capabilities on our own, the AUCCTU helps as well.

One has to say that the USSR Zhurfond represents a kind of credit bank for the Union. This year significant sums were disbursed for finishing work at the Yelino House of Creativity near Moscow, at Nardaran on the Caspian, and at the ski lodge in Teberda. When construction is completed, more than 450 journalists and their family members may vacation at the same time. Major repairs are being financed by the Central Journalists' House.

[Correspondent] Certain people believe that the board does not take up the major problems which reflect the interests of the journalists. Is that so?

[Zubkov] As a matter of fact, quite a number of problems are taken up, major ones included. Probably what we lack more, is persistence in resolving them.

I've already mentioned the CPSU Central Committee resolution on strengthening the material base of the Union, adopted by initiative of the board. The board took a direct part in drafting the proposals for the Law on the Press and Other Mass Information Media. And the nomination of candidates and election of People's Deputies from the USSR Journalists' Union was a major political event.

The Board of the Union has presented proposals to the directive organs and ministries, on improving pension support, on privileges in remuneration for additional housing space; on paying average wages when a person is incapacitated, and paid vacations, taking honoraria into account; and on increasing the amount of vacation time for certain categories of journalists. We have not been able to resolve all these, and other questions, but quite a few of our proposals have been given the OK. Quotas for

capital investment and material resources have been increased. Local party committees and Soviet organs have supported the board's requests for establishing journalists' houses in Kiev, Minsk, Novosibirsk, Riga, Krasnoyarsk, Rostov-na-Donu and Tashkent; and on organizing a training and methodological center for the Far East region in Vladivostok. Mintorg USSR has helped us open Zhurnalist, a specialized store for trade in office equipment. And there are hopes for establishing a boarding house for veteran journalists. The board believes that it will be possible to resolve this year the question of paying subsidies to journalists' pensions. Many social problems have been successfully resolved by republic and oblast organizations as well.

[Correspondent] What sort of changes have taken place in the main direction of the Union's activities—in training and methodological work?

[Zubkov] Our top-priority tasks are to provide assistance to journalists as fast as possible, and to become more deeply involved in the processes of perestroika taking place today. A permanent system of uninterrupted training and perfecting journalists' skills has been worked out. The methodology of the academic process in schools and universities for journalistic skills has been changed. Studies in courses and seminars now take place in the form of discussions, lively exchange of opinions, and creative games. Leading commentators are providing support and lending their skills. Journalists specializing in economics have taken an interest in training courses at Gosplan USSR and at union-republic state planning commissions.

The board is organizing, with the assistance of the journalism faculties (and departments) of universities and the Higher Party Schools, a number of regional methodological-training centers for raising the skills of the journalistic cadres. They have already been established in Vladivostok, Tashkent, Rostov-na-Donu, Sverdlovsk, Kishinev, Tartu, Barnaul, and Vladimir. Every center, whose network will be expanded, is being allocated staff, wage funds, and the necessary financing. Significant assistance in raising the level of the academic process is being rendered by the board's permanent lecturer group, and also by the training aids we furnish. And the number of seminars and courses has expanded.

[Correspondent] Everyone understands the need for a central apparatus; but nevertheless, quite often people look askance at it. Reproach has been heard for the command-administrative style of work... What funds are used to support the apparatus of the Union, and how has perestroika affected it?

[Zubkov] The apparatus has been reduced, and expenses for maintaining it have gone from 324,000 rubles in 1987 to 217,000 last year. These expenses are covered by means of part of the profits from our own publication—the magazine SOVETSKOYE FOTO. I must stress that a significant share of the work is carried out by the

voluntary aktiv. And, unlike other creative unions, we have no board for the RSFSR.

Oblast organizations carry out their measures primarily by means of public support. The staff of the apparat at oblast organizations consists only of a responsible secretary and a bookkeeper (and these, as a rule, are on half-wages). At 25 oblast organizations there is not a single relief worker. At the union republic level, 5-7 people on the average are employed on the staff of the board; and the Moscow city organization (with a membership of more than 14,000) employs—29. Thus, judge for yourself, whether all kinds of labels, such as "bureaucrats" are just... There is at present no beaurocratism in the organization; their workers carry out their functions as organizers of the public aktiv, methodologists, and assistants in organizing life within the union.

Unfortunately, the staff of the board of the USSR Journalists' Union is for the time being required to assume responsibility for distribution and supply functions, in order to supply people with paper for printing; photo and movie film and photographic paper; automobiles for official and personal use; petroleum, oils and lubricants; furniture, and so on. Of late 520 automobiles have been allocated for sale to journalists; more than 30 for official use; 570 tons of fuel, 150,000 square meters of photographic paper; and so on. The board completely supplies 30 photo studios with equipment and materials for production in an amount greater than 3.5 million rubles.

It goes without saying, that one could find shortcomings and neglect in every part of our work. But I think the important thing is not so much to enumerate them, as to improve the work of the Union.

[Correspondent] Do you have any ideas for improving the life of the Union in the future?

[Zubkov] After the 19th All Union Party Conference and the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the journalistic organizations produced quite a few interesting suggestions. The board is studying and summarizing them.

It is principally a question of improving the structure of the Union. On this plane, one idea which deserves our attention is that of establishing within its framework, creative associations and clubs according to interest: radio and television journalists; publishers; engineering and technical magazines; young people's press, and others. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to establish a number of creative clubs.

We are living in a rather complex time. Perestroika has sharpened the journalists' pens. This in turn, has quite often resulted in angry reactions from agencies, institutions and individual citizens who had not completely assimilated the democratic basis of the changes taking place in the country. Investigations sprang up, rebuttals were written, and correspondents were taken to court.

The Law on the Press, which is soon to be adopted by the Supreme Soviet, will play a large role in the legal defense of workers of the press. For now journalist organizations are not always reacting effectively to incidents of prejudicial attitudes toward their colleagues, or to unfair accusations against them. In this connection, it is important to strengthen the juridical-legal service of the Journalists' Union, and the board is resolving the question of its organization.

At the same time one cannot but notice that journalists themselves place themselves in a vulnerable position because of their own hasty and superficial judgments and because they are ill-informed. This makes it possible to cast a shadow not only on a given, specific author, but on the entire press. Here there is one way out—to raise the competence and responsibility of everyone; universal juridical education, and knowledge of the fundamentals of legislation and law.

There is still another problem—the formation of a corps of journalists. The Union can occupy its proper place in training the next generation of journalists, in improving the system of the mass information media, and in strengthening the material-technical base of the publishing business. On this plane, we hope, the parliamentary capabilities of journalist-deputies would also prove useful.

Perestroika is moving and is picking up speed. True, not everyone is attuned to the tempo, and some are even raising their voices and are calling for an extraordinary congress of the Union.

But must we wait for a congress? We need to be working right now; we must prepare questions and discuss problems in our organizations. Without careful preparatory work in the primary organizations—and I would like to stress this—we will be unable to come to a congress with serious, radical proposals. The problems facing us in the period of perestroika can be raised only by a cohesive, powerful, militant Union of like-thinkers. The guarantee of our overall success lies not in automation of certain organizations, but in the consolidation of all efforts of our creative Union.

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Council of Ministers Official Views Soviet Media Domestic Strike Coverage

90US0247A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 10, Oct 89 pp 2-4

[Article by Lev Tsvetkov, chief specialist at the USSR Council of Ministers' Information Department: "The Strike: a Commentary on the Press"]

[Text] Like a large volume of water piled up against a dam, in July and August this topic splashed across the pages of the press as if through a floodgate: "Strike!" It had, of course, leaked out before that: according to

certain accounts, over the course of this year and the year before, at least forty regions were shaken by conflicts connected with halting production. But those first rivulets were so skillfully regulated that they disappeared into the sand immediately. But by the start of the miners' strike all the floodgates seem to have been raised—and the information came gushing through.

And here the readers first encountered the unexpected. It seemed that there were so many different authors, so many different facts—just how many different opinions are there supposed to be! But opinion, in general and on the whole, at first turned out to be the same. They all loudly proclaimed that the miners' demands are just, but must they be presented in the form of such an ultimatum? The opinion is a proper one. And a very convenient one—you can speak very smoothly about what you see and what you hear. And with complete safety—it has already been expressed from the rostrum of the highest legislative organ.

I hope my colleagues will forgive me, but for a good two weeks, the most interesting things in their reports were the bare facts, and not what the authors thought about these facts. All their thoughts seemed to have been reduced to the same level.

Who is remembered as a man with his own position? G. Dorofeyev, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA staff correspondent for the Donbas. The highly heated atmosphere, it seemed, did not at all prevent him from repeatedly turning from the fate of the people to the fate of the abandoned mine facings. After working for decades in a mining region, a journalist, one would think, would have delved deeply into the peculiar features of mining coal. He understood, that the fixed production capital was going to waste in the depopulated mine shafts: subsidence of the rock mass was pressing down on the equipment; it was causing the drifts to collapse, and the initial, terrible portents of underground fires had appeared. Aware of all the miners' woes, and the righteousness of the strikers' demands, Dorofeyev nevertheless hurled at the strike committees serious charges of indifference for the fate of the mines.

And then, many days later, there appeared in the draft Law on Procedure for Resolving Collective Labor Conflicts a clause on the strikers' obligation to protect state and public property (that means above all, fixed capital). But to pose such a question at the very height of the conflict, when one's colleagues were writing with undisguised rapture about freedom of expression of the popular will; to put it before the people with whom one has lived side-by-side for years; to do this, you will agree, takes guts...

It is possible that there were other examples displaying the highest degree of adherence to journalistic principles, but I admit that I did not see any in the stormy and, unfortunately, murky flood of news. As distressing as it is to acknowledge, it was hard for our shop to grasp what was going on.

Let's go back to the 20th of July, when events took on the nature of an avalanche. In Kuzbas there were about 150,000 men on strike at that time; in Donbas, approximately 120,000. In certain newspaper issues, it was necessary to devote entire pages to reports from the "hot spots," because they were then coming in from Rostov-na-Donu, from Vorkuta, from Pavlograd, from Karaganda. To this add the fact that disturbances were still going on in Nagornyy Karabakh, Abkhazia and Tajikistan.

How did our press illuminate these events?

PRAVDA accompanied its report of 20 July with a letter from kolkhozniks from "Rossiya" (in Donetsk Oblast) to the striking miners: "We declare that the problems which you have raised are our problems too, but they are much worse for us... Yet our consciousness as farmers does not permit us to stoop to the method of satisfying our needs by means of strikes." That very same day, IZVESTIYA quoted telegrams from Lisichansk from the miners at the Mines imeni Kapustin and from Makeyevka, with an appeal to all miners in the country not to halt the work of their enterprises.

What is also memorable from the press reports of those days? TRUD (21 July) thoughtfully noted that one must not treat the strikes as local or regional conflicts, and that the problems go beyond the bounds of the industry. This, by the way, we managed to figure out for ourselves.

L. Karpinskiy, in MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI (No. 30) writes: "The miners began to strike because the bureaucrats have been dawdling for too long." Or this: "The miners halted their work, because the institutional functionaries did not: every day they would carefully perform their work, sabotaging, in essence, the course of history. The miners' strike was a response to the 'sit-down strike' of the functionaries." Alas, we were aware of that too. For the last ten years, in Kuzbas alone the higher union and republic organs have adopted no less than 15 resolutions, but the critical questions of socio-economic development of the region remain unsolved. Where should one look for saboteurs?

Also in MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, commentator V. Gurevich, along with V. Vyzhutovich of IZVESTIYA, tried political-economic approaches to analysis of the miners' statements. This was more promising: this is the way to get to the heart of the matter, and do it intelligently. "...It's simply that the escalation of demands may become dangerous: they shipped in meat and coffee for the miners, and we have none. Incidentally, the essence lies elsewhere: the miners saw the reason for the lack of goods in the lack of economic rights. The state is incapable of 'allocating' goods which do not exist; but it must allocate rights." (V. Gurevich) "We are still accustomed to thinking that the state is wealthy, that it will provide everything; and that if it does not provide, then we have not asked properly. However, it is first of all not wealthy at all; and secondly, any wealth, anywhere, has always been based upon productive labor alone. Halting

the labor process has never yet resolved any problems, but has only created new ones." (V. Vyzhutovich)

At the time of these articles the overall figure had not yet been published—how much it would cost the state to satisfy the demands of the miners. Goskomtrud USSR estimates it at 2.7 billion rubles. Perhaps by virtue of economical redistribution of funds in the coal-mining industry itself, it could be reduced to 2.5 billion. But it is also likely that it will grow to 3 billion for the year. In that case it will be necessary to seek out exactly half of what society is trying to scrape together—that's the only word you can use with the present state of the budget—to help your unfortunate members: pensioners, invalids and other groups in the populace who are called socially defenseless.

The journalists deserve greater respect who, not knowing the combined data, nevertheless closely estimated the capabilities of the state from which the search for ways out of the situation can begin.

Incidentally, certain of the strikers outdid the correspondent corps in this respect: their concerned voices were heard more than once, calling for consideration of the real-life situation, and not to let one's emotions blaze throughout the country, and in other branches of industry. It is annoying that these voices were not heard by those of our colleagues who had introduced the thought that the strike was of benefit to perestroika. Some support! One more bout of such "help" and the economy will enter its death throes. We have to have an honest dialogue on this—not setting one sector of the populace against another, nor entering the thicket of such worn-out phrases as, "the working class is always right."

Nevertheless, the USSR Supreme Soviet is right, to appeal for not resorting to strikes until the appropriate law is passed

By the end of July the press had already singled out several trends which were interesting enough for further elaboration. For example, the relationship of the strikers and the administrators of the coal enterprises. This question, by the way, sprang up from a highly unexpected quarter at a meeting of Donetsk miners with N.I. Ryzhkov. The workers were describing a kind of "counter-strike by the directors" as a means of putting pressure on the working collectives. But on 25 July we read in *SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA*, that "at a number of mines in Yenakiev and Makeyevka, the picketers were not allowing miners to enter the shafts, and were accusing them of strike-breaking. The enterprise director proposed that they take upon themselves the responsibility for the fate of the mines. This suggestion was not accepted. Then the enterprise administrators at the Ordzhonikidzeugol Production Association wrote a statement on relieving them from the posts they occupied, and sent it to the CPSU Central Committee and to the procuracy... They were deeply concerned for the state of the enterprises which had stoppages." This,

you will agree, differs somewhat from the version about a demonstrated "counter-strike." The people who answer with their heads for the enormous material valuables entrusted to them are unable to guarantee their security: do they really not have the right, just like the workers, to count on the protection of the law?

Or take the relationship of the strikers and the local organs. *NEDELYA* (No 30, "Lessons from the Kuzbas") noted that in open voting "the communists were found to be in the majority" on the strike committees, "and an overwhelming majority at that." Among them were mine directors, secretaries of party and Komsomol committees and trade-union officials.

In spite of the fact that many newspapers were at the same time pointing to the confusion and passivity of local party, soviet, and especially trade-union organs, it was to these very organs that the majority of the strikers' demands were addressed—suggesting the conclusion that there is a certain amount of consolidation of local leadership with the striking working collectives. Where do the roots of such consolidation lie? And against whom, in the opinion of the press, is it directed?

From the majority of the publications it comes out: against the Ministry of the Coal Industry. The press has practically equated them with the concept of the "command-administrative system." But this is yet another level of relations which must be gone into carefully.

A series of materials from certain coal fields were published in a number of newspapers (for example, *SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA* and *IZVESTIYA*), which told of the unsettled lives, poor organization and inadequate work incentives for the miners. Articles appeared on 27 July in *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* and *IZVESTIYA*, characterizing the branch as a whole. They were perceived as articles of great expository power.

From concrete examples from the Donbas, "Komsomolka" correspondent A. Kalinin described in his article "Smazka" [grease] the system of the "snowdrops" (Mine imeni 60th Anniversary of Soviet Ukraine); on over-reporting production (at the Udarnik Mines); on extorting money from the workers, and unambiguously—on the purposes of this extortion (at Makeyevskaya Mine: "The section chief...said that he's driving to Moscow, and that I must bring him 50 rubles either this evening or tomorrow morning...") About the discovery of "increasing" coal extraction by mixing coal with ordinary rock (at the Severnaya Mine: "...They always dump ordinary rock on the bottom of the railcars. In mining jargon this is called—making a layer cake.") Similar instances, according to the author's testimony, are not only commonly known, but in a number of instances were the subject of official investigation, which resulted in practically nothing. "...And the workers have become used to the idea that their wages do not depend upon themselves alone. A little something—for an obkom or gorkom delegation. And then a new means

appeared: do not ride out of the mine, and strike. And it works out that the fathers of the sector and the region find the means to increase their wages. By means of what? Well, that's an indelicate question..."

The IZVESTIYA article, "Why the Miners are Striking," as if answering this "indelicate question," describes the strike in Vorkuta: "It came down to a situation in which in order to resolve the conflict at the mine, the minister himself, M. Shchadov came, and quickly found the 'necessary' norms and wage-rates. It is understandable that the norms were at the same time adjusted downward, and the wage rates upward. Easily and simply, right?" The authors (fellows at the Coal Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department) prove that such an uncomplicated means of "extinguishing a fire," unsuitable on an industry-wide scale, is not an accident: "The branch headquarters for the past decades has remained deaf to the warnings of scientists about chronic processes leading to economic decline and worsening of social tensions; they not only rejected the scientific suggestions for bringing the branch out of a cul-de-sac, they even waged an active struggle with them." Have the newspapers found the "extreme"—and is it the ministry? And is it actually personified in the person of the head of the coal industry?

But then here is what you have to explain to me: Why then did mediators come up from the coal fields, in order to make short work of the minister in the heat of the moment? Why at meetings with the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers did representatives of the striking working collectives not demonstrate their almost tangible dislike of their branch leadership? Complaints? Yes, they expressed them. But this was a businesslike, constructive dialogue and not criticism "for destruction."

The press, out of habit, was trying to portray this complex, multifaceted phenomenon, a social conflict that has taken on the form of a strike, as a trivial matter. But a simple division into black and white would never succeed. They were unable to place the enterprise directors, nor the representatives of local or branch authorities on the opposite side of the workers' barricades: for they were speaking out left and right for the interests of the strikers.

This situation, which was very uncomfortable for those unable to make the switch to constructive thinking, nudged certain journalists to raise the level of demarcation. Read, for example, the page "The Fire Which Could Not Be Extinguished," in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA of 8 August, which published a conversation at the editorial offices with representatives of the Donbas strike committees. The article depicts a generalized "image of the enemy," which includes, along with the powers-that-be, it goes without saying, the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry, which allegedly had no interest in satisfying the workers' demands; as well as Goskomtrud [State Committee on Labor and Social Problems] and the AUCCTU, who do

not resolve problems, but just push them aside. Once again it was the AUCCTU, but now along with the USSR Council of Ministers and one of the committees of the Supreme Soviet, which presented a draft law that was so bad, "it was embarrassing to show it to the people."

Here now, to the three editorial writers workers who had prepared this page, it would appear everything is clear: the strikers, on one side of the barricade, and the highest legislative and executive authorities and the trade union center on the other. These are the sides in the conflict. Agreement between them is possible, in the form of a governmental decree.

Just one thing does not fit in this scheme: Why then, strictly speaking, did we cook up all that kasha—these fundamental democratic reforms? Did society, in giving birth in such pangs to the highest organs of power and rule, really have in mind establishing the kind of authorities with whom they would then be able to do business?

No, we had in mind that the Supreme Soviet and the government it confirms reflect the interests of all groups and strata in the populace. That, consequently, they should not appear as a party in a conflict with the masses which raised them up—but should prevent the very genesis of such conflicts. Because in the draft law criticized in the newspaper, namely the Draft Law on the Procedure for Resolving Collective Labor Conflicts, the very first article clearly signifies who the parties in these conflicts are: the labor collectives; and the enterprise administrators, or the higher-ranking branch (or inter-branch) administrative organs, or the executive committees of local Soviets. Direct government participation in settling the miners' strike is explained only by the fact that there was not yet any law in effect, and someone had to assume responsibility for improving the situation.

Did it succeed in improving it in the best way? This is problematic. It is not only a matter that a precedent has been set for redistribution of goods by methods of applying pressure, for repetition is not excluded. It is still necessary to think about the possible consequences of the miners' demand for the right to sell part of the coal at contracted prices.

At one time coal industry economists had actively spoken out against raising the cost of machine-building products. They correctly saw in this the beginning of a new price-increase spiral: the costlier the machinery, the higher the cost of the coal and other coal-derived products extracted with the aid of this machinery—including products for the populace, which entails the necessity for increasing the wages of the miners themselves. And increasing wages would once again increase the cost of the coal; and consequently, the metals which are smelted with the use of coal; and that means, once again the machinery manufactured from this metal... Would it make it any easier for the miners—and yes, for all of us—for a new price-increase spiral to begin from contracted prices for coal?

Of course, one could also perceive in this demand from the miners the restoration of social justice. The machine-builders have a variety of articles, which are renewed at a relatively rapid rate; and we have become accustomed to the fact that every innovation is accompanied by higher prices. But coal—coal is always coal, and it is practically impossible to jack up its price under any plausible pretext. Therefore, the miners' work-incentive funds (just as in the other raw-material branches) have grown at a far slower rate.

It would seem that their demands are just—to demand a little bigger piece of the social pie. But methods of force are not good; for in cutting off a little bigger piece, you are never sure whether you're getting the surplus from someone who had managed to get them before; or, whether you are absolutely impoverishing those who are already living on crumbs today.

In order that the situation does not develop according to the latter variant, a well-reasoned government resolution must be prepared. (Incidentally, it was drawn up in an extremely short period of time—in ten days, and representatives of the majority of the coal regions took part in drafting it). But there is no governmental decree that can make the public pie larger than it really is, as it is created by labor. Therefore there are no other resource sources under this resolution, other than additional deductions from the results of that very labor for social needs, and very strict economies.

But results must be earned, and savings must accumulate. This requires time. And if this is not taken into consideration and events are taken by storm, then only one thing is left—to close down the printing press, and

thereby introduce economies into the deep inflationary dive... But we have no altitude to spare. We must fly with great precision.

"The strike movement," writes economist T. Koryagina in *MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS* (22 August), "is making it impossible to predict with accuracy. It immediately makes a terrible mess of many branches and kinds of production in highly inflationary price increases. And therefore the workers unwittingly are striking not only against their own families—in the final analysis everything turns on a general price increase and is reflected in the budget of their families as well—they are piling more problems onto the shoulders of the whole population."

What alternative is there to this unreassuring prognosis? The plan for 1990, which has been examined by the USSR Supreme Soviet, names three priorities: food, goods for the populace, and the material base for the social sphere. All available resources are being allocated for them, including the funds received by means of a one-third decrease in investment in industrial construction. Difficult decisions have been taken: for example, decreasing capital investments in establishing production funds. And this is not only an economic problem for the comparatively distant future, but also a social problem for the near term: a mass of workers will be released—How can they be shifted around in order to avoid unemployment? The decisions are not easy ones. But they must be made, in order to forestall still greater social tension; and, having restored financial health, then once again give a boost to the economy.

But this is necessary, in order that the ship of state not be tossed about by a wave of strikes.

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**Belorussian SSR Official Refutes Alleged
Kuropaty Coverup**

90U N03504 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 3 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with G.S. Tarnavskiy, Belorussian SSR procurator, by BELTA correspondent Ye. Gorelik: "Kuropaty: Who Decided the Verdict?"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Readers will surely recall the government commission's communique regarding the completion of investigation of the "Kuropaty Case," which was published at the end of last year. But, as far as I know, after some time had passed, it was again reinstituted and continued for more than another half year. Won't you tell us, Georgiy Stepanovich, about the results specifically of this, second phase of the inquiry?

[Tarnavskiy] However, I would like to start with the conclusions which investigators and the commission reached during the first, to use your term, phase, of what was a big and, believe me, a very difficult job. I remind you that this is the first time that such a criminal case, concerning facts half a century old, has been instituted in our country, and that it had no precedents in terms either of the number or of the nature of the crimes. Besides the investigators and the commission, hundreds of persons were involved in getting at the truth under the obstructions and layers of such a long period of time when a policy of silence and secrecy reigned: experts, archive workers, scholars, people's deputies, military personnel, and former prisoners in Stalin's labor camps. Even in the first months of the investigation, from thousands of names, they succeeded in picking out more than 200 witnesses who are alive and well today, and of these, 55 personally witnessed the events that took place in Kuropaty. All of them were questioned in detail and, in consideration of their age, the investigators visited the majority of them at their homes, frequently hundreds of kilometers away from Minsk. The testimony of many of them has been published, and this relieves me of the need to take up a lot of your time with specific details.

The press, television, and radio have also reported on the results of exhumations of the eight suspected burial sites, about the conclusions of various experts, and have quoted verbatim responses from the archives; therefore, I don't think it is worth repeating this. I will remind you only of the most important questions with which the investigators and the government commission were occupied during the first phase: Who is buried under the Kuropaty pines? When and who carried out the executions here? As to how many people are buried in the common graves, it was possible to obtain verified answers. These are as follows: During 1937-1941, organs of the NKVD carried out mass executions of Soviet citizens in the Kuropaty forest tract. No fewer than 30,000 persons are buried within the isolated wood. I would like to underline two words in this phrase "no fewer."

[Correspondent] But at the requiem meeting that took place in Kuropaty on 29 October, the chairman of the Belorussian People's Front's council (soyma), Z. Poznyak gave an entirely different figure—250,000.

[Tarnavskiy] Let him have this on his conscience. Poznyak has been making similar sensationalist statements at meetings and in the Soviet and foreign press since August of last year—since the time that the investigators carried out excavations at the eight suspected grave sites. In two of them, as has already been reported, no burials were discovered. In the others, the remains of 356 persons were found. It was this figure that the experts used as a basis, first determining the average number of victims per grave and then, by multiplying this by 510 supposed burials sites, the total number of people buried in the mass graves. Both the investigators and the government commission, which included, I remind you, such well-known persons as the writer Vasil Bykov, USSR People's Artist M. Savitskiy, underground fighter and Hero of the Soviet Union M. Osipova, heroes of socialist labor A. Andreyev and D. Chervyakov, and others, considered the arguments of the experts and, having been convinced, concurred in their conclusions.

I allow that, as a publicist, Z. Poznyak may permit himself suppositions, hypotheses, and even artistic license, but as an archeologist he should be guided only by objective data.

Incidentally, at the same meeting, he once again repeated his version of the earlier exhumation of all 510 burials—that bones allegedly had already been removed by somebody after the war in order to "cover up the traces," to conceal the crime. The following circumstance served him as a basis for such an assertion: The numbers of skulls and bones did not always coincide and, in all the graves that were opened, the human remains were situated primarily around the edges, while a kind of crater filled with sand, had been formed in the center.

As is known, long before the beginning of the investigation, Z. Poznyak questioned dozens of residents of neighboring villages, and none of them confirmed his version. The investigators later questioned each of the 200 witnesses concerning excavations, and did not receive a single affirmative answer. Is it really possible, as Z. Poznyak himself wrote, to carry out a "monumental project" of this kind without being noticed, in secrecy from hundreds of eyes that had earlier seen and remembered everything. All the more so as then, at that time, there was no fence to hide behind.

To conclude our discussion on this subject, let me introduce two documents. Here is the testimony of one of the former drivers of a "black maria"

"We went into the forest and stopped next to a large rectangular pit. They ordered me to turn on the lights, because it was nighttime. I turned on the headlights and saw that they were taking people out from behind, from the back of the vehicle. In fact, a part of them were already sitting on the edge of the pit, their legs hanging

over and their arms tied behind their backs. When the whole edge of the pit was filled with people, they began to shoot them... The executioner slowly walked along the grave, shot them in the back of the head with a pistol, and the people fell at once into the pit..."

As the investigation established, such execution "technology" was pedantically observed. This provides an answer to the question of why the remains are resting closer to the walls of the grave. The mechanism by which a "crater" was formed in the center of the mass grave also becomes understandable—sand was easy to pour on the bodies and gradually filled the empty space in the middle of the grave site.

And still one more argument. Here is the conclusion of the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Archeology, Academician V.P. Alekseyev:

"The institute has received documents relating to excavations of grave sites in the Kuropaty' forest tract. A question has been submitted for expert resolution:

"Is it possible to consider as indisputable the impressions and observations received during excavations with regard to alleged repeated exhumation of the bodies buried in the graves?"

"For the purpose of collecting chronological and osteological materials concerning a population close to modern times, the author has excavated about 1500 graves in various regions of the Soviet Union, dating from the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. On the basis of previous experience and of carefully familiarizing myself with the report on these excavations, I can state the following.

"The preservation of bones in grave sites depends to a large extent upon the earth and a lack of correspondence in their numbers is more the rule than an exception..."

"When filling a grave pit, any layers of earth are spread more or less arbitrarily and to establish indisputably on this basis that a repeated excavation has taken place is extremely difficult and, in a majority of cases, impossible.

"Conclusion:

"In the light of what has been said, a repeated excavation appears improbable."

[Correspondent] Georgiy Stepanovich, The official report of the commission says also that the family names have been established of 40 former NKVD employees who took part in investigating cases of "enemies of the people." But here there followed the phrase: "But it has not been possible to discover them, themselves, because address bureau data does not list them as residing in the Belorussian SSR. It has not been found possible to establish whether they are alive now." Can this statement be corrected today?

[Tarnavskiy] After this was published, and it was distributed through TASS channels throughout the entire country, to newspaper editorial offices, many letters began to arrive at the Belorussian SSR Procuracy. It was mostly former repressed persons or their relatives who wrote. And in almost every letter there was an insistent request, and sometimes even a categorical demand, that someone come immediately and write down their correct testimonies. People from whom a "confession" had at one time been beaten with the help of "production-line interrogations" and torture now were begging for someone to listen to their sorrowful stories, justifiably hoping within their hearts that this would add even one tiny dab to the total picture of nationwide tragedy and would help to restore truth about the time of their bitter and unforgettable youth.

There were also angry, ultimative letters and phone calls. The sense of them can be expressed more or less as follows: Former torturers and executioners are walking and riding about all around you and you do not see them and, what is more, your helplessness is being acknowledged to the whole country. In a word, we soon turned out to have in our hands several additional threads for continuation of our search. Its result—four more volumes of the "Kuropaty Case," dozens of new documents, which corrected and added to information that had been obtained earlier and cast light on many episodes from the viewpoint of someone who had been allowed there, behind the high fence, on the far side of an invisible barrier, even if theoretical, but which has today divided the witnesses into eye-witnesses and the direct participants. Among these participants, there are former investigators, guards and transport escorts, overseers of prisons, and even one of the active executors of the sentences.

[Correspondent] I understand that, in a short interview, it is difficult to tell in detail about the results of a rather long and difficult investigation. And therefore, considering the interest of the readers and the demands being heard from the pages of certain publications that specific names be named, I ask the question: Who was it, nevertheless, who "shot them in the back of the head"?

[Tarnavskiy] I will name them now: The investigation determined that the sentences were carried out mainly by workers in the komendatura of one of the Belorussian SSR NKVD subunits.

But I certainly do not want to shift the blame for these most serious crimes onto the last man in line. We have seen only those who were at the very bottom of an enormous pyramid, at different levels of which, evils of a different scale were created.

Let us recall Berman. In the list of those who did the "shooting in the back of the head," his name must be near the top, although we do not have the proof that he "carried out," even one sentence. But he, specifically, was the principle director of that bloody spectacular which, with the blessing of the center (here one can

believe his testimony in the investigation which culminated with him being shot as a "German spy"), unfolded within Belorussia in 1937 and 1938.

Copying the scenario of the Moscow trials, one after another, Berman held loud courts, first in Gomel and Lepel, then in Zhlobin and Minsk. Before one trial would end, another would immediately get underway. The director and his obedient assistant-investigators untiringly staged "premiers" of spy-, sabotage-, and terrorist-case spectacles.

Here is a report from the archives. The political department of the Belorussian SSR NKVD State Security Directorate (UGB) reports that, according to data as of 1 June 1938, as a result of smashing the anti-Soviet underground within the Belorussian SSR "during a two year period, 2570 of its active participants were arrested, of whom, 376 were Trotskyites, 177—rightists, 138—national fascists, 585—SR's, 198—bundists, 7—mensheviks, 27—zionists, 1015—church-goers and sectarians, and 57—clerics."

Once Berman, who constantly sensed within himself a growing talent for the podium, publicly named one other person who also "shot people in the back of the head." Speaking in November 1937 to voters in Rossonskiy Rayon, where he was a candidate for USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, the people's commissar, with the martinet-like eloquence characteristic of him, solemnly stated: "Degenerates and sworn enemies and butchers of the Belorussian people have for a long time been carrying on their vile, traitorous work. The personal involvement of Comrade Stalin in Belorussian affairs has been required. It is no one other than Comrade Stalin who, on the basis of a single letter, of one signal from Belorussia, has said that there are enemies in the Belorussian SSR who are hindering the people to organize cultural life. Comrade Stalin directed us to destroy these enemies, and we have begun to destroy them."

What kind of "cultural life" it was that Berman organized for the Belorussian people, while obeying the high order of his infamous leader and teacher, we know. And not only from the materials of the "Kuropaty case."

Worthy continuers of his cause were Nasedkin, who, it is true, did not last long in the chair of a people's commissar, and, especially, Tsanova. I will not talk long about this despicable figure—an obliging assistant of Beriia: much has been written about him. I will cite only one figure: According to the calculations of historians during the first year Tsanova was in Belorussia (beginning at the end of 1938), 27,000 persons were arrested on political charges.

If we descend this hypothetical pyramid, then somewhere at its middle, the investigators will be standing shoulder to shoulder. We have established the names of many of them. These are Bykhovskiy, Volchek, Kuntsevich, Seryshev, Tsevtlin, Mikhaylov, Paremskiy, Yudin, Korotkevich, Litvinov, and others. How they conducted their investigations has been told by one

Bykhovskiy, who was arrested for violation of socialist legality at the end of 1938. I want to note that an unenviable fate befell a majority of the NKVD workers whom I have already named and of those whom I will still name: Many were shot or exiled to the camps and some of them died during the war in penal battalions. This is truly an awful situation, when you are both executioner and a victim at the same time.

But let us return to Bykhovskiy. In a statement addressed to People's Commissar Nasedkin he wrote: "I want to report about the disgraceful, anti-party, essentially fascist methods of investigation which have flourished in Belorussia over recent years..."

"At meetings, Berman and the former chief of the investigative department, Volchek, have completely openly issued directives that, if an enemy does not give up, then it necessary to apply physical pressure and to break him... And I began to apply the most varied methods during interrogations... I beat prisoners until they began to give testimony..."

And now, to complete the picture—the lowest part of the pyramid of executioners. At the risk of bringing down reader displeasure with an excess of quotations, I will nevertheless give the floor to documents—in this case, to statements from witnesses. They were obtained by the investigators from knowledgeable people, from former workers of the NKVD who saw a great deal and, fortunately, forgot little.

I will give you a short fragment from the transcript of the interrogation of one of the former guards of the Belorussian SSR NKVD komendatura:

"I can say that many komendatura workers took part in the shootings—Nikitin, Koba, Yermakov, Yakovlev... The storekeeper Abramchik actively went out to the shootings..."

"Was it necessary for you to take part in the execution of maximum sentences?"

"One time I had to serve as an escort. It seems one time..."

"Tell us about this in more detail."

"On orders from the commandant, I and the other escorts, I don't remember their names, at 2200 or 2300 hours, arrived in a closed vehicle at the amerikanka—the internal prison of the NKVD. The guards sat the prisoners in the back. If my memory does not deceive me, there were not less than 20 persons. Together with the other escorts, I also took a seat in the back. We had been instructed to guard the prisoners and not to let them escape."

"Where did the ones who were to do the shooting ride?"

"Usually they sat in the cab, or rode in another vehicle, in an passenger car."

"Where did they take them to be shot?"

"Along Logoyskiy Shosse, about four kilometers from Komarovka, then they turned left and after several minutes drove into a forest. A part of it was surrounded by a high fence..."

"Did the prisoners have any kind of things with them?"

"Yes, when leaving the prison they took along their entire, as we used to say, 'trousseau.' I myself saw bundles and bags with their things in the hands of the condemned. They took them when they got out of the truck, and nobody brought anything back. How the shootings were took place, I can not tell in detail—I was in the back of the truck at the time—but from my conversations with Bochkov, Ostreyko, and Migno, who were constantly occupied with shootings, I know that they led the person who had been sentenced to death to a pit, sat him on the edge or left him standing, and then shot him in the head. The person fell directly into the grave. They also threw all his things there."

Many such testimonies were obtained in the course of the investigation. They are important for two serious reasons: In the first place, to a large extent they dispel the sincere confusion of the authors of certain publications in the Belorussian and also in the central press who argue that the presence in the exhumed graves of the remains of dangerous razors and porcelain cups, purses and wooden spoons—is clear evidence that, following their arrest and bypassing prison, investigation, and the courts, they brought people directly to Kuropaty.

Believe me, this is not so. There were prison cells, and investigations, and sentences. It is another matter how they created cases. What methods were used to obtain the "confessions"—most frequently slander of themselves and others. What kind of sentences the "troikas" and "dvoykas" [three and two-man courts] and the "special sessions" handed down. The answer to these questions has already been given—a recent resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet has rehabilitated all those who passed through the millstones of the blind and cruel machinery of the "non-court organs."

And the second reason. However blasphemous this sounds today, but we must be grateful to that highly placed executioner—I don't know, perhaps this was Yagoda, Yeshov, or our local Molchanov or Berman—who gave the order to also take personal things to the execution. "Executed" and buried along with their proprietors, they can, even without naming names, tell a great deal about their former owner and about the time in which he was fated to live.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, Georgiy Stepanovich, was it really not possible in this way to uncover a single name from the tens of thousands of victims? Perhaps those people are right who assert that the investigators are "covering up," are hiding something?

[Tarnavskiy] I hope very much that my words will not hurt anybody's feelings. But it seems to me that, recently, it has become fashionable with us to blame everything without exception. And there would not be anything reprehensible in this if some of our fellow citizens, before stepping up to the podium or taking pen in hand, would carefully weigh whether their accusations, to whomever they are addressed, are just. And that, indeed, for some people, what wins out is not the weightiness of evaluations, not the interests of the matter, but a passionate desire more quickly and more scathingly to formulate their own sentence, not subject to appeal, and then inflict it more painfully. And it is absolutely not important on whose head their resounding blow falls.

Believe us, there is nothing to hide—we have done the maximum possible in order to return to the victims their names. And I assure you that we have worked professionally, that we have brought in the best investigative and expert personnel and have used practically all the methods of investigation with which the criminal service is equipped today. It is a great pity that, having learned thousands of family names of innocently repressed persons, having followed step by step their bitter and tragic fates, we, alas, cannot identify a single specific name. And no matter how strange this may seem to some, we have neither the moral nor the juridical right to assert that the many victims of repression whose "sentence was carried out in Minsk" rest beneath the pines of Kuropaty.

We have not succeeded in finding in the archives a single list of persons sent to Kuropaty for execution, nor a single document in the belongings of the executed. For practical purposes, there were none in the graves; most likely, they took them away upon arrest and then did not return them and, in those few papers that were found in purses and bags, unfortunately, no text was preserved.

I repeat, the search in archives for documents which would fix places of execution and the names of the persons who met death here has still not produced results. It remains to believe the witnesses who assert that the NKVD did not keep such records. Although life goes on and, who knows what great secrets of yesterday will be uncovered tomorrow.

[Correspondent] And a final question, Georgiy Stepanovich, for you as for the deputy chairman of the governmental commission. At that same meeting Z. Poznyak called cremation of the remains taken from the graves, following the completion of expert studies, a greater crime than the shootings in Kuropaty.

[Tarnavskiy] It is difficult for me to explain the motives for such a statement. I do not believe that an archeologist, a candidate of sciences, who participated in the excavations on the invitation of the investigators and who saw that on some of the bones there was a viscous, brown mass, does not understand what happens to such remains after several months. Even if they are kept in a mortuary.

Therefore, the government commission, having reviewed a statement by the city soviet executive committee and an act of the city sanitary and epidemiology station, agreed to the cremation. Incidentally, this is how things are done in all civilized countries, and it is not understandable to me why it became necessary to play on the ill information of simple participants in the meeting.

We also took into consideration the following circumstance: In the competition for the plan of a future memorial in Kuropaty, it was determined that a ritual center will be built, where an urn with the ashes of those who perished will rest near an eternal flame. It was decided to hold a nationwide funeral on the day the memorial is opened. And therefore the decision of the commission seems entirely logical to me: not to inter the remains now in order to later extract and cremate them.

[Correspondent] Your arguments are convincing. It is only a pity that there was not a well-versed person who, at that same meeting, could have come to the microphone and have explained about all this calmly and thoroughly to those present. Perhaps they would have believed him.

P.S. A detailed documentary account of the investigation of the "Kuropaty case" will be published in the weekly SEM DNEY. Subscription to it has been extended to the first of December. The indices of the Belorussian and Russian editions are 74830 and 74829, respectively. Cost—3 rubles 60 kopecks.

Kirghiz KGB Official on Rehabilitation, Current Operations

90US0227A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 21 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Kirghiz SSR KGB Investigative Division Chief Valeriy Petrovich Fateyev by Yu. Zilyuk. "The KGB on the Past and the Present"]

[Text] One of the most important political decisions taken by the party and the government in recent years is the completion of the process, started after the 20th Party Congress, of rehabilitation of persons unjustly condemned during the 1930s-1940s and 1950s. This difficult but essential endeavor was engaged in by many organs and departments, hundreds of specialists of a variety of profiles. In particular, jurists. A prominent role in this process was assigned to KGB organs.

What is directly included within the competence of the KGB in the matter of rehabilitating people who were repressed during the period of Stalin's personality cult? What has been done in this regard in Kirghizia? How long might this endeavor last, and are there guarantees that no innocent persons will remain unrehabilitated or, conversely, that no genuine criminals will remain on the rolls of the vindicated? Along with materials touching

upon the repressions of the times of the cult of personality, might some KGB archives come to light which contain data on major crimes of a later period?

Our correspondent asked Kirghiz SSR KGB Investigative Division Chief V.P. Fateyev to answer these and other questions.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Petrovich, as is well known, rehabilitation in general and the rehabilitation of people who were condemned during the period of Stalin's personality cult, calls for more than the restoration of merely juridical rights. It also involves reinstatement of the person's party status and various titles. Which of these are included within the competence of KGB organs?

[Fateyev] All the labor-intensive work relating to the restoration of historical and legal justice and the good name of everyone who suffered from repressions, regardless of national or social affiliation, religion, or position held, presently constitutes one of the most important aspects of the activities of Kirghizia's KGB.

Since the USSR Supreme Soviet Ukase of 16 January 1989 "On Additional Measures to Restore Justice in Regard to Victims of Repressions in the Period of the 1930s-1940s and Early 1950s," which provided the legal foundations for the rehabilitation work, there have been reversals of decisions handed down by non-judicial [vnesudebnyye] organs against all persons, with the exception of traitors to the Motherland, punitive force members during the Great Patriotic War, Nazi criminals, participants in gangs and their accomplices, officials who engaged in falsifying criminal cases, and a number of other categories of persons guilty of committing general crimes.

A specially created group made up of investigators and operations personnel of the Committee, along with the republic's Procuracy and the Military Procuracy of TurkVO [Turkestan Military District] have already examined more than 2000 criminal archives and restored the good names of more than 4000 citizens.

In the course of reviewing these cases, KGB organs are doing a great deal of work to prepare their findings on rehabilitation for each innocent victim, to determine the previous place of residence of rehabilitated citizens and the location of their relatives, to determine the fate of the victims of repressions and notify ZAGS [Civil Registry] organs about dates and causes of death. Reports are made to the Kirghiz CP Central Committee's Party Control Commission, which decides as to the party rehabilitation of persons who were expelled from the party in connection with the repressions. In this matter, incidentally, your newspaper is helping by regularly publishing lists of rehabilitated persons.

On requests from applicants, based on archive materials, matters of property are decided, certificates are issued concerning persons' length of labor service, places of work and residence prior to arrest, members of their

families, and so on. Information of a biographical character is given, also concerning participation in the revolutionary movement, the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, as well as other services. Personal documents kept in the archives, letters, photographs, manuscripts, and other materials confiscated during arrests are returned. In accordance with the Ukase, certificates of rehabilitation [spravki o reabilitatsii] are issued by the republic's Procuracy or the TurkVO Military Procurator. For cases examined via court procedure, they are issued by the republic's Supreme Court or the TurkVO Military Tribunal.

As for reinstating unjustly revoked titles and awards, the Committee is also submitting the necessary archival documents to the state organs which directly awarded the titles, where the cases are reviewed and the appropriate decisions made.

I might add that in accordance with the Ukase, the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in June of this year set up a commission whose tasks include assisting soviet organs in securing the rights and interests of rehabilitated persons, providing them with the necessary help in recovering material losses, and deciding questions of pension, housing, and other support; its tasks also include setting up monuments to the victims of repressions.

[Correspondent] As a rule, persons who were accused of treason and crimes against the state in the 1930s-1940s and 1950s, were judged by "troykas" [three-man commissions], "dvoykas" [two-man commissions], and "special conferences," without any investigation or court trial. For this reason, it is difficult to find materials proving or disproving the guilt of those who were convicted. On what do you structure the validity of rehabilitation in any specific case?

[Fateyev] It seems to us that readers will be interested to know that in the late 1920s and early 1930s, investigations in the OGPU [Unified State Political Administration] and NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] were conducted in compliance with laws governing legal procedure. Deviation from criminal and judicial procedures, gross violations of socialist legality, and the tilt toward the execution of unlawful orders handed down from above, began to take place in the mid-1930s, especially 1937-1939, but preliminary investigations were always carried out. Their quality, objectivity, and thoroughness is another matter. When you find in these cases two or three protocols of interrogation with "confessions" [priznatelnyye pokazaniya] by the accused but no other evidence with regard to the accusation, when the fate of an innocent man is decided by a "troyka" without the right of defense or the chance for the defendant to make a final statement, quite apart from any other legal guarantees such as, for example, the presumption of innocence, it does not make much sense to speak of legality....

When reviewing such cases, therefore, we proceed on the basis of the substance of the accusation and its evidential aspect. If there is no evidence, or it is questionable and the case was reviewed by a non-judicial organ, the decision is taken, jointly with the republic's Procuracy, to rehabilitate.

In order to obtain an objective picture, we sometimes have to conduct an additional investigation or verification and make the decision on the basis of newly gathered evidence.

[Correspondent] Those who suffered from the Stalinist repressions, or their relatives, are now frequently raising the absolutely legitimate question of material compensation. How is this being dealt with?

[Fateyev] This question is indeed a just and legitimate one. Most of the victims had their property confiscated, and we are reviewing the applications of repressed citizens or their near and dear ones who are the legitimate heirs, in accordance with existing legislation.

Compensation for the value of confiscated property is effected on the basis of documents found in the criminal files. If there are no documents concerning the seizure or confiscation of property in such files—and there are quite a few such cases—we check into the property claims. We request information from departmental archives, requisition documents from institutions, seek out and question acquaintances, fellow-workers, relatives, and the applicants themselves who may supply the necessary documents and information. Based on the results of the verification we draw up a substantiated conclusion which is submitted for review to specialized commissions attached to the republic's finance organs. They make a final assessment and decide the question of paying the value of the confiscated property and valuables.

[Correspondent] KGB organs are receiving many letters from persons who suffered from the tyranny [proizvol] that held sway during the years of the personality cult, also from their relatives and friends. Can you cite some of the most typical of these?

[Fateyev] Yes indeed, hundreds of letters have been coming in to us and to the Procuracy. Basically, people are making various inquiries concerning rehabilitation, the fate of relatives, satisfaction of property claims and the return of personal documents, confirmation of length of labor service, and so on. In addition we are getting letters like the one from labor veteran Zh.A. Algozhoyev, a resident of Kara-Balta, a holder of the Order of Lenin and the Order of Labor Glory, who writes: "Dear comrades! Thank you for your many months of painstaking effort, which resulted finally in the fact that my loved ones and I have learned that our relative Ibray Aldashev was not an enemy of the people but fell victim to Stalin's and Yezhov's repressions and died an honest Soviet citizen. It was not easy, of course, to track down the documents of long ago—after all, 52 years have passed.

If possible, would you please send us his photograph... undoubtedly, a small photograph has remained in his personal file...."

The man's file did contain a trade union membership card with a photograph, which was sent to Zh.A. Algozhoyev.

Here's another letter. It speaks painfully and sadly of a past which must never be repeated. It was sent by Yakov Yakovlevich Mann of the city of Dzhahal-Abad. "Dear KGB workers! I am one of those who was convicted during the period of Stalin's tyranny in 1942, and spent 10 years in various camps. After that I spent a four-year exile in the Far North, from which I returned as an invalid of Group 2. In October 1988, the Kirghiz SSR KGB reviewed my 'case,' and on 10 January 1989 I was fully rehabilitated in accordance with additional facts determined by the KGB.

"I understand how difficult it is to collect materials and find witnesses concerning a case from 46 years ago. Materials had to be found outside the republic as well. I can again look people in the eye and not be afraid of hearing, 'Don't forget what you are.' I used to have to hear that a lot...."

Letters of complaint come in much more rarely. Mostly, particular persons express dissatisfaction with regard to property claims. But we need understanding here. After so much time, it is often impossible to establish particular facts.

[Correspondent] Isn't there a certain amount of danger that in the course of the mass rehabilitation campaign, real criminals, rabid enemies of Soviet rule, will be vindicated at the same time? What are the legal guarantees, especially considering the fact that the investigative materials are skimpy and unobjective, while witnesses may simply no longer be alive after 40 or 50 years? Who are the people who are working in the republic's KGB with materials on rehabilitation? Might the level of their professionalism or subjectivity affect the decisions that are made with regard to a particular case under review, in the sense of illegitimate rehabilitation or, conversely, unjustified refusal of it?

[Fateyev] Let me rephrase your question a bit. There is no "mass campaign" as such, but there is painstaking methodological work underway to review each case, the fate of everyone subjected to criminal proceedings. This is attested by the letters I have cited.

I don't think there is reason to fear that persons who were really guilty will be rehabilitated, or vice versa. Let me cite just one convincing example. In January of 1988, the USSR General Procurator received a request from B., a resident of Kirghizia who was tried under Article 58-1b of the RSFSR Criminal Code in 1946 as a traitor, who had his case reviewed. The USSR Main Military Procuracy instructed us to conduct additional investigation on the basis of newly discovered circumstances.

In the course of two months, investigators obtained incontrovertible proof of the man's treason in the Great Patriotic War, including witnesses to his service in the "Turkestan Legion." Later, the applicant confessed his treason and acknowledged the justice of his punishment. Naturally, he was refused rehabilitation.

As I have stated, pursuant to the aforementioned Ukase the republic's KGB has set up a specialized group consisting of operational investigative personnel. Additionally enlisted in the undertaking are our veteran jurists who reviewed rehabilitation cases back in the 1960s, persons such as S. Skrynnikov, E. Chinetov, V. Skalov, V. Vecherkin, and a number of others. They have helped us a great deal.

In the course of the work, we have also collaborated effectively with the republic's Procuracy and the TurkVO Military Procuracy, in which experienced jurists are also involved. They are directly engaged in seeing to it that legality is complied with in carrying out rehabilitation.

[Correspondent] There are two basic views in our society today regarding the actions of the law enforcement mechanism during those years. Those who hold the one view insist that it was the law itself that was "bad." Those who hold the other view blame all the crimes against citizens on those who executed the law, who knowingly distorted it in favor of Stalin's doctrine of "combatting the enemies of the people." What is your opinion of this?

[Fateyev] It seems to me that this complicated question requires a short excursus in the history of the rise of the state and legal structure of the period of the adoption of the 1926 Criminal Code, which included the infamous Article 58 covering all types of counterrevolutionary crimes and serving as the main basis upon which people were later subjected to repressions.

In the late 1920s, as is well known, a situation began to take shape in the country which was grossly contradictory to Lenin's ideas and methods of building socialism. At that time, of course, a political and legal mechanism was not yet in place which could ensure the supremacy of the law in social relations and serve as an obstacle to personal power. Ideas about defending the honor and dignity of the individual, protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens, were gradually eliminated totally from the "official theory of law" and legal practice of that time. Vital democratic values shaped by centuries of progressive political-juridical thinking were flouted: the independence of judges, presumption of innocence, the adversarial principle, and humaneness.

In cases of state crimes, the accused were totally deprived of a defense and the right to appeal sentences; their relatives and friends were repressed.

Hence, by 1937 the order [prikaz] rather than the law dominated in practically all law enforcement organs.

Moreover, many of those who executed the law believed in the rightness of their cause—"combatting the enemies of the people."

Proof of this can be seen in just one such order. In 1937, Yezhov issued a directive calling for mass arrests. Instead of protesting and halting its execution, USSR Procurator Vyshinskiy sent out a coded telegram to the localities. It stated: "Go to the NKVD and familiarize yourselves with Yezhov's operational order No 00447 of 30 July 1937. In accordance with Point 2, Section 5, I direct the procurator to attend troyka sessions where procurators are not members of the troykas. Compliance with procedural norms and preliminary sanctions for arrest are not required... Cases concerning contingents [contingency] noted in Section 1 which have not yet been reviewed in court are to be submitted to the troykas... I require active participation in the successful implementation of the operation. I make you personally responsible for maintaining secrecy in the apparatus of the procuracies concerning the operation being carried out."

Unfortunately, such orders were carried out, because many believed blindly in the rightness of "the leader," while those who opposed illegality in the NKVD organs shared all hardships and deprivations with the people and paid with their lives. In short, by the late 1930s Stalin and his associates had created a facade of law and legality which concealed a legal void; they opened the way to tyranny and arbitrary rule. It seems to me, therefore, that the "order-law" and its execution were so intertwined that it is impossible to separate them.

[Correspondent] Recently, KGB organs have drifted more and more toward openness, and KGB personnel are more and more inclined toward dialogue. In connection with the work being done at the party's initiative to rehabilitate citizens who were unlawfully condemned in the 1930s-1940s and 1950s, questions are being raised concerning accessibility to KGB archives; materials concerning those years are being published. Does this mean that the USSR KGB and, in particular, the Kirghiz SSR KGB are ready to take the next step—to make public both materials about state crimes and about organized crime in the republic in recent decades?

[Fateyev] In the 1960s and 1970s, the Kirghiz KGB exposed a number of corrupt criminal formations.

A typical example of criminal organization can be seen in the thefts of especially large amounts that were committed for a number of years (1952-1960) in the Alamedinskiy Knit and Woven Goods Mill. The thefts and goods that were seized later totaled in the millions; they involved criminal currency dealings, connivance between criminals and particular officials of state institutions and law enforcement personnel, and huge bribes to officials.

Another example. In 1972, the Kirghiz KGB arrested I.A. Gurdzhi, a big-time swindler who posed as a doctor of sciences (although he only went to the 8th grade) and criminally recruited "authors' collectives," a number of

scientists of Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, and other republics, farm officials, VUZ [higher educational institution] scientists, who "collaborated" with him on "inventions"—more accurately, plagiarism—for which they received monetary rewards. It is sufficient to note that his "cohorts" included one academician, four candidates of science, twelve engineers, seven VUZ teachers, four sales clerks, a melon farmer, a seamstress, a dental technician, a musician, a shoemaker, and other persons who had nothing to do with scientific and invention work.

In the early 1980s, the republic's KGB uncovered a huge organization operating in the republic's meat and meat-processing industry. It had bribed and enlisted in its criminal machinations a number of officials, including law enforcement personnel. We provided operational assistance to the republic's and USSR's Procuracy in investigating the case.

It is clear from these examples that the Kirghiz KGB has not stood on the sidelines in the fight against crime, including organized crime. We view the investigation of such cases as a definite contribution to perestroika processes taking place in our republic. Naturally, this effort must be carried out in collaboration with other law enforcement organs. I hope that readers of SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA will be informed about its results.

In August of this year, USSR KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov, in answer to questions by a commentator for the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA, emphasized: "Law and glasnost are the main directions of our perestroika efforts." I think it would not only be useful but also essential to publish KGB materials for purposes of crime prevention, especially materials dealing with the results of criminal investigations. Moreover, this will make it possible to introduce clarity in regard to certain not entirely objective articles addressed to KGB organs that have begun to appear in the press in recent years.

As regards KGB archives, I think that as soon as the USSR Supreme Soviet passes the law "On Archive Holdings in the USSR," the question of making public KGB organ documents will acquire the character of legal regulation.

Central Asian, Kazakh CP History Conference Cites Need for Change

90US0227B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in
Russian 28 Oct 89 p 3

[KirTAG report: "From the Standpoint of the New Historical Approach"]

[Excerpts] The study of our party's activities today, its history, requires genuine dialectics and honesty in presenting the material, rather than replacing one half-truth with another. The main thing here is to see the past objectively and scientifically, to perceive it in all its fullness and wholeness.

It was this idea that dominated in the discussion at the regional seminar-conference on theoretical-methodological problems of preparing studies of the history of the communist parties of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which was held in Frunze on 17-19 October. Participants held fruitful debates concerning one of the most complicated and vital problems on the agenda of perestroika; they shared experience in scientific undertakings, determined the specific tasks of party-history research, and mapped out the approaches to accomplishing them.

Opening the seminar, Kirghiz CP Central Committee Secretary M.Sh. Sherimkulov noted that as the deepening of the perestroika process becomes ever clearer, interpretation of the essence and content, correct determination of the strategy and tactics, ways and means of renovation will be impossible without returning to the sources, the fundamental principles of the theory and practice of socialism, the experience of the history of the Communist Party, the entire Soviet state and society.

Over the decades, he went on to say, party-history science has unfortunately performed primarily apologetic functions, so that it has lost the scientific principles of historicism, objectivity, and party spirit (*partiynost*). It has accommodated to the ad-hoc conditions of the moment and failed to reflect actual reality and its contradictory development. The primacy of commentary has prevailed over profound analyses of actual reality. [passages omitted]

In recent years there have been definite, appreciable, positive shifts in the development of party-history science.

However, in the course of debates, and indeed in the very process of the shaping of the historical consciousness of the masses, the leading role is still played by writers on current affairs, literary persons, memoirists, and so on, in whom the striving to speak the truth is not always combined with professionalism or an in-depth knowledge of the historical facts.

There are also discernible defects in the process of the search for new models of historical knowledge among professional historians. Ignoring the principles of historicism and our modern understanding of problems of democracy and humaneness, they are guilty of taking an equally one-dimensional approach to the assessment of complicated problems of the historical past, but with a minus sign.

The main harm done by such an approach, as practice has shown, is that it leads to the total rejection of everything positive that was accomplished in the course of building and establishing socialism in the USSR. Worse, there are many who exploit discussion of the problems of the history of the CPSU and Soviet society as a pretext to attack the party and the fundamental foundations and values of socialism, to discard everything positive that has happened on our historic journey.

The party's position on this matter is clear and unambiguous, and it has, moreover, been made public many times. Perestroika does not mean the dismantling of socialism or the restoration of capitalism but rather renovation, revolutionary transformation, elimination of the deformations of socialism, a rebirth of creative Marxism, a new realization of Lenin's ideas. [passages omitted]

Major papers were delivered by two members of the collective authors of "Studies in the History of the CPSU," Candidate of Historical Sciences V.A. Kozlov, a sector head in the CPSU Central Committee's Marxism-Leninism Institute, and Candidate of Historical Sciences G.A. Bordyugov, a senior scientific associate in the same institute. The first was titled "The Contemporary Ideological Situation and Certain Problems of Party-History Science"; the second was titled "On the Question of the Deformations of Socialism."

These papers focused with extraordinary acuity on the question of the accuracy of the assessments and phenomena of history as presented in current affairs writing on history at the present time. The opinion was stated that in order to move forward and change our life for the better, it is essential not to reject or discard our past, not to attempt to argue that it could have been different, but rather to understand it. To divide life into "black" and "white"—including the party's policies and history—is unfruitful and ineffective. What is needed is a sober look at the past in order to get rid of illusions and rosy optimism, to disclose the actual struggle of interests, aspirations, and political will in history. Otherwise there is the danger of resorting once more to exposing "enemies of the people" and their plots.

The main problem today is to go beyond current affairs writing in the portrayal of "unpleasant" facts and to place them in their historical context in a convincing manner. V.A. Kozlov emphasized the necessity of understanding that in any social development there are times that can be called critical points. It is at such times that the greatest accumulation of contradictions occurs, those moments when a historic choice is to be made. Experience shows that, each time, a missed opportunity for a timely change in policies has in the long run forced the party frequently to resort to extraordinary measures.

In connection with this, G.A. Bordyugov, exploring the theme of his paper, emphasized that it is not a question of the deformations of a socialist society, which in that case would be a kind of completed result, but rather the deformations of a society that is building socialism. The search for the causes of such distortions leads to the problem of guarantees of the irreversibility of perestroika. The main focus should be on the deformations which arise at the intersection of the objective conditions of the building of a new society and its theoretical models.

The theme of the seminar was vigorously developed in the statements of its participants. Candidate of Historical Sciences Dzh.Dzh. Dzhunushaliyev, the director of the Kirghiz Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, spoke of the "blank spots" in the history of the republic's party organizations, the essence of these blank spots and ways to eliminate them. The "blank spots" in party-history science, in his opinion, should refer to its lack of truthful, scientifically substantiated elucidations, tenets, concepts, and answers to questions deriving from the needs of social practice and science itself. The appearance of such blank spots is a process conditioned by both objective and subjective factors.

In exploring certain problems of the methods and methodology of the analysis of original sources, Doctor of Historical Sciences Sh.M. Sultanov, the director of the Tajik Marxism-Leninism Institute, emphasized that scientific research based on the materials of the region is just getting underway and is still waiting for authors. Of paramount value to social scientists, the speaker noted, are the vital theoretical-methodological aspects of Lenin's concept of history. He went on to focus on the fact that the source base of most party-history research represents a kind of hierarchical structure: at the apex are party documents and the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, followed by the works of eminent figures of the party and state, followed by the press, and so on. Invariably, preference used to be given to the top level, a kind of "nomenklatura." Moreover, the very idea of a critical assessment of party and state documents was considered unethical and impermissible. Today they are awaiting a new reading and in-depth analysis, not excluding a reassessment.

It can be detected, on the other hand, that at the very bottom of this "hierarchical ladder" there are means and sources that are insufficiently "ideologically pure," as it used to be thought. With regard to them there was a practice of exclusively abusive criticism, or else complete silence. This is one more stereotype that needs to be done away with.

Resonating to this speech was the paper given by Doctor of Historical Sciences P.G. Kim, a sector head in the Uzbek Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, who spoke of the dialectics of all-party and local aspects in the source base of studies of the history of republic party organizations.

Unquestionably, the formulation of a new concept of such studies requires a precise representation of the object of the research. Just such an object, in the opinion of Doctor of Historical Sciences G.Ya. Kozlov, the deputy director of the Kazakh Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, is just the party itself, its internal life, all aspects of its activities. In previous editions of the studies, as well as in many other party-history works, he noted, the party, for various reasons, in particular because of deformations in its functions and methods of leadership, has remained essentially in the background.

Doctor of Historical Sciences R.A. Nurulin, deputy director of the Uzbek Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, shared his ideas about new approaches in elucidating the history of the Uzbek CP. He emphasized that the republic party organization is, of course, a part of the CPSU, but it is wrong, nevertheless, to force its entire history to fit the overall historical pattern. In discussing party congresses, for example, emphasis should be placed on participation in them by delegates from the republic Communist Party, on decisions affecting the republics and their party organizations. Candidate of Historical Sciences I.Ye. Semenov, deputy director of the Kirghiz Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, presented his conclusions concerning the findings of a study of the influence of kinship relations on many important aspects of party and soviet development in Kirghizia during the 1920s, demonstrating on the basis of specific facts how the party organization of the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast had to fight to overcome manifestations of tribalism.

Touching upon certain aspects of formulating the prerevolutionary history of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the studies, Doctor of Historical Sciences A.G. Sarmurzin, a sector head in the Kazakh Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, noted that under present conditions special importance attaches to the study of the party's policies and practices in dealing with the nationality question at various stages of its history, including the pre-October period. Participants in the seminar were also better enabled to elucidate the entire complexity of the task of perfecting the Soviet Federation by materials presented in the paper given by Doctor of Historical Sciences B.D. Elbaum, senior scientific associate in the Turkmen Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, which dealt with certain methodological aspects of the development of interethnic relations in Central Asia during the transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism.

Doctor of Historical Sciences V.F. Soldatenko, a sector head in the Ukrainian Affiliate of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, told of the experience that has been accumulated in working on studies of the history of the Ukrainian CP. In his opinion, it is extremely important today to analyze the extent of alternatives [alternativnost] and possible multiple variants [polivariantnost] of historical development. It is no secret, after all, that we drifted away from this in past years. But it is from this standpoint that we can objectively and convincingly reveal how the Ukrainian people made their socialistic choice in 1917 and embarked on the road of revolutionary transformations of the party of Lenin.

Relevance of Marxism Today Examined

90UN0322A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Nov 89 p 10

[Interview with Academician Georgiy Smirnov, director of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism

Institute by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political commentator Oleg Moroz: "Is Marxism Obsolete?"; time, place not given)

[Text] [Moroz] The country is in a deep economic crisis. And the light up ahead can be glimpsed only with difficulty. You know as well as I do that we now hear no small amount of criticism directed at Marxism. Perhaps it would be worth responding to it. I want to ask you several comprehensive, at times pointed questions. Not my own personally, but ones that would summarize the critical words which have a scattered presence in the newspapers, in readers' letters, and simply in conversation. The first question: To what extent can the almost deadlock situation which the country is now in be linked to the Marxist teaching which we have obediently followed for all these years? Georgiy Lukich, are you in a position to answer this question with complete sincerity?

[Smirnov] In general, some people do assert that the country has reached a deadlock. The situation is indeed grave. Yet I do not agree as far as a deadlock is concerned. A deadlock arises when there are no orientation points for movement forward. We do have orientation points. There exists a radical program for society's democratization. It seems that in this area, we have pushed forward most of all. Profound economic reform is being implemented. An interesting, long-term platform for the development of inter-ethnic relations has been adopted. The USSR Supreme Soviet and the republic Supreme Soviets are engaged in active law-making.

Everyone understands that difficulties are inevitable during such major breakthroughs; a search is underway, and it is not always successful. Yet it seems to me that the decisive role in the difficulties we are experiencing was played by the fact that the old command mechanisms have been destroyed or weakened, while the new ones have not yet started to work to the needed degree. So, this is not a deadlock, but the striving to get out of a deadlock. [Moroz] Speaking of the grave crisis, I did not at all have in mind the worsening of the situation which has occurred during the years of perestroika. It is obvious, but it does not frighten me. This is the unavoidable payment for the search for paths to recovery. By crisis I mean the large-scale crisis toward which we proceeded unswervingly for long years, merely postponing its arrival by various emergency measures...

[Smirnov] In other words, you want to know my attitude toward the frequently encountered thought that Marxism, Lenin, and our choice in October 1917 are to blame for this? There is nothing surprising in the fact that certain theses in Marx's teaching on socialism have now become outdated. They speak most frequently of the single form of state property, of the proposed abolition of goods and monetary relations. But these are Marx's principles concerning communism, and oh, how far it is to communism. The main thing is that Lenin long since worked through the refinement of Marxist views and left us in his legacy an entire system of

concepts about the economic methods of managing the economy. Had Stalin not rejected these recommendations of Lenin's, we would be in a different situation.

But in general, neither Marx nor Lenin ever viewed Marxism as some sort of immutable dogma. It was already after Lenin that Stalin and his circle managed to turn a number of the theses of the teachings of Marx and Lenin into canon and dogma, and in other cases, to simply pervert them. Marxism allows a most broad field for creative work, for seeking disparate versions of socialism's development. Was it not Lenin who wrote that the transition to socialism cannot but generate a gigantic diversity of forms of such a transition?

The historical task of perestroika consists of discarding the later features alien to socialism, to restructure and renew the economic and political institutes, to utilize completely mighty potential, and to create a humanistic and democratic system of social relations.

You speak of obedient following of Marxism, and that it is possible that this is what brought us to the deadlock. I do not know what you mean by "obedient" following, but I put the situation quite differently. We did indeed follow the path of socialist revolution and socialist construction in the most unique circumstances of tsarist Russia. As we know, they prophesied our failure and destruction. But the world's first socialist state withstood the heavy trials, despite the fact that on its path it would have to endure many serious losses, commit more than a few errors, and survive many tragedies. Yet the cause of these trials hardly lies in either Marxism or the choice of 1917. The unique experience of the USSR, with all its achievements and problems, still demands study; however, I am inclined to think that our main errors were in the sphere of political practice. We made so many mistakes, allowed so many deviations from the concepts of Marx and Lenin! Where is that obedient following here! It is the source of our misfortune that for a number of reasons we deviated from the most important Marxist-Leninist teachings on socialism. There is no sense in repeating how this expressed itself; that is known. We are now engaged in socialism's perestroika, completion [dostroyka], and renewal; that is, in principle, we are following the Marxist path. And if something does not justify itself even in our theory, then it must be corrected.

[Moroz] Thus, by and large, deviations from Marxism are at fault. Is that the case? According to Marxism, the transition from capitalism to socialism is an historical inevitability, just as is the transition from feudalism to capitalism. But capitalism was born by natural means in the midst of the old structure, and showed its advantages over feudalism. The problem finally arose of breaking the political power which preserved the old orders and restrained the further development of new economic relations. The overthrow of capitalism occurred with a principally different scenario. There was a fund of unacceptance of and hatred toward the "society of exploitation," and there was faith in the bright ideals of

socialism. As far as the economy was concerned, immediately after the revolution it suddenly became clear to all: The newly born structure had no sort of economic structure of its own, nor any sort of economic mechanism of its own—not just a mechanism formed amidst the old structure, but one that would quickly form itself and start to work under the new conditions. There are only general slogans appealing for enthusiasm, consciousness, and discipline under the conditions of liberated labor: "Count money carefully and conscientiously, economize, do not idle, do not steal; observe strict discipline in labor." It was such slogans which now become the regular and chief slogans of the time... The practical introduction into life of these slogans by Soviet power. Its methods, on the basis of its laws, are necessary and sufficient for the final victory of socialism." (V.I. Lenin, "The Next Tasks of Soviet Power"). It soon became clear, however, that general slogans are not enough—a general disintegration had begun. They began to improvise, to invent an economic mechanism: war communism, NEP [New Economic Policy], the administrative system... Taking all of this into consideration—the factual absence of economic preconditions—will you allow that the irreversible necessity of socialism all the same did not exist, that this structure was designed and invented of the magnificent, fine motives (I personally shared them and still share them), but all the same, invented? Is this not the source of all misfortune? In effect, this is an attempt to create a utopia. Is it surprising that all of this is taking place with such tortured difficulty? It would be more surprising if it were the other way around; after all, history had not known such a restructuring of a social system planned by designers...

[Sn. mov] Do I allow that socialism is an invented, designed structure without preconditions, without "its own mechanism," with only slogans, and hence all the failure? No, esteemed Oleg Pavlovich; the vitality of Marxism is that its founders thought of the new society as an historical inevitability. Moreover, they felt that without this, their views do not have any sort of theoretical and practical value. An also: "...Had there not been in this society as it was (that is, in capitalist society-G.S.), available but in hidden form, the material conditions of production and the corresponding relations of contact necessary for the classless society, then all attempts at an explosion would have been Don Quixotism."

The Marxists hardly felt that it was for them to create an economic mechanism from the bottom up. On the contrary, they were convinced that the objective preconditions of socialism must arise even under capitalism. Lenin consistently emphasized that state monopolistic capitalism is a most complete material preparations for socialism; that socialism is looking at us through all the windows of modern capitalism.

What did this signify? It would seem that it was quite natural and justified, moreover, effective, to utilize those forms of the economy's organization which capitalism created—without, of course, the exploitation of hired labor. I have in mind developed industry, the trust form

of economic organization, the independence of enterprises and associations, banks, money, and financial concerns, etc. Those who are now criticizing Lenin have not in the interim invented anything new by comparison to what he said. And he said that economic accountability is that form of management which will predominate in the near future, or even become the exclusive form of management.

The party leadership of the time rejected the Leninist precepts and built economic management entirely differently, utilizing the army experience of management. To some extent, that was conducive to mobilizing all resources and a relatively rapid advance in the industrial development to one of the leading places in Europe, although this was done with errors, miscalculations, with harsh discipline and by force. Without this, we would not have won the Great Patriotic War.

Yet all the same, these were extraordinary forms of management introduced under extraordinary circumstances. When the science and technology revolution unfolded and required that millions of workers, hundreds of thousands of collectives, specialists, and scientists be involved in technological creative work, our command-administrative system could not handle the task.

As far as concrete ideas about the future of the socialist society are concerned, Marx and Lenin were extremely restrained here. Even after the revolution, Lenin decisively refused to make concrete how socialism was going to look. Thus, at the 7th Party Congress (1918), N.I. Bukharin proposed introducing into the party draft program a detailed description of the future society. Lenin categorically objected to this, declaring that we do not now know in detail what this new society will be like; we only know certain basic principles.

Lenin had never been an advocate of "designing" a new structure. He felt that in all their detail, the forms of this structure must be found, discovered practically within the historical process itself, and only the social creative work of the popular masses could do this; he always appealed that the experience of these masses be heeded, seeing in this the true guarantee against hare-brained schemes and utopianism.

[Moroz] You spoke earlier of Lenin's views during the time of NEP. You will nevertheless agree that NEP was an obvious deviation from Marxism, at least in its classical form. NEP was a manifestation of flexibility and the breadth of tactical actions. But was this indeed a special invention of Marxism? This was peculiar to any sensible policy throughout time. As far as Marxist theory is concerned, it must not be interpreted so expansively, to the point of infinity, to the point of direct contradiction. It is clearly stated in the "Communist Party Manifesto": "Communists may express their theory in one thesis: the destruction of private property." This is precisely the basic position canceled out by NEP. To return to the essence of our conversation, it was this NEP

which signified an attempt to a certain degree to return to the economic mechanism of the previous, rejected social structure in view of the lack of its own economic mechanism, however effective.

[Smirnov] But on what basis are we to juxtapose Marxism and a "sensible policy"? There can be sensible and erroneous policy under Marxism as well. NEP was such a sensible policy, which allowed the utilization of elements of the capitalist organization of the economy in the interests of socialism. At the same time, it is entirely untrue that NEP canceled out the thesis of Marxism about the destruction of private property. During the NEP years, the socialist structure was always predominant, and continued to grow. NEP can be viewed as a deviation only where there were unjustified kinks—it was they that were the deviation from Marxism, not the result of it.

Of course, a new structure may have its own mechanisms, and they appeared. The planned conduct of the economy, for example. But why may it not use the mechanism of the previous structure? After all, this is the essence of history's continuity. You know full well that the goods and monetary relations, the state, culture—all arose centuries ago and all served people in various social and economic formations. The very idea that within each structure everything must be its own hardly emerged from the bosom of Marxism. This is some Proletcult thing, some Shulyatikov [shulyatikovskoye] thing, far removed from Marxism.

[Moroz] I am not saying that **everything** must be its own. Of course, Homer and Sophocles pass through all formations in transit. At least the main pilings should be our own. Not only the Proletcult is in solidarity with me here. Let us take the BSE [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], the most recent edition. L.I. Abalkin writes, "Inherent in the economic structure of socialism is a definite economic mechanism formed by the planned system of management of the national economy and forms and methods of management corresponding to it"; the foundation of the economic system of socialism is social property to the means of production.

So, all I want to say is that this economic mechanism supposedly inherent in socialism, which you somehow mention too casually in passing, did not form by natural means, as was the case under the establishment of previous formations. It was invented, designed. That is the first thing. The second and most important thing is that it does not work; it works badly. Today, this is completely obvious. The realization of this came even during the time of NEP, after which it fell into oblivion...

[Smirnov] You and I had agreed that Marxism is not standing in place, that it is not dogma. NEP is a creative application of Marxism under the conditions of postwar Russia, after the errors of the policy of "war communism." Lenin's works which have received in the literature the title of "The Political Testament" hold important meaning for the development of Marxist views. This

is the summit of the theoretical Leninist concepts of socialism. Undoubtedly, the most important thing in this entire cycle of works is the acknowledgment of the necessity of implementing a complete "change in our entire point of view on socialism." Lenin writes that in the cooperative, which we had slighted as huckstering, "we have now found that degree of unification of private interest...with its testing and control by the state, the degree of its subordination to common interests, which had previously been a stumbling block for many, many socialists." An further on, Lenin draws a most important conclusion: "...The structure of civilized cooperatives under social property for the means of production, under the class victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie—this is the structure of socialism."

[Moroz] Yes, those words are now cited endlessly, just as earlier, at the time of the construction of the cyclopean GES [hydroelectric power station]; communism—Soviet power plus the electrification of the entire country. So we built enough power stations and nuclear power plants, but as they say, there is still no happiness... After all, one may find different definitions of socialism in Lenin as well. Such as, for example, "The socialist state may arise only as a network of production-consumption communes which conscientiously take into account their production and consumption, and economize on labor, steadfastly raising its productivity..." Then why not take this definition, and not the one that talks about the structure of civilized cooperatives? How is known that cooperative and cooperations are the best path? Is there in the world even one more or less major state completely based upon cooperatives? Again, we are prepared to take upon ourselves the mission of experimenter-trailblazers... In general, the economic improvisation begun immediately after October continues: economic accountability, leasing, brigade contracts... In essence, we are up till now writing on a blank page. We promote a hypothesis which should still be verified, but we proclaim it an axiom. Without having verified how some forms should be, we invent new ones: family brigades, family leasing, factory-cooperative, regional economic accountability, republic economic accountability... It would seem that it must work. But will it? If it does, on what scale? Can we weave this into a single system within the framework of the entire country? Experiments, experiments, experiments...

[Smirnov] I do not quite understand why experiments irritate you. I feel that one of the reasons for our misfortune is exactly this insufficiency, or more precisely, absence of experiments over the decades.

[Moroz] On the contrary, the entirety of our domestic history of recent decades is one solid, prolonged experiment.

[Smirnov] An experiment is a search, and without a search, how can one be convinced of anything's effectiveness? Without searching comes stagnation as well. As far as I understand, you, and every healthy mind, are against artificial designing.

The idea of cooperatives is indeed a great idea, born before Marxism. The Leninist approach to it is a great contribution to the resolution of the problem of involving the peasants in the social economy. But who is saying that all society should consist of cooperatives?

In general, Lenin's words on civilized cooperatives should not be taken too literally. It seems that primary attention should be directed toward Lenin's ideas on the multiplicity of forms of property as a powerful mechanism of management and a means to overcome the alienation of indirect producers from property and production.

Now we are talking about allowing private property in the village. Let various structures compete. And we have to look at how that actually works out.

In general, it should be kept in mind that we quite strongly idealize socialism as the society of the future, and then we are disillusioned. But Lenin repeatedly stated that it is hard to judge socialism on experience of one country. Only several attempts in various countries can give a real idea of "integrated" socialism.

[Moroz] I have already cited the theses and approaches of Marxism whose trustworthiness has not been confirmed. It seems to me that one such approach is the failure to consider human nature in predicting social development, the reduction of man to an aggregate of social relations. But after all, man is first and foremost a biological being, of flesh and bone, the product of long biological evolution. Is it surprising that during the building of socialism he did not quite behave as expected; he did not accept social-state property, or the majority of other forms of socialization. It came to light: They are alien to his nature. But was it really difficult to see this from the very beginning? In the meantime, right up until October, it was considered sufficient to chase out the capitalists, and there will come an unprecedented flourishing of the economy, a growth in labor productivity never before seen. In "Principles of Communism," Engels wrote: "The fact that society will take out of the hands of the private capitalists the utilization of all productive forces and means of communication, as well as the exchange and distribution of foodstuffs; the fact that society will manage all of this according to the plan means that first and foremost will be eliminated all the pernicious effects associated with the current manner of conducting major industry... Major industry, freed from the fetters of private property, will develop on such a scale so that in comparison, its current condition will seem as insignificant as manufactory seems in comparison to the industry of our time. It is the same way for farming, for which, as the consequence of the yoke of private property and the division of plots, the inculcation of the already existing improvements and achievements of science is complicated; it will enter a new sphere of prosperity and will deliver to society's discretion a fully sufficient quantity of foodstuffs."

This argument that it is difficult to utilize the achievements of science and technology on small peasant plots, and that the future belongs to the *kolkhozes* [collective farms] and *sovkhozes* [state farms] has been heard by everyone who ever sat at a school desk during the thirties and after, right up to recent times. And the fact that the person toiling in the divided-up little plots were nevertheless the owners, and not someone who couldn't care less—this was not taken into account. In brief, take away private property, and everything will run like clockwork. But on the contrary, when it was eliminated, the disintegration began...

[Smirnov] Yes, there is such a point of view: So to say, the elimination of private property led to the disintegration of the economy, the culture, the personality, etc. Hence the conclusion is drawn concerning the theoretical collapse of Marxism, the bankruptcy of the theory and practice of socialism. Admission of the rightness of such a point of view means the admission of the need to return to capitalism.

I most emphatically cannot agree with either this conclusion or with your system of evidence, especially with the thought that it is a matter of man's biological nature. To an even greater extent, man is the product of social development.

You say that man's biological nature does not recognize social-state property. Yes, there are many conflicts. But tell me, has man reconciled himself to private property, with the order in which some sell their work force, and others exploit is and rule the system in this world? So, have all these problems been solved? Unemployment, alienation, crime, for example? You would hardly think that. In any case, progressive-minded people in capitalist countries do not believe so. We all know that in a number of countries, a high standard of living has been achieved, where a man of labor is socially well-defended. And this is wonderful, but we should remember that this was achieved by a struggle. And there are more than a few problems in these countries, too.

As far as taking into account or not taking into account man's biological peculiarities and needs is concerned, here there have indeed been miscalculations, and there may continue to be some. Mankind still has much work to do on this. Incidentally, Lenin, for example, did not build any illusions regarding the sterile or some sort of utopian nature of man. He spoke repeatedly of the need to build the new society out of the human material received from the old society. And in transforming social relations and all conditions of their life, people themselves will change themselves, and become different. And he considered this to be the cause of a number of generations. And now we are seeing that as soon as the moral and political threads of social attitudes weaken somewhere, man's behavior begins to change—for the worse.

You feel that owing to his biological nature, man did not accept social-state property, or the majority of forms of

socialization, and that this was clear from the very start. I think that this is not clear to many people even now. In certain cases, this is obvious indeed: A person is closer to what he owns; his home, car, television, some sort of work. For another person, the sociopolitical structure, the kinds of property and the kind of policy being conducted in the country are vitally important. If man did not have this "social virus," there would not exist those social movements for which people sacrifice everything—their lives, their fortune.

When the "man with a gun" came to Smolnyy, certain things were very clear to him. First of all, peace; secondly, land, and thirdly, the power of the people. What is unclear about this? And he fought for all of this in the civil war. It was clear to the workers as well, specifically, that the factories and plants must belong to the workers. And here, of course, it is impossible to agree with your assertion. I think that there are no grounds to assert that man in our society has not accepted social and state property, and that they are alien to his nature. And what will you say about the millions of workers and peasants who rose up on the side of Soviet power and with guns in hand upheld its slogans, which also contained the idea of social property? And what can you say about the workers at the plants who demanded the establishment of management through trade unions? It is another matter that under the conditions of the command-administrative system the workers turned out to be removed from the solutions of economic, social, and even political problems. And what can you say today about the workers who want to resolve all matters at public enterprises themselves? And not at capitalist enterprises, but at their own, Soviet enterprises.

[Moroz] People are different, and slogans are different. I do not have in mind a dominating kind of person or a dominating type of behavior. It is completely obvious: The revolution was victorious in peasant Russia primarily because the peasant was promised land. If he had known that in the final analysis they would deceive him, that certain social designers would decide nevertheless to replace the peasant farm, formed by natural means on the basis of living economic laws, with kolkhozes and sovkhoses designed by them, I think that the outcome of the revolution, and particularly of the civil war, would have been different.

And in general, I did not at any point say that only private property is vital. I am only saying: It would be a naive miscalculation to suppose that the substitution of private property for social-state property would lead to a flourishing economy, and not to its decline. Today's convulsive search for a "working" form of property, which simultaneously is appropriate for socialism, turning as many people as possible into owners (it will scarcely be possible to convert them all)—this is indeed a candid admission of ancient errors.

[Smirnov] According to you, politics consists of who fools whom best. But I feel that the search for effective paths of management, and the conditions under which

that search takes place are decisive here. Is it possible to ignore the experience of the successful introduction of socialized agriculture in Czechoslovakia, GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary? As far as we are concerned, that is another story, different conditions. If you take from the village as much as we have taken for the development of industry, for defense—here any economy would collapse. After all, it is well known how many times less funding, how much less energy we supply to the mechanization of our agriculture in comparison to both the socialist and the capitalist countries.

I hardly deny the ancient errors, but the whole matter lies in how we regard these errors. The main thing is that it was the CPSU itself which subjected them to criticism; it was our party which rejected the obsolete dogma and formulated new theoretical directions, which also formed the basis of perestroika. It should be seen that the theory of Marxism, the history of socialism do not end with either Marx or Lenin. Followers and pupils continue their cause. They bear the responsibility for the cause of socialism, and socialism is one of the more attractive ideas that ever appeared in history.

During the course of perestroika, the labor collective, association, kolkhoz, sovkhos, leasing organization, and the individual peasant have taken conducting the economy into their responsibility, and they enjoy the blessings brought them by their labor. And all of this does not oppose socialism; these are various forms of socialization.

[Moroz] However, let us continue the conversation about those sides of Marxism which today, unlike those ancient times, do not seem so convincing. In my opinion, the idea of the paramount role of class consciousness in comparison to other types, such as national consciousness, have proved unjustified. "Workers do not have a fatherland." The slogan, "Proletarians of the world, unite!" should have migrated across borders unhampered. However, migration did not come about. It was discovered that the fatherland is a supreme value of the majority of people, be they worker, peasant, or intellectual. The nationality consciousness proved more powerful. All nationality policy arose on the premise of its weakness and insignificance, and the paramount meaning of class interests. We are now harvesting the generous fruit of these views... Serious inter-ethnic conflicts occur first here, then there. And every nation comes across as a unified front; you cannot distinguish who is a proletarian, who is not a proletarian...

[Smirnov] The class struggle and its motive role in history were well known even before Marx: "Bourgeois historians," Marx wrote, "expounded the historical development of this class struggle long before I did, and the bourgeois economists expounded the anatomy of the classes." This does not at all mean that Marx reduces everything to class consciousness, or, as is now accepted, to "conscious-editing." It is not a matter of the paramount role of class consciousness, but rather of the fact that the historical experiment of both the great French

Revolution and the Great October Revolution showed that until recently, wars, including the class struggle, were a motive force in history. It would seem that no one has seriously refuted this. As far as our time is concerned, a time when the priority of common human interests is emerging, the new political thinking is putting in first place the tasks of cooperation, and co-development of all countries. This concerns the working class above all.

The priority of class interests above nationality interests was far from a hollow theoretical fiction. Of course, there was World War I, which brought with it the ascension of chauvinism, including social chauvinism. Yet under the influence of the objective course of events, this poisoning was gradually overcome; the idea of class solidarity came to manifest itself more and more powerfully in the anti-war demonstrations of practically all of the countries participating in the conflict. And was the broad international movement in support of Soviet Russia not a manifestation of proletarian solidarity? It is another matter that class consciousness, despite its significance, never exhausts the entirety of man's spiritual world.

And in our day, hasn't the non-solution of socioeconomic problems become the primary motivation of nationality emotions? If the economic and social interests of the republics and their class and nationality structure were taken into consideration, there would not be flashes of nationalistic and chauvinistic emotions.

Unfortunately, our class approach has at times been too narrowly, too straightforwardly, too one-sidedly understood. The specifics of the nationality problems, their formulation, have been groundlessly equated with nationalism.

[Moroz] Allow me here to bring in a quotation from Lenin which, in its day, was widely used to beat the "nationalists": "The proletariat supports everything which assists the effacement of national distinctions, and the decline of national barriers; everything which makes the connections among nationalities closer and closer; everything which leads to the merging of nations. To act otherwise means joining the side of the reactionary nationalistic petty bourgeoisie."

Close ties among nations, yes to that; that is good, but nobody wants nations to merge.

[Smirnov] There is nothing surprising in the fact that one may find such words in Lenin's work. That was a time of grandiose dreaming, and one could even come up with such a thing. But there were never, and I emphasize **never**, thoughts in Lenin's work either in the serious theory, or in serious policy of the movement thoughts supporting the merging of nations. On the contrary, developing and drawing nations closer was always discussed as two tendencies; the self-determination of nations, respect for the creative work of nations was under discussion. It bears remembering that the struggle against "autonomization" was the Stalinist design for the formation of the USSR.

[Moroz] Finally, the last question. Is Marxism a science? Does it have the potential for self-development, as is required of any science? What substance has been introduced into Marxism since the work of its three founders? Others feel that it more closely resembles religious dogma: The code of canonical works which an army of interpreters elucidates sometimes one way, some times another. An expert on the texts, one who can manipulate and adapt them to the needs of the situation is often considered a Marxist scholar. The most significant splashes of thought are perceived as heresy (Djilas, Garaudy, etc.)...

[Smirnov] As we know, Marxism is a scientific ideology; it comprises political economy (a science), philosophy (also a scientific theory, although there is a theory that this is not so much a science as a teaching about the general principles of existence and cognition, which in various trends may be a scientific or non-scientific theory), and finally, the theory of scientific socialism.

All three components developed and continue to develop uninterruptedly. An enumeration of the corresponding works would take up too much space.

As far as faith in socialist teaching is concerned, there is curious side of the matter here. When they say that Marxism is a scientific ideology, that does not at all mean that the masses who have accepted this ideology have comprehended all the fine points of its theoretical constructions. They approach Marxism through the perception of his fundamental humanitarian principles, such as the collectivization of the basic means of production, "from each according to his ability to each according to his labor," self-management, etc. In other words, the masses **believe** in the equity of this ideology. But all the same, it cannot be called dogma, since it is structured and developed as a science, according to the laws of science; it has to do with the real world, not the spiritual.

Assiduous adherence and dogmatism did indeed exert an extremely negative influence on the state of all our social science. In some of its fields, interpretation of the classic texts almost displaced research work proper. The main reason for this is found in the colossal pressure of the command-administrative system on the scientific sphere, and the subordination of this sphere to the rigid and frequently incompetent control of bureaucrats. It is a joy that the situation is now changing radically: Many substantive and far-ranging ideas have appeared, new approaches; extremely pointed discussions on the most important issues of our theory are in progress.

The perception of bold, innovative ideas as "heretical" is in general a widely distributed phenomenon. An it hardly manifests itself solely in ideology. Just recall what the original attitude was toward the theory of relativity.

As a theory, Marxism does not at all contain any sort of prohibitions against bold, innovative ideas. On the contrary, it is methodologically geared toward constant self-renewal.

[Moroz] Obviously, it is no secret for you that students [the sharp-tongued ones] call the VUZ [higher educational institution] subjects of the "foundations of Marxism-Leninism," or the affiliated "foundations of Marxist philosophy," "history of the CPSU," etc. the "law of god." Even your academician colleagues have dubbed "our pope" one of the patrons who made his career in the social sciences in Marx's name.

[Smirnov] This is a question from the same class as the previous one. If Marxism is a dogma, then it must be taught as the law of god. Is it really surprising that some so name the dogmatized instruction of the "foundations of Marxism-Leninism" (incidentally, there has been no such subject in the VUZs for some time now). I see nothing terrible for Marxism in these little jokes of youth. These are more likely barbs aimed at the instructors, and our textbooks, which are estranged from life.

It is precisely due to Marxism's capacity for self-development that we managed to dismantle the obstructions which Stalinism created on the path to cognition, and dogmatism in general, and start on the idea of a positive renewal of socialism. Moreover, during the process of perestroika, not only the dogmatism, but the actual primitivism, and the utopianism of certain ideas of socialism began to be revealed.

We are now observing a burgeoning, genuine interest in the truth of history, an aspiration to understand not just formally but substantively what Marx, Engels, and Lenin taught—and they did indeed teach—and how to embody this teaching in life. The works of many outstanding Marxist thinkers have achieved great popularity today, especially the works of those undeservedly expunged from our history in their own time, for example, N.I. Bugarin.

[Moroz] Does it seem to you that the time has come to reconsider the view of Marxism as a state ideology? It is

possible—and incidentally, some of our readers express such an opinion in their letters—that emancipating Marxism from an excessive ideological burden would finally grant it freedom of development as a science. The benefit to the state would be that dubious "scientific" theses would cease to be perceived as guidance for action.

[Smirnov] If by "state ideology" you have in mind a doctrine forcibly driven into people's consciousness, then we are against such an ideology. All the more so if by ideology you mean a pseudoreligious utopia or a utopian pseudoreligion. But there are a number of aspects to the problem which you have posed. We know that effective democracy requires that the fundamental mass of the population hold certain common values. Under such conditions, views, convictions, and theoretical approaches may differ, yet certain key value orientation points must be fairly similar. Otherwise, mutual understanding, and thus effective cooperation within the framework of democratic institutions simply is not possible. And in the formation of such a value system—and for the overwhelming majority of Soviet people, these are socialist values—Marxism has played, plays, and apparently will continue to play an historically great role, for nothing better has been created up to now.

It is naive to think that any state can operate in an ideological vacuum. After this supposition, consciously or not, comes an appeal for either an eclectic of a bourgeois ideology. For example, Keynes instead of Marx, religion instead of a scientific world view and a genuinely communist morality. Incidentally, it has become fashionable to equate religion with morality. As if there had never been human sacrifices, or inquisitions, or crusades, or the destruction of infidels (giaours)...

As far as the free, creative, and effective development of the social sciences is concerned, our need for it is great. Only the necessary conditions must be created for this—material, legal, moral, and political.

Measures Proposed to Rescue USSR From 'Ecological Colonialism'

90US0205A Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE ABRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 15, Oct 89 pp 65-72

[Article by Valentin Yuryevich Katasonov, docent, department of political economics, Moscow Higher Party School: "Are We Threatened by 'Ecological Colonialism'?"]

[Text] It may be said that the issue of ecological security stands today at the same level of importance as the problems of preventing thermonuclear war. So-called "ecological colonialism" is becoming one of the powerful factors destabilizing the ecological situation in certain countries, regions and in the world as a whole. This concept was initially applied exclusively to relations between developed capitalist countries and developing countries. It meant rapacious exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries by Western monopolies, leading to destruction of the human habitat and the advent of an ecological crisis in the Third World. The forms in which "ecological colonialism" manifests itself are extremely diverse: exploitation of mineral, land, timber and other biological resources with damaging ecological consequences: removal of "dirty" industrial sectors to developing countries, and exportation of ecologically dangerous goods and production processes to these countries; burial of toxic and radioactive wastes in Third World territory, and so on.

The state of the environment in our country today can be characterized as critical. An analysis of the causes behind worsening of the ecological situation shows that not only internal factors (natural resources are free, the economy is oriented on spending, ecological legislation is weak, and so on) but also external factors are "working" in behalf of the destruction of nature. Hard though it may be to admit this, but the conclusion one arrives at is that like with the developing countries, the USSR is transforming gradually into an object of the West's "ecological colonialism."

Is Everything for Sale?

We know that mining industry, which is associated with displacement of enormous quantities of natural material and disturbance of ecological balances, does especially serious, sometimes irreversible harm to the environment. In the period from 1950 to the mid-1980s, extraction of the most important types of raw minerals and fuel and production of primary products (mineral fertilizers, cement) increased from 600 million tons to almost 3 billion tons.

Today, in a time when we are attempting to look at socioeconomic processes in our society in a new way, the feeling such figures elicit is hardly one of pride, but one of sadness and alarm. They attest to our society's flawed orientation on gross and on intermediate indicators, to domination of the spending mechanism in our economy's operation, to neglect of the real needs of society.

Thus for example, does it make any sense that we mine five times more iron ore and smelt twice more steel than the USA, if the volume of industrial production in the USSR is only 80 percent of the American level, and national income is even lower?

However, exploitation of natural resources in the economy on an ever-increasing scale is explained not only by unsatisfied demand for them within the country but also by growing exports of fuel and raw materials abroad. The following figures attest to the dynamics of such exports. While in 1960 oil exports were 17.8 million tons, in 1985 they climbed to 117 million tons. Exports of natural gas were correspondingly 0.2 and 68.7 billion cubic meters, petroleum product exports were 15.4 and 49.7 million tons, and so on. As a result by the mid-1980s fuel, energy, raw materials and semifinished products made up four-fifths of the cost of Soviet exports. In order to imagine how deeply we have "mired" ourselves in our specialization as raw material providers, let me note that in the mid-1980s this indicator was a little more than 50 percent in Latin American countries, around 70 percent in developing Asian countries, and around 90 percent in developing African countries. As fate would have it, we are somewhere between Asia and Africa! Like in the classical developing country, the export structure of the Soviet Union has narrowed to a single form of goods. This is supported by the fact that in the 1980s, the Soviet Union began receiving 80 percent of its convertible currency from the sale of Siberian oil and gas.

What is deeply troubling is that despite decisions of the party's 27th Congress to decisively change the structure of exports, our economy continues to "mire" itself ever deeper in raw material exports. In 1985-1988 oil exports increased by another 27 million tons, petroleum product exports increased by 11.3 million tons, exports of natural gas increased by 19.3 billion cubic meters, and so on. Forced exportation of energy sources is proceeding in the presence of a simultaneous drop in prices on them in the world market. As a result income from their export decreased by 10 billion rubles in 1985-1988! Such an export policy recalls ever-faster running in place, or even backwards. The more we export, the poorer we become, since we are squandering nonrenewable natural resources. Some of them will be exhausted in the foreseeable future. According to estimates of the American journal *LIFE*, if the Soviet Union were to maintain its present rate of extraction, it will empty its oil coffers sometime by the year 2015. And what is the "contribution" of exports to this exhaustion? It is extremely sizable. According to official data the proportion of oil exported abroad with respect to its total extraction volume in the country is 22 percent. And if we consider expenditure of oil to produce petroleum and petrochemical products intended for export, we find that practically every second ton of extracted oil goes outside our country. One out of every 8-9 cubic meters of gas, almost

1 out of every 3 tons of potassium fertilizer, 1 out of every 6-7 tons of nitrogen fertilizers and so on are sent abroad.

The unfavorable ecological situation is aggravated by the fact that central economic departments and ministries are operating in accordance with the principle of "hard currency at any price." As a result nature protection measures find themselves in second or third place in importance. Take for example the Yamburg deposit, which is exploited for export purposes. Yamburg is one of the largest projects of the 12th Five-Year Plan, and its implementation is estimated to cost 4 billion rubles. Were all of the ecological aspects accounted for by the project's developers? Back in 1983 G. Shemrayev, the main engineer of the Yamburg project, was forced to admit: "Effective waste treatment specific to arctic conditions...has not yet been conceived. Methods used in some places to freeze wastes inevitably lead to the problem of what to do with them next. The extremely tight planning schedule makes it impossible to request scientific research. This pertains not only to treatment facilities but also to the project as a whole." Such an admission cannot but elicit alarm, astonishment and indignation. Nonetheless the project is being implemented at full steam.

What is also troubling is that minerals make up the overwhelming share of our country's raw material exports. Inasmuch as these are nonrenewable resources, their exportation means direct subtraction from our natural potential. In this aspect the situation has become incomparably worse than even before the revolution. Although raw materials dominated exports in czarist Russia as well, their overwhelming majority were renewable. Thus, in 1910-1912 90 percent of exports were grain, other foodstuffs, agricultural raw materials and timber goods. Russia's raw material exports were supported chiefly by agriculture, which was based on utilization of land, a renewable resource. In Russia it was essentially the principal and, what is very important, inexhaustible source of hard currency. Because of a careless and, to be frank, rapacious attitude toward them, our land and many of our biological resources are already becoming no longer renewable. I think it is because of progressive degradation of the soil and reduction of its biological productivity, among other factors, that we are compelled to purchase tens of millions tons of grain and millions tons of other food from abroad. We are also squandering our timber resources rapaciously. We supply foreign countries with almost 20 million cubic meters of "round timber"—that is, unprocessed logs, which are worth a pittance on the world market. This is a real disgrace to us, since after all, even most of the developing countries have prohibited exportation of timber in unprocessed form. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the rate at which our forests are being felled exceeds the rate of forest recovery, and in the next few decades our country may transform from a timber power to a desert territory.

Readers may accuse me of exaggerating, that not enough time has yet passed since the 27th CPSU Congress in order to implement its decisions on doing away with raw materials from the structure of exports. But what is most tragic is that immediately after the congress, contrary to its decisions, our economy began orienting itself on exporting even larger quantities of natural raw materials, at least in the next few decades. Take for example at least the recently adopted long-range state program for development of productive forces of the Far Eastern Economic Region. It foresees a threefold increase in exports from the region. However, this is to be done chiefly through the sale of oil, gas, coal and timber, and predominantly in unprocessed form at that. This may be difficult to believe, but for example, by the year 2000 the volume of lumber exports should be not more than 10 percent of round timber exports. For practical purposes this program legalizes the bargain-basement sale of the renewable and nonrenewable resources of the country's richest corner, and its transformation into a raw material appendix of countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

In light of these negative consequences—the immediate and the especially long-range—which further growth of raw material exports harbors, the natural conclusion that they must be reduced begs itself. And immediately, without waiting until tomorrow. I foresee possible objections: "We can't do this immediately, since first we need to restructure our domestic economy," "Such reduction would mean failure of the five-year plan's targets for foreign trade turnover," "What will we pay for our imports with?," "How do we compensate for the decrease in income from raw material exports?" and so on and so forth.

The limited volume of the article does not permit detailed examination of all of these objections. Some of them, of course, are extremely serious.

But certain objections are clearly far-fetched. They are spawned in particular by the fact that many executives of central economic organs, ministries and departments still pay homage to "His Highness Gross." In the foreign economic sphere, "His Highness" takes the form of commodity turnover volume expressed in cost terms. Failure to fulfill the commodity turnover plan, and all the more so its reduction, are still qualified as something almost of the nature of a state crime, and they are punished with the greatest strictness. I am certain that we need to develop a system of indicators for assessing the activities of the foreign economic complex which would more objectively account for its contribution to solving our society's social problems, to restructuring the economy and to accelerating scientific and technical progress.

There is another objective that is intimately associated with this one. In order to "break" the resistance of the administrative bureaucratic apparatus, which opposes decisive restructuring of our foreign economic relations, we must rely on concrete economic calculations. In particular we need to supplement the traditional practice

of evaluating the economic effectiveness of exporting particular goods with calculation of the economic harm caused by such exports. I think that the following elements should be kept in mind when calculating this harm: commercial losses due to sale of natural resources in the world market at low prices; income lost due to delivery of natural resources in unprocessed or crudely processed form; losses resulting from our national economy's not receiving enough of particular natural resources.

Without a doubt these calculations cannot account for all forms of losses with sufficient completion in cost form. For example how do we assess the complete disappearance of certain species of flora and fauna as a result of logging? How do we calculate the harm done to indigenous northern populations, which are being pushed out of places of their traditional habitation to allow for development of oil and gas deposits? Who can fully assess the economic, social and political consequences of the exhaustion of crude hydrocarbons threatening the country? Such questions are accumulating in extremely large numbers. But even the most approximate estimates made by the author show that exports of oil, gas, iron ore, mineral fertilizers and products of ferrous metallurgy create losses for us which, expressed in cost terms, exceed the income from such exports by several orders of magnitude. Continued exportation of natural resources in previous proportions will mean ever-increasing robbery of the society.

In this connection our lawyers certainly should think about making mass exports of natural resources a crime at a level equivalent to especially large misappropriations of state property.

Imports for "Smokestack Industry"

Rather rigid standards on protecting the environment and defending consumer rights adopted in the West in the 1970s created a situation where some forms of industrial products dangerous to the environment and human health were made illegal. In order to lengthen the "life" of such products the monopolies began forcing their export to developing countries. "Dirty" equipment and high-waste production procedures, motor vehicles with highly toxic exhausts, medicines and pesticides harmful to health, other ecologically dangerous chemical products, and so on flooded Third World countries.

It was not that long ago that we surveyed this process as if from afar. Today the danger exists that we may transform into a market for dumping outdated and ecologically doubtful goods. The clearest and most scandalous example of this is pesticide imports. While in 1960 we imported 19,200 tons of chemical plant protection resources from abroad, in 1980 we imported as much as 96,500 tons, and 118,000 tons in 1987. Each year we spend around half a billion rubles of our extremely limited hard currency funds to import toxic chemicals; this amount exceeds by many times our purchases of medicines for hard currency. Pesticide

production in the West is a multibillion dollar business bringing high profits to chemical monopolies. Corporations such as Monsanto, Bayer, BASF, ICI and others are attempting to push their toxic goods in all countries of the world. In the early 1980s they sold \$30 billion worth of toxic chemicals just in developing countries. The consequences of such trade to Third World countries are extremely lamentable. According to WHO data each year 500,000 persons are poisoned by toxic chemicals in these countries, which is equivalent to about one poisoning each minute. Of these, not less than 5,000 die. Most likely these estimates are severely understated, since most poisonings are not recorded at all in the Third World. It is becoming increasingly more difficult for chemical monopolies to sell their toxic goods in the world market: Many states, including developing ones, are imposing restrictions on pesticide use. Some (for example Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan and many states of the USA) have banned the use of toxic chemicals in agriculture completely. Under these conditions the chemical monopolies have intensified their pesticide "pressure" on the Soviet Union. The situation is extremely alarming. While the pesticide sales volume has recently dropped in the world market, imports of pesticides into the USSR are increasing. And this is at the same time that our country's doctors, ecologists and the public are bringing up more and more new facts of the destructive influence of toxic chemicals on the natural environment and human health.

Today, some chemical monopolies are prepared to sell us not only toxic chemicals but also the equipment and procedures for their production. West Germany's Lurgi [transliteration] managed to impose a deal on us to deliver equipment for production of the obsolete pesticide basudin. This is a highly toxic preparation which actively penetrates into plant organisms, which is insoluble in water and which resists breakdown in soil. Construction of a plant to produce it was started in Volgograd. In the end its erection was halted in response to extremely strong pressure from the public. But 70 million rubles in hard currency were cast to the winds.

Imports of many other machines, production processes and equipment may also promote a worsening of the ecological situation in the country. In recent years machinery and technical products have made up over 40 percent of our total imports. The overwhelming share of purchases of these products are not at all intended for development of science-intensive production operations that are relatively harmless to the environment (electronics, robot engineering and so on). Their purpose is chiefly to service the continued growth of so-called "smokestack industry" (in the West, this term refers to the complex of traditional sectors, and primarily heavy industry). The West is doing everything it can to impose on the Soviet Union deals which would transform it into a concentrated center of materials-, energy- and ecologically-intensive production operations. Just in 1981-1985 more than 850 outfits of imported equipment were placed into operation in the USSR national economy—

predominantly in metallurgical industry, in mineral fertilizer production, in chemistry and petrochemistry, and so on. To a significant degree, imports are being put to work to reproduce the raw material structure of our exports. A unique vicious circle arises as a result: We receive hard currency by exporting oil, gas and timber; we spend currency earned at the price of destruction of nature to buy equipment to further increase raw material exports and destruction of nature. Thus although the USSR is a leading producer of steel tubing in the world, it is nonetheless continually increasing its imports, in order to build more and more new gas pipelines, including for the purposes of exporting gas. In 1970-1980 tubing imports tripled, while in 1980-1986 they doubled. In 1986 the total volume of tubing purchased from abroad already noticeably exceeded its total production in the USA, Great Britain and France.

Other imported purchases are also reinforcing the raw material and nature-destroying structure of the Soviet economy. Take for example equipment for production of mineral fertilizers. Just Norway's Noshk Gidro [transliteration] alone delivered equipment and procedures to us for five complex fertilizer plants. Comrades from the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizers justified such purchases by the notion that the country does not have enough fertilizer. I am not going to immerse myself into the labyrinth of agronomical science in order to clarify whether or not our agricultural demand for fertilizers is being satisfied. But how do we explain the fact that in 1987 we exported 0.7 million tons of phosphorus fertilizers, 5.4 million tons of potassium fertilizers, and 5.8 million tons of nitrogen fertilizers?

Sober conclusions beg themselves when we learn that in 1987 we went abroad to purchase 1 billion rubles' worth of metallurgical equipment, 0.4 billion rubles' worth of mining equipment, 1 billion rubles' worth of equipment for well drilling and operation, and so on. For comparison we can note that imports of equipment for food industry were less than 0.7 billion rubles in that same year, while purchases of medicines for hard currency totaled only a few tens of millions of rubles. Under these conditions there can be no talk of any kind of social orientation of Soviet imports. They are primarily servicing the insatiable appetite of our nature-exploiting and nature-destroying departments, which (wittingly or unwittingly) primarily service the interests of industrially developed capitalist countries.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that in the world market of machinery and equipment, Western firms entering into relations with our departments and enterprises are acting in accordance with the principle of dumping otherwise worthless goods. Knowing our tendency to be pennywise and dollar-stupid, capitalist monopolies are striving to sell us, "on advantageous terms," outdated goods—that is, obsolete, often ecologically dangerous equipment. Despite the fact that protests against the conclusion of such "dirty" deals by our bureaucracies are ringing ever-louder in our press, this practice is still continuing.

Equipment was recently purchased for production of polycarbonates in Ufa. Alas, the equipment turned out to be extremely doubtful from an ecological point of view. Demonstrations rolled across the city against the plant's construction. In the end the public got its way, but what do we do now with the equipment, for which 300 million rubles in hard currency were paid? We also suffered large losses in connection with purchases of imported equipment for erection of the Astrakhan Gas-Condensate Complex (AGK). It cost us a billion nonconvertible rubles. The first generation of the AGK was recently started up, after which it was discovered that alas, the equipment was defective, and it operated unreliably. Just last year the concentration of hydrogen sulfide recorded in the air of the 8-kilometer zone of special control exceeded the standard by a factor of 243, while the concentration of sulfur dioxide was excessive by over 100 times. One of the accidental discharges caused the death of four people. Thirty thousand persons found themselves to be the totally unwilling occupants of a zone dangerous to health and life.

In recent years Western monopolies have been striving to obtain additional profits by exporting to other countries not only "dirty" goods and production procedures but also toxic and radioactive wastes. Just in the last 2 years, according to some estimates, certain Western states ferried 3.5 million tons of highly toxic wastes to developing countries. The temptation to conduct such operations is extremely high to the monopolies, since the sums which they pay to economically weakly developed states for their consent to receive the wastes turn out to be tens and sometimes hundreds and even thousands of times less than what it costs to bury them or process them in their own countries.

Judging from everything, the monopolies view USSR territory as another potential dump site. A statement made by Academician N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnyy during a press conference held in August of last year at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is particular evidence of this: "A number of countries have submitted requests to the Soviet Union to bury wastes formed by nuclear power engineering." However, the academician responded in the negative when asked whether or not specific agreements requiring us to accept radioactive wastes from abroad exist. At the same time some of our mass media and foreign information sources have reported that such an agreement has already been signed with the FRG.

What must we do in order to stop the ecologically dangerous imports? I think that first of all we need to implement a complex of administrative, legislative, economic and other measures which would make the use and consumption of ecologically harmful products inside the country impermissible. For example the Law on Product Quality and Protection of Consumer Rights should become a dependable barrier to agriculture's use of toxic chemicals jeopardizing human health. We need to categorically end the practice of concluding deals for the purchase of dubious goods. Our businessmen often

buy foreign equipment in accordance with the principle of "whatever is cheapest" (this is the way their work is assessed), without bringing specialists (including ecologists) and representatives of the client into the negotiations. In view of the fact that thousands of enterprises and cooperatives have now been given the right to engage in export-import operations, and they cannot always competently assess the ecological properties of the goods they buy, why not create a special expert ecological information service under the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment? It could provide the needed consultation, and subject goods imported from abroad to ecological inspection (at least selectively).

But the main thing that must be done to reduce the negative influence of imports on the natural environment, it seems to me, is to fundamentally change their structure. Imports must serve the purpose not of expanding materials-, energy- and ecologically-intensive sectors, but of developing science-intensive production operations, the nonproductive sphere (services primarily), and other sectors of the economy "working" directly for the individual.

"I Bought a Part of the Biosphere From You"

Creation of joint ventures in which firms and organizations of other countries participate is now a commonplace practice. Having declared a course toward development of joint enterprise two and a half years ago, our government hoped to use it to accelerate saturation of our "hungry" domestic market with consumer goods and services, and spur scientific and technical progress as well. By this moment around 800 joint ventures have been registered, and negotiations on establishing another few hundred are underway.

But apprehensions are being expressed that they may become a serious factor aggravating the already unfavorable ecological situation in the country. Special concern is elicited in this connection by the heightened interest of Western firms in creating joint ventures in the area of chemistry and petrochemistry. The basis for this interest is openly discussed by Yan Vanous [transliteration], president of America's Planecon Consulting Company: "Because of insufficient knowledge of Soviet labor laws on the part of Western firms, capital-intensive sectors of the economy which do not require large amounts of workers and the Western style of production management should be treated as the most promising areas for joint ventures." The businessman is probably uncertain as to whether the USSR will allow Western monopolies to exploit its manpower without supervision. Therefore he concludes: "I would name chemistry and petrochemistry as a possible direction of such cooperation." Development of these sectors in the USSR appears especially attractive to Western businessmen also because chemistry and petrochemistry are in the class of ecologically hazardous production operations. A recent survey in the FRG showed that 45 percent of the respondents were

sharply against chemical industry, while another 50 percent were troubled by its development. In view of growing opposition on the part of the Green Party, companies in "dirty" sectors, including chemistry and petrochemistry, are finding it increasingly more difficult and expensive to build new enterprises at home. Just the procedure of conducting ecological expert examination and issuing permits for new construction can take up several years there. On the backdrop of such a "bureaucratic" procedure, that of creating joint enterprises in the USSR in ecologically hazardous sectors seems extremely simple to Western monopolies. The ratio of outlays on environmental protection attests to some extent to the stiffness of state and public ecological control over the activities of enterprises in our country and in developed capitalist countries. While in the USSR these outlays presently total 10 billion rubles, in the USA for example they amount \$80 billion.

Considering that outlays on protecting the environment may attain 20 percent or more of the total volume of investments into chemistry and petrochemistry in the West, the monopolies hope to receive additional millions in profits by economizing on ecology in the USSR.

They are hastening to implement their plans. In March 1988 Italy's ENI and Montedison [transliterations] corporations, America's Occidental Petroleum and Japan's Marubeni [transliteration] signed a protocol of intentions to create the Tengizpolimer joint venture with capital of \$6 billion with the USSR Ministry of Petroleum and Gas Industry. Construction of the Eastern Hemisphere's largest petrochemical complex on the basis of the highly rich deposit of crude hydrocarbons in Tengiz (Guryev Oblast) is foreseen. It will produce 1 million tons of granulated sulfur, 600,000 tons of polyethylene, 400,000 tons of polypropylene and a significant quantity of other plastics annually for deliveries both to the domestic and to the foreign market.

In December 1988 the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on measures to create oil, gas and chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast on the basis of crude hydrocarbon deposits of Western Siberia using progressive production processes. It foresees construction of five oil, gas and chemical complexes (in the cities of Nizhnevartovsk, Tobolsk, Surgut and Novyy Urengoy and in the settlement of Uvat) with the participation of firms from capitalist countries. A number of preliminary agreements on creating a joint venture in Tyumen Oblast have already been signed. A consortium of a number of American and Japanese companies headed by Mitsubishi Corporation signed an agreement with the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry to build 15 plants in Nizhnevartovsk producing construction materials and a number of polymers.

The Tyumen project is eliciting considerable alarm. Although clauses foreseeing use of the latest, ecologically cleanest production processes are included in the preliminary agreements with Western firms, this can hardly serve as a guarantee that the regions in which the oil, gas

and chemical complexes will be located will not transform into centers of ecological disaster. Even within the framework of a transnational corporation (TNC), the latest technology used in its main production operation does not reach enterprises of daughter firms and affiliates abroad until an average of 4-5 years later. And transfer of technology to "alien" companies occurs even later as a rule, after a new generation of the TNC appears. This is why I don't put much stock in the hope that joint ventures in the USSR would be provided with the latest technologies. All the more so, as was noted above, because Western firms have a certain amount of experience in selling obsolete and ecologically unsafe equipment to our departments and enterprises.

But even delivery of the latest equipment would not guarantee anything. Both our departments and foreign participants of joint ventures will try to economize on current nature protection outlays, which may end up being larger than the initial investments into environmental protection within a few years. There are more than sufficient means of unlawful economization of such outlays: diluting liquid wastes with large proportions of water, discharging wastes at night in large doses, pumping contaminated substances into subterranean beds, burning wastes in city dumps, and so on. Surveys of enterprises both here and abroad show that oftentimes waste treatment equipment is not working: It is shut down for the sake of economy, or it is idle due to malfunctions. Risking their reputations, capitalist firms are prepared to resort to any sort of "ecological crimes." Thus according to just official data the number of such crimes committed in the FRG in 1987 was 18,000. Many of the firms that are now participating in negotiations to create joint ventures on USSR territory have also been party to "ecological crimes." What is surprising is why this is not raising the eyebrows of the leaders of our departments.

Take for example at least the Swiss chemical monopoly Sandoz [transliteration], which is contracting with our Ministry of Chemical Industry to erect a joint venture producing dyes in the settlement of Armysansk (Krymsk Oblast). In fall 1986 30 tons of toxic substances were dumped into the Rhine by enterprises of this monopoly in the vicinity of Basel. This led to serious destruction of ecosystems in the upper and middle reaches of the river, and the incident was declared to be one of the greatest ecological catastrophes of Western Europe in recent years.

America's Union Carbide Corporation is part of the consortium of capitalist firms building the oil, gas and chemical complex in Nizhnevartovsk. It is mournfully notorious because of the fact that a pesticide enterprise of this corporation leaked 40 tons of an extremely toxic substance—methylisocyanate—in the Indian city of Bhopal in 1984. One of the greatest ecological disasters of the last decade occurred as a result: Three thousand people died, and over 100,000 were severely intoxicated and doomed to a slow death. After this incident a

number of countries turned down offers by Union Carbide to make investments on their territory.

The ecological reputation of Occidental Petroleum has also been extremely damaged. Residents of our cities know of this company's ecological "sins" from more than just rumors. In the 1970s Occidental Petroleum, which is headed by the American millionaire A. Hammer, signed a compensatory business deal with Soviet departments worth \$20 billion. In accordance with this "deal of the century" we were provided an outfit of equipment on credit for plants producing ammonia and carbanide, while we obligated ourselves to deliver liquid ammonia to the American corporation as compensation for a period of 20 years. This deal turned out to be extremely profitable to Occidental Petroleum, inasmuch as introduction of stiff ecological standards in the USA made production of ammonia and some other chemical products in this country noticeably more expensive. So it was that American corporations began moving these production operations to developing countries and, of all places, the Soviet Union.

Today the ecological situation in the locations of plants built on the basis of equipment supplied by Occidental Petroleum is extremely unfavorable. One such enterprise is the Stirol Association in Gorlovka. The concentrations of toxic substances around it exceed the maximum permissible concentrations of, for example, ammonia and nitrogen oxides by a factor of 3-6.

In the vicinity of the Priportovoy plant near Odessa, the ammonia concentration twice exceeds the planned levels and thrice exceeds the level guaranteed by the American firm. Today the situation is so serious that moving out the residents of one of the nearby settlements is suggested. It stands to reason that Occidental Petroleum is not about to cover the arising losses. And generally speaking, judging from everything, A. Hammer is not very troubled by the fate of the population around plants in the USSR built by his firm. Evidence of this can be found in a phrase he let fall once in connection with the Priportovoy plant: "I bought a part of the biosphere from you." And now Occidental Petroleum hopes to profit from participating in the Tengizpolimer joint venture. This enterprise will be operating off of crude hydrocarbons with a heightened content of hydrogen sulfide and other toxic substances. Any infringements in operation of the equipment there harbor ecological disasters comparable to Bhopal or Chernobyl.

Decisions to create joint ventures of this sort could probably be made only after thorough feasibility studies are conducted on them and serious independent expert examination is carried out. However, the corresponding departments interested in their implementation are striving to "railroad" the projects through without fulfilling these elementary requirements. In late 1988 the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry, the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry, the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizers and some other interested ministries were able to "railroad," through the USSR Council of Ministers, the

decree mentioned above, which permits construction of oil, gas and chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast not only without economic and ecological expert examination but even without preliminary feasibility studies. And yet according to specialists we are talking about the "construction project of the century," which will require allocations of 90-100 billion rubles, which is equivalent to building six or seven Baikal-Amur rail mainlines. Feasibility studies antedated after the decree's publication gave practically no consideration to important ecological factors. The ecological expert examination that was carried out after the fact was also essentially a formal step; there is simply no time for it, since the decree foresees output of the first products by the oil, gas and chemical complex in 1991. Note for comparison that in the West, ecological expert examination of projects of this scale occupies several years as a rule, and it presupposes discussion of the project by the public, by the top legislative organs and so on. The issue of compensating for damages arising from accidents is avoided in the preliminary agreements with Western monopolies. And these damages may total not in the millions but even in the billions (for example, the suit brought against Union Carbide by the victims of Bhopal totaled \$3.3 billion). Consequently, judging from everything, our state—that is, ultimately you and I—will have to pay in the event of an ecological disaster at a joint venture. I believe that TNCs have never even dreamed of such "conditions of greatest ecological auspiciousness." In a word, the plans for building oil, gas and chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast must be subjected to independent, serious economic and socioecological expert examination.

How to Avoid Bureaucratic Claims

I think that the Soviet Union's transformation into an "ecological colony" of the West is not predestined. Of course, the main barrier to this process should be raised by restructuring our economy's internal organization, by freeing it from the ballast of materials- and energy-intensive and "dirty" production operations and "smokestack industry," and orienting ourselves on accelerated development of science-intensive sectors that do not do harm to the natural environment. This is a firm foundation for changing the place of the USSR in international division of labor, and it will make it possible to avoid transforming the country into a raw material appendix and dumping ground of capitalist monopolies. Of course, such restructuring cannot be completed in a year or two—it is a lengthy process. Therefore without waiting until we become a "high technology" power, we must begin restructuring foreign economic relations in the direction of their "ecologization." First of all there is an urgent need for immediately reducing exports of minerals and other natural resources, especially in unprocessed form. "But the country lacks hard currency as it is," I can hear the objections now. However, first of all a significant part of our hard currency is simply cast to the winds (recall just the one fact that the cost of equipment we have imported but not installed is now almost 5 billion rubles). Second, the

possibility is not excluded that reduction of raw material exports may become the "catalyst" for a "technological leap" by our industry.

Obviously we should not totally reject the advantages offered in the sphere of foreign economic relations associated with presence of rich natural resources in our fatherland. First of all we should certainly develop the country's export base by subjecting these resources to deep processing; this will make it possible to increase hard currency income several times over while simultaneously reducing the amount of natural substances placed into economic turnover.

In order that exportation of resources would not be accompanied by exhaustion of natural potential, we obviously need to shift the center of gravity from non-renewable resources (minerals) to predominantly renewable ones—timber, food and agricultural raw materials. It stands to reason that all of the necessary measures for their expanded reproduction must be ensured in this case. Our country, which possesses 55 percent of all of the planet's chernozem, a fourth of the world's timber reserves and a significant share of fish resources, could make its natural potential the source of currency income, given competent management.

Of course, today, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, intellectual and not natural resources offer the greatest prospects, and can provide the greatest impact in foreign economic exchange. Our country possesses enormous intellectual potential, but we simply don't know how to use it prudently. As N. Chernyshevskiy noted, a person must not be conditioned to being energetic in the cornfield and irresponsible in mental work. The bureaucracy is afraid to extract energy and talent from the popular subsoil, preferring to extract energy and resources from the terrestrial subsoil. And so it stakes itself on natural resources and not on intellectual resources, even though the latter are much more important in the era of the scientific and technical revolution from the standpoint of reproducibility; moreover intellectual resources are quickly improved. It seems to me in this connection that the most important prerequisite for restructuring foreign economic relations in accordance with the requirements of ecology and of the scientific and technical revolution is to resist authoritarian methods of managing the economy.

And this in turn requires depriving the departments of their monopolies on the corresponding information, which are the basis of their domination. Thus we are entitled to demand full and reliable information from the USSR State Committee for Safety and Industry and Atomic Power Industry in regard to whether or not it has signed an agreement to bury radioactive wastes on USSR territory. We are also entitled to demand cessation of the various secret negotiations of our departments with Western firms concerning creation of joint ventures that jeopardize the country's ecological safety. We are also entitled to know what contracts for exporting natural

resources are being signed with capitalist corporations, and for what purposes scarce hard currency is being spent.

We must not only know but also participate, by the mechanisms of democracy, in development of the country's foreign economic strategy, in adoption of decisions on major deals and so on. In the meantime, the departments are doing all things unchecked.

Perhaps it would be worthwhile for the Supreme Soviet to determine the basic principles of enterprise. There is probably a need for a law on joint enterprise which would establish clear priorities and foresee a differentiated policy in relation to foreign capital. Such a policy might stimulate, for example, its inflow into science-intensive sectors and poorly developed territory, and hinder or even make impossible any foreign investments into resource-intensive and "dirty" sectors, regions with a large concentration of industry and population, and so on. Considering the critical state of the environment in the country, why not stimulate creation of joint ventures of an "ecological" profile (for ecological reconstruction of existing production operations, for production of waste treatment equipment, monitoring and measuring apparatus, and so on)? Our country already has some examples of such joint ventures. We need to attract foreign firms to this sphere of activity more actively by means of tax, credit, customs and other measures.

Besides regulating foreign investments into the Soviet economy, I think that the supreme organ of legislative power should also take a most active part in solving the fundamental problems of developing other forms of the country's foreign economic relations. It must offer its conclusions on annual and five-year plans for foreign trade, on long-range export and import programs and on the state's foreign economic policy as a whole. The possibility is not excluded that some problems would be brought up for popular discussion and referendum.

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Member Explains Goals of Environmental Protection Guardians Movement

90US0255A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 4 Nov 89a p 4

[Interview with Yevgeniy Shvarts by S. Dukhanov: "With Perestroyka We are Breathing More Freely"]

[Text] During the past 2-3 years public awareness of the seriousness of the environmental situation has undergone a striking change. The turning point for us was, of course, Chernobyl.

With the arrival of glasnost the general public has obtained more information about the threatening ecological situation in several regions of our country, where pollution from oil refineries, metallurgical plants and chemical enterprises has resulted in an increased number

of children being born with various abnormalities, and cases of illnesses such as asthma and various disturbances of the immune and nervous systems occur with greater frequency.

Yevgeniy Shvarts, a leader of the Environmental Protection Guardians Movement, a young people's ecological organization, thinks that with regard to the authorities' recognition of the ecological situation things are much more difficult. It must be kept in mind that, first of all, many representatives of the leadership structures have no idea of the seriousness of the ecological situation, because, as a rule, they do not live in these regions. With our extreme centralization of authority the overwhelming majority of economic decisions directly affecting local ecological situations are made in Moscow. From the capital it is not easy to control the environmental situation in the periphery.

[S. Dukhanov] Is it apparently no accident that among other goals, perestroyka has set for itself the goal of economic and political decentralization and the return of all power to the soviets?

[Ye. Shvarts] Just as the change in management workers' psychology and way of thinking. For example, many apparatus leaders at the State Committee for the Protection of Nature sincerely think that the most diverse ecological societies should be "counted as their own" and be a continuation of their agencies, but with the rights of public organizations.

[S. Dukhanov] What organizations and societies in our country can be considered ecological?

[Ye. Shvarts] There are several such organizations, each of them with its own specific features. For example, the activities of the Ecological Union, led by Professor Nikolay Reymers, is directed towards research to make independent ecological expert evaluations of various production and economic projects and to provide consultation in ecological calamities.

Ecologiya i Mir, led by the writer Sergey Zalygin, unites representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia and is making ethical and scientific evaluations of the struggle to protect the environment.

The All-Union Ecological Society, headed by Professor Boris Iskhakov, is also advocating a clean environment.

The Social - Ecological Union, in which our Environmental Protection Guardians has the rights of collective membership, sets as its goal the activation of the country's entire population in the struggle for human health and in disseminating knowledge about the environment and culture, and experience and techniques in preventing ecological crises on a local and global scale. Also, an entire series of ecological funds exists.

[S. Dukhanov] A few words about your movement.

[Ye. Shvarts] I represent the Environmental Protection Guardians Movement. This is an independent nature

protection organization with rich traditions. Its first sprouts appeared back in 1924, when a Circle of Young Biologists was created at the Moscow Zoo. Then followed decades of the Stalin regime, when any civil initiative was considered to be anti-state activity. The very concept of the protection of nature was considered seditious. From what should it be protected? From our soviet man? Or from the Soviet State? Only during the "thaw" under Khrushchev was our movement organized. It was then that its members, at that time either teachers or students at the Biology Department of Moscow State University, concluded that it was necessary to move from the collective study of nature to its collective defense. The movement quickly became country wide, as graduates from Moscow State University, travelling throughout the country, organized similar "guardians" in other localities.

In 1972 we conducted our first all-union conference, attended by 28 leaders of local organizations in 22 cities. The Komsomol leadership categorically objected to this. There were attempts to eliminate the movement. What saved us was that on the opening day of the conference, a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on strengthening the protection of nature appeared. Instead of being eliminated we received praise and honors. However, the threat of dissolution hung over us constantly. Only when perestroika aroused powerful efforts in our people did numerous independent public organizations begin to appear and did we begin to breathe more freely.

[S. Dukhanov] What new has happened in your organization recently?

[Ye. Shvarts] We have recognized that up until now we have been fighting effects, but we needed to expose the causes. The reasons are the monopolism in our economy and state structure. We became aware that the task was not so much that of finding the people guilty of specific ecological calamities and punishing them, but to answer the question: "How can ecological calamities be avoided in the future?" We will continue our actions, but will maintain the course towards politicizing the movement, towards the right of legislative initiative and the right to control the activities of state organs. We are trying to act in accordance with the principle: "Think globally—act locally."

Scientists' Open Letter Faults Katun GES Project Reasoning

90US0255B Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 46 Nov 89 p 20

["Open Letter to Chairman of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician V. A. Koptug"]

[Text] Deeply esteemed Valentin Afanasevich! We are all certain that on the eve of the final decision of the government of the Russian Federation concerning the fate of plans for the Katun GES [Hydroelectric Power

Station] and, to a great extent, the fate of a vast region of 2 to 3 million people it is necessary to be fully confident that it is indisputably justified. The long discussion between proponents and opponents of this project is evidence of the complexity of the problem itself, of fundamentally different approaches and different world views and political principles.

One approach is traditional-departmental, apparatus, command-directive and supposedly implemented on a scientific basis, in the name of the people and therefore in its interests. The second, equally suitable, approach is to guarantee that it protects nature and is ecologically irreproachable in all its principal aspects—economic, power engineering, social, and with regard to nationalities. It can be assured not only by departmentally independent qualified expert review but also by widespread discussion in a democratic spirit.

The basis for our letter is the clear contradiction between, on the one hand, the decision of the third State Commission of Gosplan, Goskompriroda and Gosstroy of the Russian Federation, which, after a thorough analysis of the Katun GES, declined to give it a majority vote, "in view of the ecological dangers and the threat of losing great historical, cultural and spiritual values...", and, on the other, your letter, sharing the view of O. F. Vasilev, director of the Institute of Water and Ecological Problems, who asserts that the mercury content of the river and its sources does not exceed the maximum permissible concentrations and who does not consider the mercury danger to be a real obstacle to constructing the GES.

Such different approaches to the problem cause us to ask several questions that only you can answer. We will be grateful if you do this. The interest the general public has shown in this problem has prompted us to appeal to you via this open letter in this publication, which is discussing an economic policy new for our country, a policy which does not contradict, but is compatible with ecological principles.

First question: Isn't it sufficient for our country to have experienced Chernobyl—the crown of several other disasters that do not have to be listed here, but which were essentially programmed by the traditional underestimation of the ecological danger in various types of large projects, of incompetent and irresponsible designs and, as a rule, intradepartmental expert review?

We do not doubt that you will agree, but we want to hear from you, how you will explain your approval of the Katun GES plan when the decree of the SO, USSR Academy of Sciences "On Results of Research on the Behavior of Mercury in the Katun River Basin with Regard to Estimating the Danger of Mercury Pollution in the Katun GES reservoir" that you signed at the end of 1988 states: "The reservoir is planned for a zone of increased ecological risk from the presence of toxic elements (mainly mercury) in various components of the environment in the construction area and in the watershed

of the Katun River" and that "this is due to this region's location in relationship to the large Kuznetsko-Altayskiy polymetallic ore belt. In addition to ore in the bedrock, high contents of mercury are noted in the soils and groundwaters...", and also, that at present it is difficult to estimate the length of time the reservoir waters will contain increased amounts of mercury."

Second question: How can one reconcile the obvious necessity of an objective, qualified expert evaluation of the GES with the following facts:

The Novosibirsk Institute for Hygiene, the primary such institute in Siberia and the Far East, whose principal task is to study the influence of environmental factors upon human health, capabilities for work, etc., was denied participation in the expert review.

The opinions and negative conclusions of physicians, biologists and geophysicists, including internationally known specialists who participated in the expert reviews and evaluations in Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Moscow were ignored. However, there was acceptance of the viewpoints concerning mercury behavior and its effects on the organism expressed by nonspecialists from the Institute of Water and Ecological Problems, Siberian Department, USSR Academy of Sciences, where there is not one geophysicist.

Third question: Don't you think that the Academy of Sciences is made too financially dependent upon agencies because of its need to "earn" part of its keep at their expense, especially in the form of payment for expert review of their plans? The dependence of the SO, USSR Academy of Sciences, and especially the Institute for Water and Ecological Problems upon Gidroyekt [Scientific Research Institute for Planning Hydroelectric Projects] and Minenergo is a veiled system that is all too transparent.

The alternative to developing this region should be the creation, on its entire territory, of a biospheric reserve, a zone for ecological monitoring, a health spa and recreation complex for tourists. This could also attract foreign capital. In view of the Chermal region's climactic conditions, extremely favorable for health treatments, we should examine the construction of an international health and treatment camp for children (a Siberian Artek).

The natural and ecological features of the Gorniy Altay make it possible to plan the development of a program for the production of ecologically pure dietetic food products, giving a new start to local beekeeping, cattle sheep and goat raising, horse breeding, medicinal plants, hunting and unique folk arts. Ecologically pure regions and factors promoting human health and vitality are invaluable; they are becoming the state's most valuable property. There is no need to talk about the economic prospects for ecological needs.

Everything that has been said permits us to speak out against the technocratic plans for the construction of the

series of projects in the Katun GES. It is based upon old fashioned agencies and a local administrative-bureaucratic apparatus steeped in the spirit of the old "stagnant" times.

We are confident that it is more useful to our country to have an independent Academy of Sciences, not only as a center for fundamental research, but also as a country wide expert reviewer of the most important measures. "Savings" in the millions do not justify losses of many billions from underestimating the harm done to nature and the public.

[Signed] V. Kaznacheyev, director, Institute for Clinical and Experimental Medicine, SO [Siberian Department], USSR AMN [Academy of Medical Sciences] member, Presidium SO USSR, head of section "Modern Ecological-Neospheric Processes," Center for Science of Humanity, Presidium, USSR Academy of Sciences, member USSR AMN; V. Lozovoy, director, Institute for Clinical Immunology, SO, USSR AMN; L. Panin, director, Institute of Biochemistry, SO, USSR AMN, correspondent member, USSR AMN; V. Vinogradov, acting director, Institute of Physiology, SO, USSR AMN, correspondent member, USSR AMN; Ye. Gorbachev, director, Institute of Hygiene, USSR Ministry of Health; Ye. Trofimovich, leader, Department of Environmental Hygiene and Water Problems Laboratory; A. Sychev, senior scientific associate, Institute of Mathematics, SO, USSR Academy of Sciences, professor; and V. Turchenko, Professor, Institute, of History, Philology and Philosophy, doctor of philological sciences:

Controversial Protein Vitamin Concentrate Plant Conversion Lagging

90US0255C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Nov 89 Second Edition p 5

[Article by O. Plakhotnikova: "The Matter Is Proceeding Slowly"]

[Text] The Health Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet discussed the reprofiling of protein vitamin concentrate plants in the USSR Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological Industry. This matter cannot be delayed. Kirishi, Angarsk, Volgograd, these and other cities where protein vitamin concentrate plants are located have in common poor ecological health. Many papers, including SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, report massive outbreaks of allergies and increased incidence of bronchial asthma in these cities.

Unfortunately, the substantial tonnage production of concentrates has turned out to be profitable not only to the Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological Industry, but also to the late Gosagroprom; it is immeasurably easier to produce such protein than it is to make fundamental changes in cropping structure and to obtain balanced feeds.

V. Semukha, chairman of the Subcommittee on Medical Technology and Pharmaceuticals, said that in contrast to

the instructions contained in the report Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov gave to the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet regarding the reprofiling of microbiological feed protein plants, work in this direction is not really organized. The ministry has restricted itself to the preliminary evaluation of proposals for the more thorough processing of single cell protein.

Obviously, such a half measure will not help ease the social tension. The deputies turned to V. Bykov, the Minister of the Medical and Microbiological Industry, with a suggestion that these plants produce disposable syringes, vitamins and insulin, which are now in very short supply.

The discussion of problems at the protein vitamin concentrate plants turned into a discussion about how domestic industry cannot meet the public's needs for pharmaceuticals. Recently the Ministry of Health has been able to correct the situation somewhat by allocating additional foreign exchange, but, alas, the shortage continues.

The USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Measures to Increase the Production of Pharmaceuticals and to Fully Supply the Need for Them in Preventative-Treatment Institutions, the Population and the National Economy during 1988-1995" is threatened with breakdown, the deputies claimed. We should now be prepared not only for the present shortage, but for one even more acute.

Kazakh SSR: Officials Outline Pavlodar Oblast Pollution Concerns

90US0188A Alma-Ata PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN
KAZAKHSTANA in Russian No 9, Sep 89 pp 83-88

[Article by E. Krivobokov: "Both a Workshop and a Temple...: Reflections Following a Round Table Held in Pavlodar"]

[Text] Pavlodar—"The fatherland is in ecological danger!" That is the way well-known representatives of culture and science and prominent public figures began their appeal to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. "The water, land, air and all living things need our urgent help."

Unfortunately, there is no exaggeration in those words. Hundreds of plant smokestacks and motor vehicles are poisoning the atmosphere with toxic gas, many rivers have already turned into sewers, and the land yields harvests saturated with pesticides and nitrates. In more than 100 of the country's cities, on the list of which Alma-Ata is one of the first, the air has become dangerous to people's health. It is as though people have forgotten that nature is not only a workshop in which they work, but also a temple in which we all live. The preservation of a healthy environment is becoming a priority task today. Housing construction, the Food

Program and other social programs lose meaning if the air is not fit for breathing, food for eating, and water for drinking.

People, it should be said, are more and more clearly realizing the priority of environmental problems over the many other ones. One reflection of this shift in public awareness was the very fact of the meeting of a round table on questions of environmental protection in the Irtysh region that was held in early summer by the Pavlodar Obkom together with the USSR Journalists' Union and the Kazakh SSR Journalists' Union. Local authorities—party and soviet—took what was perhaps one of the first attempts to openly and fearlessly hold up their own shortcomings, defects and sores to general view, and to analyze the state of the environment in order to make it possible to work out measures to return it to health. Taking part in the all-union round table discussion were, on the one hand, employees of the enterprises of union and republic ministries and departments whose ecological terrorism and unwillingness to sustain expenses for the creation of waste-free, or low-waste technologies and production processes that are as clean as possible has become a reason for the disastrous—without exaggeration—state of the earth's fragile biosphere in many regions. On the other hand, participants in the round table included the representatives of party and soviet agencies, environmental-protection, medical and sanitation organizations that are called on to watch out for the legitimate interests of Soviet people, who have every right to live in an environment that is safe for their health.

It is possible that some people found the discussion that was held insufficiently constructive in the sense of also discussing and defining measures capable of reducing the harmful influence of man's unthinking economic activities on nature. However, considering the former efforts of the powers that be to embellish reality and hide the true situation from the people, the very attempt to clarify the real situation with respect to environmental protection can be considered constructive. Only after recognizing the actual state of affairs is it possible to move on further, to realistic assessments and actions to preserve purity and order in our common home, the earth. Therefore, even from that viewpoint, the discussion with whose principal points we would like to familiarize the reader can be considered useful and instructive. Although, of course, it did not remain solely within the limits of an analysis of what exists, but inevitably touched on the future and the prospects and possibilities for curbing ecological madness.

One of the most trenchant and substantive speeches at the round table was the report by A. F. POLOVNIKOV, deputy chairman of the oblast ispolkom. He said:

"In assessing the present ecological situation in the oblast, we must admit that the measures being taken are still inadequate and relatively ineffective. This is attributable to ecological illiteracy in deciding many economic questions, and to an inability to take a comprehensive

approach to the rational use of natural resources. Unfortunately, no one is yet in a position to answer the question of what effect this thoughtless attitude toward nature will have in the near future. According to the calculations of scientists of the republic Academy of Sciences, pollution of the air, water and food is already reducing labor productivity at enterprises of the Pavlodar-Ekibastuz Territorial Industrial Complex by four to five percent today. And what will happen when the construction of Ekibastuz State Regional Electric Power Stations Nos 2 and 3 is completed?

"Air pollution causes special alarm. In 1988 industrial enterprises discharged 1,340 tons of harmful substances into the atmosphere, which is 24 percent of all emissions in the republic. Last year atmospheric pollution exceeded maximum allowable concentrations of dust by a factor of 50, of hydrogen chloride by a factor of 86, of nitrogen dioxide by a factor of 75, and of hydrogen sulfide by a factor of 17. If you figure emissions of harmful substances per inhabitant of the oblast, they come to 1.4 tons a year, including 0.8 tons in Pavlodar, 4.7 tons in Ekibastuz, and 6.8 tons in Yermak, while the average figure for the republic as a whole is 300 kilograms.

"The chief air polluters are power-engineering enterprises, which account for 88 percent (or 1,174 tons) of toxic emissions. The situation at Ekibastuz State Regional Power Station No 1 is particularly alarming; its first generating unit went into operation back in 1980, but the station has still not reached rated capacity for ash trapping. Its gross emissions last year reached 720,000 tons, or 2.3 times as much as called for in its project plans. That is the consequence of the unsatisfactory state of its ash-trapping equipment, mistakes in design and construction, and the low qualifications of service personnel.

"Unfortunately, the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification and the Kazakh SSR have not drawn conclusions from the blunders that have been made. They are carrying out construction of the station's second stage on the basis of a design that hardly differs from the design for State Regional Power Station No 1, including aspects having to do with its harmful impact on the environment. And in order to reach health-service standards for level of air pollution, the Novosibirsk division of the State Institute for the Design of Thermal Power Engineering Enterprises is proposing to limit the capacity of the station that is already in operation. What you get is some sort of theater of the absurd: we are building a new state regional electric power station in order to subsequently close the old one. Yet it is proposed to build yet a third stage. Such a concentration of electric power stations within a relatively small territory will cause irreversible ecological consequences. Emissions of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen alone, which are the most dangerous for nature and human beings, will come to about a million tons a year. We ask the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification and its branch institutes: How long will our oblast, which generates more than 55

percent of the republic's electric power and transmits more than 60 percent of it beyond the oblast's boundaries, remain a hostage to gaseous emissions into the atmosphere?

"The situation at the Yermak Ferrous Alloy Plant remains complex; its emissions into the atmosphere are three times maximum allowable norms. Of 197 gas-treatment units at the plant, 68 (or 35 percent) are out of order.

"Environmental-protection work at chemical plants and petroleum refineries draws a lot of criticism. Because of violations of technological requirements and emergency situations, chlorine, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen sulfide and hydrocarbons enter the atmosphere in excess of safety norms.

"The condition of water resources is a matter of special concern. The Irtysh River, which flows through the oblast, has long been left without a genuine proprietor. From Zaysan to Khanty-Mansiysk, the withdrawal of water from it is done blindly, without calculations of the water balance, and without an approved comprehensive plan for use of the river's flow. Consequently, in the past few years that flow has dropped from 30 to 25 cubic kilometers. Until the construction of the relatively small and ecologically harmful Bukhtarminskaya Hydroelectric Power Station, in our oblast alone nearly 400,000 hectares of floodplain, which yielded nearly a half million tons of high-quality hay, would be flooded during high water. Now spring waters submerge from 50 to 80 percent of former hay meadows. With the reduction and destruction of natural spawning grounds, fish have practically disappeared from the river. Against this background, proposals for the construction of the South Omsk and Semipalatinsk hydroelectric power stations and the second stage of the Shulbinsk Hydroelectric Power Station are senseless and worthless. Along with the total regulation of the Uba and Ulba, the Irtysh's principal tributaries, this will completely upset the naturally established system of creeks in the unique Irtysh floodplain.

"However, it will soon be impossible to use even the water that still exists in the Irtysh. Enterprises of Eastern Kazakhstan and Semipalatinsk Oblast are doing too much harm to the river. At the point where it enters Pavlodar Oblast, amounts of petroleum products, copper, zinc and phenols are from two to nine times maximum allowable concentrations. Our industry, too, contributes its share to the river's pollution. Over the past year, 895 tons of suspended matter, 2,139 tons of organic pollutants and 263 tons of petroleum products were discharged into the Irtysh above allowable norms.

"The waste-storage lagoons and ash and slag dumps of industrial enterprises have created a serious problem in Pavlodar and Ekibastuz. Over the past few years there has been a steady increase in the levels and pollution of ground waters. The principal causes are associated with the seepage of toxic solutions from unshielded ash heaps

and waste-storage lagoons. Fluorine, arsenic, mercury, vanadium, cadmium, petroleum products and phenols are entering the water-bearing levels, which is creating a real threat to the health of the population and to the Muyady Health Resort, which is an all-union facility.

"Environmental problems in agriculture are growing, too. According to the data of research institutions, in the past few years humus reserves in the oblast's chernozem zone have dropped from 4.7 to 3.3 percent. On most farms the land is tilled by heavy machinery that causes compacting of the soil and a decline in crop yields. If adjustments are not made in this technology promptly, humus reserves will continue to decline. Violations in the transportation of chemical herbicides and pesticides and mineral fertilizers, and poor physical facilities for storing them, not to even mention violations in applying chemical products to the soil, threaten to poison the fields permanently and make them unfit for growing agricultural crops."

That is the sort of depressing information that's available reflection. Now no one is hiding it; to the contrary, in light of the party's increased demands for environmental-protection work, efforts are being made to convey it to the broad masses. An oblast commission for monitoring ecological and sanitation conditions has been formed under the oblast soviet of people's deputies. Monthly conferences on the environment and, in particular, on monitoring progress in utilizing capital investments at environmental-protection facilities have started to be held. Schedules have been drawn up and approved for the executives of enterprises to make reports on environmental-protection activities in the oblast newspapers and on radio and television. A university of ecological knowledge and a volunteer council on the environment, which includes scientists and representatives of all strata of the population, have been established and are successfully operating under the oblast environmental-protection committee. Two screens reporting on work on improving the environment in the oblast have been set up on squares in the oblast center. Another informational board shows the level of radiation in Pavlodar, which made it possible to immediately put a stop to discussion on that subject that was based on rumors and uninformed opinions. People's uneasiness regarding the radiation situation stems from the relative proximity of the Semipalatinsk Atomic Testing Ground. At present that situation in Pavlodar Oblast is characterized by magnitudes of ambient radiation within the limits of 10-12 microroentgens per hour. According to the information of A.A. Saleyev, the head of a department at Tomsk Medical Institute, who is a member of an interdepartmental comprehensive commission for evaluating the state of the health of people living on the territories adjoining the testing ground, the level of pollution of the area with long-lived radionuclides of cesium-137 and strontium-90 is virtually the same as that which is characteristic of most regions of the country. All this information was previously in the

possession of the Pavlodar Sanitation and Epidemiological Station, which has been monitoring the radiological situation since 1963, but the information was kept quiet and was made into totally unjustifiable secrets. That is what gave rise to various rumors.

Knowledge of the actual situation is the main condition for determining realistic measures for overcoming ecological crisis. On this assumption, the speaker said, a question arises: are local authorities capable of changing the situation for the better in the near future?

A. F. POLOVNIKOV: "Scientists consider that in order to maintain a normal healthy environment when building enterprises, it is necessary to allocate at least three percent of total capital investments for environmental protection, while more than five percent must be allocated in order to improve the situation. During the years of the 11th five-year plan, a total of only two percent was allocated for environmental protection, while 2.7 percent has been allocated during the current five-year plan. These funds are clearly inadequate. Granted, albeit belatedly, allocations for 1989-1990 have risen to four percent. This fact indicates that economic managers are starting to face the needs of the environment. But if you consider the degree to which the problem has been neglected, even 20 percent probably would not be enough to bring the environment up to satisfactory condition.

"It has long been known that the spoil banks of various production facilities are gigantic storehouses of mineral raw materials, from which it is possible to obtain building materials, ceramics and valuable alloys. However, so far the comprehensive utilization of secondary raw materials has not gone beyond talk. Before 1995 in Ekibastuz, utilizing the ash of state regional power stations and the overburden of opencut coal mines, it is planned to build eight brick plants with a capacity of 630 million bricks a year. That would seem to be a huge number! In reality, these enterprises will make it possible to utilize only 900,000 tons of waste products (about two percent), while the amount of ash at electric power stations alone is increasing by 12 million tons annually. And what is to be done with the 100 million tons that have already been accumulated?"

What do the figures cited by A. F. Polovnikov indicate? That the central departments' enterprises continue to exploit natural resources in a predatory fashion, trying, in order to economize, to invest as little money as possible in environmental-protection measures. In this connection the local Soviet authority does not yet possess real powers to put a stop to the plunder and influence this sort of "colonial" policy of the departments. The only thing that the oblast ispolkom has been able to achieve lately, and that was with the support of F. T. Morgun, former chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, has been to cancel the construction in Pavlodar of a plant to produce protein and vitamin concentrates. Evidently, when endowing the new soviets with powers in the course of

the political reform, some thought should be given to how to make them sovereign masters on their territories. It is not the soviet of people's deputies that should try to pry away pathetic crumbs and paltry percentages of funds for protection of the land, water and air from the ministries and departments, but just the opposite—the economic managers should come with outstretched hands to the soviets and ask permission to use natural resources on their territories, and what's more, to use them for a charge, and with an obligation to protect and do minimal damage to the environment. That is the only way significant changes can be made in the preservation of the environment.

The deputy chairman of the oblast ispolkom spoke about the technical and technological aspect, so to speak, of the predatory destruction of the environment. But environmental pollution has yet another dimension, the human one. M.Ye. Kulmanov, general director of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Health's republic center for the protection of health and doctor of medical sciences, spoke persuasively and vividly about how a consumeristic, thoughtless, ignorant and frivolous attitude toward the earth's riches affects people's health:

"The barbaric destruction of the human environment has been going on for decades, and our society's poverty will not allow us to solve the problem quickly; it will take many years to straighten the situation out. Since there is not enough money to deal with all our problems at once, we should make the yardstick of our work not the frightening amounts of capital investments that are put to use, but the people's health, the level of which is capable of reliably confirming whether we are using money correctly or not, and which mortally dangerous problems money should be allocated for first of all.

"But what is the situation with respect to the health of the population in Pavlodar Oblast? Just recently our center, commissioned by the oblast party committee and oblast ispolkom, began studying the illness rate among residents of the Irtysh region in order to compile a Prevention Program in which we will try to establish connections among indices of the population's health and natural factors, the social sphere, pollution of the human environment, and the activities of public health workers. Despite the fact that we are at the very outset of our path, I will cite some figures, which you can't call boring—you can only call them frightening.

"In 1976 about 17,000 persons per 100,000 of the population fell ill, and in 1988 that figure was already nearly 31,000, or 1.8 times as great. Since natural factors had not changed in such a short time, this increase can be attributed only to a deterioration in living conditions and pollution of the environment. The incidence of hypertension rose by a factor of 1.4, of endocrine diseases and sugar diabetes—by a factor of 2.4, of ischemic heart disease—by a factor of nearly 5, and of acute myocardial infarction and stomach and duodenal ulcers—by a factor of 1.7. Health indices are even lower for children: the incidence of pneumonia rose by a factor

of 4.6, of nephrosis, nephritis and other kidney diseases—by a factor of 4, of bronchial asthma—by a factor of 3.4, of congenital heart anomalies—by a factor of 2.3, and of cerebral palsy—by a factor of 1.8. The average life expectancy in the oblast, which is a factor reflecting the overall quality of life and its socioeconomic conditions, cannot make us happy: men live for 63 years, and women for 75. For comparison, the corresponding figures are 66 and 68 years in China, 69 and 75 years in the GDR, and 75 and 80 years in Japan.

"Another reason that the drop in life expectancy arouses special concern is that it is taking place against the background of a rise in expenditures for health care. From 1977 to 1988 allocations rose from 32 to 71 million rubles. It works out that we first save rubles on environmental protection, damage people, and then allocate more money to treat them. Wouldn't it be more correct to follow this strategy: allocate more money for protecting the health of the environment, and then there will be fewer expenditures for treatment. Here are some rough calculations that we made at the tractor plant alone. On the average, 1,000 to 1,200 employees a year there miss work, primarily because of colds. Overall losses from this reach 2.5 million rubles. These figures indicate how economically advantageous it is to preserve people's health by showing concern for creating a healthy environment. I think that each region of the republic needs its own disease-prevention program for identifying and eliminating harmful habits and harmful environmental factors that have a negative impact on the people's health."

The two speeches at the round table that we have cited are the most interesting and most candid. To a considerable extent, this is due primarily to the fact that both speakers represent organizations that themselves do not participate directly in polluting the environment, which allows them to broadly and freely see all aspects of the problem, even extremely unpleasant ones. From this viewpoint, the speeches of the majority of other participants in the meeting, executives of the environmentally polluting production facilities and ministries and departments who took the podium, suffered from a narrowly departmental outlook, departmental chauvinism, and a desire to shift at least part of the blame for a predatory treatment of natural resources onto their partners. In this respect, the position of V.I. Gushcha, chief engineer with the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification's Environmental Protection Administration, was, for example, characteristic. What was its essence? Yes, the power engineers are to blame for emitting harmful substances, he said, but can they be the only ones to blame? "I believe," said V.I. Gushcha, "that the machine builders, the coal miners, the USSR Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems, and everyone who develops and supplies equipment have made their contribution to these emissions." Incidentally, whether he wanted to or not, the speaker

formulated here one of the paradoxes of the administrative-command system, in which there are always blunders but never anyone to answer for them. When everyone is to blame for pollution, that means no one is actually to blame. Although, who forced the power engineers to accept environmentally unfit equipment? Why did they agree to install electric filters that trap nothing? The machine builders turned out defective products because they knew that their output would be taken anyway by a client who regarded the environment with contempt, and who was concerned with only one thing—how to fulfill the plan sanctified by directives. For sometimes he was held accountable for that.

Evidently, even V.I. Gushcha himself sensed the unconvincing nature of his arguments, since he found yet another rather curious excuse for the actions of his native ministry: "The branches," he said, "cannot fully bear responsibility for decisions that were taken at the government level." The representatives of several other polluting enterprises demonstrated a similar technique of passing on responsibility.

Nonetheless, despite the unconstructive position assumed by some participants in the round table meeting, on the whole the discussion was useful all the same, if only because it will arouse environmental awareness and force people to think about the huge danger that hangs over every home and over our Fatherland. And

sooner or later, but eventually, concerned thinking will be able to find a solution to the problem.

And some concluding remarks. At the all-union round table meeting that was held, outwardly the role of the oblast party committee looked extremely modest and unnoticeable. Neither A.M. Azhibayev, the obkom secretary, nor the heads of the committee departments and instructors who were present were among those who reported on questions of environmental pollution, nor did they attempt to assume the right to pass final judgment and issue categorical appraisals of ecological problems and the sole true formulas for surmounting them.

"We saw our task," said A.M. Azhibayev, "as creating the conditions for specialists to make a free and impartial analysis of the existing situation, exchange views, and search for a way out of the difficult situation. And in order to convey the urgency of environmental problems to the broad masses, we also invited the country's journalists to the round table. The professionals' concerned discussion helped us bring out the real state of affairs with regard to environmental pollution. We shall use the extremely rich data obtained during the discussion in order to draw up environmental-protection measures in the oblast.

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**CPSU Central Committee Official on Ousted
CRA Head Kharchev**

90UN0462A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 48, 25
Nov 89-2 Dec 89 pp 28-29

[Article by Aleksandr Degtyayev, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, doctor of historical sciences: "A Necessary Explanation of the 'Third Discussion.'"; See JPRS-UPA-89-066 of 12 December 1989 for another article on this topic.]

[Text] Although I have been working in the Central Committee for less than a year and have caught only the final phase of this story, nevertheless after 3 years of OGONEK's support for the former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs K. Kharchev, I consider it necessary to set forth the understanding of the situation about him that has long since been held in the Central Committee departments, arisen in the spheres that K. Kharchev oversaw, and led ultimately to his replacement in this important post.

I think that in this analysis it is best to rely on recollections and personal assessments, no matter whose they may be (the reader has probably noticed that the writer Aleksandr Nezhnyy knows only one opinion, only one value system—the system belonging to K. Kharchev). Every historian is aware of the insidiousness of memoirs as a source for the history of something that happened in the past. The first demand made of any researcher who has decided to make use the recollections and assessments of a writer of memoirs is to check them with other witnesses, documents, and facts.

A. Nezhnyy does not do this, relying totally on K. Kharchev's assessments. This is as he pleases, but the insidiousness of memoirs has also played its joke on him. If, of course, he did not have any special purposes. He probably did; this can be seen from the materials in the essays, from the kindly feelings and the labels. The main thought in the last interview is simple: before us we have one of the dramas of perestroika, when a progress leader was vanquished by a conservative party apparatus, pressed hard by the KGB, and almost falling under the influence of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The attacks came one after another and continued for a year, two years, and in the end the dramatic finale. Such was the canvas painted for the story published in OGONEK No 44.

But let us try to collate some of its moments with the testimony contained in a solid block of documentary evidence connected with the activity of K. Kharchev in the aforesaid post.

My comments, naturally, are colored by my personal assessment, but they are in the nature of systematic biography of K. Kharchev when he was chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs. Their purpose is much more modest: to give the reader an opportunity to look at the problem from another angle, and have an opportunity to make a better considered judgment.

I would like to emphasize that I am not dealing with the history of many of the issues resolved when K. Kharchev was chairman of the council. The line of the new attitude toward religion, determined by perestroika itself, has been pursued by many people, and I also participated in this. I am focusing attention on those parts that led to the finale whose regularity is questioned both by the hero and by the interviewer.

And so, here are some fragments on K. Kharchev's attitude toward various aspects of the matter entrusted to him, supported by documents and testimony.

Views on the Subject

I think that in the case of K. Kharchev we encounter what is, unfortunately, a not uncommon situation, in which people versed in the vocabulary of perestroika but of inadequate competence and with a simple irresponsibility gain the opportunity to control some economic, spiritual, religious or other matter. When in the recent past I was presenting university courses on the history of Russia I naturally also engaged in a study of ecclesiastical problems in our motherland. And I cannot therefore believe that a man who has spent most of his conscious life sitting in secretaries' armchairs and never had any interest in the problems and history of religion (on his own admission in that same interview he opened the Bible for the first time only after he was appointed to the post, in his sixth decade) can instantaneously master this very complex field and start immediately to resolve problems connected with the activity of the many denominations in this enormous state.

In my opinion, another hypothesis is closer to the truth. Many actions of the former council chairman are strikingly reminiscent of a modern day Tarelkin. You remember: "When progress was reported in Russia Tarelkin took up the banner and marched ahead of progress..." Here we have a similar case. True, when he carried the banner Tarelkin never in fact believed in the progress. His life's credo had other supports, one of which was a quite cynical attitude toward that for which he was allegedly fighting.

I understand that I am making a quite sharp comparison, and I therefore justify it by the fact that the precedence for this assessment is not mine but was made after a certain French journalist familiarized herself with K. Kharchev's statements. And we shall also familiarize ourselves with some of the main points in two quite crucial statements made by the council chairman.

The first of them was made late in March 1988 at the Moscow Higher Party School. This lecture had repercussions not only among those studying at the party school. Without anyone knowing what had been recorded it was sent abroad. Voice of America devoted a program to it. It was reprinted by the Paris-based RUSSKAYA MYSL and the French journal LA CROIX, and LE MONDE carried excerpts. In terms of its repercussions it was like the lectures given by Nobel Prize winners. "Why?" the reader rightly asks. I think that it was because the

publications that drew attention to it suggested quite justifiably that in the Moscow Higher Party School—the citadel that trains party cadres—the communists were engaged in particularly frank discussions (and incidentally, they were). The Voice of America accurately noted this: "Kharchev is talking with his party comrades, and so he talks openly, without any sense of diplomacy."

And what did the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs impart to his students, how did he outline the conceptual factors of party and state policy in this matter? Let me quote some of the key statements.

"According to Lenin the party should maintain all spheres of the lives of citizens under control (!—author's note), and since you cannot just get rid of the believers (!—author's note), and our history has shown that religion is a serious and long-lasting matter, then for the party it is easier to make a true believer believe also in communism (!—author's note). And here we face the task of indoctrinating a new type of priest (!—author's note). The selection and placement of priests is a party matter! (!—author's note)."

"Comrades, in this we need party science. I appeal to you to create in the near future if not an institute then at least a problem laboratory to study relations between the party and the church..." (!—author's note).

"...The party has an interest in the new type of Russian priest!..." (!—author's note).

"... The priest is also a Soviet person, and he also regularly puts his ballot paper in the ballot box for us. And take all these committees and foundations—the Peace Foundation, the Cultural Foundation—they sit on all of them" (he gestures to show the headdress and long beard; laughter in the hall)...

"... Religion enters into socialism, and even does not enter into it but roars in, as if on rails, and since we hold all power, I think that it is within our power to direct those rails in any particular directions (without difference!—author's note) depending on our interests."

They say that when they heard these passages those who watched the various expressions on the faces of students almost fell out of their seats. And K. Kharchev's frankness shook the foreign students even more, with what was undoubtedly central in this statement, and in real life the crafty line was deeply masked by the communists. K. Kharchev revealed it at this lecture, and henceforth it was known to the interest community: "Priest cadres is a party matter!" Nothing more nor less.

The French journalist (Tilvi Kofman) wrote in LE MONDE that K. Kharchev's thought had been formed "with cruelty and cynicism." It is hard to disagree. And then she dropped this, very ambiguously: "The Soviet authorities are not denying this document." Here, K. Kharchev's line was unambiguously perceived as the party and state line. These subjective and confused views of things were not some chance misfire in just one

statement. Here is a passage from another lecture by the council chairman (December 1988 in the CPSU CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences). In it he dealt in special detail with his ardent support for the economic "experiments" that had been initiated.

A church cooperative was created in Krasnoyarsk to keep bees and produce honey. The church authorities were against the experiment but K.M. Kharchev made full use of his own strength and authority to organize the cooperative. However, the undertaking failed. Referring to this story, in his statement he said the following: "Yes, the experiment in Krasnoyarsk was not particularly successful. And why? It was church money (!—author's note). In Krasnoyarsk the empowered agent did everything possible to make everything normal. But they did not go far along that road. There was nothing left. Nothing was left alive."

A voice from the hall: "There was nothing there."

K. Kharchev: "I am explaining what happened in Krasnoyarsk. The believers organized the cooperative. They took a 200,000 loan from the church. They were helped with machines and equipment. And they embarked on a fantastic experiment to breed new species of bees in Siberia so that bees could live there (as you know, the survivability of bees in Siberia is not good). They worked for virtually 2 years. They used new methods but they turned out to be wrong. And why?"

"The cooperative there is continuing with perestroika but we think it will be on a somewhat different basis..."

Reading this one is involuntarily reminded of the heroes of Plato who invented an aircraft by making a cloud of electrified sand above the land. Perhaps the difference lies only in the words used to frame the same kind of projects.

Relations with the Church Fathers

Making reference to the unprecedented (it happened for the first time in the years of Soviet power, and this is also a sign of perestroika) appeal issued by the Synod to the top leadership in the country on the subject of the actions of the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, K.M. Kharchev admitted that he could not "adequately clearly answer this question." True, he did immediately look at a proposal noticeably redolent of the same attitude, that his position on the "succession of the leadership" in the Russian Orthodox Church, and his proposal on "alternative democratic choices" in the top hierarchy of the church could influence this.

A. Nezhnyy and K. Kharchev make this proposal in a newspaper with a circulation of millions, never for a moment thinking that in today's situation this kind of talk and proposals not only from the Synod but from any priest, and indeed any believer, would be considered, first, blasphemous, and second would qualify them as impudent interference in the internal affairs of the church, which, as is known, is separated from the state. If

this is so, what is the justification for a state official to do in Rome what the Romans do, even if it is very fashionable in our civic world?

But no thought of justification even enters the head of the former chairman. And even today he is convinced that he was allowed to interfere in the affairs of the denominations, as he puts forward any ideas of proposals that suit him. I cannot rule out that given this kind of development of events the various denominations could also come to multiple mandate okrugs, okrug gatherings, meetings, programs for candidates and other progress innovations.

The Orthodox Church was not the first denomination to be in conflict with K. Kharchev.

In May 1988 the leadership of the Lithuanian Catholic bishops expressed their indignation about him. After holding them in Moscow for a day after their return from Rome, the council chairman then refused to receive the newly consecrated bishops after informing them through an employee that he did not recognize their appointment by the Vatican.

In April 1988 four of the country's top spiritual Muslims spoke out against attempts by K. Kharchev to apply pressure to them. Even through the inherent restraint seen in persons holding spiritual rank one can clearly catch the tension that had built up at that time in relations with the council chairman.

"The leaders of the spiritual board of administration may have taken Holy Orders but they, like all Soviet citizens, do have their personal dignity and a love for the motherland and the people. But K. Kharchev's attitude toward us and his desire to exert pressure on us by using impermissible methods and making various kinds of promises if we agree with him and so forth deeply offends us. We have given no cause for this."

And there was more: "In making this appeal we ask that we be protected against K.M. Kharchev's incessant attempts to subordinate us to his will..."

They had refused to comply with K. Kharchev's instructions to use Muslim funds to finance an information-analytical department set up under the Council for Religious Affairs, and to give additional money payments to certain workers on the council. For your information: from 1985 to 1988 Kharchev's co-workers (state employees—author's note) were, thanks exclusively to the initiative of the new leader, paid several thousand rubles through the department of international links belonging to one of the denominations.

It must be said that the method of paying for the needs of a state institution by using church money, a method that staggers my conservative consciousness, flourished under K. Kharchev with many thousands of splendid flowers. By no means modest gifts were showered on

foreign delegations using church funds, and a subscription was even paid for periodicals for our trusted hero of a state department!

The trend toward subordinating religious figures and putting pressure on them occurred in the work of K. Kharchev before the direct replacement of religious figures at various talks with foreign religious organizations. He, the leader of a state organ, began to sign protocols and agreements that contained only matters concerning mutual relations between religious organizations. This was now direct interference in the affairs of the denominations, and it had nothing to do with, indeed was even at direct variance with present principles of party policy in this sphere... It sometimes became absurd. Open IZVESTIYA for 27 April 1987 and read the report on page 4: "Aden, 26 April (TASS). A Soviet Muslim (!—author's note) delegation led by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs K.M. Kharchev (?!—author's note) visiting the Yemen Democratic Republic was received..." E. Ionesco himself could have envied such subject matter.

This would all be funny were it not for its extremely negative aspect. Religious leaders and even leading figures in some countries visited by those strange delegations led by K. Kharchev have repeatedly expressed bewilderment at their remarkable composition, and some have even directly expressed the thought that here we have every sign of tighter administrative control over the activity of church organizations by the state. This was only one of the consequences arising from incompetent leadership, which was often reminiscent of the actions of a certain atheist in folklore who was forced to pray to God. True, the harm that he did was much greater than in the story.

The Struggle Against the Bureaucracy

K. Kharchev's story about how he proposed for the first time in Soviet state practice to abolish an institution that he himself led sent the interviewer into raptures. This comes across almost as an act of selfless sacrifice and, of course, the constant struggle against the bureaucracy. But K. Kharchev's memory does him a bad turn here, and in turn he does a bad turn for the journalist. He did actually suggest abolishing the Council for religious Affairs, but in its place a State Committee for the Affairs of Believers and Religious Organizations was to be created, and this was reflected in the many requests he made for this. That is, to put it graphically, he wanted to replace what was from the standpoint of the council chairman a very formless portfolio in terms of the party schedule with a solid and modern ministerial briefcase. In the OGONEK discussion the idea of transformation was brought up to date: it was proposed that instead of the council a "corresponding USSR Supreme Soviet councils of ministers" be created, that is, to place an organ with executive functions in the country's highest legislative organ. The proposal was extremely controversial.

Another step taken by K. Kharchev also sent the interviewer into raptures of delight, namely, his proposal to reduce the number of his deputies from three to one. This was presented to the reader as the latest attempt in K. Kharchev's constant struggle against the bureaucracy and inflated staffs. In fact, if we clothe his abstracted reasoning in the reality of life this proposal can be seen in a somewhat different light. K. Kharchev was proposing to eliminate the posts of two deputies who consistently and openly spoke out against the violations he was permitting, the arbitrary decisions, rudeness, and so forth. Taking this into account, the innovative move becomes a trivial method, well known to our bureaucrats, of getting rid of undesirables.

K. Kharchev showed this kind of hard pressure not only with respect to persons directly subordinate to him in service and in his own apparatus. Here is a scene described in a statement from the chairman of the RSFSR Council for Religious Affairs, Professor L. Kolesnikov.

"On 3 June 1988, with the agreement of the administrator of affairs in the Moscow Patriarchate, the Metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassy, Vladimir, was to deliver to Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Russian Synod of the Orthodox Church letters of congratulation from the RSFSR Council for Religious Affairs on the occasion of the millennium of the introduction of Christianity to Russia. To this end I and my deputies were invited to the residence of the vice-regent of the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Epiphany, where members of the Synod had gathered. However, Comrade Kharchev, who had turned up there, built an obstruction against the ecclesiastical hierarchy in the literal sense of the word by expressing indignation that the leaders of the republic council had arrived to conduct the ceremonies... in work time and without his permission. As a result, the presentation of the letters of congratulation was interrupted, the clergy found itself in an awkward situation, and the leadership of the republic council was put in a humiliating position.

"Regarding the actions of Comrade K.M. Kharchev as impermissible and unworthy of the leader of a state organ, I would like to draw attention to the fact that this is not the first time that he has displayed 'great leader syndrome' [vozhdizm] and the command style in his relations with the leadership of the republic council and top clergy, and this compromises him in the eyes of worshipers, and the council that he heads."

Similar such instances could easily be multiplied, I think, by the people who worked under K. Kharchev's command.

K. Kharchev and the Various Levels of Authority

I suppose that the reader is acquainted with the work of the Central Committee departments under present conditions. Very briefly, it is as follows. First, it is activity to analyze particular lines of political development, study problems and prepare documents on assignment from

the Central Committee and its commissions and secretaries. Second, it is analysis of compliance with decisions already made by the party at congresses and conferences and in Central Committee resolutions. It is clear that in this work we cannot get by without making evaluations of the activity of communists working on particular sectors, and this is what happened in this case.

The party favors religious activity being a constructive element in the humanization and democratization of society. Neither is it indifferent to how religious organizations will build on the new perestroika foundation their relations with state organs and political and public structures. And so the attention to Kharchev's work was natural and for some time was no different from practical work concerning relations with other communists occupying leading posts.

Many people helped K. Kharchev in establishing him as a leader. They helped with advice and with deeds, particularly in the early days. Later there were conversations on specific erroneous actions. The work of communists on the Council for Religious Affairs was discussed in the Central Committee Propaganda Department, and then, at the initiative of the department, at a party meeting of council workers. However, while admitting the obvious errors, K. Kharchev was reluctant to correct them, constantly lengthening the chain of his own, to put it mildly, ill-considered actions. It became clear that he simply lacked many of the qualities of a leader of such a complex organ as the Council for Religious Affairs. He lacked theoretical training and a sufficiently deep understanding of the processes taking place in the religious sphere, and the ability to organize the work of the council. His impulsiveness, inconsistency and ambitiousness started seriously to affect the state of affairs. Under these conditions the Central Committee Propaganda Department submitted a proposal to review the question of strengthening the council leadership. And it was not supported.

In December 1988, after analyzing the state of affairs, the same proposal was submitted by the newly created Central Committee Ideological Department. Again it was rejected.

The issue was resolved only after the unprecedented petition from the Synod to the highest state leaders, which K. Kharchev was not able "clearly" to explain. Here we also remind you of the position of the Central Committee departments, which had been unable to prove what was proven by the religious figures. So that at closer examination, the "victory" of the apparatus of which A. Nezhnyy writes turned out to be a defeat for it (which is also a sign of the democratization under way, paradoxical though it may seem).

In Place of an Epilogue

It appears from A. Nezhnyy's article that earthly forces and heavenly forces were joined in the persecution of our

hero. The mighty KGB, the impenetrable party apparatus... The Orthodox Synod, the Catholic bishops and the Muslim muftis...

We can imagine what kind of difficult fate awaits anyone on whom this unbelievable sub lunar alliance may turn its wrath!

And where is the fallen hero of three years of comment by OGONEK?

"...they transferred me to leading work in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and are now deciding the question of appointing me ambassador to some country" (OGONEK No 44, 1989, page 9).

So there you have it, reader.

Despite the disastrous circumstances the former chairman has managed to make a soft landing. And now that he has landed on an ambassadorial salary, indulging in his memoirs, and awaiting his appointment. "In some country." It is all the same to him. He will represent us with brilliance anywhere.

God will be his judge!

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Film Makers Urged To Make Documentary of Georgian Annexation

18130023 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 19 Oct 89 p 6

[Amiran Kaladze: "An Open Letter to Georgian Film Makers"]

[Text] A while ago, the Georgian public showed considerable interest in a documentary film titled "Hitler-Stalin 1939," which was made by the independent Estonian firm Estofilm (an associate [kompanyon] of the Swedish firm Nord-Safar). The screenplay was written by Aigar Vahemetsa, and the film was directed by Olav Neuland. The film was made at the initiative of the Estonian People's Front. It was sponsored by Estonian enterprises, farms, benevolent societies, cooperative firms, and individual citizens.

Now that a competent commission has been created, thanks to the insistent and categorical demands of the Estonian people, to investigate the secrecy-shrouded Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, a number of shocking documentary film segments obtained and discovered thanks to the diligence and willpower of the group that made the film, constitute certain and incontrovertible proof that the secret amendments of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact led to the annexation of the Baltic republics.

Mr. Olav Neuland has stated that Estofilm has decided to shoot a five-part documentary film in the near future under the overall title "Everyday Communism," which will cover the entire Soviet period from 1917 to our own days. In the film's final installment, considerable space

will be devoted to the theme of the Estonian and Georgian national-liberation movement, including the tragedy of 9 April. It is significant that the director has compared his new series to five droplets of water taken from the ocean of truth.... And on the same subject, it is worth noting that the Baltic people ascribe great importance to the droplets, minutes, and ellipses that drop one after another from the vessel of patience....

Hopefully, professional cinema critics will have their competent say as to the merits and defects of "Hitler-Stalin 1939." As for me, allow me to make a modest request of you, one in which I am sure all the Georgian people will concur.... Please emulate your Estonian colleagues, follow the example of their enviable enthusiasm, make use of materials which we have or which can be found in the archives of various parts of the world and make a film about "Georgia 1918-1921." Such a film would certainly help the special commission working on questions of Georgia's annexation. It is time for us also to undertake a gathering of "documentary history" drop by drop from our own ocean of truth.

Such a film should be seen by all the world! (Your Estonian colleagues have already managed that.) Truth that is concealed is the source of lies! And proof of the power that a documentary film has, as Mr. Olav Neuland told us, is provided by something a Russian general said in all frankness to an Estonian military unit after he saw "Hitler-Stalin 1939": "After seeing such a terrible truth, all an honorable Russian officer can do is commit suicide...."

I believe no commentary is needed here.

We do not know who will say what in regard to a documentary film depicting the annexation of Georgia, but we do know for sure how many Georgians themselves, confused by Soviet ideology, are still boundlessly grateful for the despicable "brotherly aid" of the 11th Army and to this day drain "manly" drinking horns to the bottom in honor of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze!

The people not only need to know why we removed Ordzhonikidze's monument in Tbilisi but also what other persons' monuments should be carted off.

God grant that we may live to see that day!

"We ourselves must build our future!"

Georgian Writers Urged to Join P.E.N.

18130024 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 26 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Lovard Tukhashvili, Peliks Kozhiashvili, and Germane Patsatsia: "Georgian Writers in the International Writers Association!"]

[Text] On 8 April 1989, LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO published a decision that was taken at the 6 September meeting of the secretariat of the Board of the Georgian Writers' Union, to declare the Georgian

Writers' Union an independent organization that is to function under its own charter.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this decision. It raises the prospects that the "Georgian Writers' Union" will cease being a nominal, formal entity (in which "Member of the USSR Writers' Union" is inscribed in each Georgian writer's membership booklet) and become a true, genuine "Georgian" entity.

The timely and practical implementation of this decision will constitute a step (among others) toward the expansion of Georgia's sovereignty and its independent emergence into the international arena. The decision also calls for contractual relations with literary organizations abroad, which will constitute another significant step—namely, joining the international writers' association known as the P.E.N. Club!

This international organization, which was founded in 1921, combines the national P.E.N. clubs of more than 80 countries and enjoys high prestige throughout the world. It fights everywhere for writers' freedom and democratic rights; it fights to resolve the world's political, ethnic, and other forms of conflicts and to foster humanistic ideals. It is worth noting that a few days ago, at the latest Congress held in Toronto, Canada, they passed a resolution in support of the writers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania "in their struggle for a free and democratic society" (see *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, 11 October 1989).

Several months ago, as is well known, the P.E.N. Club accepted a group of Soviet writers who had created a USSR P.E.N. Club (Chabua Amiredzhibi represented Georgia). At the Toronto Congress, moreover, according to *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, the world family of writers accepted into its ranks a Ukrainian writers' group which had already founded an independent Ukrainian national P.E.N. Club. Its members include well known writers such as O. Gonchar, B. Oleynik, I. Drach, V. Yavorovskiy, and others. It also includes Ukrainian writers living abroad.

The Congress also approved the formation of a Belorussian P.E.N. Center (whose members include V. Bykov, A. Adamovich, S. Alekseyevich, A. Dudarev, and many others). Its official acceptance into the association will take place at next year's General Conference.

As we can see, it is not as difficult to join the P.E.N. Club as, for example, to join the International Olympic Committee. All it takes is to create a national P.E.N. Club, properly constituted, and make the appropriate application.

We think it is not necessary to argue for the necessity of this step. And not just for our writers either. Georgia desperately needs to become established in prestigious international organizations, to find a place in independent associations in order to assert its rights and be among the free and independent nations!

We believe that our well known writers will emulate their Ukrainian and Belorussian colleagues, create a Georgian national P.E.N. Club, and then take their worthy place in the international P.E.N. Club!

Until then, however:

1. An initiative group must be created immediately.
2. It is essential to contact the Ukrainian and Belorussian P.E.N. clubs in order to share their experience.

It's up to you, Georgian writers!

Armenian SSR: Status of Post-Quake Restoration of Medical Facilities

90US01324 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
6 Oct 89 p 1

[Armenpress report: "Medics to the Earthquake Zone"]

[Text] A joint session of the collegium of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health was held in Yerevan. The session reviewed the progress being made in the fulfillment of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of December 27, 1988 on the restoration of the material and technical base of the health sector in the rayons of the Armenian SSR affected by the earthquake.

In opening the joint session of the collegium, USSR Deputy Minister of Health V.V. Gromyko noted that from the very first days of the unprecedented earthquake the medical profession of the republic and of the entire country demonstrated a high degree of self-sacrifice in saving thousands of persons from the grips of death and grave trauma. Following up on the first stage of the emergency action undertaken by the medical personnel that entailed first aid, sanitation-epidemiological, and certain repair and restorative operations, came the second and broader project of constructing material and technical base facilities for the entire region affected by the earthquake. The fulfillment of this large-scale task involved the participation of the USSR Ministry of Health, its planning and construction organizations, and many Union republics. However, V.V. Gromyko noted, an inspection has shown that the slated dates for starting up most of the facilities for 1990 have been delayed to 1991 at the latest.

A detailed report on this problems was presented by Armenian SSR Minister of Health A.V. Aznauryan. He said that according to preliminary estimates the losses incurred by the public health system as a result of the natural calamity have been more than 500 million rubles.

Two hundred fifty four physicians and medical personnel perished. Two hundred forty five medical institutions were completely destroyed, including 32 hospitals, 14 polyclinics, 17 medical out-patient dispensaries, 134 gynecology-obstetric stations, three sanitation-epidemiological stations, and 45 other facilities such

pharmacies, warehouses, blood transfusion stations, etc. In that connection, the USSR Ministry of Health and the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health have drawn up an estimate of the essential quantity and capacity of medical institutions that will have to be erected in the disaster zone.

After having given detailed information to the participants of the joint collegium session about the proposed displacement of therapeutic-prophylactic institutions, A.V. Aznauryan stated that actual steps taken to realize that task have been insufficient and the current status of the situation can in no way be considered satisfactory. This is primarily due to the unjustified delays in the assignment of construction sites, the lack of regional seismic maps, the lack of guidelines for the planning and construction of buildings and facilities in the earthquake zone, and the late appointment of a single directorate for building clients. All of this has meant that the start of planning the overwhelming majority of medical facilities has been delayed. This is why the assigned start-up dates slated for 1990 have been put off to later periods.

The restoration and capital repairs of public health facilities have not been proceeding in the best possible fashion. The fulfillment of this work has been practically paralyzed because of the three-month absence of construction materials and equipment. The capital repair plan for 1989 has been disrupted by the economic boycott undertaken against the republic.

After the discussion on the report of the republic's minister of health on the work that has been completed, the joint session heard a number of supervisors from the USSR Ministry of Health, planning organizations, representatives of Union republics, and from local soviets of the cities and rayon centers in the disaster zone.

"If we are to face the truth," said Chief of the Main Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health V. Kalinin, "the only real help the republic has received is from foreigners. Soviet construction workers have not only not built but even haven't started to build a single medical facility.

"To a large extent this is due to the not quite correct psychology that first comes the housing, then the rest can follow. That tendency is in no way justified in view of the extreme public need for medical assistance."

Much was said at the collegium session about the need for more concise coordination between clients, planners, and subcontractors, and greater performance responsibility. The address of Chairman of the Stepanavan gorispolkom A. Babadzhanyan was revealing in that connection. His city of 40,000 inhabitants and deprived of practically all of its therapeutic and preventive institutions has been lost from sight of the planners and not only is without a construction program but not does have the required technical basis for working out planning and construction estimate documentation. As was explained that work was supposed to be undertaken by Armgosproyekt, but its representatives were not even at

the joint session. That was the kind of "interest" shown by the leaders of Leninakan, Spitak, Akhuryan, and the Armenian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee which consequently ruined the plan for reconstruction projects in the rural rayons of the zone.

Under the conditions that have resulted from that failure the position of republic's Gosstroy and State Architecture Committee should have carried more weight, but, unfortunately, that did not happen.

The participants of the joint collegium session of the USSR Ministry of Health and the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health also heard an address by Second Secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee O.I. Lobov. The decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on the restoration of the public health sector material and technical base in the affected rayons of the Armenian SSR came out quite rapidly. But 10 months have since transpired since the tragedy and the results of that work have not been satisfactory. True, the situation turned out to be considerably more serious since after shocks continued and the destruction picture was vast. That is why our losses in the disaster zone today come to approximately 13 to 15 billion rubles and more than 10 million square meter of total housing space.

All of this has happened at a time when the entire capacity of the republic's construction industry base can hardly provide 800,000 square meters per year. This kind of discrepancy requires new, intensive methods of efficient construction which we, unfortunately, do not have. But, in a relatively few months Norwegian construction workers were able to plan, create, deliver, and assemble a hospital. We must be able to emulate that kind of experience. We must carry out and complete the search for our own progressive designs. "Actually", continued O.I. Lobov, "the situation brought about by the economic boycott has been quite serious. This is the third month that machinery and people have been idle. Twelve thousand construction workers have left. There is a shortage of 25,000 houses in the disaster zone for inhabitants and medical personnel who will have to undergo a severe winter. That is why this unprecedented act seems particularly inhuman, without any justification and warrants total condemnation. On behalf of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the government of the republic O.I. Lobov thanked the representatives of the Union republics and the USSR Ministry of Health and the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health who attended the joint session of the collegium for their assistance. The participants of the joint session of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Health and the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health adopted an appeal to all medical personnel of the country and all participants in the clean-up operations followings the earthquake in Armenia.

Formerly Secret Statistics Published on Tuberculosis in Kazkh SSR

90US0138A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by A. Dzhunusbekov, director of the Scientific-Research Institute of Tuberculosis, doctor of medical sciences, professor and G. Khauadamova, senior scientific associate, candidate of medical sciences: "Risk Factors"]

[Text] Just one year ago it was impossible to publish information about the prevalence of tuberculosis in the special scientific medical literature. Such information was kept only in closed departmental compendiums. The mass periodical literature sidestepped this topic since violation of the then existent complete taboo of the subject was impossible, and appeals for the prevention of tuberculosis were left hanging in the air because of the lack of specifics or persons who could be addressed on the subject. The result was that the public has been uninformed about the actual prevalence of the one of the most dangerous diseases in the republic's territory.

We take advantage of the recently obtained opportunity to remove the cloak of secrecy from these kinds of statistics and invite our readers to give thought to an active prevention of this dire infectious disease. That prevention literally depends upon every one of us. The antitubercular institutions of Kazakhstan now have 54,000 registered patients and 1,600 to 1,800 TB patients die each year. Through the efforts of phthisiologists approximately 12,500 persons are annually cured successfully, although almost the same number of persons are identified as new cases of illnesses of which one third constitute an open form of tuberculosis that is dangerous to those around them. Consequently, the number of afflicted persons and the number of cured patients has been maintained at a constant dynamic equilibrium which has created an intensive epidemiological situation in the republic that has existed for many decades.

Our republic has developed a program for rural social assistance. Plans have been outlined for the installation of gas lines, intensive housing construction, roads, water lines, schools, and hospitals for thirty of the most socially backward rayons. This will make it possible to raise the life quality and cultural level of people and improve their living environs. Implementation of the outlined measures will without doubt positively affect the people's health and make it possible to reduce the tuberculosis morbidity rate.

At the same time it is important that medical prevention receive continued attention. Fluorogram examinations of the thoracic cage can detect the initial forms of tuberculosis as well as lung cancer. Unfortunately, such examinations are not being undertaken everywhere on a massive and systematic scale. Thus, only 61.9 to 64.9

percent of the population in the Alma-Ata, Karagand, Tselinograd oblasts, and the city of Alma-Ata has undergone such examinations.

A frivolous attitude toward one's health entails a heavy cost: Those who did not want to spend a few minutes for an examination often face the prospect of losing years of fully-active life. Inasmuch as the examinations are planned to be implemented at labor collectives, we are counting on the cooperation of the administration and trade union committees. It is not at all difficult to convince workers to take a short break to undergo an examination. Nevertheless, unfortunately, medical personnel are not getting the required support, as indicated by the fact that road teams of our specialists in April and May of this year in the Ural Oblast were refused cooperation by a number of enterprise managers in organizing tuberculosis tests at their collectives.

Children are generally recognized to be the most seriously affected by tuberculosis infections. A significant measure to prevent the danger of infection was the creation of preschool all-day health groups in kindergartens for youngsters with a high risk of infection, where provision is made for fortified nutrition and preventive medicine. Most important of all is the fact that these children are guarded against contact with infected persons. However, such groups have been opened in only 55 rayons whereas there is a need for them in 116 rayons of the republic. For example, only three out of eleven rayons in the Chimkent Oblast have such groups, and only two out of ten in the Kokchetav Oblast.

Through the use of questionnaires in the city of Guryev we identified the kind of living conditions that exist among families with tuberculosis victims. Less than one-half of the families queried have adequate housing (42.1 percent). The overwhelming majority live in extremely cramped and congested quarters. There are many families in which the living space per person is less than five square meters. This is so in spite of the fact that by law persons afflicted with the open form of tuberculosis must be provided with an additional 10 square meters of housing space.

There were 1,700 tubercular patients last year in the republic who were in need of apartments but only 740 received them. The housing situation is particularly bad in the Kzyl-Orda and Chimkent oblasts. There has been a drastic reduction of apartments allotted to patients in Alma-Ata. Whereas new housing was provided for 71 tubercular patients in the 1986-1987 period, only 46 obtained housing in 1988.

One more important factor is that families with tuberculosis sufferers have a low average annual income. Only 17.7 percent of the families had incomes over 75 rubles per person, and 15.6 percent were on the edge of poverty with less than 35 rubles per person. Basically these were families with many children. These persons obviously had deficient nutrition. They eat little meat and dairy

products. Only 29 percent of the persons ill with tuberculosis have the opportunity of including meat into their diet annually, and 40 percent include milk over the same period.

Even the non-specialist can recognize that it is difficult to prevent illness with this kind of nutrition. On more than one occasion the Kazakh Scientific-Research Institute of Tuberculosis and the republic's ministry of health have suggested that persons afflicted with tuberculosis be assigned to specially ordered dietary schedules. This has been done in Guryev, but the problem is far from being resolved as a whole.

There is no need to prove the curative properties of koumis and shubat. They are produced in the republic at a rate of only 5.5 tons. This would hardly be enough even for tuberculosis patients. It is not hard to imagine how much of that product is provided to them... Koumis [mare's milk] and shubat are as rare in our treatment facilities as are overseas oranges which, by the way, do not contain more vitamin C than our traditional national beverages.

The Kamen Plateau sanatorium near Alma-Ata was famous at one time for its good food. It had its own subsidiary farm and its patients got sufficient amounts of koumis and fruits. Now this facility has declined. Its lands have been taken away and almost no koumis is available.

The social roots of tuberculosis are also to be found in antisocial behavior. Up to 12 percent of first-time tuberculosis patients are alcoholics and drug addicts. A significant number of them came from corrective-labor camps of the MVD. These persons exhibit an epidemiologically dangerous form of tuberculosis such as fibrocavernous tuberculosis which is encountered eight times more frequently. They frequently do not have families and eat at restaurants thereby spreading the infection. Such persons are difficult to treat since they arbitrarily leave the hospital and violate the regimens prescribed for them. Special departments must be organized in concert with the MVD to treat this contingent in all oblasts.

The republic's health sector and veterinary services are confronted with a most serious problem: the prevention of human infection by tubercular cattle. Sick cattle is the reason for the spread of the so-called bovine tuberculosis, especially among cattle breeders. That form is a more grave type of tuberculosis and is more difficult to treat. It is essential that farms are sanitized and that all tubercular-infected animals are slaughtered. This requirement as well as the whole complex of sanitation and hygiene measures is being quite poorly implemented.

By the beginning of the current year there were 442 farms with particularly unfavorable conditions within the republic's State Agroindustrial Committee system where there were more 154,000 tuberculosis-infected animals. There were frequent cases in the North Kazakhstan, Kustanay, Kokchetav, and other oblasts where

the farms were delivering infected meat and dairy products to the state without informing authorities about the true status of matters.

The material base of phthisiatric services has been extremely neglected. In spite of four governmental decrees, the gorispolkom in Alma-Ata has not built a single standard building. All of the antituberculosis institutions are located in adobe-straw buildings with extensions for laboratories and X-ray equipment. Conditions do not exist for hospital treatment, and the clinic of our institute has been forced to admit up to 40 percent of the capital's residents thereby limiting its hospital facilities to patients from the remote oblasts.

The struggle against tuberculosis and its prevention require the combined efforts of the offices of the public health sector, the therapeutic institutions, and the sanitation-epidemiological stations as well as the persistent attention and competent handling of the soviets and a concise execution of the adopted social programs.

Improved Health Care, Family Planning Urged for Issyk-Kul Oblast

90US0116A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 3 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by V. Koltakov, special entrusted physician of the V.I. Lenin Children's Fund for the Issyk-Kul Oblast, main specialist of the USSR Ministry of Health: "Children Are Not Getting the Very Best"]

[Text] We have known from childhood that our country has overtaken the whole world in the per capita production of iron, steel, and coal. But what about the fact that child mortality in our country is 2.5 times higher than in the USA, England, and the FRG, and five times higher than it is in Japan and that we are in 51st place in the world in this category? And what about the fact that 50.3 percent of child mortality is attributed to the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan? Not so long ago these figures were concealed behind the press family, but surely this directly reflects the well-being of the people.

The Issyk-Kul Oblast makes no small contribution to these sad statistics. Here approximately 2,000 children die each year. The child mortality index for the oblast in 1988 was 35.2 per 1,000 live born children (the national figure was 25.2). One out of every 23 children in the oblast dies before reaching the age of one year.

As they say, one cannot argue with statistics but, fortunately, they can and must be improved. That is why a public organization, the Soviet Children's Fund im. V.I. Lenin, in concert with the USSR Ministry of Health sent their representatives to the republics of Central Asia. The basic purpose of our trip (of course, in concert with local medical personnel) was to normalize the health of women and children and to lower mother and child mortality.

Today the medical profession alone will not improve the health of the Soviet people. A comprehensive approach is required here as well as a restructuring of views on the part of soviet and party authorities regarding the needs of the health sector.

The base of the health sector constitutes a very serious problem. Because of the lack of standard premises and the congestion in the available facilities a situation is created in them which I would characterize in the following way: "Even if you go into a treatment facility as a healthy person, you will come out sick." For example, the pediatric polyclinic in the city of Przhevalsk which was built before the revolution is heated by 32 "complimentary tickets," and the corridors are dark and narrow. Wits joke that the pediatric polyclinic in the city of Issyk-Kul is a place where as soon as new specialist appears a waiting barrier is put into place thus creating another office. There is a total of three offices for the 25 district pediatricians! No kind of sanitation can be maintained under those conditions. Crowded conditions lead to secondary infections among those who are recovering or among healthy children.

The oblast urgently needs essential new maternity homes, pediatric polyclinics and departments, and infectious disease hospitals. I believe that prefabricated outpatient-polyclinic facilities could be erected on the first floors of residential buildings. That kind of construction has proven to be practical in many cities of the country. The situation can be significantly improved by turning administrative buildings into public health facilities. Here the Issyk-Kul obkom party buro is discussing the transfer of the agroindustrial state committee building to a pediatric polyclinic. But the buro members... have decided not to do this because the biological laboratory facility is more important than a pediatric polyclinic. Is not a narrow-minded bureaucratic approach to solving the problem at the expense of health of children and of the future generation as a whole?

There has been absolutely no resolution of the oblast's problem concerning the care of premature and ill newborn infants whose numbers grow with each year. It is essential that therapeutic wings be constructed for such children today, and in order to avoid a loss of time, the buildings that are available now should be turned over for that purpose. And there are quite a few of them, such as the Naryn special hospital. The oblast has been eliminated and the equipment has been significantly reduced. Is it not high time to eliminate special privileges as well?

The organization of pediatric nutrition is in an extremely bad state. A completed sociological study in the Tonskiy and Ak-Talinskiy rayons and in the city of Naryn has clearly demonstrated that more than 30 percent of the infants under one year of age are being fed through dairy kitchens. But all must be fed. But this requires a solution of the problem concerning the construction of dairy kitchens and an increase in their capacity, and the allotment of additional funds and quotas for milk. And

this must be done now without putting it off. After all this concerns our future fathers and mothers. They are the ones who will continue our progeny and it must be a healthy one.

Nutrition for pregnant and breast-feeding mothers also requires serious attention. In some sections of the country they have the privilege of obtaining food products at stores for veterans of the Great Fatherland War. In this way women are getting a guaranteed adequate diet. Incidentally, this has already been done in the city of Issyk-Kul as well. This practice should be extended throughout the oblast and the entire republic as a whole.

It is essential that we halt the harmful practice of employing pregnant women and breast-feeding women for lifting jobs and jobs associated with harmful working conditions. Considerable improvement is needed in the general preventive medical examinations for girls and health maintenance of women between births.

One of the important conditions for reducing child and mother mortality is family planning. This problem should be correctly understood. Medical personnel are not advocating a reduction in the birth rate and reduction in the number of children in a family (this should by rights be decided by only the husband and wife). We do advocate prolonging the interval between births so that each born child is alive and healthy. Science has proven that the interval between births should be no less than three years. During that interval a woman manages to regain her health and strength, and the child grows up a little. Unfortunately, the average interval between births in our oblast has been 1.5 to 2 years. There are quite a few cases where a woman gives birth twice in a single calendar year. This inflicts double harm to both mother and child.

Only by resolving our accumulated problems in a comprehensive manner, by resolving them cooperatively and by consolidating the forces of soviet and party organizations, and labor collectives can we normalize the state of the public health sector and thus realize the motto: "All the best for the children!"

Tajik Social, Economic, Religious Situation Examined

90US0286A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 10 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with Muso Dinorshoyevich Dinorshoyev, doctor of philosophical sciences, philosophy department head, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, by correspondent L. Kolbina: "Until the Initiative is Captured"; time, place not given]

[Text] The recent televised speech of Tajik CP Central Committee secretary K.M. Makhkamov concerning the republic's socioeconomic and political situation is the topic of our conversation with Muso Dinorshoyevich Dinorshoyev, doctor of philosophical sciences, philosophy department head, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

[Correspondent] In what manner do you see the consolidation of all healthy forces of society, of which K.M. Makhkamov spoke?

[Dinorshoyev] Strictly speaking, there is no consolidation yet. A common platform is needed for this. After all, the concept of perestroika is interpreted in various ways, for example, by the informals. Even though arguments and discussions surround the party, I think that this is the single real force capable of gathering them all together, of helping them overcome the existing variations of the course of perestroika in the republic.

[Correspondent] The republic is entering a period of active preparation for the transition to economic accountability. The philosophers and social scientists probably have something to say here. It should be supposed that they have already recovered from the criticism leveled at their sciences for their former service in the "ideology of stagnation," and that they are prepared to propose some sort of new concepts and visions for society's future development?

After all, they perceive that we await their evaluations, their comprehension of the current events of social and political life...

[Dinorshoyev] The philosophy department's broad-scale program has been developed: "The Dialectic of the National and the International in the Area of the Social and Spiritual Life of Society." We dedicated 2 years to the program. The crisis in the social sciences was caused by their excessive politicization and commentary nature, their turning into an appendage of ideology. Attempts are being made to overcome this crisis.

For example, we are developing the topic of "The Historical Consciousness and Culture." The issue of national self-consciousness has now become acute, as well as the influence of its awakening upon the various spheres of the nation's life.

I think that the development of the topic of nationalism will assist in the search for paths to surmounting this abnormal phenomenon.

Sociologists are laboring over the topic of "The Social Structure of Tajikistan." All of this is being examined from modern positions.

The development of problems of the theory of the nation and inter-ethnic relations is now very topical. Unfortunately, there is in the Academy of Sciences no independent scientific subdivision which could study this. These were created in other republics after the 19th Party Conference. Life itself demands answers here. Decisions have been made more than once, but have not gotten to the stage of action.

We are conducting absolutely no research in the field of ethics, aesthetics, and logic; they have not been planned since 1953. Independent subdivisions must be created here as well.

A special commission has been created on the transition to economic accountability. Only two philosophers, A. Tursunov and M. Mirrakhimov, have been included in the subcommission for the theoretical and methodological provisions for the transition to economic accountability. It seems to me that more philosophers should be involved in this matter. It is strange that not a single sociologist has been brought into the commission. How can analyses be conducted, or prognostications constructed without them? It is incomprehensible.

My colleagues could also work out cultural issues; we have some elaborations. Yet there is no such subcommission...

[Correspondent] Perhaps it is a matter of the initiative shown by the scientists themselves? Or do the previous rebukes bind them?

[Dinorshoyev] Of course, we must show the initiative. And we will do this when the draft of the transition to economic accountability developed by the Economic Institute is being discussed.

We are not afraid of rebukes. They are justified. They must be accepted, and we move forward. Yet surmounting the backwardness takes time.

[Correspondent] What, out of everything happening in the republic today, interests you most, alarms you most?

[Dinorshoyev] The issue of the division of power of the party and the soviets. The party leader must first and foremost direct attention to issues of a political nature; they are extremely serious. An extended "powerlessness" is troubling. I explain this by force of traditions—the party committees have difficulty rejecting the omnipotence they held. Our soviets have done nothing for so long that it is difficult for them to "use power"; they are not accustomed to it. The elections to local soviets are coming, but there is still no law on soviets...even though too many laws are now being set, as are commissions. This is some kind of mania for hurried creation of law. We overdo it, trying to strictly regulate our lives in every way.

[Correspondent] We know that religious figures are currently gaining popularity by actively supporting perestroika. Among youth, religion is becoming a sort of fashion, a new passion...

[Dinorshoyev] Kokhor Makhkamovich poses the question correctly with regard to religion. We must collaborate with its representatives wherever possible: In the moral sphere, and in spiritual upbringing, without allowing fanaticism to develop. And there is such a danger. Then we would have new tension in public circumstances. The leaders of Islam who are gaining popularity are testing their strength—and ours... I repeat that it is necessary to work with them, but it is not necessary to flirt under the flag of perestroika—we will not concede our world view positions. I do not feel that

religiousness is growing. It has always existed, but was driven into itself. And that idea that we are an atheistic country was self-deceit.

I see historical correctness in the current religious activity. In society, a time of disillusionment always comes when materialistic ideals are for some reasons not moving, when hopes are not being justified. And then idealism and religion capture the initiative, as if saying, "Man proposes but god disposes."

**Unification of Western Ukraine Anniversary
Marked by Public Prayer in Lvov**

*18120013A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No
39, 1-8 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by Alexander Gurevich: "Prayer in Lvov"]

[Text] By tradition September 17 is marked throughout the Ukraine as the date of the unification of the West

Ukraine with the Republic. Fifty years later new stresses have appeared in the interpretation of this event.

Some insist that the date be celebrated as usual, others urge people to understand the tragic aspect this event has for Poles. At that time the Western Lands of the Ukraine were part of the bourgeois Polish state. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army entered the territory of Poland which had become the first victim of the war unleashed by the Nazis. This day is also darkened by repressions against all sections of the population in the Western regions of the Ukraine, which followed shortly.

The main event on September 17, 1989, in Lvov was public prayer and a march through the city centre to St. Jura Cathedral by more than 100,000 adherents of the illegal Ukrainian Catholic Church. At the beginning of the prayer they adopted appeals to Pope John Paul II, head of the Catholic Church, and to Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, requesting the two to help legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

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DATE FILMED

18 Jan 1990